Tag Archives: Passwordless Authentication

DOM Extension Clickjacking — Risks, DEF CON 33 & Zero-DOM fixes

Movie poster style illustration of DOM extension clickjacking unveiled at DEF CON 33, showing hidden iframes, Shadow DOM hijack, and sovereign Zero-DOM countermeasures

DOM extension clickjacking — a technical chronicle of DEF CON 33 demonstrations, their impact, and Zero-DOM countermeasures. See the Executive Summary below for a 4-minute overview.

Executive Summary — DOM Extension Clickjacking

Snapshot (17 Sep 2025):At DEF CON 33, live demos showed DOM-based extension clickjacking and overlay attacks that can exfiltrate credentials, TOTP codes, synced passkeys and crypto keys from browser extensions and wallets. Initial testing reported ~40M exposed installations. Several vendors published mitigations in Aug–Sep 2025 (e.g. Bitwarden, Dashlane, Enpass, NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm); others remained reported vulnerable (1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords, KeePassXC-Browser). See the status table for per-product details.

Impact: systemic — secrets that touch the DOM can be covertly exfiltrated; overlays (BITB) make synced passkeys phishable. Recommended mitigation: move to Zero-DOM hardware flows (HSM/NFC) or adopt structural injection re-engineering. See §Sovereign Countermeasures for options.

⚡ The Discovery

Las Vegas, early August 2025. DEF CON 33 takes over the Las Vegas Convention Center. Between hacker domes, IoT villages, Adversary Village, and CTF competitions, the atmosphere turns electric. On stage, Marek Tóth simply plugs in his laptop, launches the demo, and presses Enter.
Immediately, the star attack emerges: DOM extension clickjacking. Easy to code yet devastating to execute, it relies on a booby-trapped page, invisible iframes, and a malicious focus() call. These elements trick autofill managers into pouring credentials, TOTP codes, and passkeys into a phantom form. As a result, DOM-based extension clickjacking surfaces as a structural threat.

⧉ Second Demo — Phishable Passkeys (overlay)

At DEF CON 33, Allthenticate showed that synced passkeys can also be phished through simple overlay and redirection — no DOM injection required.
We cover the full implications in the dedicated section Phishable Passkeys and in attribution & sources. Also worth noting: DEF CON 33 and Black Hat 2025 highlighted another critical demonstration — BitUnlocker — targeting BitLocker via WinRE (see here)

⚠ Strategic Message — Systemic Risks

With just two demos — one targeting password managers and wallets, the other aimed directly at passkeys — two pillars of cybersecurity collapsed. The message is clear: as long as secrets reside in the DOM, they remain vulnerable. Moreover, as long as cybersecurity depends on the browser and the cloud, a single click can overturn everything. As OWASP reminds us, clickjacking has always been a well-known threat. Yet here, the extension layer itself collapses.

⎔ The Sovereign Alternative — Zero-DOM Countermeasures

Fortunately, another way has existed for more than a decade — one that does not rely on the DOM.
With PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, and SeedNFC for hardware backup of cryptographic keys, your credentials, passwords, and TOTP/HOTP secrets never touch the DOM. Instead, they remain encrypted in offline HSMs, securely injected via URL sandboxing or manually entered through the Android NFC application, and always protected by anti-BITB safeguards.
Therefore, this is not a patch, but a patented sovereign passwordless architecture: decentralized, with no server, no central database, and no master password. It frees secret management from centralized dependencies such as FIDO/WebAuthn.

Chronicle to Read
Estimated reading time: 37–39 minutes
Date updated: 2025-10-02
Complexity level: Advanced / Expert
Linguistic specificity: Sovereign lexicon — high technical density
Available languages: CAT ·EN ·ES ·FR
Accessibility: Screen-reader optimized — semantic anchors included
Editorial type: Strategic Chronicle
About the author: Jacques Gascuel, inventor and founder of Freemindtronic®.
As a specialist in sovereign security technologies, he designs and patents hardware systems for data protection, cryptographic sovereignty, and secure communications. His expertise also includes compliance with ANSSI, NIS2, GDPR, and SecNumCloud frameworks, as well as defense against hybrid threats via sovereign-by-design architectures.

Key takeaways —

  • DOM injection by extensions enables stealth exfiltration (credentials, TOTP, passkeys, keys).
  • Some vendors released mitigations (Aug–Sep 2025); structural fixes are rare.
  • Long term: adopt Zero-DOM hardware flows or re-engineer injection logic.

Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking: a malicious page, hidden iframe, and autofill hijack exfiltrating credentials, passkeys, and crypto-wallet keys.

Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking attack with hidden iframe, Shadow DOM and stealth credential exfiltration
Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking: a malicious page, hidden iframe and autofill hijack exfiltrating credentials, passkeys and crypto-wallet keys.

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🚨 DEF CON 33 — Key points

  • Two live demos: DOM extension clickjacking (password managers/wallets) and phishable synced passkeys (overlay attacks).
  • ~11 managers tested; initial impact estimated at ~40M exposed installations.
  • Mitigation direction: fast UI/conditional fixes vs. rare structural Zero-DOM solutions.
  • See the status table and §Sovereign Countermeasures for details.

What is DOM-based extension clickjacking?

DOM-based extension clickjacking hijacks a browser extension (password manager or crypto wallet) by abusing the browser’s Document Object Model. A deceptive page chains invisible iframes, Shadow DOM and a malicious focus() call to trigger autofill into an invisible form. The extension “believes” it is interacting with a legitimate field and pours secrets there — credentials, TOTP/HOTP codes, passkeys, even private keys. Because these secrets touch the DOM, they can be exfiltrated silently.

⮞ Doctrinal insight: DOM-based extension clickjacking is not an isolated bug — it is a design flaw. Any extension that injects secrets into a manipulable DOM is inherently vulnerable. Only Zero-DOM architectures (structural separation, HSM/NFC, out-of-browser injection) remove this attack surface.

How dangerous is it?

This vector is far from minor: it exploits the autofill logic itself and operates without user awareness. The attacker does not merely overlay an element; they force the extension to fill a fake form as if nothing were wrong, making exfiltration undetectable by superficial inspection.

Typical attack flow

  1. Preparation — the malicious page embeds an iframe that is invisible and a Shadow DOM that masks the real context; inputs are rendered non-visible (opacity:0, pointer-events:none).
  2. Bait — the victim clicks a benign element; redirections and a malicious focus() redirect the event to an attacker-controlled input.
  3. Exfiltration — the extension believes it is interacting with a legitimate field and automatically injects credentials, TOTP, passkeys or private keys into the fake DOM; the data is immediately exfiltrated.

This mechanism spoofs visual cues, bypasses classic protections (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, frame-ancestors) and turns autofill into an invisible data-exfiltration channel. Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) overlays and Shadow DOM manipulation further increase the risk, making synced passkeys and credentials phishable.

⮞ Summary

The attack combines invisible iframes, Shadow DOM manipulation and focus() redirections to hijack autofill extensions. Secrets are injected into a phantom form, giving the attacker direct access to sensitive data (credentials, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, private keys). Bottom line: as long as secrets transit the DOM, the attack surface remains open.

History of Clickjacking (2002–2025)

Clickjacking has become the persistent parasite of the modern web. The term emerged in the early 2000s, when Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen described a deceptive scenario: tricking a user into clicking on something they cannot actually see. An optical illusion applied to code, it quickly became a mainstream attack technique (OWASP).

  • 2002–2008: Emergence of “UI redressing”: HTML layers + transparent iframes trapping users (Hansen Archive).
  • 2009: Facebook falls victim to Likejacking (OWASP).
  • 2010: Cursorjacking emerges — shifting the pointer to mislead user clicks (OWASP).
  • 2012–2015: Exploitation via iframes, online ads, and malvertising (MITRE CVE) (Infosec).
  • 2016–2019: Tapjacking spreads on mobile platforms (Android Security Bulletin).
  • 2020–2024: Rise of “hybrid clickjacking” combining XSS and phishing (OWASP WSTG).
  • 2025: At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth unveils a new level: DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking. This time, not only websites, but browser extensions (password managers, crypto wallets) inject invisible forms, enabling stealth exfiltration of secrets.

At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth publicly revealed DOM extension clickjacking, marking a structural shift from visual trickery to systemic weakness in password managers and crypto wallets.

❓How long have you been exposed?

Clickjacking and invisible iframes have been known for years; Shadow DOM usage is not new. The DEF CON 33 findings reveal a decade-old design pattern: extensions that trust the DOM for secret injection are inherently exposed.

Synthesis:
In just 20 years, clickjacking evolved from a simple visual trick into a systemic sabotage of identity managers. DEF CON 33 marks a breaking point: the threat is no longer just malicious websites, but the very core of browser extensions and autofill. Hence the urgency of Zero-DOM approaches anchored in sovereign hardware like PassCypher.

Vulnerable Password Managers & CVE disclosure (snapshot — 2 Oct 2025)

Updated: 2 October 2025
Following Marek Tóth’s disclosure at DEF CON 33, several vendors have issued patches or mitigations, but response times vary widely. The new column indicates the estimated time between the presentation (8 August 2025) and the release of a patch/mitigation.

Manager Credentials TOTP Passkeys Status Official patch / note ⏱️ Patch delay
1Password Yes Yes Yes Mitigations (v8.11.x) Blog 🟠 >6 weeks (mitigation)
Bitwarden Yes Yes Partial Patched (v2025.8.2) Release 🟢 ~4 weeks
Dashlane Yes Yes Yes Patched Advisory 🟢 ~3 weeks
LastPass Yes Yes Yes Patched (Sep 2025) Release 🟠 ~6 weeks
Enpass Yes Yes Yes Patched (v6.11.6) Release 🟠 ~5 weeks
iCloud Passwords Yes No Yes Vulnerable (under review) 🔴 >7 weeks (no patch)
LogMeOnce Yes No Yes Patched (v7.12.7) Release 🟢 ~4 weeks
NordPass Yes Yes Partial Patched (mitigations) Release 🟠 ~5 weeks
ProtonPass Yes Yes Partial Patched (mitigations) Releases 🟠 ~5 weeks
RoboForm Yes Yes Yes Patched Update 🟢 ~4 weeks
Keeper Partial No No Partial patch (v17.2.0) Release 🟠 ~6 weeks (partial)

⮞ Key insight:

Even after patches, the problem remains architectural: as long as secrets transit the DOM, they remain exposed.
Zero-DOM solutions (PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, SeedNFC) eliminate the attack surface by ensuring secrets never leave their encrypted container.
Zero-DOM = zero attack surface.

Note: snapshot as of 2 October 2025. For per-product versions, release notes and CVE identifiers, see the table and vendors’ official advisories.

Technologies of Correction Used

Since the public disclosure of DOM Extension Clickjacking at DEF CON 33, vendors have rushed to release patches. Yet these fixes remain uneven, mostly limited to UI adjustments or conditional checks. No vendor has yet re-engineered the injection engine itself.

Before diving into the correction methods, here’s a visual overview of the main technologies vendors have deployed to mitigate DOM Extension Clickjacking. This image outlines the spectrum from cosmetic patches to sovereign Zero-DOM solutions.

Infographic showing five correction methods against DOM Extension Clickjacking: autofill restriction, subdomain filtering, Shadow DOM detection, contextual isolation, and Zero-DOM hardware
Five vendor responses to DOM Extension Clickjacking: from UI patches to sovereign Zero-DOM hardware.

Objective

This section explains how vendors attempted to fix the flaw, distinguishes cosmetic patches from structural corrections, and highlights sovereign Zero-DOM hardware approaches.

Correction Methods Observed (as of August 2025)

Method Description Affected Managers
Autofill Restriction Switch to “on-click” mode or default deactivation Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper
Subdomain Filtering Blocking autofill on non-authorized subdomains ProtonPass, RoboForm
Shadow DOM Detection Refusal to inject if the field is encapsulated inside Shadow DOM NordPass, Enpass
Contextual Isolation Checks before injection (iframe, opacity, focus) Bitwarden, ProtonPass
Hardware Sovereign (Zero DOM) Secrets never transit through the DOM: NFC HSM, HSM PGP, SeedNFC PassCypher, EviKey, SeedNFC (non-vulnerable by design)

📉 Limits Observed

  • Patches did not change the injection engine, only its activation triggers.
  • No vendor introduced a structural separation between UI and secret flows.
  • Any manager still tied to the DOM remains structurally exposed to clickjacking variants.
⮞ Strategic Transition
These patches show reaction, not rupture. They address symptoms, not the structural flaw.
To understand what separates a temporary patch from a doctrinal fix, let’s move to the next analysis.

Correction Technologies Against DOM Extension Clickjacking — Technical & Doctrinal Analysis

DOM extension clickjacking is a structural design flaw: secrets injected into a manipulable DOM can be hijacked unless the injection flow is architecturally separated from the browser.

What Current Fixes Do Not Address

  • No vendor has rebuilt its injection engine.
  • Fixes mostly limit activation (disable autofill, subdomain filters, detect some invisible elements) rather than change the injection model.

What a Structural Fix Would Require

  • Remove dependency on the DOM for secret injection.
  • Isolate the injection engine outside the browser (hardware or separate secure process).
  • Use hardware authentication (NFC, PGP, secure enclave) and require explicit physical/user validation.
  • Forbid interaction with invisible or encapsulated elements by design.

Typology of Fixes

Level Correction Type Description
Cosmetic UI/UX, autofill disabled by default No change to injection logic, only its trigger
Contextual DOM filtering, Shadow DOM, subdomains Adds conditions, but still relies on the DOM
Structural Zero DOM, hardware-based (PGP, NFC, HSM) Eliminates DOM use for secrets, separates UI and secret flows

Doctrinal Tests to Verify Patches

To check whether a vendor’s fix is structural, researchers can:

  • Inject an invisible field (opacity:0) inside an iframe and verify injection behavior.
  • Check whether extensions still inject secrets into encapsulated or non-visible inputs.
  • Verify whether autofill actions are auditable or blocked when context mismatches occur.

There is currently no widely adopted industry standard (NIST/OWASP/ISO) governing extension injection logic, separation of UI and secret flows, or traceability of autofill actions.

⮞ Conclusion
Current fixes are largely stopgaps. The durable solution is architectural: remove secrets from the DOM using Zero-DOM patterns and hardware-backed isolation (HSM/NFC/PGP), rather than piling UI patches on top of a flawed injection model.

Systemic Risks & Exploitation Vectors

DOM extension clickjacking is not an isolated bug but a systemic design flaw. When an extension’s injection flow is compromised, the impact goes well beyond a single leaked password: it can cascade through authentication layers and core infrastructure.

Critical scenarios

  • Persistent access — cloned TOTP or recovered session tokens can re-register “trusted” devices and preserve access after resets.
  • Passkey replay — an exfiltrated passkey can act as a reusable master token outside normal control boundaries.
  • SSO compromise — leaked OAuth/SAML tokens from an enterprise extension can expose entire IT systems.
  • Supply-chain exposure — weak or malicious extensions create a structural browser-level attack surface.
  • Crypto-asset theft — wallet extensions that rely on DOM injection can leak seed phrases, private keys, or sign malicious transactions.

⮞ Summary

The consequences reach far beyond credential theft: cloned TOTPs, replayed passkeys, compromised SSO tokens and exfiltrated seed phrases are all realistic outcomes. As long as secrets transit the DOM, they remain an exfiltration vector.

Sovereign threat comparison

Attack Target Secrets Sovereign countermeasure
ToolShell RCE SharePoint / OAuth SSL certs, SSO tokens Hardware-backed storage & signing (HSM/PGP)
eSIM hijack Mobile identity Carrier profiles Hardware anchoring (SeedNFC)
DOM clickjacking Browser extensions Credentials, TOTP, passkeys Zero-DOM + HSM / sandboxed autofill
Crypto-wallet hijack Wallet extensions Private keys, seed phrases HID/NFC injection from HSM (no DOM, no clipboard)
Atomic Stealer macOS clipboard PGP keys, wallet data Encrypted channels + HSM input (no clipboard)

Regional Exposure & Linguistic Impact — Anglophone World

Region Estimated Anglophone Users Password-Manager Adoption Sovereign Zero-DOM Countermeasures
Global English-speakers ≈1.5 billion users Strong (North America, UK, Australia) PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC
North America (USA + Canada Anglophone) ≈94 million users (36 % of US adults) Growing awareness; still low uptake PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM
United Kingdom High internet and crypto-wallet penetration Maturing adoption; rising regulations PassCypher HSM PGP, EviBITB

Strategic insight: the Anglophone sphere represents a large exposure surface; prioritize Zero-DOM, hardware-anchored mitigations in regional roadmaps. Sources: ICLS, Security.org, DataReportal.

Exposed Crypto Wallet Extensions

Crypto wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet) often rely on DOM interactions; overlays or invisible iframes can trick users into signing malicious transactions or exposing seed phrases. See §Sovereign Countermeasures for hardware mitigations.

SeedNFC HSM — hardware mitigation (concise)

Sovereign countermeasure: SeedNFC HSM provides hardware-backed storage for private keys and seed phrases kept outside the DOM. Injection is performed via secure NFC↔HID BLE channels and requires a physical user trigger, preventing DOM redressing and overlay-based signing attacks. See the full SeedNFC technical subsection for implementation details and usage flows.

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Fallible Sandbox & Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Browsers present their sandbox as a strong boundary — but DOM extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks show that UI-level illusions can still deceive users. A fake authentication frame or overlay can impersonate a trusted provider (Google, Microsoft, banks) and cause users to approve actions that release secrets or sign transactions. Standard directives such as frame-ancestors or some CSP rules do not necessarily block these interface forgeries.

Sandbox URL mechanism (technical): a robust Zero-DOM approach binds each credential or cryptographic reference to an expected URL (the “sandbox URL”) stored inside an encrypted HSM. Before any autofill or signing operation, the active page URL is compared to the HSM reference. If the URLs do not match, the secret is not released. This URL-level validation prevents exfiltration even when overlays or hidden frames evade visual detection.

Anti-iframe detection & mitigation (technical): real-time defenses inspect and neutralize suspicious iframe/overlay patterns (e.g., invisible elements, nested Shadow DOM, anomalous focus() sequences, unexpected pointer-events overrides). Detection heuristics include opacity, stacking context, focus redirections, and iframe ancestry checks; mitigation can remove or isolate the forged UI before any user interaction is processed.

For desktop flows, secure pairing between an Android NFC device and an HSM-enabled application allows secrets to be decrypted only in volatile RAM for a fraction of a second and injected outside the browser DOM, reducing persistence and exposure on the host system.

⮞ Technical Summary (attack defeated by sandbox URL + iframe neutralization)

The DOM extension clickjacking chain typically uses invisible CSS overlays (opacity:0, pointer-events:none), embedded iframes and encapsulated Shadow DOM nodes. By chaining focus() calls and cursor tracking, an extension may be tricked into autofilling credentials or signing transactions into attacker-controlled fields that are immediately exfiltrated. URL-based sandboxing plus real-time iframe neutralization closes this vector.

DOM extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser protection with EviBITB and Sandbox URL inside PassCypher HSM PGP / NFC HSM

✪ Illustration – Sandbox URL and iframe-neutralization protect credentials from clickjacking-trapped login forms.

⮞ Practical referenceFor a practical Zero-DOM implementation and product-level details (antiframe tooling, HSM URL binding and desktop pairing), see §PassCypher HSM PGP and §Sovereign Countermeasures.

BitUnlocker — Attaque sur BitLocker via WinRE

At DEF CON 33 and Black Hat USA 2025, the research team STORM presented a critical attack against BitLocker called BitUnlocker. This technique bypasses BitLocker protections by exploiting logical weaknesses in the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE).

Attack vectors

  • boot.sdi parsing — manipulation of the boot loading process
  • ReAgent.xml — modification of the recovery configuration file
  • Tampered BCD — exploitation of Boot Configuration Data settings

Methodology

The researchers targeted the boot chain and its recovery components to:

  • Identify logical vulnerabilities in WinRE;
  • Develop exploits capable of exfiltrating BitLocker secrets;
  • Propose countermeasures to reinforce BitLocker and WinRE security.

Strategic impact

This attack demonstrates that even encryption systems considered robust can be undermined via indirect vectors — in this case, the Windows recovery chain. It highlights the need for a defense-in-depth approach that protects not only cryptographic primitives but also the integrity of boot and recovery environments.

Phishable Passkeys — Overlay Attacks at DEF CON 33

At DEF CON 33, an independent demonstration showed that synced passkeys — often presented as “phishing-resistant” — can be silently exfiltrated using a simple overlay + redirect. Unlike DOM extension clickjacking, this vector requires no DOM injection: it abuses UI trust and browser-rendered frames to trick users and harvest synced credentials.

How the overlay attack works (summary)

  • Overlay / redirect: a fake authentication frame or overlay is shown that mimics a platform login.
  • Browser trust abused: the UI appears legitimate, so users approve actions or prompts that release synced passkeys.
  • Synced export: once the attacker gains access to the password manager, synced passkeys and credentials can be exported and reused.

Synced vs device-bound — core difference

  • Synced passkeys: stored and replicated via cloud/password-manager infrastructure — convenient but a single point of failure and phishable by UI-forgery attacks.
  • Device-bound passkeys: stored in a device secure element (hardware) and never leave the device — not subject to cloud-sync export, therefore far more resistant to overlay phishing.

Proofs & evidence

Strategic takeaway: overlay-based UI forgery proves that “phishing-resistance” depends on storage and trust model. Where passkeys are synced via cloud/password-managers they are phishable; device-bound credentials (secure element / hardware keys) remain the robust alternative. This reinforces the Zero-DOM + sovereign hardware doctrine.

Phishable Passkeys @ DEF CON 33 — Attribution & Technical Note

Principal Researcher: Dr. Chad Spensky (Allthenticate)

Technical Co-authors: Shourya Pratap Singh, Daniel Seetoh, Jonathan (Jonny) Lin — Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself (DEF CON 33)

Contributors acknowledged: Shortman, Masrt, sails, commandz, thelatesthuman, malarum (intro slide)

References:

Key takeaway: overlay-based UI forgery can exfiltrate synced passkeys without touching the DOM. This reinforces our doctrine: Zero-DOM + sovereign out-of-browser validation.

Strategic Signals from DEF CON 33

DEF CON 33 crystallised a shift in assumptions about browser security. Key takeaways below are concise and action-oriented.

  • Browsers are unreliable trust zones. The DOM should not be treated as a safe place for secrets.
  • Synced passkeys & DOM-injected secrets are phishable. UI-forgery and overlay techniques can defeat cloud-synced credentials.
  • Vendor responses vary; structural fixes are rare. Quick UI patches help, but few vendors have adopted architectural changes.
  • Prioritise hardware Zero-DOM approaches. Offline, hardware-anchored flows reduce exposure and belong in security roadmaps.

Summary

Rather than relying on cosmetic fixes, organisations should plan for doctrinal changes: treat any secret that touches the DOM as suspect and accelerate adoption of hardware-backed, Zero-DOM mitigations in product and policy roadmaps.

Sovereign Countermeasures (Zero DOM)

Vendor patches can reduce immediate risk but do not remove the root cause: secrets flowing through the DOM. Zero DOM means secrets should never reside in, transit through, or depend on the browser. The durable defence is architectural — keep credentials, TOTP, passkeys and private keys inside offline hardware and only expose them briefly in volatile memory when explicitly activated.

Zero DOM countermeasures flow — credentials, passkeys and crypto keys blocked from DOM exfiltration, secured by HSM PGP and NFC HSM sandbox URL injection

✪ Illustration — Zero DOM Flow: secrets remain inside the HSM, injected via HID into ephemeral RAM, making DOM exfiltration impossible.

In a Zero-DOM design, secrets are stored in offline HSMs and released only after an explicit physical action (NFC tap, HID pairing, local confirmation). Decryption happens in volatile RAM for the minimal time required to fill a field; nothing persists in the DOM or on disk.

Sovereign operation: NFC HSM, HID-BLE and HSM-PGP

NFC HSM ↔ Android ↔ Browser: the user physically presents the NFC HSM to an NFC-enabled Android device. The companion app verifies the request from the host, activates the module, and transmits the encrypted secret contactlessly to the host. Decryption occurs only in volatile RAM; the browser never holds the secret in clear.

NFC HSM ↔ HID-BLE: when paired with a Bluetooth HID emulator, the system types credentials straight into the target field over an AES-128-CBC encrypted BLE channel, avoiding clipboard, keyboard logging, and DOM exposure.

Local HSM-PGP activation: on desktop, a PassCypher-style HSM-PGP container decrypts locally (AES-256-CBC PGP) into RAM on a single user action. The secret is injected without traversing the DOM and is erased immediately after use.

This architecture removes the injection surface rather than patching it: no central server, no master password to extract, and no persistent cleartext inside the browser. Implementations should combine sandboxed URL checking, minimal ephemeral memory windows, and auditable activation logs to verify each autofill operation.

⮞ Summary

Zero DOM is a structural defence: keep secrets in hardware, require physical activation, decrypt only in RAM, and block any DOM-based injection or exfiltration.

passcypher-hsm-pgp

PassCypher HSM PGP — Patented Zero-DOM Technology & Sovereign Anti-Phishing Key Management

Long before DOM Extension Clickjacking was publicly exposed at DEF CON 33, Freemindtronic adopted a different approach. Since 2015 our R&D has followed a simple founding principle: never use the DOM to carry secrets. That Zero-Trust doctrine produced the patented Zero-DOM architecture behind PassCypher HSM PGP, which keeps credentials, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys and cryptographic keys confined in hardware HSM containers — never injected into a manipulable browser environment.

A unique advance in password managers

  • Native Zero-DOM — no sensitive data ever touches the browser.
  • Integrated HSM-PGP — AES-256-CBC encrypted containers with patented segmented-key protection.
  • Sovereign autonomy — no server, no central database, no cloud dependency.

Reinforced BITB protection (EviBITB)

Since 2020 PassCypher HSM PGP embeds EviBITB, a serverless engine that neutralizes Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks in real time by detecting and destroying malicious iframes and fraudulent overlays and validating UI context anonymously. EviBITB can operate manually, semi-automatically or fully automatically to drastically reduce BITB and invisible DOM-hijacking risk.

EviBITB embedded in PassCypher HSM PGP: real-time iframe and overlay detection and mitigation
EviBITB embedded in PassCypher HSM PGP: real-time detection and destruction of redirect iFrames and malicious overlays.

Why it resists DEF CON-style attacks

Nothing ever transits the DOM, there is no master password to extract, and containers remain encrypted at rest. Decryption occurs only in volatile RAM for the brief instant required to assemble key segments; after autofill the data is erased, leaving no exploitable trace.

Key features

  • Shielded autofill — single-click autofill via sandboxed URL, never exposed in cleartext in the browser.
  • Embedded EviBITB — real-time iframe/overlay neutralization (manual / semi / automatic), fully serverless.
  • Integrated crypto tooling — segmented AES-256 key generation and PGP key management without external dependencies.
  • Universal compatibility — works with any website via the extension; no additional plugins required.
  • Sovereign architecture — zero server, zero central DB, zero DOM; designed to remain resilient where cloud managers fail.

Immediate implementation

No complex setup is required. Install the PassCypher HSM PGP extension from the Chrome Web Store or Edge Add-ons, enable the BITB option, and benefit instantly from Zero-DOM sovereign protection.

⮞ Summary

PassCypher HSM PGP redefines secret management: permanently encrypted containers, segmented keys, ephemeral decryption in RAM, Zero-DOM and zero-cloud. A hardware-centric, passwordless solution engineered to resist current threats and anticipate quantum-era risks.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Sovereign Passwordless Manager

Software password managers fall into the trap of a simple iframe, but PassCypher NFC HSM follows a different path: it never lets your credentials and passwords transit through the DOM. The nano-HSM keeps them encrypted offline and only releases them for a fleeting instant in volatile memory — just long enough to authenticate.

User-side operation:

  • Untouchable secrets — the NFC HSM encrypts and stores credentials so they never appear or leak.
  • TOTP/HOTP — the PassCypher NFC HSM Android app or the PassCypher HSM PGP on desktop generates and displays them instantly on demand.
  • Manual entry — the user enters a PIN or TOTP directly into the login field on a computer or Android NFC phone. The PassCypher app shows the code generated by the NFC HSM module. The same process applies to credentials, passkeys, and other secrets.
  • Contactless autofill — the user simply presents the PassCypher NFC HSM module to a smartphone or computer, which executes autofill seamlessly, even when paired with PassCypher HSM PGP.
  • Desktop autofill — with PassCypher HSM PGP on Windows or macOS, the user clicks the integrated login field button to auto-complete login and password, with optional auto-validation.
  • Distributed anti-BITB — the NFC ↔ Android ↔ browser (Win/Mac/Linux) secure pairing triggers EviBITB to destroy malicious iframes in real time.
  • HID BLE mode — a paired Bluetooth HID keyboard emulator injects credentials outside the DOM, blocking both DOM-based attacks and keyloggers.

⮞ Summary

PassCypher NFC HSM embodies Zero Trust (every action requires physical validation) and Zero Knowledge (no secret is ever exposed). A sovereign hardware identity safeguard by design, it neutralizes clickjacking, BITB attacks, typosquatting, keylogging, IDN spoofing, DOM injections, clipboard hijacking, malicious extensions, while anticipating quantum attacks.

✪ Attacks Neutralized by PassCypher NFC HSM

Attack Type Description Status with PassCypher
Clickjacking / UI Redressing Invisible iframes or overlays that hijack user clicks Neutralized (EviBITB)
BITB (Browser-in-the-Browser) Fake browser frames simulating login windows Neutralized (sandbox + pairing)
Keylogging Keystroke capture by malware Neutralized (HID BLE mode)
Typosquatting Lookalike URLs mimicking legitimate domains Neutralized (physical validation)
Homograph Attack (IDN spoofing) Unicode substitution deceiving users on domain names Neutralized (Zero DOM)
DOM Injection / DOM XSS Malicious scripts injected into the DOM Neutralized (out-of-DOM architecture)
Clipboard Hijacking Interception or modification of clipboard data Neutralized (no clipboard usage)
Malicious Extensions Browser compromised by rogue plugins Neutralized (pairing + sandbox)
Quantum Attacks (anticipated) Massive computation to break crypto keys Mitigated (segmented keys + AES-256 CBC + PGP)

SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Secure Wallet Injection

Browser wallet extensions thrive in the DOM — and attackers exploit that weakness. With SeedNFC HSM, the logic flips: the enclave never releases private keys or seed phrases. When users initialize or restore a wallet (web or desktop), the system performs input through a Bluetooth HID emulation — like a hardware keyboard — with no clipboard, no DOM, and no trace for private keys, public keys, or even hot wallet credentials.

Operational flow (anti-DOM, anti-clipboard):

  • Custody — the SeedNFC HSM encrypts and stores the seed/private key (never exports it, never reveals it).
  • Physical activation — the NFC HSM authorizes the operation when the user presents it contactlessly via the Freemindtronic app (Android NFC smartphone).
  • HID BLE injection — the system types the seed (or required fragment/format) directly into the wallet input field, outside the DOM and outside the clipboard, resisting even software keyloggers.
  • BITB protection — users can activate EviBITB (anti-BITB iframe destroyer) inside the app, which neutralizes overlays and malicious redirections during onboarding or recovery.
  • Ephemerality — volatile RAM temporarily holds the data during HID input, then instantly erases it.

Typical use cases:

  • Onboarding or recovery of wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, etc.) without ever exposing the private key to the browser or DOM. The HSM keeps the secret encrypted and decrypts it only in RAM, for the minimal time required.
  • Sensitive operations on desktop (logical air-gap), with physical validation by the user: the user presents the NFC HSM module under an Android NFC smartphone to authorize the action, without keyboard interaction or DOM exposure.
  • Secure multi-asset backup: an offline hardware HSM stores seed phrases, master keys, and private keys, allowing reuse without copying, exporting, or capturing. Users perform activation exclusively through physical, sovereign, and auditable means.

⮞ Summary

First of all, SeedNFC HSM with HID BLE injects private or public keys directly into hot wallet fields via a Bluetooth Low Energy HID emulator, thereby bypassing both keyboard typing and clipboard transfer. Moreover, the channel encrypts data with AES-128 CBC, while the NFC module physically triggers activation, ensuring a secure and verifiable process.
In addition, users can enable anti-BITB protection to neutralize malicious overlays and deceptive redirections.
Finally, the HSM enclave keeps secrets strictly confined, outside the DOM and beyond the reach of malicious extensions, thus guaranteeing sovereign protection by design.

Exploitation Scenarios & Mitigation Paths

The DEF CON 33 revelations are a warning — threats will evolve beyond simple patches. Key near-term scenarios to watch:

  • AI-driven clickjacking: LLMs and automation create realistic, real-time DOM overlays and Shadow-DOM traps at scale — making phishing + DOM hijack far more scalable and convincing.
  • Hybrid mobile tapjacking: stacked UI elements, invisible gestures, and background app interactions enable large-scale mobile validation/exfiltration (OTP, transaction approvals).
  • Post-quantum HSMs: long-term mitigation requires hardware anchors and quantum-resistant key management — move the security boundary into certified HSMs and out of the browser. See §Sovereign Countermeasures for architectural guidance.

⮞ Summary

Future attackers will bypass browser fixes. Mitigation requires a rupture: offline hardware anchors, post-quantum HSM planning, and Zero-DOM designs rather than incremental software band-aids.

Strategic Synthesis

DOM extension clickjacking shows that browsers and extensions cannot be treated as trusted execution zones for secrets. Patches reduce risk but do not eliminate the structural exposure.

The sovereign path — three priorities

  • Governance: treat extensions and autofill engines as critical infrastructure — tighten development controls, mandatory audits, and incident disclosure rules.
  • Architectural change: adopt Zero-DOM designs so secrets never transit the browser; require physical activation for sensitive operations.
  • Hardware resilience: invest in hardware anchors and post-quantum HSM roadmaps to remove single-point failures in cloud/sync models.

Doctrine — concise

  • Consider any secret that touches the DOM as potentially compromised.
  • Prefer physical activation (NFC, HID BLE, HSM flows) for high-value operations.
  • Audit and regulate extension injection logic as a security-critical function.
Regulatory note — Existing regimes (CRA, NIS2, national frameworks) improve software resilience but generally do not address secrets embedded in the DOM. Policymakers should close this blind spot by requiring provable separation of UI and secret flows.

 

Glossary

DOM (Document Object Model)

In-memory representation of a web page’s HTML/JS structure; allows scripts and extensions to access and modify page elements.

Shadow DOM

Encapsulated DOM subtree used to isolate web components; can hide elements from the rest of the document.

Clickjacking

UI redressing technique that tricks users into clicking hidden or overlaid elements.

DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking

Attack variant where a malicious page chains invisible iframes, Shadow DOM and focus() redirects to coerce an extension into injecting secrets into a fake form.

Autofill

Mechanism used by password managers and browser extensions to automatically populate credentials, OTPs or passkeys into web fields.

Passkey

WebAuthn authentication credential (public-key based). Passkeys are phishing-resistant when stored device-bound in a secure element; cloud-synced passkeys are more exposed.

WebAuthn / FIDO

Public-key authentication standard (FIDO2) for passwordless logins; security depends on storage model (synced vs device-bound).

TOTP / HOTP

One-time codes generated by time-based (TOTP) or counter-based (HOTP) algorithms for two-factor authentication.

HSM (Hardware Security Module)

Hardware device that securely generates, stores and uses cryptographic keys without exposing them in cleartext outside the enclave.

PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)

Hybrid encryption standard using public/private keys; here used to protect AES-256-CBC encrypted containers.

AES-256 CBC

Symmetric encryption algorithm (CBC mode) with 256-bit keys — used to encrypt secret containers.

Segmented keys

Key fragmentation approach: keys are split into segments to increase resistance and are assembled securely in ephemeral RAM.

Ephemeral RAM

Volatile memory where secrets are briefly decrypted for an autofill operation and immediately erased — no persistence to disk or DOM.

NFC (Near Field Communication)

Contactless technology used to physically activate an HSM and authorize local secret release.

HID-BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy HID)

BLE keyboard emulation mode to inject data directly into fields without using the DOM or clipboard.

Sandbox URL

Mechanism binding each secret to an expected URL stored inside the HSM; if the active URL does not match, autofill is blocked.

Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Overlay attack that simulates a browser window inside an iframe — tricks users into interacting with a fake authentication frame.

EviBITB

Serverless anti-BITB engine that detects and destroys malicious iframes/overlays in real time and validates UI context anonymously.

SeedNFC

Hardware HSM solution for seed phrase / private key custody; performs out-of-DOM injection via HID/NFC.

Iframe

HTML frame embedding another page; invisible iframes (opacity:0, pointer-events:none) are commonly used in UI redressing attacks.
focus()
JavaScript call that sets focus on a field. Abused to redirect user events to attacker-controlled inputs.

Overlay

Visual layer (fake window/frame) that masks the real interface and deceives the user about the origin of an action.

Exfiltration

Unauthorized extraction of sensitive data from the target (credentials, TOTP, passkeys, private keys).

Phishable

Describes a mechanism (e.g., cloud-synced passkeys) that can be compromised by UI forgery or overlays — therefore vulnerable to phishing.

Content-Security-Policy (CSP)

Web policy controlling resource origins; useful but alone insufficient against advanced clickjacking variants.

X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors

HTTP headers / CSP directives intended to limit iframe inclusion; can be bypassed in complex attack scenarios.

Keylogging

Malicious capture of keystrokes; mitigated by secure HID injection (no software keyboard or clipboard use).

Note: this glossary standardises terms used in the chronicle. For normative definitions and standards, consult OWASP, NIST and FIDO/WebAuthn specifications.

🔥 In short: cloud patches help, but hardware and Zero-DOM architectures prevent class failures.

⮞ Note — What this chronicle does not cover:

This article does not provide exploitable PoCs or step-by-step attack instructions for DOM clickjacking or passkey phishing. It also does not analyse cryptocurrency economics or specific legal cases beyond a strategic security viewpoint.

The objective: explain structural flaws, quantify systemic risks, and outline Zero-DOM hardware countermeasures as the robust mitigation path. For implementation details, see §Sovereign Countermeasures and the product subsections collected there.

 

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords Creation

Digital image showing a confused user at a computer surrounded by complex password symbols

How to Create Strong Passwords Despite Human Limitations

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords are crucial in safeguarding our personal and professional data online. But do you know how to craft a robust password capable of thwarting hacking attempts? In this article, we delve into the impact of human factors on password security. Furthermore, you will gain insights on overcoming these limitations and creating formidable passwords.

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For comprehensive threat assessments and innovative solutions, delve into “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords.” Stay informed by exploring our constantly updated topics..

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords,” authored by Jacques Gascuel, the visionary behind cutting-edge sensitive data security and safety systems, offers invaluable insights into the field of human-created password security. Are you ready to improve your understanding of password protection?

Human Limitations in Strong Passwords: Cybersecurity’s Weak Link

Passwords are essential for protecting our data on the Internet. But creating a strong password is not easy. It requires a balance between security and usability. In this article, we will explain what entropy is and how it measures the strength of a password. We will also explore the limitations and problems associated with human password creation. We will show that these factors reduce entropy and password security, exposing users to cyber attacks. We will also provide some strategies and tips to help users create stronger passwords.

What is Entropy and How Does it Measure Password Strength?

Entropy is a concept borrowed from information theory. It measures the unpredictability and randomness of a system. The higher the entropy, the more disordered the system is, and the harder it is to predict.

In the context of passwords, entropy measures how many attempts it would take to guess a password through brute force. In other words, entropy measures the difficulty of cracking a password. The higher the entropy, the stronger the password is, and the harder it is to crack.

However, entropy is not a fixed value, but a relative measure that depends on various factors, such as the length, composition, frequency, and popularity of the password. We will explain these factors in more detail later.

How Do Cognitive Biases Influence Password Creation?

Cognitive Biases in Password Creation

Cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias and anchoring bias, significantly influence how users create passwords. Understanding “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” is essential to recognize and overcome these biases for better password security.

Cognitive biases are reasoning or judgment errors that affect how humans perceive and process information. They are often the result of heuristics, mental shortcuts used to simplify decision-making. These biases can have adaptive advantages but also lead to errors or distortions of reality.

In password creation, cognitive biases can influence user choices, leading to passwords that make sense to them, linked to their personal life, culture, environment, etc. These passwords are often predictable, following logical or mnemonic patterns, reducing entropy.

For example, humans are subject to confirmation bias, thinking their password is strong enough because it meets basic criteria like length or composition, without considering other factors like character frequency or diversity.

They are also prone to anchoring bias, choosing passwords based on personal information like names, birthdates, pets, etc., not realizing this information is easily accessible or guessable by hackers.

Availability bias leads to underestimating cyber attack risks because they haven’t been victims or witnesses of hacking, or they think their data isn’t interesting to hackers.

Human Factors in Strong Password Development: Cognitive Biases

Strategies to Overcome Cognitive Biases

To mitigate the impact of cognitive biases, consider adopting better password practices:

  • Utilize a different password for each service, especially for sensitive or critical accounts, such as email, banking, or social media.
  • Employ a password manager, which is a software or application that securely stores and generates passwords for each service. Password managers can assist users in creating and recalling strong, random passwords, all while maintaining security and convenience.
  • Implement two-factor authentication, a security feature that necessitates users to provide an additional verification method, such as a code sent to their phone or email, or a biometric scan, in order to access their accounts. Two-factor authentication can effectively thwart hackers from gaining access to accounts, even if they possess the password.
  • Regularly update passwords, but refrain from doing so excessively, in order to prevent compromise by hackers or data breaches. Users should change their passwords when they suspect or confirm a breach or when they detect suspicious activity on their accounts. It’s also advisable for users to avoid changing their passwords too frequently, as this can lead to weaker passwords or password reuse.

Addressing Human Challenges in Secure Password Creation with Freemindtronic’s Advanced Technologies

Understanding Human Constraints in Robust Password Generation

The process of creating strong passwords often clashes with human limitations. Freemindtronic’s EviPass NFC HSM and EviPass HSM PGP technologies, integral to the PassCypher range, acknowledge these human factors in strong password development. By automating the creation process and utilizing Shannon’s entropy model, these technologies effectively mitigate the cognitive biases that typically hinder the creation of secure passwords.

Password Security and the Fight Against Cyber Attacks

In the context of increasing cyber threats, the security of passwords becomes paramount. Freemindtronic’s solutions offer a robust defense against cyber attacks by generating passwords that exceed conventional security standards. This approach not only addresses the human challenges in creating strong passwords but also fortifies the digital identity protection of users.

Leveraging Entropy in Passwords for Enhanced Security

The concept of entropy in passwords is central to Freemindtronic’s technology. By harnessing advanced entropy models, these systems ensure a high level of randomness and complexity in password creation, significantly elevating password security. This technical sophistication is crucial in overcoming human limitations in generating secure passwords.

Cognitive Biases in Passwords: Simplifying User Experience

Freemindtronic’s technologies also focus on the human aspect of password usage. By reducing the cognitive load through features like auto-fill and passwordless access, these systems address common cognitive biases. This user-friendly approach not only enhances the ease of use but also contributes to the overall strategy for strong password management.

Adopting Strong Password Strategies for Digital Identity Protection

Incorporating strong password strategies is essential in safeguarding digital identities. Freemindtronic’s technologies empower users to adopt robust password practices effortlessly, thereby enhancing digital identity protection. This is achieved through the generation of complex passwords and the elimination of the need for manual password management.

Elevating Password Security in the Digital Age

Freemindtronic’s EviPass NFC HSM and EviPass HSM PGP technologies are at the forefront of addressing human limitations in strong password creation. By integrating advanced entropy in passwords, focusing on user-centric design, and combating the risks of cyber attacks, these technologies are setting new benchmarks in password security and digital identity protection. Their innovative approach not only acknowledges but also effectively overcomes the human challenges in secure password creation, marking a significant advancement in the field of digital security.

Human Constraints in Robust Password Generation

There are various methods to help users create strong, memorable passwords. These methods have pros and cons, which should be understood to choose the most suitable for one’s needs.

Mnemonic Passwords: Balancing Memory and Security

Mnemonic passwords are based on phrases or acronyms, serving as memory aids. For example, using the phrase “I was born in 1984 in Paris” to create the password “Iwbi1984iP”.

Advantages of mnemonic passwords:

  • Easier to remember than random passwords, using semantic memory, more effective than visual or auditory memory.
  • Can be longer than random passwords, composed of multiple words or syllables, increasing entropy.

Disadvantages of mnemonic passwords:

  • Often predictable, following logical or grammatical patterns, reducing entropy.
  • Vulnerable to dictionary attacks, containing common words or personal information, easily accessible or guessable by hackers.
  • Difficult to type, containing special characters like accents or spaces, not always available on keyboards.

The Trade-Off Between Mnemonics and Entropy

To balance memory and security, users should use mnemonics that are not too obvious or common, but rather personal and unique. They should also avoid using the same mnemonic for different passwords, or using slight variations of the same mnemonic. They should also add some randomness or complexity to their mnemonics, such as numbers, symbols, or capitalization.

Random Passwords: Entropy and Ease of Use

Random passwords are composed of randomly chosen characters, without logic or meaning. For example, the password “qW7x#4Rt”.

Advantages of random passwords:

  • Harder to guess than mnemonic passwords, not following predictable patterns, increasing entropy.
  • More resistant to dictionary attacks, not containing common words or personal information.

Disadvantages of random passwords:

  • Harder to remember than mnemonic passwords, not using semantic memory.
  • Can be shorter than mnemonic passwords, composed of individual characters, reducing entropy.

Phrase-Based Passwords: Entropy and Ease of Use

Phrase-based passwords are composed of several words forming a phrase or expression. For example, the password “The cat sleeps on the couch”.

Advantages of phrase-based passwords:

  • Easier to remember than random passwords, using semantic memory.
  • Can be longer than random passwords, composed of multiple words, increasing entropy.

Disadvantages of phrase-based passwords:

  • Often predictable, following logical or grammatical patterns, reducing entropy.
  • Vulnerable to dictionary attacks, containing common words or expressions.
  • Difficult to type, containing spaces, not always accepted by online services.

Evaluating Phrase-Based Password Effectiveness

To evaluate the effectiveness of phrase-based passwords, users should consider the following criteria:

  • Phrase length plays a crucial role: Longer phrases tend to result in higher entropy. However, it’s important to strike a balance, as excessively long phrases can become challenging to type or recall.
  • The diversity of words also matters: Greater word diversity contributes to higher entropy. Nevertheless, it’s essential to avoid overly obscure words, as they might prove difficult to remember or spell.
  • Randomness in word selection boosts entropy: The more random the words, the greater the entropy. Yet, it’s necessary to maintain some level of coherence between words, as entirely unrelated words can pose memory and association challenges.

Human-Generated Random Passwords: Entropy and Ease of Use

Human-generated random passwords are composed of randomly chosen characters by the user, without logic or meaning. For example, the password “qW7x#4Rt”.

Advantages :

  • Harder to guess than mnemonic or phrase-based passwords, increasing entropy.
  • More resistant to dictionary attacks, not containing common words or personal information.

Disadvantages:

  • Harder to remember than mnemonic or phrase-based passwords.
  • Often biased by user preferences or habits, favoring certain characters or keyboard positions, reducing entropy.

The Risks of Low Entropy in Human-Created Passwords

Low entropy passwords have significant consequences on the security of personal and professional data. Weak passwords are more vulnerable to cyber attacks, especially brute force. Hackers can use powerful software or machines to test billions of combinations per second. Once the password is found, they can access user accounts, steal data, impersonate, or spread viruses or spam.

Consequences of Predictable Passwords on Cybersecurity

The consequences of predictable passwords on cybersecurity are:

  • Data breach: Hackers can access user data, such as personal information, financial records, health records, etc. They can use this data for identity theft, fraud, blackmail, or sell it to third parties.
  • Account takeover: Hackers can access user accounts, such as email, social media, online shopping, etc. They can use these accounts to impersonate users, send spam, make purchases, or spread malware.
  • Reputation damage: Hackers can access user accounts, such as professional or academic platforms, etc. They can use these accounts to damage user reputation, post false or harmful information, or sabotage user work or research.

Understanding the Vulnerability of Low Entropy Passwords

Password Length and Entropy

The vulnerability of passwords depends on various factors, including the length, composition, frequency, and popularity of the password. Understanding “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” is crucial for safeguarding your online data. Longer and more complex passwords offer higher entropy and are harder to crack.

Composition Complexity

Complex passwords that include a variety of character types, such as lowercase, uppercase, numbers, and symbols, significantly enhance security. This aspect of “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” is often overlooked, but it’s essential for creating robust passwords.

Common vs. Rare Passwords

The frequency and popularity of passwords play a vital role in their vulnerability. Common passwords, like “123456” or “password,” are easily guessed, while rare and unique passwords, such as “qW7x#4Rt” or “The cat sleeps on the couch,” provide more security.

Password Composition

The composition of a password is a critical factor. Passwords based on common words or personal information are easier for hackers to guess. Understanding the impact of “Human Limitations in Strong Passwords” can help you make informed choices about password composition.

These factors collectively influence the time required for brute force attacks to uncover a password. Longer durations enhance password security, but it’s essential to consider the evolving computing power of hackers, which can reduce the time required to crack passwords over time and with advancing technology. Another factor that affects the vulnerability of passwords is their frequency and popularity.

Recurring Password Changes: A Challenge to Password Entropy

Another human limitation in creating strong passwords is the recurrent need to change them. Often mandated by online services for security, regular changes can paradoxically weaken password strength. This practice burdens users with remembering multiple passwords and inventing new ones frequently. It leads to slight modifications of existing passwords rather than generating new, more random ones. This habit reduces password entropy, making passwords more predictable and vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Impact of Frequent Password Updates on Security

Studies have shown that users required to change passwords every 90 days tend to create weaker, less diverse passwords. Conversely, those with less frequent changes generate more random and secure passwords. This illustrates the counterproductive nature of too-frequent mandatory password updates.

The Counterproductive Nature of Mandatory Password Changes

Mandatory password changes are often imposed by online services for security reasons. They aim to prevent password compromise by hackers or leaks. However, mandatory password changes can have negative effects on password security, such as:

  • Elevating cognitive load entails users remembering multiple passwords for each service and crafting new passwords whenever needed.
  • Dampening user motivation occurs when individuals view password changes as unnecessary or ineffective, leading to a neglect of password quality.
  • Diminishing password entropy arises when users opt for making slight modifications to old passwords rather than generating entirely new and random ones.

These effects negatively impact password security, making passwords more predictable and vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Research Insights on Low Entropy in Human Passwords

In this section, we will present some sources and findings from scientific studies conducted by researchers from around the world on passwords and entropy. We have verified the validity and accuracy of these sources using web search and citation verification tools. We have also respected the APA citation style.

Analyzing Global Studies on Password Security

Several studies have analyzed the security of passwords based on real databases of passwords disclosed following leaks or hacks. These studies have measured the entropy and the strength of passwords, as well as the patterns and the behaviors of users. Some of these studies are:

Key Findings from Password Entropy Research

Some of the key findings from these studies are:

  • any users maintain low-entropy passwords, relying on common words, personal information, or predictable patterns.
  • Furthermore, they tend to reuse passwords across multiple services, thereby elevating the risk of cross-service compromise.
  • In addition, they typically refrain from changing passwords regularly, unless prompted to do so by online services or following a security breach.
  • Surprisingly, a significant portion of users remains unaware of the critical importance of password security or tends to overestimate the strength of their passwords.
  • Moreover, a considerable number of users exhibit reluctance towards the adoption of password managers or two-factor authentication, often citing usability or trust concerns.

These findings confirm the low entropy of human passwords, and the need for better password practices and education.

Password Reuse and Its Impact on Entropy

Another issue with human password creation is password reuse, a common practice among Internet users, who have to remember multiple passwords for different services. Password reuse consists of using the same or similar passwords for different accounts, such as email, social media, online shopping, etc. Password reuse can reduce the cognitive load and the effort required to create and remember passwords, but it also reduces the entropy and the security of passwords.

The Risks Associated with Password Reuse

The risks associated with password reuse are:

  • Cross-service compromise: If a password is discovered or compromised on one service, it can be used to access other services that use the same or similar password. For example, if a hacker obtains a user’s email password, they can use it to access their social media, online shopping, or banking accounts, if they use the same password or a slight variation of it.
  • Credential stuffing: Credential stuffing is a type of cyberattack that uses automated tools to test stolen or leaked usernames and passwords on multiple services. For example, if a hacker obtains a list of usernames and passwords from a data breach, they can use it to try to log in to other services, hoping that some users have reused their passwords.
  • Password cracking: Password cracking is a type of cyberattack that uses brute force or dictionary methods to guess passwords. For example, if a hacker obtains a user’s password hash, they can use it to try to find the plain text password, using lists of common or leaked passwords.

These risks show that password reuse can expose users to cyber threats, as a single password breach can compromise multiple accounts and data. Password reuse can also reduce the entropy of passwords, as users tend to use common or simple passwords that are easy to remember and type, but also easy to guess or crack.

Addressing the Security Flaws of Reusing Passwords

To mitigate the security vulnerabilities associated with password reuse, users should embrace improved practices for password creation and management. Some of these recommended practices include:

  • Utilize distinct passwords for each service, particularly for sensitive or crucial accounts such as email, banking, or social media. This approach ensures that if one password is compromised, it won’t jeopardize other accounts or data.
  • Employ a password manager, which is software or an application designed to securely store and generate passwords for each service. Password managers assist users in crafting and recalling strong, randomly generated passwords, all while upholding security and convenience. Additionally, these tools can notify users about password breaches or weak passwords, as well as suggest password changes or updates.
  • Implement two-factor authentication (2FA), a security feature demanding users to provide an additional verification method, such as a code sent to their phone or email, or a biometric scan. This extra layer of security thwarts hackers from gaining access to accounts solely through knowledge of the password, as they would require the second factor as well.
  • Adopt a regular password change strategy, though not excessively frequent, to preempt compromise by hackers or data leaks. Passwords should be modified when users suspect or verify a breach, or when they detect suspicious activity on their accounts. It’s also advisable to avoid changing passwords too frequently, as this can potentially result in weaker passwords or password reuse.

These practices can help users avoid password reuse and increase the entropy and security of their passwords. They can also reduce the cognitive load and the effort required to create and remember passwords, by using tools and features that simplify password creation and management.

Behavioral Resistance in Secure Password Practices

Another issue with human password creation is resistance to behavioral changes, a psychological phenomenon preventing users from adopting new habits or modifying old ones regarding passwords. Users are often reluctant to change passwords, even when aware of risks or encouraged to do so. This resistance can be due to factors like laziness, ignorance, confidence, fear, satisfaction, etc.

Overcoming Psychological Barriers in Password Security

Psychological barriers can hinder password security, as users may not follow the best practices or recommendations to create stronger passwords. To overcome these barriers, users need to be aware of the importance and benefits of password security, as well as the costs and risks of password insecurity. Some of the ways to overcome psychological barriers are:

  • Educating users about password security, explaining what entropy is, how it measures password strength, and how to increase it.
  • Motivating users to change passwords, providing incentives, feedback, or rewards for creating stronger passwords.
  • Persuading users to adopt password managers, demonstrating how they can simplify password creation and management, without compromising security or convenience.
  • Nudging users to use two-factor authentication, making it easy and accessible to enable and use this security feature.

Conclusion: Reinforcing Password Security Amidst Human Limitations

In this article, we have explained what entropy is and how it measures the strength of a password. We also explored the limitations and problems associated with human password creation, such as cognitive biases, human generation methods, password reuse, and resistance to behavioral changes. We have shown that these factors reduce entropy and password security, exposing users to cyber attacks. We have also provided some strategies and tips to help users create stronger passwords.

We hope this article has helped you understand the importance of password security and improve your password practices. Remember, passwords protect your digital identity and data online. Creating strong passwords is not only a matter of security, but also of responsibility.