Tag Archives: Passwordless Authentication

DOM Extension Clickjacking — Risks, DEF CON 33 & Zero-DOM fixes

Movie poster style illustration of DOM extension clickjacking unveiled at DEF CON 33, showing hidden iframes, Shadow DOM hijack, and sovereign Zero-DOM countermeasures

Executive Summary — DOM Extension Clickjacking

⮞ Reading Note

If you only want the essentials, the Executive Summary (≈4 minutes) will give you a solid overview. However, for a complete and technical vision, you should continue with the full chronicle (≈36–38 minutes).

⚡ The Discovery

Las Vegas, early August 2025. DEF CON 33 takes over the Las Vegas Convention Center. Between hacker domes, IoT villages, Adversary Village, and CTF competitions, the atmosphere turns electric. On stage, Marek Tóth simply plugs in his laptop, launches the demo, and presses Enter.
Immediately, the star attack emerges: DOM extension clickjacking. Easy to code yet devastating to execute, it relies on a booby-trapped page, invisible iframes, and a malicious focus() call. These elements trick autofill managers into pouring credentials, TOTP codes, and passkeys into a phantom form. As a result, DOM-based extension clickjacking surfaces as a structural threat.

✦ Immediate Impact on Password Managers

The results strike hard. Marek Tóth tested 11 password managers, and all showed vulnerabilities by design. In fact, 10 out of 11 leaked credentials and secrets. According to SecurityWeek, nearly 40 million installations remain exposed.Furthermore, the wave spreads beyond password managers: even crypto-wallets leaked private keys “like a leaky faucet,” thereby directly exposing financial assets.

⧉ Second Demonstration ⟶ Passkeys Phished via Overlay at DEF CON 33

Right after Marek Tóth’s demo, a second, independent demonstration exposed a critical flaw in “phishing-resistant” passkeys.
Despite their reputation, synced passkeys were exfiltrated using a simple overlay and a malicious redirection — no DOM injection needed.
The attack exploits user trust in familiar interfaces and browser-based validation, making even FIDO/WebAuthn vulnerable in non-sovereign setups.
We detail this stealthy technique in our chronicle: Phishable Passkeys at DEF CON 33. Just like a gamer fooled by a fake Steam login, secrets were handed over to an interface fully controlled by the attacker.

⚠ Strategic Message — Systemic Risks

With just two demos — one targeting password managers and wallets, the other aimed directly at passkeys — two pillars of cybersecurity collapsed. The message is clear: as long as secrets reside in the DOM, they remain vulnerable. Moreover, as long as cybersecurity depends on the browser and the cloud, a single click can overturn everything.
As OWASP reminds us, clickjacking has always been a well-known threat. Yet here, the extension layer itself collapses.

⎔ The Sovereign Alternative — Zero-DOM Countermeasures

Fortunately, another way has existed for more than a decade — one that does not rely on the DOM.
With PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, and SeedNFC for hardware backup of cryptographic keys, your credentials, passwords, and TOTP/HOTP secrets never touch the DOM. Instead, they remain encrypted in offline HSMs, securely injected via URL sandboxing or manually entered through the Android NFC application, and always protected by anti-BITB safeguards.
Therefore, this is not a patch, but a patented sovereign passwordless architecture: decentralized, with no server, no central database, and no master password. It frees secret management from centralized dependencies such as FIDO/WebAuthn.

Chronicle to Read
Estimated reading time: 36–38 minutes
Complexity level: Advanced / Expert
Linguistic specificity: Sovereign lexicon — high technical density
Available languages: CAT · EN · ES · FR
Accessibility: Screen-reader optimized — semantic anchors included
Editorial type: Strategic Chronicle
About the author: Written by Jacques Gascuel, inventor and founder of Freemindtronic®.
As a specialist in sovereign security technologies, he designs and patents hardware systems for data protection, cryptographic sovereignty, and secure communications. Moreover, his expertise includes compliance with ANSSI, NIS2, GDPR, and SecNumCloud frameworks, as well as defense against hybrid threats via sovereign-by-design architectures.

 

TL;DR — At DEF CON 33, 10 out of 11 password managers fell to DOM extension clickjacking.
Exfiltrated: logins, TOTP codes, passkeys, and crypto keys.
Techniques: invisible iframes, Shadow DOM, Browser-in-the-Browser overlays.
Impact: ~40M installations exposed, with ~32.7M still vulnerable as of August 23, 2025, due to missing patches.
Countermeasure: PassCypher NFC/PGP and SeedNFC — secrets (TOTP, logins, passwords, crypto/PGP keys) stored in offline HSMs, physically activated, securely injected via NFC, HID, or encrypted RAM channels.
Principle: Zero DOM, zero attack surface.

Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking: a malicious page, hidden iframe, and autofill hijack exfiltrating credentials, passkeys, and crypto-wallet keys.

Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking attack with hidden iframe, Shadow DOM and stealth credential exfiltration
Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking: a malicious page, hidden iframe and autofill hijack exfiltrating credentials, passkeys and crypto-wallet keys.

2025 Digital Security

Chrome V8 Zero-Day: CVE-2025-6554 Actively Exploited

2025 Digital Security

APT29 Exploits App Passwords to Bypass 2FA

2025 Digital Security

Signal Clone Breached: Critical Flaws in TeleMessage

2025 Digital Security

APT29 Spear-Phishing Europe: Stealthy Russian Espionage

2024 Digital Security

Why Encrypt SMS? FBI and CISA Recommendations

2025 Digital Security

APT44 QR Code Phishing: New Cyber Espionage Tactics

2023 Digital Security

WhatsApp Hacking: Prevention and Solutions

2024 Digital Security

BitLocker Security: Safeguarding Against Cyberattacks

2024 Digital Security

French Minister Phone Hack: Jean-Noël Barrot’s G7 Breach

2024 Digital Security

Cyberattack Exploits Backdoors: What You Need to Know

2021 Cyberculture Digital Security Phishing

Phishing Cyber victims caught between the hammer and the anvil

2024 Digital Security

Google Sheets Malware: The Voldemort Threat

2024 Articles Digital Security News

Russian Espionage Hacking Tools Revealed

2024 Digital Security Spying Technical News

Side-Channel Attacks via HDMI and AI: An Emerging Threat

2024 Digital Security Technical News

Apple M chip vulnerability: A Breach in Data Security

Digital Security Technical News

Brute Force Attacks: What They Are and How to Protect Yourself

2023 Digital Security

Predator Files: The Spyware Scandal That Shook the World

2023 Digital Security Phishing

BITB Attacks: How to Avoid Phishing by iFrame

2023 Digital Security

5Ghoul: 5G NR Attacks on Mobile Devices

2024 Cyberculture Digital Security

Russian Cyberattack Microsoft: An Unprecedented Threat

2024 Digital Security

Europol Data Breach: A Detailed Analysis

Digital Security EviToken Technology Technical News

EviCore NFC HSM Credit Cards Manager | Secure Your Standard and Contactless Credit Cards

2024 Cyberculture Digital Security News Training

Andorra National Cyberattack Simulation: A Global First in Cyber Defense

Articles Digital Security EviVault Technology NFC HSM technology Technical News

EviVault NFC HSM vs Flipper Zero: The duel of an NFC HSM and a Pentester

Articles Cryptocurrency Digital Security Technical News

Securing IEO STO ICO IDO and INO: The Challenges and Solutions

Articles Cyberculture Digital Security Technical News

Protect Meta Account Identity Theft with EviPass and EviOTP

2024 DataShielder Digital Security PassCypher Phishing

Midnight Blizzard Cyberattack Against Microsoft and HPE: What are the consequences?

2024 Digital Security

Cybersecurity Breach at IMF: A Detailed Investigation

2023 Articles Cyberculture Digital Security Technical News

Strong Passwords in the Quantum Computing Era

2024 Digital Security

PrintListener: How to Betray Fingerprints

2021 Articles Cyberculture Digital Security EviPass EviPass NFC HSM technology EviPass Technology Technical News

766 trillion years to find 20-character code like a randomly generated password

2024 Articles Digital Security News Spying

How to protect yourself from stalkerware on any phone

2023 Articles DataShielder Digital Security Military spying News NFC HSM technology Spying

Pegasus: The cost of spying with one of the most powerful spyware in the world

2024 Digital Security Spying

Ivanti Zero-Day Flaws: Comprehensive Guide to Secure Your Systems Now

2024 Articles Compagny spying Digital Security Industrial spying Military spying News Spying Zero trust

KingsPawn A Spyware Targeting Civil Society

2024 Articles Digital Security EviKey NFC HSM EviPass News SSH

Terrapin attack: How to Protect Yourself from this New Threat to SSH Security

Articles Crypto Currency Cryptocurrency Digital Security EviPass Technology NFC HSM technology Phishing

Ledger Security Breaches from 2017 to 2023: How to Protect Yourself from Hackers

2024 Articles Digital Security News Phishing

Google OAuth2 security flaw: How to Protect Yourself from Hackers

Articles Digital Security EviCore NFC HSM Technology EviPass NFC HSM technology NFC HSM technology

TETRA Security Vulnerabilities: How to Protect Critical Infrastructures

2023 Articles DataShielder Digital Security EviCore NFC HSM Technology EviCypher NFC HSM EviCypher Technology NFC HSM technology

FormBook Malware: How to Protect Your Gmail and Other Data

Articles Digital Security

Chinese hackers Cisco routers: how to protect yourself?

Articles Crypto Currency Digital Security EviSeed EviVault Technology News

Enhancing Crypto Wallet Security: How EviSeed and EviVault Could Have Prevented the $41M Crypto Heist

Articles Digital Security News

How to Recover and Protect Your SMS on Android

Articles Crypto Currency Digital Security News

Coinbase blockchain hack: How It Happened and How to Avoid It

Articles Compagny spying Digital Security Industrial spying Military spying Spying

Protect yourself from Pegasus spyware with EviCypher NFC HSM

Articles Digital Security EviCypher Technology

Protect US emails from Chinese hackers with EviCypher NFC HSM?

Articles Digital Security

What is Juice Jacking and How to Avoid It?

2023 Articles Cryptocurrency Digital Security NFC HSM technology Technologies

How BIP39 helps you create and restore your Bitcoin wallets

Articles Digital Security Phishing

Snake Malware: The Russian Spy Tool

Articles Cryptocurrency Digital Security Phishing

ViperSoftX How to avoid the malware that steals your passwords

Articles Digital Security Phishing

Kevin Mitnick’s Password Hacking with Hashtopolis

In sovereign cybersecurity This chronicle is part of the Digital Security section, continuing our research into exploits, systemic vulnerabilities, and hardware-based zero trust countermeasures.

Key Points:

  • 11 password managers proved vulnerable — credentials, TOTP, and passkeys were exfiltrated through DOM redressing.
  • Popular crypto-wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet) face the same DOM extension clickjacking risks.
  • Exploitation requires only a single click, leveraging hidden iframes, encapsulated Shadow DOM, and Browser-in-the-Browser overlays.
  • The browser sandbox is no sovereign stronghold — BITB overlays can deceive user perception.
  • PassCypher NFC / HSM PGP and SeedNFC provide hardware-based Zero-DOM flows anchored in secure enclaves, with integrated anti-BITB kill-switch.
  • A decade of sovereign R&D anticipated these risks: segmented AES-256 containers, hybrid NFC↔PGP RAM channels, and HID injection form the native alternative.

History of Clickjacking (2002–2025)

Clickjacking has become the persistent parasite of the modern web. The term emerged in the early 2000s, when Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen described a deceptive scenario: tricking a user into clicking on something they cannot actually see. An optical illusion applied to code, it quickly became a mainstream attack technique (OWASP).

  • 2002–2008: Emergence of “UI redressing”: HTML layers + transparent iframes trapping users (Hansen Archive).
  • 2009: Facebook falls victim to Likejacking (OWASP).
  • 2010: Cursorjacking emerges — shifting the pointer to mislead user clicks (OWASP).
  • 2012–2015: Exploitation via iframes, online ads, and malvertising (MITRE CVE) (Infosec).
  • 2016–2019: Tapjacking spreads on mobile platforms (Android Security Bulletin).
  • 2020–2024: Rise of “hybrid clickjacking” combining XSS and phishing (OWASP WSTG).
  • 2025: At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth unveils a new level: DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking. This time, not only websites, but browser extensions (password managers, crypto wallets) inject invisible forms, enabling stealth exfiltration of secrets.

At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth publicly revealed DOM extension clickjacking, marking a structural shift from visual trickery to systemic weakness in password managers and crypto wallets.

❓How long have you been exposed?

Password manager vendors had all the warning signs.
OWASP has documented clickjacking since 2002, invisible iframes have been known for over 15 years, and Shadow DOM has never been an esoteric hacker secret.
In short: everyone knew.

And yet, most kept building their castles of sand on DOM autofill. Why? Because it looked slick on marketing slides: smooth UX, magical one-click logins, mass adoption… with security as an afterthought.

The DOM extension clickjacking revealed at DEF CON 33 is not a brand-new revelation of 2025. It is the result of a decade-old design flaw. Every extension that “trusted the DOM” to inject logins, TOTP, or passkeys was already vulnerable.

⮞ Critical Reflection: how long have attackers silently exploited this?

The real question is: how long have these vulnerabilities been exploited quietly by stealthy attackers — through targeted espionage, identity theft, or crypto-wallet siphoning?

While software-based managers looked away, PassCypher and SeedNFC from Freemindtronic Andorra took another path. Designed outside the DOM, outside the cloud, and without a master password, they proved that a sovereign alternative already existed: security by design.

Result: a decade of silent exposure for some, and a decade of technological lead for those who invested in sovereign hardware.

Synthesis:
In just 20 years, clickjacking evolved from a simple visual trick into a systemic sabotage of identity managers. DEF CON 33 marks a breaking point: the threat is no longer just malicious websites, but the very core of browser extensions and autofill. Hence the urgency of Zero-DOM approaches anchored in sovereign hardware like PassCypher.

What is DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking? Definition, Attack Flow & Zero-DOM Defense

DOM-based extension clickjacking hijacks a password manager or wallet extension by abusing the browser’s Document Object Model. A deceptive page chains hidden iframes, Shadow DOM, and a malicious focus() to trigger autofill into an invisible form. The extension “thinks” it is on the right field and pours secrets—credentials, TOTP, passkeys, even wallet keys—straight into the attacker’s trap. Because secrets touch the DOM, they can be silently exfiltrated.

Key takeaway: as long as secrets traverse the DOM, the attack surface remains. Zero-DOM architectures remove it.
⮞ Doctrinal Insight: DOM-based extension clickjacking is not a bug — it’s a design flaw. Any extension that injects secrets into the DOM without structural isolation is vulnerable by design. Only Zero-DOM architectures, such as PassCypher HSM PGP or NFC HSM, eliminate this surface entirely.

DOM extension clickjacking is not a trivial variant — it exploits the very logic of autofill password managers.
Here, the attacker does not simply overlay a button with an iframe; instead, they force the extension to fill out a fake form as if it were legitimate.

Typical attack sequence:

  • Preparation — The malicious page embeds an invisible iframe and a hidden Shadow DOM to disguise the real context.
  • Bait — The victim clicks on an innocent-looking element; a malicious focus() call silently redirects the event to the attacker-controlled input field.
  • Exfiltration — The extension believes it is interacting with a valid form and automatically injects credentials, TOTP, passkeys, or even private crypto keys directly into the fake DOM.

This stealthy mechanism confuses visual cues, bypasses traditional defenses (X-Frame-Options, CSP, frame-ancestors), and turns autofill into a covert data exfiltration channel.
Unlike traditional clickjacking, the user is not tricked into clicking a third-party site — instead, the browser extension betrays itself by trusting the DOM.

Summary:
The attack combines invisible iframes, Shadow DOM manipulation, and malicious focus() redirection to hijack autofill extensions.
As a result, password managers inject secrets not into the intended site, but into a phantom form, giving attackers direct access to sensitive data.

Glossary

  • DOM (Document Object Model): The browser’s internal structure representing page elements.
  • Clickjacking: A technique that tricks users into clicking hidden or disguised elements.
  • Shadow DOM: A hidden encapsulated DOM subtree used to isolate components.
  • Zero-DOM: A security architecture where secrets never touch the DOM, eliminating injection risks.

Password Manager Vulnerabilities (2025)

As of August 27, 2025, live testing by Marek Tóth at DEF CON 33 confirms that most browser-based password managers remain structurally exposed to DOM extension clickjacking.

Out of 11 managers tested, 10 leaked credentials, 9 leaked TOTP codes, and 8 exposed passkeys.

In short: even the most trusted vault can become porous once it delegates secrets to the DOM.

  • Still vulnerable: 1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce
  • Patched: Bitwarden, Dashlane, NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm, Enpass, Keeper (partial)
  • Actively working on fixes: Bitwarden, Enpass, iCloud Passwords
  • Marked as “informative” (no fix planned): 1Password, LastPass

Status Table (Updated August 27, 2025)

Password Manager Credentials TOTP Passkeys Status Patch Link
1Password Yes Yes Yes Vulnerable
Bitwarden Yes Yes Partial Patched (v2025.8.0) Release
Dashlane Yes Yes Yes Patched Release
LastPass Yes Yes Yes Vulnerable
Enpass Yes Yes Yes Patched (v6.11.6) Release
iCloud Passwords Yes No Yes Vulnerable
LogMeOnce Yes No Yes Vulnerable
NordPass Yes Yes Partial Patched Release
ProtonPass Yes Yes Partial Patched Releases
RoboForm Yes Yes Yes Patched Update
Keeper Partial No No Partially patched (v17.2.0) Mention
⮞ Key Insight: Even with rapid patching, the core issue remains: as long as secrets flow through the DOM, they can be intercepted.
In contrast, hardware-based solutions like PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, and SeedNFC eliminate the threat by design: no credentials, passwords, TOTP/HOTP codes, or private keys ever touch the browser.
Zero DOM, zero attack surface.

CVE Disclosure & Vendor Responses (Aug–Sep 2025)

The discovery by Marek Tóth at DEF CON 33 could not remain hidden:
DOM-based extension clickjacking vulnerabilities are currently being assigned official CVE identifiers.
Yet, as often happens in vulnerability disclosure, the process moves slowly.
Several flaws were reported as early as spring 2025, but by mid-August,
some vendors had still not issued public fixes.

Vendor responses and patching timeline:

  • Bitwarden — reacted quickly with patch v2025.8.0 (August 2025), mitigating credential and TOTP leakage.
  • Dashlane — released a fix (v6.2531.1, early August 2025), confirmed in official release notes.
  • RoboForm — deployed patches in July–August 2025 across Windows and macOS builds.
  • NordPass & ProtonPass — announced official updates in August 2025, partially mitigating DOM exfiltration issues.
  • Keeper — acknowledged the impact but remains in “under review” status with no confirmed patch.
  • 1Password, LastPass, Enpass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce — still unpatched as of early September 2025, leaving users exposed.

The problem is not only the patching delay but also the way some vendors minimized the issue.
According to security disclosures, certain publishers initially labeled the vulnerability as “informational,” downplaying the severity.
In other words: the leakage was acknowledged, but put in a gray box until media and community pressure mounted.

⮞ Summary

DOM extension clickjacking CVEs are still being processed.
While vendors like Bitwarden, Dashlane, NordPass, ProtonPass, and RoboForm published official patches in Aug–Sep 2025,
others (1Password, LastPass, Enpass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce) lag behind, leaving millions of users exposed.
Some companies even chose silence over transparency, treating a structural exploit as a minor issue until forced to act.

Technologies of Correction Used

Since the public disclosure of DOM Extension Clickjacking at DEF CON 33, vendors have rushed to release patches. Yet these fixes remain uneven, mostly limited to UI adjustments or conditional checks. No vendor has yet re-engineered the injection engine itself.

🔍 Before diving into the correction methods, here’s a visual overview of the main technologies vendors have deployed to mitigate DOM Extension Clickjacking. This image outlines the spectrum from cosmetic patches to sovereign Zero-DOM solutions.

Infographic showing five correction methods against DOM Extension Clickjacking: autofill restriction, subdomain filtering, Shadow DOM detection, contextual isolation, and Zero-DOM hardware
Five vendor responses to DOM Extension Clickjacking: from UI patches to sovereign Zero-DOM hardware.

Objective

This section explains how vendors attempted to fix the flaw, distinguishes cosmetic patches from structural corrections, and highlights sovereign Zero-DOM hardware approaches.

Correction Methods Observed (as of August 2025)

Method Description Affected Managers
Autofill Restriction Switch to “on-click” mode or default deactivation Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper
Subdomain Filtering Blocking autofill on non-authorized subdomains ProtonPass, RoboForm
Shadow DOM Detection Refusal to inject if the field is encapsulated inside Shadow DOM NordPass, Enpass
Contextual Isolation Checks before injection (iframe, opacity, focus) Bitwarden, ProtonPass
Hardware Sovereign (Zero DOM) Secrets never transit through the DOM: NFC HSM, HSM PGP, SeedNFC PassCypher, EviKey, SeedNFC (non-vulnerable by design)

📉 Limits Observed

  • Patches did not change the injection engine, only its activation triggers.
  • No vendor introduced a structural separation between UI and secret flows.
  • Any manager still tied to the DOM remains structurally exposed to clickjacking variants.
⮞ Strategic Transition
These patches show reaction, not rupture. They address symptoms, not the structural flaw.
To understand what separates a temporary patch from a doctrinal fix, let’s move to the next analysis.

Correction Technologies Against DOM Extension Clickjacking — Technical and Doctrinal Analysis

📌 Observation

DOM Extension Clickjacking is not a bug, but a design flaw: injecting secrets into a manipulable DOM without structural separation or contextual verification.

⚠️ What Current Fixes Do Not Address

  • No vendor has rebuilt its injection engine.
  • Fixes remain limited to disabling autofill, filtering subdomains, or detecting some invisible elements.
  • None integrates a Zero-DOM architecture that ensures inviolability by design.

🧠 What a Structural Fix Would Require

  • Remove all dependency on the DOM for secret injection.
  • Isolate the injection engine outside the browser.
  • Use hardware authentication (NFC, PGP, biometrics).
  • Log every injection in an auditable journal.
  • Forbid interaction with invisible or encapsulated elements.

📊 Typology of Fixes

Level Correction Type Description
Cosmetic UI/UX, autofill disabled by default No change to injection logic, only its trigger
Contextual DOM filtering, Shadow DOM, subdomains Adds conditions, but still relies on the DOM
Structural Zero DOM, hardware-based (PGP, NFC, HSM) Eliminates DOM use for secrets, separates UI and secret flows

🧪 Doctrinal Tests to Verify Patches

To verify if a vendor’s fix is truly structural, security researchers can:

  • Inject an invisible field (opacity:0) inside an iframe.
  • Simulate an encapsulated Shadow DOM.
  • Check if the extension still injects secrets.
  • Verify if the injection is logged or blocked.

📜 Absence of Industry Standard

Currently, no official standard (NIST, OWASP, ISO) regulates:

  • Extension injection logic,
  • Separation of UI and secret flows,
  • Traceability of autofill actions.
⮞ Conclusion
Today’s patches are band-aids. Only Zero-DOM sovereign architectures — PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, SeedNFC — represent a doctrinal and structural correction.
The path forward is not software tinkering, but sovereign hardware doctrine.

Systemic Risks & Exploitation Vectors

DOM extension clickjacking is not an isolated bug — it represents a systemic flaw. When a browser extension collapses, the fallout is not limited to a leaked password. Instead, it undermines the entire digital trust model, creating cascading breaches across authentication layers and infrastructures.

Critical scenarios:

  • Persistent access — A cloned TOTP is sufficient to register a “trusted device” and maintain access, even after a full account reset.
  • Passkey replay — The exfiltration of a passkey functions as a master token, reusable outside any control boundary. Zero Trust becomes an illusion.
  • SSO compromise — A trapped extension in an enterprise leads to the leakage of OAuth/SAML tokens, compromising the entire IT system.
  • Supply chain breach — Poorly regulated extensions create a structural attack surface at the browser level.
  • Crypto-assets siphoning — Wallets such as MetaMask, Phantom, and TrustWallet inject keys into the DOM; seed phrases and private keys are drained as easily as credentials.

⮞ Summary

The risks extend far beyond password theft: cloned TOTPs, replayed passkeys, compromised SSO tokens, and exfiltrated seed phrases. As long as the DOM remains the interface for autofill, it will continue to serve as the interface for stealth exfiltration.

Sovereign Threat Comparison

Attack Target Secrets Targeted Sovereign Countermeasure
ToolShell RCE SharePoint / OAuth SSL certificates, SSO tokens PassCypher HSM PGP (storage + signature outside DOM)
eSIM hijack Mobile identity Carrier profiles, embedded SIM SeedNFC HSM (hardware anchoring of mobile identities)
DOM Clickjacking Browser extensions Credentials, TOTP, passkeys PassCypher NFC HSM + PassCypher HSM PGP (secure OTP, sandboxed autofill, anti-BITB)
Crypto-wallet hijack Wallet extensions Private keys, seed phrases SeedNFC HSM + NFC↔HID BLE coupling (secure multi-platform hardware injection)
Atomic Stealer macOS clipboard PGP keys, crypto wallets PassCypher NFC HSM ↔ HID BLE (encrypted channels, injection without clipboard)

Regional Exposure & Linguistic Impact — Anglophone World

Not all regions share the same risk level when it comes to DOM-based extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks. The Anglophone sphere—thanks to high adoption of password managers and crypto wallets—represents a significantly larger exposed user base. Sovereign, Zero-DOM countermeasures are critical to safeguard this digitally dependent region.

🌍 Estimated Exposure — Anglophone Region (Aug 2025)

Region Estimated Anglophone Users Password-Manager Adoption Sovereign Zero-DOM Countermeasures
Global English-speakers ≈1.5 billion users Strong (North America, UK, Australia) PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC
North America (USA + Canada Anglophone) ≈94 million users (36 % of US adults) Growing awareness; still low uptake PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM
United Kingdom High internet and crypto-wallet penetration Maturing adoption; rising regulations PassCypher HSM PGP, EviBITB

⮞ Strategic Insight

The Anglophone world represents an immense exposure surface: up to 1.5 billion English speakers globally, with nearly 100 million users employing password managers in North America alone. With rising cyber threats, these populations require Zero-DOM sovereign solutions—like PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC, and EviBITB—to fundamentally neutralize DOM-based risks.

Sources: ICLS (English speakers), Security.org (US password manager usage), DataReportal (UK digital statistics).

Exposed Crypto Wallet Extensions

Password managers are not the only victims of DOM extension clickjacking. The most widely used crypto walletsMetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet — rely on the same DOM injection mechanism to display or sign transactions. Consequently, a well-placed overlay or an invisible iframe tricks the user into believing they are approving a legitimate transaction, while in reality they are authorizing a malicious transfer or exposing their seed phrase.

Direct implication: Unlike stolen credentials or cloned TOTP, these leaks concern immediate financial assets. Billions of dollars in liquid value depend on such extensions. Therefore, the DOM becomes not only a vector of identity compromise but also a monetary exfiltration channel.

⮞ Summary
Crypto wallet extensions reuse the DOM for user interaction. This architectural choice exposes them to the same flaws as password managers: seed phrases, private keys, and transaction signatures can be intercepted via overlay redressing and autofill hijack.

Sovereign Countermeasure: SeedNFC HSM — hardware-based backup of private keys and seed phrases, kept outside the DOM, with secure injection through NFC↔HID BLE. Keys never leave the HSM; each operation requires a physical user trigger, rendering DOM redressing ineffective.

In complement, PassCypher HSM PGP and PassCypher NFC HSM protect OTPs and access credentials for trading platforms, thereby preventing lateral compromise across accounts.

Fallible Sandbox & Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Browsers present their sandbox as an impregnable fortress. However, DOM extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks prove otherwise. A simple overlay and a fake authentication frame can deceive the user into believing they are interacting with Google, Microsoft, or their bank — when in reality they are handing over secrets to a fraudulent page. Even frame-ancestors directives and some CSP policies fail to prevent such interface illusions.

This is where sovereign technologies change the equation. With EviBITB (IRDR), Freemindtronic integrates into PassCypher HSM PGP a detection and destruction engine for malicious iframes, neutralizing BITB attempts in real time. Activable with a single click, it operates in manual, semi-automatic, or automatic mode, entirely serverless and database-free, ensuring instant defense (explanation · detailed guide).

The keystone remains the sandbox URL. Each identifier or cryptographic key is bound to a reference URL securely stored inside the encrypted HSM. When a page requests autofill, the active URL is compared to the reference. If it does not match, no data is injected. Consequently, even if an iframe evades detection, the sandbox URL blocks exfiltration attempts.

This dual-layer barrier also extends to desktop usage. Through secure NFC pairing between an Android NFC smartphone and the Freemindtronic application embedding PassCypher NFC HSM, users benefit from anti-BITB protection on desktop. Secrets remain encrypted inside the NFC HSM and are only decrypted in volatile memory (RAM) for a few milliseconds, just long enough for autofill — never persisting in the DOM.

⮞ Technical Summary (attack defeated by EviBITB + sandbox URL)

The DOM extension clickjacking attack exploits invisible CSS overlays (opacity:0, pointer-events:none) to redirect clicks into a hidden field injected from the Shadow DOM (e.g., protonpass-root). By chaining focus() calls and cursor tracking, the extension triggers its autofill, placing credentials, TOTP, or passkeys into an invisible form that is immediately exfiltrated.

With EviBITB (IRDR), these iframes and overlays are destroyed in real time, eliminating the malicious click vector. Meanwhile, the sandbox URL validates the destination against the encrypted HSM reference (PassCypher HSM PGP or NFC HSM). If it does not match, autofill is blocked. The outcome: no trapped click, no injection, no leak. Secrets remain outside the DOM, including during desktop usage via NFC HSM paired with an Android smartphone.

DOM extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser protection with EviBITB and Sandbox URL inside PassCypher HSM PGP / NFC HSM

✪ Illustration – The EviBITB shield and Sandbox URL lock prevent credential theft from a clickjacking-trapped login form.

⮞ Global Technical Leadership
To date, PassCypher HSM PGP, even in its free edition, remains the only known solution capable of practically neutralizing Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) and DOM extension clickjacking attacks.Where competing managers (1Password, LastPass, Dashlane, Bitwarden, Proton Pass…) continue exposing users to invisible overlays and Shadow DOM injections, PassCypher relies on a sovereign dual-barrier:

  • EviBITB, an anti-iframe engine destroying malicious redirection frames in real time (detailed guide, technical article);
  • Sandbox URL, binding identifiers to a reference URL within an AES-256 CBC PGP-encrypted container, blocking any exfiltration in case of mismatch.

This combination positions Freemindtronic, from Andorra, as a pioneer. For the end user, installing the free PassCypher HSM PGP extension already raises security beyond current standards across all Chromium browsers.

Strategic Signals from DEF CON 33

In the electrified corridors of DEF CON 33, it’s not just badges blinking — it’s our assumptions. Between a lukewarm beer and a frantic CTF, conversations converge on a single point: the browser is no longer a trust zone. Consequently, DOM extension clickjacking is treated not as a bug class, but as a structural failure affecting password managers, passkeys, and crypto wallets alike.

  • The DOM becomes a minefield: it no longer hosts “basic XSS” only; it now carries identity primitives — managers, passkeys, and wallets — making autofill hijack via Shadow DOM a first-order risk.
  • The “phishing-resistant” promise falters: watching a passkey get phished live feels like seeing Neo stabbed by a script kiddie — dramatic, yet technically trivial once the interface is subverted.
  • Industrial slowness: some vendors patch in 48 hours; others drown in committees and press releases. Meanwhile, millions remain exposed to browser extension security flaws and stealth overlays.
  • Zero Trust, reinforced: any secret that even touches the DOM should be treated as already compromised — from credentials to TOTP to passkeys.
  • Return of sovereign hardware: as cloud illusions crumble, eyes turn to Zero-DOM countermeasures operated offline: PassCypher NFC HSM, PassCypher HSM PGP, and SeedNFC for encrypted backup of crypto keys. Zero DOM, zero interface illusion.
⮞ Summary
At DEF CON 33, experts delivered a clear message: browsers no longer act as protective bastions. Instead of relying on cosmetic patches, the real solution lies in adopting sovereign, offline, Zero-DOM architectures. In these environments, secrets remain encrypted, anchored in hardware, and fully managed under sovereign access control.
Consequently, the key phrases to retain are: DOM extension clickjacking, password manager vulnerabilities 2025, and phishing-resistant passkeys.

Sovereign Countermeasures (Zero DOM)

Vendor patches may reassure in the short term, yet they do not resolve the core issue: the DOM remains a sieve. The only durable response is to remove secrets from its reach. This principle, known as Zero DOM, dictates that no sensitive data should reside in, transit through, or depend on the browser. In other words, DOM extension clickjacking is neutralized not by patchwork, but by architectural sovereignty.

Zero DOM countermeasures flow — credentials, passkeys and crypto keys blocked from DOM exfiltration, secured by HSM PGP and NFC HSM sandbox URL injection

✪ Illustration — Zero DOM Flow: secrets remain inside the HSM, injected via HID into ephemeral RAM, making DOM exfiltration impossible.

In this paradigm, secrets (credentials, TOTP, passkeys, private keys) are preserved in offline hardware HSMs. Access is only possible via physical activation (NFC, HID, secure pairing) and leaves only an ephemeral footprint in RAM. This eliminates DOM exposure entirely.

Sovereign Operation: NFC HSM, HID BLE and HSM PGP

NFC HSM ↔ Android ↔ Browser Activation:
First of all, with the NFC HSM, activation does not occur via a simple phone tap. Instead, it requires physically presenting the NFC HSM module under an NFC-enabled Android smartphone. Consequently, the Freemindtronic application receives the request from the paired computer (via PassCypher HSM PGP), activates the secure module, and transmits the encrypted secret contactlessly to the computer. As a result, the entire process remains end-to-end encrypted, with decryption happening only in volatile RAM — never transiting or persisting in the DOM.

NFC HSM ↔ HID BLE Activation:
In addition, when paired with a Bluetooth HID keyboard emulator (e.g., InputStick), the Android NFC application injects credentials directly into login fields via an AES-128 CBC encrypted BLE channel. Therefore, this method ensures secure autofill outside the DOM, even on unpaired computers, while at the same time neutralizing keyloggers and classic DOM attacks.

Local HSM PGP Activation:
Finally, with PassCypher HSM PGP on desktop, a single click on the login field button triggers autofill instantly. The secret decrypts locally from its AES-256 CBC PGP container, only in volatile RAM, without NFC involvement and never transiting through the DOM. This design therefore guarantees a sovereign autofill architecture, inherently resistant to malicious extensions and invisible overlays.

Unlike cloud password managers or FIDO passkeys, these solutions do not apply reactive patches — they eliminate the attack surface by design. This is the essence of the sovereign-by-design approach: decentralized architecture, no central server, and no database to siphon.

⮞ Summary

Zero DOM is not a patch, but a doctrinal shift. As long as secrets live in the browser, they remain vulnerable. Once shifted outside the DOM, encrypted in HSMs and activated physically, they become unreachable for clickjacking or BITB attacks.

PassCypher HSM PGP — Patented Zero-DOM Technology Since 2015

Long before the exposure of DOM Extension Clickjacking at DEF CON 33, Freemindtronic took another path. Since 2015, our R&D established a founding principle: never use the DOM to carry secrets. This Zero Trust doctrine gave birth to a patented Zero-DOM architecture in PassCypher, ensuring that credentials, TOTP/HOTP, passwords, and cryptographic keys remain confined in a hardware HSM — never injected into a manipulable environment.

🚀 A Unique Advance in Password Managers

  • Native Zero DOM — no sensitive data ever touches the browser.
  • Integrated HSM PGP — AES-256 CBC encryption + patented key segmentation.
  • Sovereign Autonomy — no server, no database, no cloud dependency.

🛡️ Reinforced BITB Protection

Since 2020, PassCypher HSM PGP has included — even in its free version — the technology EviBITB.
This innovation neutralizes Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks in real time: destroying malicious iframes, detecting fraudulent overlays, and validating contexts serverlessly, database-free, and completely anonymously.
Learn how EviBITB works in detail.

⚡ Immediate Implementation

The user configures nothing: simply install the PassCypher HSM PGP extension from the
Chrome Web Store
or Edge Add-ons, enable the BITB option, and enjoy Zero-DOM sovereign protection instantly — where competitors are still scrambling to react.

PassCypher HSM PGP interface with EviBITB enabled, automatically removing malicious redirection iFrames

EviBITB embedded in PassCypher HSM PGP detects and destroys all redirection iFrames in real time, neutralizing BITB attacks and invisible DOM hijacking.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Sovereign Passwordless Manager

Software password managers fall into the trap of a simple iframe, but PassCypher NFC HSM follows a different path: it never lets your credentials and passwords transit through the DOM. The nano-HSM keeps them encrypted offline and only releases them for a fleeting instant in volatile memory — just long enough to authenticate.

User-side operation:

  • Untouchable secrets — the NFC HSM encrypts and stores credentials so they never appear or leak.
  • TOTP/HOTP — the PassCypher NFC HSM Android app or the PassCypher HSM PGP on desktop generates and displays them instantly on demand.
  • Manual entry — the user enters a PIN or TOTP directly into the login field on a computer or Android NFC phone. The PassCypher app shows the code generated by the NFC HSM module. The same process applies to credentials, passkeys, and other secrets.
  • Contactless autofill — the user simply presents the PassCypher NFC HSM module to a smartphone or computer, which executes autofill seamlessly, even when paired with PassCypher HSM PGP.
  • Desktop autofill — with PassCypher HSM PGP on Windows or macOS, the user clicks the integrated login field button to auto-complete login and password, with optional auto-validation.
  • Distributed anti-BITB — the NFC ↔ Android ↔ browser (Win/Mac/Linux) secure pairing triggers EviBITB to destroy malicious iframes in real time.
  • HID BLE mode — a paired Bluetooth HID keyboard emulator injects credentials outside the DOM, blocking both DOM-based attacks and keyloggers.

⮞ Summary

PassCypher NFC HSM embodies Zero Trust (every action requires physical validation) and Zero Knowledge (no secret is ever exposed). A sovereign hardware identity safeguard by design, it neutralizes clickjacking, BITB attacks, typosquatting, keylogging, IDN spoofing, DOM injections, clipboard hijacking, malicious extensions, while anticipating quantum attacks.

✪ Attacks Neutralized by PassCypher NFC HSM

Attack Type Description Status with PassCypher
Clickjacking / UI Redressing Invisible iframes or overlays that hijack user clicks Neutralized (EviBITB)
BITB (Browser-in-the-Browser) Fake browser frames simulating login windows Neutralized (sandbox + pairing)
Keylogging Keystroke capture by malware Neutralized (HID BLE mode)
Typosquatting Lookalike URLs mimicking legitimate domains Neutralized (physical validation)
Homograph Attack (IDN spoofing) Unicode substitution deceiving users on domain names Neutralized (Zero DOM)
DOM Injection / DOM XSS Malicious scripts injected into the DOM Neutralized (out-of-DOM architecture)
Clipboard Hijacking Interception or modification of clipboard data Neutralized (no clipboard usage)
Malicious Extensions Browser compromised by rogue plugins Neutralized (pairing + sandbox)
Quantum Attacks (anticipated) Massive computation to break crypto keys Mitigated (segmented keys + AES-256 CBC + PGP)

PassCypher HSM PGP — Sovereign Anti-Phishing Key Management

In a world where traditional managers are looted by a simple phantom iframe, PassCypher HSM PGP refuses to bend.

Its rule? Zero server, zero database, zero DOM.

Your secrets — credentials, passwords, passkeys, SSH/PGP keys, TOTP/HOTP — live in AES-256 CBC PGP encrypted containers, protected by a patented segmented-key system engineered to withstand even the quantum era.

Why does it resist DEF CON 33-class attacks?

Because nothing ever transits through the DOM, no master password exists to be extracted, and crucially: containers stay encrypted at all times. The system decrypts them only in volatile RAM, for the brief instant required to assemble key segments. Once autofill completes, everything vanishes instantly — leaving no exploitable trace.

Key Features:

  • Shielded autofill — one click is enough, but always via URL sandbox, never in cleartext inside the browser.
  • Embedded EviBITB — destroys malicious iframes and overlays in real time, operable in manual, semi-automatic or fully automated mode, entirely serverless.
  • Integrated crypto tools — generation and management of segmented AES-256 keys and PGP keys without external dependencies.
  • Universal compatibility — works with any site via software + browser extension — no forced updates, no additional plugins.
  • Sovereign architecture — no server, no database, no master password, fully anonymized — unattackable by design where cloud managers collapse.

⮞ Summary

PassCypher HSM PGP redefines secret management: containers permanently encrypted, segmented keys, ephemeral decryption in RAM, zero DOM and zero cloud.
A hardware password manager and sovereign passwordless mechanism designed to withstand today’s threats and anticipate quantum attacks.

SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Secure Wallet Injection

Browser wallet extensions thrive in the DOM — and attackers exploit that weakness. With SeedNFC HSM, the logic flips: the enclave never releases private keys or seed phrases. When users initialize or restore a wallet (web or desktop), the system performs input through a Bluetooth HID emulation — like a hardware keyboard — with no clipboard, no DOM, and no trace for private keys, public keys, or even hot wallet credentials.

Operational flow (anti-DOM, anti-clipboard):

  • Custody — the SeedNFC HSM encrypts and stores the seed/private key (never exports it, never reveals it).
  • Physical activation — the NFC HSM authorizes the operation when the user presents it contactlessly via the Freemindtronic app (Android NFC smartphone).
  • HID BLE injection — the system types the seed (or required fragment/format) directly into the wallet input field, outside the DOM and outside the clipboard, resisting even software keyloggers.
  • BITB protection — users can activate EviBITB (anti-BITB iframe destroyer) inside the app, which neutralizes overlays and malicious redirections during onboarding or recovery.
  • Ephemerality — volatile RAM temporarily holds the data during HID input, then instantly erases it.

Typical use cases:

  • Onboarding or recovery of wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, etc.) without ever exposing the private key to the browser or DOM. The HSM keeps the secret encrypted and decrypts it only in RAM, for the minimal time required.
  • Sensitive operations on desktop (logical air-gap), with physical validation by the user: the user presents the NFC HSM module under an Android NFC smartphone to authorize the action, without keyboard interaction or DOM exposure.
  • Secure multi-asset backup: an offline hardware HSM stores seed phrases, master keys, and private keys, allowing reuse without copying, exporting, or capturing. Users perform activation exclusively through physical, sovereign, and auditable means.

⮞ Summary

First of all, SeedNFC HSM with HID BLE injects private or public keys directly into hot wallet fields via a Bluetooth Low Energy HID emulator, thereby bypassing both keyboard typing and clipboard transfer. Moreover, the channel encrypts data with AES-128 CBC, while the NFC module physically triggers activation, ensuring a secure and verifiable process.
In addition, users can enable anti-BITB protection to neutralize malicious overlays and deceptive redirections.
Finally, the HSM enclave keeps secrets strictly confined, outside the DOM and beyond the reach of malicious extensions, thus guaranteeing sovereign protection by design.

Exploitation Scenarios & Mitigation Paths

The revelations of DEF CON 33 are not the end of the game, but a warning. What follows may prove even more corrosive:

  • AI-driven phishing + DOM hijack — Tomorrow, it will not be a garage-made phishing kit, but LLMs generating real-time DOM overlays, virtually indistinguishable from legitimate banking or cloud portals. These AI-powered clickjacking attacks will weaponize Shadow DOM credential theft at scale.
  • Hybrid mobile tapjacking — The touchscreen becomes a minefield: stacked apps, invisible permissions, and background gestures hijacked to validate transactions or exfiltrate OTPs. This represents the evolution of tapjacking phishing into systemic mobile compromise.
  • Post-quantum ready HSM — The next line of defense will not be a browser patch, but quantum-resistant HSMs capable of withstanding Shor’s or Grover’s algorithms. Solutions such as PassCypher HSM PGP and SeedNFC, already designed as Zero-DOM post-cloud sovereign anchors, embody this paradigm shift.

⮞ Summary

Future attackers will bypass browser patches instead of relying on them.
To mitigate the threat, adopt a rupture: offline hardware supports, quantum-secure HSMs, and sovereign Zero-DOM architectures.
Reject all other options — they remain fragile software band-aids that will inevitably crack.

Strategic Synthesis

DOM extension clickjacking reveals a stark truth: browsers and extensions are not trust environments. Patches arrive in fragmented waves, user exposure reaches tens of millions, and regulatory frameworks remain in perpetual catch-up mode.
The only sovereign path? Strict software governance, combined with offline hardware safeguards outside the DOM (PassCypher NFC HSM / PassCypher HSM PGP), where secrets stay encrypted, offline, and untouchable by redressing.

The Sovereign Path:

  • Strict governance of software and extensions
  • Hardware-backed identity security (PassCypher NFC HSM / HSM PGP)
  • Secrets encrypted, outside DOM, outside cloud, redress-proof

Doctrine of Hardware Cyber Sovereignty —

  • Consider any secret that touches the DOM as already compromised.
  • Activate digital identity only through physical actions (NFC, HID BLE, HSM PGP).
  • Build trust on hardware isolation, not on the browser sandbox.
  • Audit extensions as critical infrastructures.
  • Ensure post-quantum resilience by physically isolating keys.
Regulatory Blind Spot —
CRA, NIS2, or RGS (ANSSI) reinforce software resilience, yet none address secrets embedded in the DOM.
Hardware guardianship remains the only sovereign fallback — and only states capable of producing and certifying their own HSMs can guarantee true digital sovereignty.
Strategic Continuity —
DOM clickjacking adds to a dark sequence: ToolShell, eSIM hijack, Atomic Stealer… each exposing structural limits of software trust.
The doctrine of hardware-rooted sovereign cybersecurity is no longer optional. It has become a fundamental strategic baseline.
🔥 In short: the cloud may patch tomorrow, but hardware already protects today.

⮞ Note — What this chronicle does not cover:

First of all, this analysis provides neither an exploitable proof-of-concept nor a technical tutorial to reproduce DOM clickjacking or passkey phishing attacks. In addition, it does not address the economic aspects of cryptocurrencies or specific legal implications outside the EU.

Instead, the objective is clear: to deliver a sovereign, strategic reading. In other words, the chronicle aims to help readers understand structural flaws, identify systemic risks, and, above all, highlight Zero-DOM hardware countermeasures (PassCypher, SeedNFC) as a pathway to resilient and phishing-resistant security.

Ultimately, this perspective invites decision-makers and security experts to look beyond temporary software patches and adopt sovereign architectures rooted in hardware protection.

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords Creation

Digital image showing a confused user at a computer surrounded by complex password symbols

How to Create Strong Passwords Despite Human Limitations

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords are crucial in safeguarding our personal and professional data online. But do you know how to craft a robust password capable of thwarting hacking attempts? In this article, we delve into the impact of human factors on password security. Furthermore, you will gain insights on overcoming these limitations and creating formidable passwords.

For comprehensive threat assessments and innovative solutions, delve into “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords.” Stay informed by exploring our constantly updated topics..

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords,” authored by Jacques Gascuel, the visionary behind cutting-edge sensitive data security and safety systems, offers invaluable insights into the field of human-created password security. Are you ready to improve your understanding of password protection?

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords: Cybersecurity’s Weak Link

Passwords are essential for protecting our data on the Internet. But creating a strong password is not easy. It requires a balance between security and usability. In this article, we will explain what entropy is and how it measures the strength of a password. We will also explore the limitations and problems associated with human password creation. We will show that these factors reduce entropy and password security, exposing users to cyber attacks. We will also provide some strategies and tips to help users create stronger passwords.

What is Entropy and How Does it Measure Password Strength?

Entropy is a concept borrowed from information theory. It measures the unpredictability and randomness of a system. The higher the entropy, the more disordered the system is, and the harder it is to predict.

In the context of passwords, entropy measures how many attempts it would take to guess a password through brute force. In other words, entropy measures the difficulty of cracking a password. The higher the entropy, the stronger the password is, and the harder it is to crack.

However, entropy is not a fixed value, but a relative measure that depends on various factors, such as the length, composition, frequency, and popularity of the password. We will explain these factors in more detail later.

How Do Cognitive Biases Influence Password Creation?

Cognitive Biases in Password Creation

Cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias and anchoring bias, significantly influence how users create passwords. Understanding “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” is essential to recognize and overcome these biases for better password security.

Cognitive biases are reasoning or judgment errors that affect how humans perceive and process information. They are often the result of heuristics, mental shortcuts used to simplify decision-making. These biases can have adaptive advantages but also lead to errors or distortions of reality.

In password creation, cognitive biases can influence user choices, leading to passwords that make sense to them, linked to their personal life, culture, environment, etc. These passwords are often predictable, following logical or mnemonic patterns, reducing entropy.

For example, humans are subject to confirmation bias, thinking their password is strong enough because it meets basic criteria like length or composition, without considering other factors like character frequency or diversity.

They are also prone to anchoring bias, choosing passwords based on personal information like names, birthdates, pets, etc., not realizing this information is easily accessible or guessable by hackers.

Availability bias leads to underestimating cyber attack risks because they haven’t been victims or witnesses of hacking, or they think their data isn’t interesting to hackers.

Human Factors in Strong Password Development: Cognitive Biases

Strategies to Overcome Cognitive Biases

To mitigate the impact of cognitive biases, consider adopting better password practices:

  • Utilize a different password for each service, especially for sensitive or critical accounts, such as email, banking, or social media.
  • Employ a password manager, which is a software or application that securely stores and generates passwords for each service. Password managers can assist users in creating and recalling strong, random passwords, all while maintaining security and convenience.
  • Implement two-factor authentication, a security feature that necessitates users to provide an additional verification method, such as a code sent to their phone or email, or a biometric scan, in order to access their accounts. Two-factor authentication can effectively thwart hackers from gaining access to accounts, even if they possess the password.
  • Regularly update passwords, but refrain from doing so excessively, in order to prevent compromise by hackers or data breaches. Users should change their passwords when they suspect or confirm a breach or when they detect suspicious activity on their accounts. It’s also advisable for users to avoid changing their passwords too frequently, as this can lead to weaker passwords or password reuse.

Addressing Human Challenges in Secure Password Creation with Freemindtronic’s Advanced Technologies

Understanding Human Constraints in Robust Password Generation

The process of creating strong passwords often clashes with human limitations. Freemindtronic’s EviPass NFC HSM and EviPass HSM PGP technologies, integral to the PassCypher range, acknowledge these human factors in strong password development. By automating the creation process and utilizing Shannon’s entropy model, these technologies effectively mitigate the cognitive biases that typically hinder the creation of secure passwords.

Password Security and the Fight Against Cyber Attacks

In the context of increasing cyber threats, the security of passwords becomes paramount. Freemindtronic’s solutions offer a robust defense against cyber attacks by generating passwords that exceed conventional security standards. This approach not only addresses the human challenges in creating strong passwords but also fortifies the digital identity protection of users.

Leveraging Entropy in Passwords for Enhanced Security

The concept of entropy in passwords is central to Freemindtronic’s technology. By harnessing advanced entropy models, these systems ensure a high level of randomness and complexity in password creation, significantly elevating password security. This technical sophistication is crucial in overcoming human limitations in generating secure passwords.

Cognitive Biases in Passwords: Simplifying User Experience

Freemindtronic’s technologies also focus on the human aspect of password usage. By reducing the cognitive load through features like auto-fill and passwordless access, these systems address common cognitive biases. This user-friendly approach not only enhances the ease of use but also contributes to the overall strategy for strong password management.

Adopting Strong Password Strategies for Digital Identity Protection

Incorporating strong password strategies is essential in safeguarding digital identities. Freemindtronic’s technologies empower users to adopt robust password practices effortlessly, thereby enhancing digital identity protection. This is achieved through the generation of complex passwords and the elimination of the need for manual password management.

Elevating Password Security in the Digital Age

Freemindtronic’s EviPass NFC HSM and EviPass HSM PGP technologies are at the forefront of addressing human limitations in strong password creation. By integrating advanced entropy in passwords, focusing on user-centric design, and combating the risks of cyber attacks, these technologies are setting new benchmarks in password security and digital identity protection. Their innovative approach not only acknowledges but also effectively overcomes the human challenges in secure password creation, marking a significant advancement in the field of digital security.

Human Constraints in Robust Password Generation

There are various methods to help users create strong, memorable passwords. These methods have pros and cons, which should be understood to choose the most suitable for one’s needs.

Mnemonic Passwords: Balancing Memory and Security

Mnemonic passwords are based on phrases or acronyms, serving as memory aids. For example, using the phrase “I was born in 1984 in Paris” to create the password “Iwbi1984iP”.

Advantages of mnemonic passwords:

  • Easier to remember than random passwords, using semantic memory, more effective than visual or auditory memory.
  • Can be longer than random passwords, composed of multiple words or syllables, increasing entropy.

Disadvantages of mnemonic passwords:

  • Often predictable, following logical or grammatical patterns, reducing entropy.
  • Vulnerable to dictionary attacks, containing common words or personal information, easily accessible or guessable by hackers.
  • Difficult to type, containing special characters like accents or spaces, not always available on keyboards.

The Trade-Off Between Mnemonics and Entropy

To balance memory and security, users should use mnemonics that are not too obvious or common, but rather personal and unique. They should also avoid using the same mnemonic for different passwords, or using slight variations of the same mnemonic. They should also add some randomness or complexity to their mnemonics, such as numbers, symbols, or capitalization.

Random Passwords: Entropy and Ease of Use

Random passwords are composed of randomly chosen characters, without logic or meaning. For example, the password “qW7x#4Rt”.

Advantages of random passwords:

  • Harder to guess than mnemonic passwords, not following predictable patterns, increasing entropy.
  • More resistant to dictionary attacks, not containing common words or personal information.

Disadvantages of random passwords:

  • Harder to remember than mnemonic passwords, not using semantic memory.
  • Can be shorter than mnemonic passwords, composed of individual characters, reducing entropy.

Phrase-Based Passwords: Entropy and Ease of Use

Phrase-based passwords are composed of several words forming a phrase or expression. For example, the password “The cat sleeps on the couch”.

Advantages of phrase-based passwords:

  • Easier to remember than random passwords, using semantic memory.
  • Can be longer than random passwords, composed of multiple words, increasing entropy.

Disadvantages of phrase-based passwords:

  • Often predictable, following logical or grammatical patterns, reducing entropy.
  • Vulnerable to dictionary attacks, containing common words or expressions.
  • Difficult to type, containing spaces, not always accepted by online services.

Evaluating Phrase-Based Password Effectiveness

To evaluate the effectiveness of phrase-based passwords, users should consider the following criteria:

  • Phrase length plays a crucial role: Longer phrases tend to result in higher entropy. However, it’s important to strike a balance, as excessively long phrases can become challenging to type or recall.
  • The diversity of words also matters: Greater word diversity contributes to higher entropy. Nevertheless, it’s essential to avoid overly obscure words, as they might prove difficult to remember or spell.
  • Randomness in word selection boosts entropy: The more random the words, the greater the entropy. Yet, it’s necessary to maintain some level of coherence between words, as entirely unrelated words can pose memory and association challenges.

Human-Generated Random Passwords: Entropy and Ease of Use

Human-generated random passwords are composed of randomly chosen characters by the user, without logic or meaning. For example, the password “qW7x#4Rt”.

Advantages :

  • Harder to guess than mnemonic or phrase-based passwords, increasing entropy.
  • More resistant to dictionary attacks, not containing common words or personal information.

Disadvantages:

  • Harder to remember than mnemonic or phrase-based passwords.
  • Often biased by user preferences or habits, favoring certain characters or keyboard positions, reducing entropy.

The Risks of Low Entropy in Human-Created Passwords

Low entropy passwords have significant consequences on the security of personal and professional data. Weak passwords are more vulnerable to cyber attacks, especially brute force. Hackers can use powerful software or machines to test billions of combinations per second. Once the password is found, they can access user accounts, steal data, impersonate, or spread viruses or spam.

Consequences of Predictable Passwords on Cybersecurity

The consequences of predictable passwords on cybersecurity are:

  • Data breach: Hackers can access user data, such as personal information, financial records, health records, etc. They can use this data for identity theft, fraud, blackmail, or sell it to third parties.
  • Account takeover: Hackers can access user accounts, such as email, social media, online shopping, etc. They can use these accounts to impersonate users, send spam, make purchases, or spread malware.
  • Reputation damage: Hackers can access user accounts, such as professional or academic platforms, etc. They can use these accounts to damage user reputation, post false or harmful information, or sabotage user work or research.

Understanding the Vulnerability of Low Entropy Passwords

Password Length and Entropy

The vulnerability of passwords depends on various factors, including the length, composition, frequency, and popularity of the password. Understanding “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” is crucial for safeguarding your online data. Longer and more complex passwords offer higher entropy and are harder to crack.

Composition Complexity

Complex passwords that include a variety of character types, such as lowercase, uppercase, numbers, and symbols, significantly enhance security. This aspect of “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” is often overlooked, but it’s essential for creating robust passwords.

Common vs. Rare Passwords

The frequency and popularity of passwords play a vital role in their vulnerability. Common passwords, like “123456” or “password,” are easily guessed, while rare and unique passwords, such as “qW7x#4Rt” or “The cat sleeps on the couch,” provide more security.

Password Composition

The composition of a password is a critical factor. Passwords based on common words or personal information are easier for hackers to guess. Understanding the impact of “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” can help you make informed choices about password composition.

These factors collectively influence the time required for brute force attacks to uncover a password. Longer durations enhance password security, but it’s essential to consider the evolving computing power of hackers, which can reduce the time required to crack passwords over time and with advancing technology. Another factor that affects the vulnerability of passwords is their frequency and popularity.

Recurring Password Changes: A Challenge to Password Entropy

Another human limitation in creating strong passwords is the recurrent need to change them. Often mandated by online services for security, regular changes can paradoxically weaken password strength. This practice burdens users with remembering multiple passwords and inventing new ones frequently. It leads to slight modifications of existing passwords rather than generating new, more random ones. This habit reduces password entropy, making passwords more predictable and vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Impact of Frequent Password Updates on Security

Studies have shown that users required to change passwords every 90 days tend to create weaker, less diverse passwords. Conversely, those with less frequent changes generate more random and secure passwords. This illustrates the counterproductive nature of too-frequent mandatory password updates.

The Counterproductive Nature of Mandatory Password Changes

Mandatory password changes are often imposed by online services for security reasons. They aim to prevent password compromise by hackers or leaks. However, mandatory password changes can have negative effects on password security, such as:

  • Elevating cognitive load entails users remembering multiple passwords for each service and crafting new passwords whenever needed.
  • Dampening user motivation occurs when individuals view password changes as unnecessary or ineffective, leading to a neglect of password quality.
  • Diminishing password entropy arises when users opt for making slight modifications to old passwords rather than generating entirely new and random ones.

These effects negatively impact password security, making passwords more predictable and vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Research Insights on Low Entropy in Human Passwords

In this section, we will present some sources and findings from scientific studies conducted by researchers from around the world on passwords and entropy. We have verified the validity and accuracy of these sources using web search and citation verification tools. We have also respected the APA citation style.

Analyzing Global Studies on Password Security

Several studies have analyzed the security of passwords based on real databases of passwords disclosed following leaks or hacks. These studies have measured the entropy and the strength of passwords, as well as the patterns and the behaviors of users. Some of these studies are:

Key Findings from Password Entropy Research

Some of the key findings from these studies are:

  • any users maintain low-entropy passwords, relying on common words, personal information, or predictable patterns.
  • Furthermore, they tend to reuse passwords across multiple services, thereby elevating the risk of cross-service compromise.
  • In addition, they typically refrain from changing passwords regularly, unless prompted to do so by online services or following a security breach.
  • Surprisingly, a significant portion of users remains unaware of the critical importance of password security or tends to overestimate the strength of their passwords.
  • Moreover, a considerable number of users exhibit reluctance towards the adoption of password managers or two-factor authentication, often citing usability or trust concerns.

These findings confirm the low entropy of human passwords, and the need for better password practices and education.

Password Reuse and Its Impact on Entropy

Another issue with human password creation is password reuse, a common practice among Internet users, who have to remember multiple passwords for different services. Password reuse consists of using the same or similar passwords for different accounts, such as email, social media, online shopping, etc. Password reuse can reduce the cognitive load and the effort required to create and remember passwords, but it also reduces the entropy and the security of passwords.

The Risks Associated with Password Reuse

The risks associated with password reuse are:

  • Cross-service compromise: If a password is discovered or compromised on one service, it can be used to access other services that use the same or similar password. For example, if a hacker obtains a user’s email password, they can use it to access their social media, online shopping, or banking accounts, if they use the same password or a slight variation of it.
  • Credential stuffing: Credential stuffing is a type of cyberattack that uses automated tools to test stolen or leaked usernames and passwords on multiple services. For example, if a hacker obtains a list of usernames and passwords from a data breach, they can use it to try to log in to other services, hoping that some users have reused their passwords.
  • Password cracking: Password cracking is a type of cyberattack that uses brute force or dictionary methods to guess passwords. For example, if a hacker obtains a user’s password hash, they can use it to try to find the plain text password, using lists of common or leaked passwords.

These risks show that password reuse can expose users to cyber threats, as a single password breach can compromise multiple accounts and data. Password reuse can also reduce the entropy of passwords, as users tend to use common or simple passwords that are easy to remember and type, but also easy to guess or crack.

Addressing the Security Flaws of Reusing Passwords

To mitigate the security vulnerabilities associated with password reuse, users should embrace improved practices for password creation and management. Some of these recommended practices include:

  • Utilize distinct passwords for each service, particularly for sensitive or crucial accounts such as email, banking, or social media. This approach ensures that if one password is compromised, it won’t jeopardize other accounts or data.
  • Employ a password manager, which is software or an application designed to securely store and generate passwords for each service. Password managers assist users in crafting and recalling strong, randomly generated passwords, all while upholding security and convenience. Additionally, these tools can notify users about password breaches or weak passwords, as well as suggest password changes or updates.
  • Implement two-factor authentication (2FA), a security feature demanding users to provide an additional verification method, such as a code sent to their phone or email, or a biometric scan. This extra layer of security thwarts hackers from gaining access to accounts solely through knowledge of the password, as they would require the second factor as well.
  • Adopt a regular password change strategy, though not excessively frequent, to preempt compromise by hackers or data leaks. Passwords should be modified when users suspect or verify a breach, or when they detect suspicious activity on their accounts. It’s also advisable to avoid changing passwords too frequently, as this can potentially result in weaker passwords or password reuse.

These practices can help users avoid password reuse and increase the entropy and security of their passwords. They can also reduce the cognitive load and the effort required to create and remember passwords, by using tools and features that simplify password creation and management.

Behavioral Resistance in Secure Password Practices

Another issue with human password creation is resistance to behavioral changes, a psychological phenomenon preventing users from adopting new habits or modifying old ones regarding passwords. Users are often reluctant to change passwords, even when aware of risks or encouraged to do so. This resistance can be due to factors like laziness, ignorance, confidence, fear, satisfaction, etc.

Overcoming Psychological Barriers in Password Security

Psychological barriers can hinder password security, as users may not follow the best practices or recommendations to create stronger passwords. To overcome these barriers, users need to be aware of the importance and benefits of password security, as well as the costs and risks of password insecurity. Some of the ways to overcome psychological barriers are:

  • Educating users about password security, explaining what entropy is, how it measures password strength, and how to increase it.
  • Motivating users to change passwords, providing incentives, feedback, or rewards for creating stronger passwords.
  • Persuading users to adopt password managers, demonstrating how they can simplify password creation and management, without compromising security or convenience.
  • Nudging users to use two-factor authentication, making it easy and accessible to enable and use this security feature.

Conclusion: Reinforcing Password Security Amidst Human Limitations

In this article, we have explained what entropy is and how it measures the strength of a password. We also explored the limitations and problems associated with human password creation, such as cognitive biases, human generation methods, password reuse, and resistance to behavioral changes. We have shown that these factors reduce entropy and password security, exposing users to cyber attacks. We have also provided some strategies and tips to help users create stronger passwords.

We hope this article has helped you understand the importance of password security and improve your password practices. Remember, passwords protect your digital identity and data online. Creating strong passwords is not only a matter of security, but also of responsibility.