In Sovereign Cybersecurity ↑ This article is part of our Digital Security section, continuing our research on zero-trust hardware exploits and countermeasures.

What is a WebAuthn API Hijacking Attack?

A WebAuthn interception attack via a spoofable authentication prompt (WebAuthn API Hijacking) consists of imitating in real time the authentication window displayed by a system or browser. Consequently, the attacker does not seek to break the cryptographic algorithm; instead, they reproduce the user interface (UI) at the exact moment the victim expects to see a legitimate prompt. Visual lures, precise timing, and perfect synchronization make the deception indistinguishable to the user.

History of Passkey / WebAuthn Vulnerabilities

Despite their cryptographic robustness, passkeys — based on the open standards WebAuthn and FIDO2 from the FIDO Alliance — are not invulnerable. The history of vulnerabilities and recent research confirms that the key weakness often lies in the user interaction and the execution environment (browser, operating system). The industry officially adopted passkeys on May 5, 2022, following a commitment from Apple, Google, and Microsoft to extend their support on their respective platforms.

Timeline of Vulnerabilities

• SquareX – Compromised Browsers (August 2025):

  At DEF CON 33, a demonstration showed that a malicious extension or script can intercept the WebAuthn flow to substitute keys. See the TechRadar analysis and the SecurityWeek report.

• CVE-2025-31161 (March/April 2025):

  Authentication bypass in CrushFTP via a race condition. Official NIST Source.

• CVE-2024-9956 (March 2025):

  Account takeover via Bluetooth on Android. This attack demonstrated that an attacker can remotely trigger a malicious authentication via a `FIDO:/` intent. Analysis from Risky.Biz. Official NIST Source.

• CVE-2024-12604 (March 2025):

  Cleartext storage of sensitive data in Tap&Sign, exploiting poor password management. Official NIST Source.

• CVE-2025-26788 (February 2025):

  Authentication bypass in StrongKey FIDO Server. Detailed Source.

• Passkeys Pwned – Browser-based API Hijacking (Early 2025):

  A research study showed that the browser, as a single mediator, can be a point of failure. Read the Security Boulevard analysis.

• CVE-2024-9191 (November 2024):

  Password exposure via Okta Device Access. Official NIST Source.

• CVE-2024-39912 (July 2024):

  User enumeration via a flaw in the PHP library `web-auth/webauthn-lib`. Official NIST Source.

• CTRAPS-type Attacks (2024):

  These protocol-level attacks (CTAP) exploit authentication mechanisms for unauthorized actions. For more information on FIDO protocol-level attacks, see this Black Hat presentation on FIDO vulnerabilities.

• First Large-Scale Rollout (September 2022):

  Apple was the first to deploy passkeys on a large scale with the release of iOS 16, making this technology a reality for hundreds of millions of users. Official Apple Press Release.

• Industry Launch & Adoption (May 2022):

  The FIDO Alliance, joined by Apple, Google, and Microsoft, announced an action plan to extend passkey support across all their platforms. Official FIDO Alliance Press Release.

• Timing Attacks on keyHandle (2022):

  A vulnerability allowing account correlation by measuring time variations in the processing of `keyHandles`. See IACR ePrint 2022 article.

• Phishing of Recovery Methods (since 2017):

  Attackers use AitM proxies (like Evilginx, which appeared in 2017) to hide the passkey option and force a fallback to less secure methods that can be captured. More details on this technique.

AI as a Threat Multiplier

Artificial intelligence is not a security flaw, but a catalyst that makes existing attacks more effective. Since the emergence of generative AI models like GPT-3 (2020) and DALL-E 2 (2022), new capabilities for automating threats have appeared. These developments notably allow for:

• Large-scale Attacks (since 2022): Generative AI enables attackers to create custom authentication prompts and phishing messages for a massive volume of targets, increasing the effectiveness of phishing of recovery methods.
• Accelerated Vulnerability Research (since 2023): AI can be used to automate the search for security flaws, such as user enumeration or the detection of logical flaws in implementation code.

“These recent and historical vulnerabilities highlight the critical role of the browser and the deployment model (device-bound vs. synced). They reinforce the call for sovereign architectures that are disconnected from these vectors of compromise.”

Vulnerability of the Synchronization Model

One of the most debated passkeys security vulnerabilities does not concern the WebAuthn protocol itself, but its deployment model. Most publications on the subject differentiate between two types of passkeys:

• Device-bound passkeys: Stored on a physical device (like a hardware security key or Secure Enclave). This model is generally considered highly secure because it is not synchronized via a third-party service.
• Synced passkeys: Stored in a password manager or a cloud service (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, etc.). These passkeys can be synchronized across multiple devices. For more details on this distinction, refer to the FIDO Alliance documentation.

The vulnerability lies here: if an attacker manages to compromise the cloud service account, they could potentially gain access to the synced passkeys across all the user’s devices. This is a risk that device-bound passkeys do not share. Academic research, such as this paper published on arXiv, explores this issue, highlighting that “the security of synced passkeys is primarily concentrated with the passkey provider.”

This distinction is crucial because the implementation of vulnerable synced passkeys contradicts the very spirit of a so-called phishing-resistant MFA, as synchronization introduces an intermediary and an additional attack surface. This justifies the FIDO Alliance’s recommendation to prioritize device-bound passkeys for maximum security.

The DEF CON 33 Demonstration – WebAuthn API Hijacking in Action

WebAuthn API Hijacking is the central thread of this section: we briefly explain the attack path shown at DEF CON 33 and how a spoofable prompt enabled real-time session takeover, before detailing the live evidence and the video highlights.

Passkeys Pwned — DEF CON 33 Talk on WebAuthn

During DEF CON 33, the Allthenticate team presented a talk titled “Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself.”
This session demonstrated how attackers could exploit WebAuthn API Hijacking to
compromise synced passkeys in real time using a spoofable authentication prompt.

By using the provocative phrase “Passkeys Pwned,” the researchers deliberately emphasized that even so-called phishing-resistant credentials can be hijacked when the user interface itself is the weak link.

Evidence of WebAuthn API Hijacking at DEF CON 33

In Las Vegas, at the heart of DEF CON 33 (August 8–11, 2025), the world’s most respected hacker community witnessed a demonstration that made many squirm. In fact, researchers at Allthenticate showed live that a vulnerable synced passkey – despite being labeled “phishing-resistant” – could be tricked. So what did they do? They executed a WebAuthn API Hijacking attack (spoofing the system prompt) of the spoofable authentication prompt type (real-time prompt spoofing). They created a fake authentication dialog box, perfectly timed and visually identical to the legitimate UI. Ultimately, the user believed they were validating a legitimate authentication, but the adversary hijacked the session in real time. This proof of concept makes the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” tangible through a real-time spoofable prompt.

Video Highlights — WebAuthn API Hijacking in Practice

To visualize the sequence, watch the clip below: it shows how WebAuthn API Hijacking emerges from a simple UI deception that aligns timing and look-and-feel with the expected system prompt, leading to seamless session capture.

Comparison – WebAuthn Interception Flaw: Prompt Spoofing vs. DOM Clickjacking

At DEF CON 33, two major research findings shook confidence in modern authentication mechanisms. Indeed, both exploit flaws related to the user interface (UX) rather than cryptography, but their vectors and targets differ radically.

▸ Key takeaway: This article focuses exclusively on prompt spoofing, which illustrates a major WebAuthn interception flaw and challenges the promise of “phishing-resistant passkeys.” For a complete study on DOM clickjacking, please see the related article.

Regulations & Compliance – MFA and WebAuthn Interception

Official documents such as the CISA guide on phishing-resistant MFA or the OMB M-22-09 directive insist on this point: authentication is “phishing-resistant” only if no intermediary can intercept or hijack the WebAuthn flow.
In theory, WebAuthn passkeys respect this rule. In practice, however, the implementation of vulnerable synced passkeys opens an interception flaw that attackers can exploit via a spoofable authentication prompt.

In Europe, both the NIS2 directive and the SecNumCloud certification reiterate the same requirement: no dependence on un-mastered third-party services.

As such, the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” contradicts the spirit of a so-called phishing-resistant MFA, because synchronization introduces an intermediary.

In other words, a US cloud managing your passkeys falls outside the scope of strict digital sovereignty.

European & Francophone Statistics – Real-time Phishing and WebAuthn Interception

Public reports confirm that advanced phishing attacks — including real-time techniques — represent a major threat in the European Union and the Francophone area.

• European Union — ENISA: According to the Threat Landscape 2024 report, phishing and social engineering account for 38% of reported incidents in the EU, with a notable increase in Adversary-in-the-Middle methods and real-time prompt spoofing, associated with WebAuthn interception. Source: ENISA Threat Landscape 2024
• France — Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr: In 2023, phishing generated 38% of assistance requests, with over 1.5M consultations related to this type of attack. Fake bank advisor scams jumped by +78% vs. 2022, often via spoofable authentication prompts. Source: 2023 Activity Report
• Canada (Francophone) — Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: The National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024 indicates that 65% of businesses expect to experience a phishing or ransomware attack. Phishing remains a preferred vector for bypassing MFA, including via WebAuthn flow interception. Source: Official Assessment

Sovereign Use Case – Neutralizing WebAuthn Interception

In a practical scenario, a regulatory authority reserves synced passkeys for low-risk public portals. Conversely, the PassCypher choice eliminates the root cause of the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” by removing the prompt, the cloud, and any DOM exposure.
For critical systems (government, sensitive operations, vital infrastructure), it deploys PassCypher in two forms:

• PassCypher NFC HSM — offline hardware authentication, with no server and BLE AES-128-CBC keyboard emulation. Consequently, no spoofable authentication prompt can exist.
• PassCypher HSM PGP — sovereign management of inexportable segmented keys, with cryptographic validation that is cloud-free and synchronization-free.
  ▸ Result
  In this model, the prompt vector exploited during the WebAuthn interception attack at DEF CON 33 is completely eliminated from critical pathways.

Why PassCypher Eliminates the WebAuthn Interception Risk

PassCypher solutions stand in radical contrast to FIDO passkeys that are vulnerable to the WebAuthn interception attack:

• No OS/browser prompt — thus no spoofable authentication prompt.
• No cloud — no vulnerable synchronization or third-party dependency.
• No DOM — no exposure to scripts, extensions, or iframes.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Eliminating the WebAuthn Prompt Spoofing Attack Vector

Allthenticate’s attack at DEF CON 33 proves that attackers can spoof any system that depends on an OS/browser prompt. PassCypher NFC HSM removes this vector: there is no prompt, no cloud sync, secrets are encrypted for life in a nano-HSM NFC, and validated by a physical tap. User operation:

• Mandatory NFC tap — physical validation with no software interface.
• HID BLE AES-128-CBC Mode — out-of-DOM transmission, resistant to keyloggers.
• Zero-DOM Ecosystem — no secret ever appears in the browser.

WebAuthn API Hijacking Neutralized by PassCypher NFC HSM

PassCypher HSM PGP — Segmented Keys Against Phishing

The other pillar, PassCypher HSM PGP, applies the same philosophy: no exploitable prompt.
Secrets (credentials, passkeys, SSH/PGP keys, TOTP/HOTP) reside in AES-256 CBC PGP encrypted containers, protected by a patented system of segmented keys.

• No prompt — so there is no window to spoof.
• Segmented keys — they are inexportable and assembled only in RAM.
• Ephemeral decryption — the secret disappears immediately after use.
• Zero cloud — there is no vulnerable synchronization.

Attack Surface Comparison

Weak Signals – Trends Related to WebAuthn Interception

Strategic Glossary

A review of the key concepts used in this article, for both beginners and advanced readers.

• Passkey / Passkeys

  A passwordless digital credential based on the FIDO/WebAuthn standard, designed to be “phishing-resistant.”

  • Passkey (singular): Refers to a single digital credential stored on a device (e.g., Secure Enclave, TPM, YubiKey).
  • Passkeys (plural): Refers to the general technology or multiple credentials, including synced passkeys stored in Apple, Google, or Microsoft clouds. These are particularly vulnerable to WebAuthn API Hijacking (real-time prompt spoofing demonstrated at DEF CON 33).

• Passkeys Pwned

  Title of the DEF CON 33 talk by Allthenticate (“Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself”). It highlights how WebAuthn API Hijacking can compromise synced passkeys in real time, proving that they are not 100% phishing-resistant.

• Vulnerable synced passkeys

  Stored in a cloud (Apple, Google, Microsoft) and usable across multiple devices. They offer a UX advantage but a strategic weakness: dependence on a spoofable authentication prompt and the cloud.

• Device-bound passkeys

  Linked to a single device (TPM, Secure Enclave, YubiKey). More secure because they lack cloud synchronization.

• Prompt

  A system or browser dialog box that requests a user’s validation (Face ID, fingerprint, FIDO key). This is the primary target for spoofing.

• WebAuthn Interception Attack

  Also known as WebAuthn API Hijacking, this attack manipulates the authentication flow by spoofing the system/browser prompt and imitating the user interface in real time. The attacker does not break cryptography, but intercepts the WebAuthn process at the UX level (e.g., a cloned fingerprint or Face ID prompt). See the official W3C WebAuthn specification and FIDO Alliance documentation.

• Real-time prompt spoofing

  The live spoofing of an authentication window, which is indistinguishable to the user.

• DOM Clickjacking

  An attack using invisible iframes and Shadow DOM to hijack autofill and steal credentials.

• Zero-DOM

  A sovereign architecture where no secret is exposed to the browser or the DOM.

• NFC HSM

  A secure hardware module that is offline and compatible with HID BLE AES-128-CBC.

• Segmented keys

  Cryptographic keys that are split into segments and only reassembled in volatile memory.

• Device-bound credential

  A credential attached to a physical device that is non-transferable and non-clonable.

Technical FAQ (Integration & Use Cases)

• Q: Are there any solutions for vulnerable passkeys?

  A: Yes, in a hybrid model. Keep FIDO for common use cases and adopt PassCypher for critical access to eliminate WebAuthn interception vectors.

• Q: What is the UX impact without a system prompt?

  A: The action is hardware-based (NFC tap or HSM validation). There is no spoofable authentication prompt or dialog box to impersonate, resulting in a total elimination of the real-time phishing risk.

• Q: How can we revoke a compromised key?

  A: You simply revoke the HSM or the key itself. There is no cloud to purge and no third-party account to contact.

• Q: Does PassCypher protect against real-time prompt spoofing?

  A: Yes. The PassCypher architecture completely eliminates the OS/browser prompt, thereby removing the attack surface exploited at DEF CON 33.

• Q: Can we integrate PassCypher into a NIS2-regulated infrastructure?

  A: Yes. The NFC HSM and HSM PGP modules comply with digital sovereignty requirements and neutralize the risks associated with vulnerable synced passkeys.

• Q: Are device-bound passkeys completely inviolable?

  A: No, but they do eliminate the risk of cloud-based WebAuthn interception. Their security then depends on the hardware’s robustness (TPM, Secure Enclave, YubiKey) and the physical protection of the device.

• Q: Can a local malware reproduce a PassCypher prompt?

  A: No. PassCypher does not rely on a software prompt; the validation is hardware-based and offline, so no spoofable display exists.

• Q: Why do third-party clouds increase the risk?

  A: Vulnerable synced passkeys stored in a third-party cloud can be targeted by Adversary-in-the-Middle or WebAuthn interception attacks if the prompt is compromised.

CISO/CSO Advice – Universal & Sovereign Protection

Frequently Asked Questions for CISOs/CSOs

CISO/CSO Action Plan

Strategic Outlook

The message from DEF CON 33 is clear: authentication security is won or lost at the interface. In other words, as long as the user validates graphical authentication prompts synchronized with a network flow, real-time phishing and WebAuthn interception will remain possible.

Thus, prompt-free and cloud-free models — embodied by sovereign HSMs like PassCypher — radically reduce the attack surface.

In the short term, generalize the use of device-bound solutions for sensitive applications. In the medium term, the goal is to eliminate the spoofable UI from critical pathways. Ultimately, the recommended trajectory will permanently eliminate the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” from critical pathways through a gradual transition to a full-PassCypher model, providing a definitive solution for vulnerable passkeys in a professional context.