Category Archives: Digital Security

Digital security is the process of protecting your online identity, data, and other assets from intruders, such as hackers, scammers, and fraudsters. It is essential for trust in the digital age, as well as for innovation, competitiveness, and growth. This field covers the economic and social aspects of cybersecurity, as opposed to purely technical aspects and those related to criminal law enforcement or national and international security.

In this category, you will find articles related to digital security that have a direct or indirect connection with the activities of Freemindtronic Andorra or that may interest the readers of the article published in this category. You will learn about the latest trends, challenges, and solutions in this field, as well as the best practices and recommendations from experts and organizations such as the OECD. You will also discover how to protect your personal data from being used and sold by companies without your consent.

Whether you are an individual, a business owner, or a policy maker, you will benefit from reading these articles and gaining more knowledge and awareness about this topic and its importance for your online safety and prosperity. Some of the topics that you will find in this category are:

  • How to prevent and respond to cyberattacks
  • How to use encryption and cryptography to secure your data
  • How to manage risks and vulnerabilities
  • How to comply with laws and regulations
  • How to foster a culture of security in your organization
  • How to educate yourself and others about this topic

We hope that you will enjoy reading these articles and that they will inspire you to take action to improve your security. If you have any questions or feedback, please feel free to contact us.

Under the GDPR, metadata (IP addresses, timestamps, etc.) are personal data. Their collection, storage, and processing require a valid legal basis. Hence CNIL and the EDPB require explicit consent for trackers.

It does not remove them — they are required for email routing. It reduces their profiling value by separating them from content. Upstream encapsulation ensures only minimal transport information remains visible to intermediaries, complicating correlation.

No. They protect content very effectively, but transport metadata (IP, timestamps) can remain visible to them. Cross‑platform emails (e.g., to Gmail/Outlook) will always expose metadata to third‑party providers.

Because they reveal a precise social and technical map: who talks to whom, when, how often, and from where (IP geolocation). These details are enough to build a connection graph, often more powerful for profiling and surveillance than content.

In‑transit encryption (e.g., TLS/SSL) protects the message while it travels between servers, but not when stored. At‑rest encryption protects the message on a server or disk. Complete security requires both, as messages can be intercepted at rest if not encrypted.

Yes, but it’s nuanced. Webmail services like Gmail display the sender IP as the Gmail server’s IP. Some services (e.g., ProtonMail) strip the sender’s IP from headers. A VPN or Tor can also mask your real IP.

⮞ Summary

PGP and MTA‑STS protect content and transport respectively, without hiding routing metadata. DataShielder HSM adds offline encapsulation to reduce exposure of content metadata and improve overall email‑metadata privacy.

Strategic outlook — digital sovereignty & communications

Mastering email metadata and related traces goes beyond technical cybersecurity. It enables a sovereign doctrine that aligns privacy protection, regulatory compliance, and resilience against hybrid threats.

In the coming years, convergence between end‑to‑end encryption, offline encapsulation, and decentralised infrastructure will redefine the balance between security and efficiency. A key perspective will be EU‑level standards on metadata retention — integrating judicial needs with individual protection. As mass‑correlation AI rises, sovereign hardware like DataShielder™ will be vital to restore strategic symmetry between citizens, businesses, and institutions.

Longer term, the goal is hybrid resilience that combines local solutions (offline HSM, segmented compartments) with encrypted cloud services, ensuring continuity even under geopolitical or technological stress.

⧉ What we didn’t cover
This column focused on email metadata and sovereign countermeasures.
Still to explore: the impact of emerging quantum networks, dynamic pseudonymisation standards, and algorithmic sovereignty applied to mass correlation.
These will be addressed in future pieces.


WebAuthn API Hijacking: A CISO’s Guide to Nullifying Passkey Phishing

Movie poster-style image of a cracked passkey and fishing hook. Main title: 'WebAuthn API Hijacking', with secondary phrases: 'Passkeys Vulnerability', 'DEF CON 33', and 'Why PassCypher Is Not Vulnerable'. Relevant for cybersecurity in Andorra.

WebAuthn API Hijacking: A critical vulnerability, unveiled at DEF CON 33, demonstrates that synced passkeys can be phished in real time. Indeed, Allthenticate proved that a spoofable authentication prompt can hijack a live WebAuthn session.

Executive Summary — The WebAuthn API Hijacking Flaw

▸ Key Takeaway — WebAuthn API Hijacking

We provide a dense summary (≈ 1 min) for decision-makers and CISOs. For a complete technical analysis (≈ 13 min), however, you should read the full article.

Imagine an authentication method lauded as phishing-resistant — namely, synced passkeys — and then exploited live at DEF CON 33 (August 8–11, 2025, Las Vegas). So what was the vulnerability? It was a WebAuthn API Hijacking flaw (an interception attack on the authentication flow), which allowed for passkeys real-time prompt spoofing.

This single demonstration, in fact, directly challenges the proclaimed security of cloud-synced passkeys and opens the debate on sovereign alternatives. We saw two key research findings emerge at the event: first, real-time prompt spoofing (a WebAuthn interception attack), and second, DOM extension clickjacking. Notably, this article focuses exclusively on prompt spoofing because it undeniably undermines the “phishing-resistant” promise for vulnerable synced passkeys.

▸ Summary

The weak link is no longer cryptography; instead, it is the visual trigger. In short, attackers compromise the interface, not the cryptographic key.

Strategic Insight This demonstration, therefore, exposes a historical flaw: attackers can perfectly abuse an authentication method called “phishing-resistant” if they can spoof and exploit the prompt at the right moment.

Chronique à lire
Article to Read
Estimated reading time: ≈ 13 minutes (+4–5 min if you watch the embedded videos)
Complexity level: Advanced / Expert
Available languages: CAT · EN · ES · FR
Accessibility: Optimized for screen readers
Type: Strategic Article
Author: Jacques Gascuel, inventor and founder of Freemindtronic®, designs and patents sovereign hardware security systems for data protection, cryptographic sovereignty, and secure communications. As an expert in ANSSI, NIS2, GDPR, and SecNumCloud compliance, he develops by-design architectures capable of countering hybrid threats and ensuring 100% sovereign cybersecurity.

Official Sources

TL; DR

  • At DEF CON 33 (August 8–11, 2025), Allthenticate researchers demonstrated a WebAuthn API Hijacking path: attackers can hijack so-called “phishing-resistant” passkeys via real-time prompt spoofing.
  • The flaw does not reside in cryptographic algorithms; rather, it’s found in the user interface—the visual entry point.
  • Ultimately, this revelation demands a strategic revision: we must prioritize device-bound passkeys for sensitive use cases and align deployments with threat models and regulatory requirements.

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In Sovereign Cybersecurity ↑ This article is part of our Digital Security section, continuing our research on zero-trust hardware exploits and countermeasures.

 ▸ Key Points

  • Confirmed Vulnerability: Cloud-synced passkeys (Apple, Google, Microsoft) are not 100% phishing-resistant.
  • New Threat: Real-time prompt spoofing exploits the user interface rather than cryptography.
  • Strategic Impact: Critical infrastructure and government agencies must migrate to device-bound credentials and sovereign offline solutions (NFC HSM, segmented keys).

What is a WebAuthn API Hijacking Attack?

A WebAuthn interception attack via a spoofable authentication prompt (WebAuthn API Hijacking) consists of imitating in real time the authentication window displayed by a system or browser. Consequently, the attacker does not seek to break the cryptographic algorithm; instead, they reproduce the user interface (UI) at the exact moment the victim expects to see a legitimate prompt. Visual lures, precise timing, and perfect synchronization make the deception indistinguishable to the user.

Simplified example:
A user thinks they are approving a connection to their bank account via a legitimate Apple or Google system prompt. In reality, they are interacting with a dialog box cloned by the attacker. As a result, the adversary captures the active session without alerting the victim.
▸ In short: Unlike “classic” phishing attacks via email or fraudulent websites, the real-time prompt spoofing takes place during authentication, when the user is most confident.

History of Passkey / WebAuthn Vulnerabilities

Despite their cryptographic robustness, passkeys — based on the open standards WebAuthn and FIDO2 from the FIDO Alliance — are not invulnerable. The history of vulnerabilities and recent research confirms that the key weakness often lies in the user interaction and the execution environment (browser, operating system). The industry officially adopted passkeys on May 5, 2022, following a commitment from Apple, Google, and Microsoft to extend their support on their respective platforms.

Timeline illustrating the accelerated evolution of Passkey and WebAuthn vulnerabilities from 2012 to 2025, including FIDO Alliance creation, phishing methods, CVEs, and the WebAuthn API Hijacking revealed at DEF CON 33.
Accelerated Evolution of Passkey and WebAuthn Vulnerabilities (2012-2025): A detailed timeline highlighting key security events, from the foundation of the FIDO Alliance to the emergence of AI as a threat multiplier and the definitive proof of the WebAuthn API Hijacking at DEF CON 33.

Timeline of Vulnerabilities

  • SquareX – Compromised Browsers (August 2025):

    At DEF CON 33, a demonstration showed that a malicious extension or script can intercept the WebAuthn flow to substitute keys. See the TechRadar analysis and the SecurityWeek report.

  • CVE-2025-31161 (March/April 2025):

    Authentication bypass in CrushFTP via a race condition. Official NIST Source.

  • CVE-2024-9956 (March 2025):

    Account takeover via Bluetooth on Android. This attack demonstrated that an attacker can remotely trigger a malicious authentication via a FIDO:/ intent. Analysis from Risky.Biz. Official NIST Source.

  • CVE-2024-12604 (March 2025):

    Cleartext storage of sensitive data in Tap&Sign, exploiting poor password management. Official NIST Source.

  • CVE-2025-26788 (February 2025):

    Authentication bypass in StrongKey FIDO Server. Detailed Source.

  • Passkeys Pwned – Browser-based API Hijacking (Early 2025):

    A research study showed that the browser, as a single mediator, can be a point of failure. Read the Security Boulevard analysis.

  • CVE-2024-9191 (November 2024):

    Password exposure via Okta Device Access. Official NIST Source.

  • CVE-2024-39912 (July 2024):

    User enumeration via a flaw in the PHP library web-auth/webauthn-lib. Official NIST Source.

  • CTRAPS-type Attacks (2024):

    These protocol-level attacks (CTAP) exploit authentication mechanisms for unauthorized actions. For more information on FIDO protocol-level attacks, see this Black Hat presentation on FIDO vulnerabilities.

  • First Large-Scale Rollout (September 2022):

    Apple was the first to deploy passkeys on a large scale with the release of iOS 16, making this technology a reality for hundreds of millions of users. Official Apple Press Release.

  • Industry Launch & Adoption (May 2022):

    The FIDO Alliance, joined by Apple, Google, and Microsoft, announced an action plan to extend passkey support across all their platforms. Official FIDO Alliance Press Release.

  • Timing Attacks on keyHandle (2022):

    A vulnerability allowing account correlation by measuring time variations in the processing of keyHandles. See IACR ePrint 2022 article.

  • Phishing of Recovery Methods (since 2017):

    Attackers use AitM proxies (like Evilginx, which appeared in 2017) to hide the passkey option and force a fallback to less secure methods that can be captured. More details on this technique.

AI as a Threat Multiplier

Artificial intelligence is not a security flaw, but a catalyst that makes existing attacks more effective. Since the emergence of generative AI models like GPT-3 (2020) and DALL-E 2 (2022), new capabilities for automating threats have appeared. These developments notably allow for:

  • Large-scale Attacks (since 2022): Generative AI enables attackers to create custom authentication prompts and phishing messages for a massive volume of targets, increasing the effectiveness of phishing of recovery methods.
  • Accelerated Vulnerability Research (since 2023): AI can be used to automate the search for security flaws, such as user enumeration or the detection of logical flaws in implementation code.
Historical Note — The risks associated with spoofable prompts in WebAuthn were already raised by the community in W3C GitHub issue #1965 (before the DEF CON 33 demonstration). This shows that the user interface has long been recognized as a weak link in so-called “phishing-resistant” authentication.

“These recent and historical vulnerabilities highlight the critical role of the browser and the deployment model (device-bound vs. synced). They reinforce the call for sovereign architectures that are disconnected from these vectors of compromise.”

Vulnerability of the Synchronization Model

One of the most debated passkeys security vulnerabilities does not concern the WebAuthn protocol itself, but its deployment model. Most publications on the subject differentiate between two types of passkeys:

  • Device-bound passkeys: Stored on a physical device (like a hardware security key or Secure Enclave). This model is generally considered highly secure because it is not synchronized via a third-party service.
  • Synced passkeys: Stored in a password manager or a cloud service (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, etc.). These passkeys can be synchronized across multiple devices. For more details on this distinction, refer to the FIDO Alliance documentation.

The vulnerability lies here: if an attacker manages to compromise the cloud service account, they could potentially gain access to the synced passkeys across all the user’s devices. This is a risk that device-bound passkeys do not share. Academic research, such as this paper published on arXiv, explores this issue, highlighting that “the security of synced passkeys is primarily concentrated with the passkey provider.”

This distinction is crucial because the implementation of vulnerable synced passkeys contradicts the very spirit of a so-called phishing-resistant MFA, as synchronization introduces an intermediary and an additional attack surface. This justifies the FIDO Alliance’s recommendation to prioritize device-bound passkeys for maximum security.

The DEF CON 33 Demonstration – WebAuthn API Hijacking in Action

WebAuthn API Hijacking is the central thread of this section: we briefly explain the attack path shown at DEF CON 33 and how a spoofable prompt enabled real-time session takeover, before detailing the live evidence and the video highlights.

Passkeys Pwned — DEF CON 33 Talk on WebAuthn

During DEF CON 33, the Allthenticate team presented a talk titled “Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself.”
This session demonstrated how attackers could exploit WebAuthn API Hijacking to
compromise synced passkeys in real time using a spoofable authentication prompt.

By using the provocative phrase “Passkeys Pwned,” the researchers deliberately emphasized that even so-called phishing-resistant credentials can be hijacked when the user interface itself is the weak link.

Evidence of WebAuthn API Hijacking at DEF CON 33

In Las Vegas, at the heart of DEF CON 33 (August 8–11, 2025), the world’s most respected hacker community witnessed a demonstration that made many squirm. In fact, researchers at Allthenticate showed live that a vulnerable synced passkey – despite being labeled “phishing-resistant” – could be tricked. So what did they do? They executed a WebAuthn API Hijacking attack (spoofing the system prompt) of the spoofable authentication prompt type (real-time prompt spoofing). They created a fake authentication dialog box, perfectly timed and visually identical to the legitimate UI. Ultimately, the user believed they were validating a legitimate authentication, but the adversary hijacked the session in real time. This proof of concept makes the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” tangible through a real-time spoofable prompt.

Video Highlights — WebAuthn API Hijacking in Practice

To visualize the sequence, watch the clip below: it shows how WebAuthn API Hijacking emerges from a simple UI deception that aligns timing and look-and-feel with the expected system prompt, leading to seamless session capture.

Official Authors & Media from DEF CON 33
▸ Shourya Pratap Singh, Jonny Lin, Daniel Seetoh — Allthenticate researchers, authors of the demo “Your Passkey is Weak: Phishing the Unphishable”.
Allthenticate Video on TikTok — direct explanation by the team.
DEF CON 33 Las Vegas Video (TikTok) — a glimpse of the conference floor.
Highlights DEF CON 33 (YouTube) — including the passkeys flaw.

▸ Summary

DEF CON 33 demonstrated that vulnerable synced passkeys can be compromised live when a spoofable authentication prompt is inserted into the WebAuthn flow.

Comparison – WebAuthn Interception Flaw: Prompt Spoofing vs. DOM Clickjacking

At DEF CON 33, two major research findings shook confidence in modern authentication mechanisms. Indeed, both exploit flaws related to the user interface (UX) rather than cryptography, but their vectors and targets differ radically.

Architecture comparison of PassCypher vs FIDO WebAuthn authentication highlighting phishing resistance and prompt spoofing risks
Comparison of PassCypher and FIDO WebAuthn architectures showing why Passkeys are vulnerable to WebAuthn API hijacking while PassCypher eliminates prompt spoofing risks.

Real-Time Prompt Spoofing

  • Author: Allthenticate (Las Vegas, DEF CON 33).
  • Target: vulnerable synced passkeys (Apple, Google, Microsoft).
  • Vecteur: spoofable authentication prompt, perfectly timed to the legitimate UI (real-time prompt spoofing).
  • Impact: WebAuthn interception attack that causes “live” phishing; the user unknowingly validates a malicious request.

DOM Clickjacking

  • Authors: Another team of researchers (DEF CON 33).
  • Target: Credential managers, extensions, stored passkeys.
  • Vecteur: invisible iframes, Shadow DOM, malicious scripts to hijack autofill.
  • Impact: Silent exfiltration of credentials, passkeys, and crypto-wallet keys.

▸ Key takeaway: This article focuses exclusively on prompt spoofing, which illustrates a major WebAuthn interception flaw and challenges the promise of “phishing-resistant passkeys.” For a complete study on DOM clickjacking, please see the related article.

Strategic Implications – Passkeys and UX Vulnerabilities

As a result, the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” forces us to rethink authentication around prompt-less and cloud-less models.

  • We should no longer consider vulnerable synced passkeys to be invulnerable.
  • We must prioritize device-bound credentials for sensitive environments.
  • We need to implement UX safeguards: detecting anomalies in authentication prompts and using non-spoofable visual signatures.
  • We should train users on the threat of real-time phishing via a WebAuthn interception attack.
▸ Insight
It is not cryptography that is failing, but the illusion of immunity. WebAuthn interception demonstrates that the risk lies in the UX, not the algorithm.

Regulations & Compliance – MFA and WebAuthn Interception

Official documents such as the CISA guide on phishing-resistant MFA or the OMB M-22-09 directive insist on this point: authentication is “phishing-resistant” only if no intermediary can intercept or hijack the WebAuthn flow.
In theory, WebAuthn passkeys respect this rule. In practice, however, the implementation of vulnerable synced passkeys opens an interception flaw that attackers can exploit via a spoofable authentication prompt.

In Europe, both the NIS2 directive and the SecNumCloud certification reiterate the same requirement: no dependence on un-mastered third-party services.

As such, the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” contradicts the spirit of a so-called phishing-resistant MFA, because synchronization introduces an intermediary.

In other words, a US cloud managing your passkeys falls outside the scope of strict digital sovereignty.

▸ Summary

A vulnerable synced passkey can compromise the requirement for phishing-resistant MFA (CISA, NIS2) when a WebAuthn interception attack is possible.

European & Francophone Statistics – Real-time Phishing and WebAuthn Interception

Public reports confirm that advanced phishing attacks — including real-time techniques — represent a major threat in the European Union and the Francophone area.

  • European Union — ENISA: According to the Threat Landscape 2024 report, phishing and social engineering account for 38% of reported incidents in the EU, with a notable increase in Adversary-in-the-Middle methods and real-time prompt spoofing, associated with WebAuthn interception. Source: ENISA Threat Landscape 2024
  • France — Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr: In 2023, phishing generated 38% of assistance requests, with over 1.5M consultations related to this type of attack. Fake bank advisor scams jumped by +78% vs. 2022, often via spoofable authentication prompts. Source: 2023 Activity Report
  • Canada (Francophone) — Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: The National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024 indicates that 65% of businesses expect to experience a phishing or ransomware attack. Phishing remains a preferred vector for bypassing MFA, including via WebAuthn flow interception. Source: Official Assessment
▸ Strategic Reading
Real-time prompt spoofing is not a lab experiment; it is part of a trend where phishing targets the authentication interface rather than algorithms, with increasing use of the WebAuthn interception attack.

Sovereign Use Case – Neutralizing WebAuthn Interception

In a practical scenario, a regulatory authority reserves synced passkeys for low-risk public portals. Conversely, the PassCypher choice eliminates the root cause of the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” by removing the prompt, the cloud, and any DOM exposure.
For critical systems (government, sensitive operations, vital infrastructure), it deploys PassCypher in two forms:

  • PassCypher NFC HSM — offline hardware authentication, with no server and BLE AES-128-CBC keyboard emulation. Consequently, no spoofable authentication prompt can exist.
  • PassCypher HSM PGP — sovereign management of inexportable segmented keys, with cryptographic validation that is cloud-free and synchronization-free.
    ▸ Result
    In this model, the prompt vector exploited during the WebAuthn interception attack at DEF CON 33 is completely eliminated from critical pathways.

Why PassCypher Eliminates the WebAuthn Interception Risk

PassCypher solutions stand in radical contrast to FIDO passkeys that are vulnerable to the WebAuthn interception attack:

  • No OS/browser prompt — thus no spoofable authentication prompt.
  • No cloud — no vulnerable synchronization or third-party dependency.
  • No DOM — no exposure to scripts, extensions, or iframes.
✓ Sovereignty: By removing the prompt, cloud, and DOM, PassCypher eliminates any anchor point for the WebAuthn interception flaw (prompt spoofing) revealed at DEF CON 33.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Eliminating the WebAuthn Prompt Spoofing Attack Vector

Allthenticate’s attack at DEF CON 33 proves that attackers can spoof any system that depends on an OS/browser prompt. PassCypher NFC HSM removes this vector: there is no prompt, no cloud sync, secrets are encrypted for life in a nano-HSM NFC, and validated by a physical tap. User operation:

  • Mandatory NFC tap — physical validation with no software interface.
  • HID BLE AES-128-CBC Mode — out-of-DOM transmission, resistant to keyloggers.
  • Zero-DOM Ecosystem — no secret ever appears in the browser.

▸ Summary

Unlike vulnerable synced passkeys, PassCypher NFC HSM neutralizes the WebAuthn interception attack because a spoofable authentication prompt does not exist.

WebAuthn API Hijacking Neutralized by PassCypher NFC HSM

Attack Type Vector Status
Prompt Spoofing Fake OS/browser dialog Neutralized (zero prompt)
Real-time Phishing Live-trapped validation Neutralized (mandatory NFC tap)
Keystroke Logging Keyboard capture Neutralized (encrypted HID BLE)

PassCypher HSM PGP — Segmented Keys Against Phishing

The other pillar, PassCypher HSM PGP, applies the same philosophy: no exploitable prompt.
Secrets (credentials, passkeys, SSH/PGP keys, TOTP/HOTP) reside in AES-256 CBC PGP encrypted containers, protected by a patented system of segmented keys.

  • No prompt — so there is no window to spoof.
  • Segmented keys — they are inexportable and assembled only in RAM.
  • Ephemeral decryption — the secret disappears immediately after use.
  • Zero cloud — there is no vulnerable synchronization.

▸ Summary

PassCypher HSM PGP eliminates the attack surface of the real-time spoofed prompt: it provides hardware authentication, segmented keys, and cryptographic validation with no DOM or cloud exposure.

Attack Surface Comparison

Criterion Synced Passkeys (FIDO) PassCypher NFC HSM PassCypher HSM PGP
Authentication Prompt Yes No No
Synchronization Cloud Yes No No
Exportable Private Key No (attackable UI) No No
WebAuthn Hijacking/Interception Present Absent Absent
FIDO Standard Dependency Yes No No
▸ Insight By removing the spoofable authentication prompt and cloud synchronization, the WebAuthn interception attack demonstrated at DEF CON 33 disappears completely.

Weak Signals – Trends Related to WebAuthn Interception

▸ Weak Signals Identified

  • The widespread adoption of real-time UI attacks, including WebAuthn interception via a spoofable authentication prompt.
  • A growing dependency on third-party clouds for identity, which increases the exposure of vulnerable synced passkeys.
  • A proliferation of bypasses through AI-assisted social engineering, applied to authentication interfaces.

Strategic Glossary

A review of the key concepts used in this article, for both beginners and advanced readers.

  • Passkey / Passkeys

    A passwordless digital credential based on the FIDO/WebAuthn standard, designed to be “phishing-resistant.

    • Passkey (singular): Refers to a single digital credential stored on a device (e.g., Secure Enclave, TPM, YubiKey).
    • Passkeys (plural): Refers to the general technology or multiple credentials, including synced passkeys stored in Apple, Google, or Microsoft clouds. These are particularly vulnerable to WebAuthn API Hijacking (real-time prompt spoofing demonstrated at DEF CON 33).
  • Passkeys Pwned

    Title of the DEF CON 33 talk by Allthenticate (“Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself”). It highlights how WebAuthn API Hijacking can compromise synced passkeys in real time, proving that they are not 100% phishing-resistant.

  • Vulnerable synced passkeys

    Stored in a cloud (Apple, Google, Microsoft) and usable across multiple devices. They offer a UX advantage but a strategic weakness: dependence on a spoofable authentication prompt and the cloud.

  • Device-bound passkeys

    Linked to a single device (TPM, Secure Enclave, YubiKey). More secure because they lack cloud synchronization.

  • Prompt

    A system or browser dialog box that requests a user’s validation (Face ID, fingerprint, FIDO key). This is the primary target for spoofing.

  • WebAuthn Interception Attack

    Also known as WebAuthn API Hijacking, this attack manipulates the authentication flow by spoofing the system/browser prompt and imitating the user interface in real time. The attacker does not break cryptography, but intercepts the WebAuthn process at the UX level (e.g., a cloned fingerprint or Face ID prompt). See the official W3C WebAuthn specification and FIDO Alliance documentation.

  • Real-time prompt spoofing

    The live spoofing of an authentication window, which is indistinguishable to the user.

  • DOM Clickjacking

    An attack using invisible iframes and Shadow DOM to hijack autofill and steal credentials.

  • Zero-DOM

    A sovereign architecture where no secret is exposed to the browser or the DOM.

  • NFC HSM

    A secure hardware module that is offline and compatible with HID BLE AES-128-CBC.

  • Segmented keys

    Cryptographic keys that are split into segments and only reassembled in volatile memory.

  • Device-bound credential

    A credential attached to a physical device that is non-transferable and non-clonable.

▸ Strategic Purpose: This glossary shows why the WebAuthn interception attack targets the prompt and UX, and why PassCypher eliminates this vector by design.

Technical FAQ (Integration & Use Cases)

  • Q: Are there any solutions for vulnerable passkeys?

    A: Yes, in a hybrid model. Keep FIDO for common use cases and adopt PassCypher for critical access to eliminate WebAuthn interception vectors.

  • Q: What is the UX impact without a system prompt?

    A: The action is hardware-based (NFC tap or HSM validation). There is no spoofable authentication prompt or dialog box to impersonate, resulting in a total elimination of the real-time phishing risk.

  • Q: How can we revoke a compromised key?

    A: You simply revoke the HSM or the key itself. There is no cloud to purge and no third-party account to contact.

  • Q: Does PassCypher protect against real-time prompt spoofing?

    A: Yes. The PassCypher architecture completely eliminates the OS/browser prompt, thereby removing the attack surface exploited at DEF CON 33.

  • Q: Can we integrate PassCypher into a NIS2-regulated infrastructure?

    A: Yes. The NFC HSM and HSM PGP modules comply with digital sovereignty requirements and neutralize the risks associated with vulnerable synced passkeys.

  • Q: Are device-bound passkeys completely inviolable?

    A: No, but they do eliminate the risk of cloud-based WebAuthn interception. Their security then depends on the hardware’s robustness (TPM, Secure Enclave, YubiKey) and the physical protection of the device.

  • Q: Can a local malware reproduce a PassCypher prompt?

    A: No. PassCypher does not rely on a software prompt; the validation is hardware-based and offline, so no spoofable display exists.

  • Q: Why do third-party clouds increase the risk?

    A: Vulnerable synced passkeys stored in a third-party cloud can be targeted by Adversary-in-the-Middle or WebAuthn interception attacks if the prompt is compromised.

CISO/CSO Advice – Universal & Sovereign Protection

To learn how to protect against WebAuthn interception, it’s important to know that EviBITB (Embedded Browser-In-The-Browser Protection) is a built-in technology in PassCypher HSM PGP, including its free version. t automatically or manually detects and removes redirection iframes used in BITB and prompt spoofing attacks, thereby eliminating the WebAuthn interception vector.

  • Immediate Deployment: It is a free extension for Chromium and Firefox browsers, scalable for large-scale use without a paid license.
  • Universal Protection: It works even if the organization has not yet migrated to a prompt-free model.
  • Sovereign Compatibility: It works with PassCypher NFC HSM Lite (99 €) and the full PassCypher HSM PGP (129 €/year).
  • Full Passwordless: Both PassCypher NFC HSM and HSM PGP can completely replace FIDO/WebAuthn for all authentication pathways, with zero prompts, zero cloud, and 100% sovereignty.

Strategic Recommendation:
Deploy EviBITB immediately on all workstations to neutralize BITB/prompt spoofing, then plan the migration of critical access to a full-PassCypher model to permanently remove the attack surface.

Frequently Asked Questions for CISOs/CSOs

Q: What is the regulatory impact of a WebAuthn interception attack?

A: This type of attack can compromise compliance with “phishing-resistant” MFA requirements defined by CISA, NIS2, and SecNumCloud. In case of personal data compromise, the organization faces GDPR sanctions and a challenge to its security certifications.

Q: Is there a universal and free protection against BITB and prompt spoofing?

A: Yes. EviBITB is an embedded technology in PassCypher HSM PGP, including its free version. It blocks redirection iframes (Browser-In-The-Browser) and removes the spoofable authentication prompt vector exploited in WebAuthn interception. It can be deployed immediately on a large scale without a paid license.

Q: Are there any solutions for vulnerable passkeys?

A: Yes. PassCypher NFC HSM and PassCypher HSM PGP are complete sovereign passwordless solutions: they allow authentication, signing, and encryption without FIDO infrastructure, with zero spoofable prompts, zero third-party clouds, and a 100% controlled architecture.

Q: What is the average budget and ROI of a migration to a prompt-free model?

A: According to the Time Spent on Authentication study, a professional loses an average of 285 hours/year on classic authentications, representing an annual cost of about $8,550 (based on $30/h). PassCypher HSM PGP reduces this time to ~7 h/year, and PassCypher NFC HSM to ~18 h/year. Even with the full model (129 €/year) or the NFC HSM Lite (99 € one-time purchase), the breakeven point is reached in a few days to a few weeks, and net savings exceed 50 times the annual cost in a professional context.

Q: How can we manage a hybrid fleet (legacy + modern)?

A: Keep FIDO for low-risk uses while gradually replacing them with PassCypher NFC HSM and/or PassCypher HSM PGP in critical environments. This transition removes exploitable prompts and maintains application compatibility.

Q: What metrics should we track to measure the reduction in attack surface?

A: The number of authentications via system prompts vs. hardware authentication, incidents related to WebAuthn interception, average remediation time, and the percentage of critical accesses migrated to a sovereign prompt-free model.

CISO/CSO Action Plan

Priority Action Expected Impact
Implement solutions for vulnerable passkeys by replacing them with PassCypher NFC HSM (99 €) and/or PassCypher HSM PGP (129 €/year) Eliminates the spoofable prompt, removes WebAuthn interception, and enables sovereign passwordless access with a payback period of days according to the study on authentication time
Migrate to a full-PassCypher model for critical environments Removes all FIDO/WebAuthn dependency, centralizes sovereign management of access and secrets, and maximizes productivity gains measured by the study
Deploy EviBITB (embedded technology in PassCypher HSM PGP, free version included) Provides immediate, zero-cost protection against BITB and real-time phishing via prompt spoofing
Harden the UX (visual signatures, non-cloneable elements) Complicates UI attacks, clickjacking, and redress
Audit and log authentication flows Detects and tracks any attempt at flow hijacking or Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks
Align with NIS2, SecNumCloud, and GDPR Reduces legal risk and provides proof of compliance
Train users on spoofable interface threats Strengthens human vigilance and proactive detection

Strategic Outlook

The message from DEF CON 33 is clear: authentication security is won or lost at the interface. In other words, as long as the user validates graphical authentication prompts synchronized with a network flow, real-time phishing and WebAuthn interception will remain possible.

Thus, prompt-free and cloud-free models — embodied by sovereign HSMs like PassCypher — radically reduce the attack surface.

In the short term, generalize the use of device-bound solutions for sensitive applications. In the medium term, the goal is to eliminate the spoofable UI from critical pathways. Ultimately, the recommended trajectory will permanently eliminate the “Passkeys WebAuthn Interception Flaw” from critical pathways through a gradual transition to a full-PassCypher model, providing a definitive solution for vulnerable passkeys in a professional context.

Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn | DEF CON 33 & PassCypher

Image type affiche de cinéma: passkey cassée sous hameçon de phishing. Textes: "Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn", "DEF CON 33 Révélation", "Pourquoi votre PassCypher n'est pas vulnérable API Hijacking". Contexte cybersécurité Andorre.

Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn : une vulnérabilité critique dévoilée à DEF CON 33 démontre que les passkeys synchronisées sont phishables en temps réel. Allthenticate a prouvé qu’un prompt d’authentification falsifiable permettait de détourner une session WebAuthn en direct.

Résumé exécutif — Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn

⮞ Note de lecture

Un résumé dense (≈ 1 min) pour décideurs et RSSI. Pour l’analyse technique complète (≈ 13 min), consultez la chronique intégrale.

Imaginez : une authentification vantée comme phishing-resistant — les passkeys synchronisées — exploitée en direct lors de DEF CON 33 (8–11 août 2025, Las Vegas). La vulnérabilité ? Une faille d’interception du flux WebAuthn, permettant un prompt falsifié en temps réel (real-time prompt spoofing).

Cette démonstration remet frontalement en cause la sécurité proclamée des passkeys cloudisées et ouvre le débat sur les alternatives souveraines. Deux recherches y ont marqué l’édition : le spoofing de prompts en temps réel (attaque d’interception WebAuthn) et, distincte, le clickjacking des extensions DOM. Cette chronique est exclusivement consacrée au spoofing de prompts, car il remet en cause la promesse de « phishing-resistant » pour les passkeys synchronisées vulnérables.

⮞ Résumé

Le maillon faible n’est plus la cryptographie, mais le déclencheur visuel. C’est l’interface — pas la clé — qui est compromise.

Note stratégique Cette démonstration creuse une faille historique : une authentification dite “résistante au phishing” peut parfaitement être abusée, dès lors que le prompt peut être falsifié et exploité au bon moment.

Chronique à lire
Temps de lecture estimé : ≈ 13 minutes (+4–5 min si vous visionnez les vidéos intégrées)
Niveau de complexité : Avancé / Expert
Langues disponibles : CAT · EN · ES · FR
Accessibilité : Optimisée pour lecteurs d’écran
Type : Chronique stratégique
Auteur : Jacques Gascuel, inventeur et fondateur de Freemindtronic®, conçoit et brevète des systèmes matériels de sécurité souverains pour la protection des données, la souveraineté cryptographique et les communications sécurisées. Expert en conformité ANSSI, NIS2, RGPD et SecNumCloud, il développe des architectures by design capables de contrer les menaces hybrides et d’assurer une cybersécurité 100 % souveraine.

Sources officielles

• Talk « Your Passkey is Weak : Phishing the Unphishable » (Allthenticate) — listé dans l’agenda officiel DEF CON 33 • Présentation « Passkeys Pwned : Turning WebAuthn Against Itself » — disponible sur le serveur média DEF CON • Article « Phishing-Resistant Passkeys Shown to Be Phishable at DEF CON 33 » — relayé par MENAFN / PR Newswire, rubrique Science & Tech

TL; DR
• À DEF CON 33 (8–11 août 2025), les chercheurs d’Allthenticate ont démontré que les passkeys dites « résistantes au phishing » peuvent être détournées via des prompts falsifiés en temps réel.
• La faille ne réside pas dans les algorithmes cryptographiques, mais dans l’interface utilisateur — le point d’entrée visuel.
• Cette révélation impose une révision stratégique : privilégier les passkeys liées au périphérique (device-bound) pour les usages sensibles, et aligner les déploiements sur les modèles de menace et les exigences réglementaires.

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⮞ Points Clés

  • Vulnérabilité confirmée : les passkeys synchronisées dans le cloud (Apple, Google, Microsoft) ne sont pas 100 % résistantes au phishing.
  • Nouvelle menace : le prompt falsifié en temps réel (real‑time prompt spoofing) exploite l’interface utilisateur plutôt que la cryptographie.
  • Impact stratégique : infrastructures critiques et administrations doivent migrer vers des credentials device-bound et des solutions hors-ligne souveraines (NFC HSM, clés segmentées).

Qu’est-ce qu’une attaque Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn ?

Une attaque d’interception WebAuthn via prompt d’authentification falsifiable (WebAuthn API Hijacking) consiste à imiter en temps réel la fenêtre d’authentification affichée par un système ou un navigateur. L’attaquant ne cherche pas à casser l’algorithme cryptographique : il reproduit l’interface utilisateur (UI) au moment exact où la victime s’attend à voir un prompt légitime. Leurres visuels, timing précis et synchronisation parfaite rendent la supercherie indiscernable pour l’utilisateur.

Exemple simplifié :
Un utilisateur pense approuver une connexion sur son compte bancaire via un prompt système Apple ou Google. En réalité, il interagit avec une boîte de dialogue clonée par l’attaquant. Le résultat : l’adversaire récupère la session active sans alerter la victime.
⮞ En clair : contrairement aux attaques « classiques » de phishing par e‑mail ou site frauduleux, le prompt falsifié en temps réel (real‑time prompt spoofing) se déroule pendant l’authentification, là où l’utilisateur est le plus confiant.

Historique des vulnérabilités Passkeys / WebAuthn

Malgré leur robustesse cryptographique, les passkeys — basés sur les standards ouverts WebAuthn et FIDO2 de la FIDO Alliance — ne sont pas invulnérables. L’historique des vulnérabilités et des recherches récentes confirme que la faiblesse clé réside souvent au niveau de l’interaction utilisateur et de l’environnement d’exécution (navigateur, système d’exploitation). C’est le 5 mai 2022 que l’industrie a officialisé leur adoption, suite à l’engagement d’Apple, Google et Microsoft d’étendre leur support sur leurs plateformes respectives.

Chronologie des vulnérabilités Passkey et WebAuthn de 2017 à 2025 montrant les failles de sécurité et les interceptions.
Cette chronologie illustre les failles de sécurité et les vulnérabilités découvertes dans les technologies Passkey et WebAuthn entre 2017 et 2025.

Chronologie des vulnérabilités

  • SquareX – Navigateurs compromis (août 2025) :

    Lors du DEF CON 33, une démonstration a montré qu’une extension ou un script malveillant peut intercepter le flux WebAuthn pour substituer des clés. Voir l’analyse de TechRadar et le report de SecurityWeek.

  • CVE-2025-31161 (mars/avril 2025) :

    Contournement d’authentification dans CrushFTP via une condition de concurrence. Source officielle NIST.

  • CVE-2024-9956 (mars 2025) :

    Prise de contrôle de compte via Bluetooth sur Android. Cette attaque a démontré qu’un attaquant peut déclencher une authentification malveillante à distance via un intent FIDO:/. Analyse de Risky.Biz. Source officielle NIST.

  • CVE-2024-12604 (mars 2025) :

    Stockage en clair de données sensibles dans Tap&Sign, exploitant une mauvaise gestion des mots de passe. Source officielle NIST.

  • CVE-2025-26788 (février 2025) :

    Contournement d’authentification dans StrongKey FIDO Server. Source détaillée.

  • Passkeys Pwned – API Hijacking basé sur le navigateur (début 2025) :

    Une recherche a démontré que le navigateur, en tant que médiateur unique, peut être un point de défaillance. Lire l’analyse de Security Boulevard.

  • CVE-2024-9191 (novembre 2024) :

    Exposition de mots de passe via Okta Device Access. Source officielle NIST.

  • CVE-2024-39912 (juillet 2024) :

    Énumération d’utilisateurs via une faille dans la bibliothèque PHP web-auth/webauthn-lib. Source officielle NIST.

  • Attaques de type CTRAPS (courant 2024) :

    Ces attaques au niveau du protocole (CTAP) exploitent les mécanismes d’authentification pour des actions non autorisées.

  • Première mise à disposition (septembre 2022) :

    Apple a été le premier à déployer des passkeys à grande échelle avec la sortie d’iOS 16, faisant de cette technologie une réalité pour des centaines de millions d’utilisateurs.

  • Lancement et adoption par l’industrie (mai 2022) :

    L’Alliance FIDO, rejointe par Apple, Google et Microsoft, a annoncé un plan d’action pour étendre le support des clés d’accès sur toutes leurs plateformes.

  • Attaques de Timing sur keyHandle (2022) :

    Vulnérabilité permettant de corréler des comptes en mesurant les variations temporelles dans le traitement des keyHandles. Voir article IACR ePrint 2022.

  • Phishing des méthodes de secours (depuis 2017) :

    Les attaquants utilisent des proxys AitM (comme Evilginx, apparu en 2017) pour masquer l’option passkey et forcer le recours à des méthodes moins sécurisées, qui peuvent être capturées. Plus de détails sur cette technique.

Note historique — Les risques liés aux prompts falsifiables dans WebAuthn étaient déjà soulevés par la communauté dans le W3C GitHub issue #1965 (avant la démonstration du DEF CON 33). Cela montre que l’interface utilisateur a longtemps été reconnue comme un maillon faible dans l’authentification dite “phishing-resistant“.

Ces vulnérabilités, récentes et historiques, soulignent le rôle critique du navigateur et du modèle de déploiement (device-bound vs. synced). Elles renforcent l’appel à des architectures **souveraines** et déconnectées de ces vecteurs de compromission.

Vulnérabilité liée au modèle de synchronisation

Une des vulnérabilités les plus débattues ne concerne pas le protocole WebAuthn lui-même, mais son modèle de déploiement. La plupart des publications sur le sujet font la distinction entre deux types de passkeys :

  • Passkeys liés à l’appareil (device-bound) : Stockés sur un appareil physique (comme une clé de sécurité ou un Secure Enclave). Ce modèle est généralement considéré comme très sécurisé, car il n’est pas synchronisé via un service tiers.
  • Passkeys synchronisés dans le cloud : Stockés dans un gestionnaire de mots de passe ou un service cloud (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, etc.). Ces passkeys peuvent être synchronisés sur plusieurs appareils. Pour plus de détails sur cette distinction, consultez la documentation de la FIDO Alliance.

La vulnérabilité réside ici : si un attaquant parvient à compromettre le compte du service cloud, il pourrait potentiellement accéder aux passkeys synchronisés sur l’ensemble des appareils de l’utilisateur. C’est un risque que les passkeys liés à l’appareil ne partagent pas. Des recherches universitaires comme celles publiées sur arXiv approfondissent cette problématique, soulignant que “la sécurité des passkeys synchronisés est principalement concentrée chez le fournisseur de la passkey”.

Cette distinction est cruciale, car l’implémentation de **passkeys synchronisés vulnérables** contrevient à l’esprit d’une MFA dite résistante au phishing dès lors que la synchronisation introduit un intermédiaire et une surface d’attaque supplémentaire. Cela justifie la recommandation de la FIDO Alliance de privilégier les passkeys liés à l’appareil pour un niveau de sécurité maximal.

Démonstration – Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn (DEF CON 33)

À Las Vegas, au cœur du DEF CON 33 (8–11 août 2025), la scène hacker la plus respectée a eu droit à une démonstration qui a fait grincer bien des dents. Les chercheurs d’Allthenticate ont montré en direct qu’une passkey synchronisée vulnérable – pourtant labellisée « phishing-resistant » – pouvait être trompée. Comment ? Par une attaque d’interception WebAuthn de type prompt d’authentification falsifiable (real‑time prompt spoofing) : une fausse boîte de dialogue d’authentification, parfaitement calée dans le timing et l’UI légitime. Résultat : l’utilisateur croit valider une authentification légitime, mais l’adversaire récupère la session en direct.
La preuve de concept rend tangible “Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn” via un prompt usurpable en temps réel.

🎥 Auteurs & Médias officiels DEF CON 33
⮞ Shourya Pratap Singh, Jonny Lin, Daniel Seetoh — chercheurs Allthenticate, auteurs de la démo « Your Passkey is Weak: Phishing the Unphishable ».
• Vidéo Allthenticate sur TikTok — explication directe par l’équipe.
• Vidéo DEF CON 33 Las Vegas (TikTok) — aperçu du salon.
• Vidéo Highlights DEF CON 33 (YouTube) — incluant la faille passkeys.

⮞ Résumé

DEF CON 33 a démontré que les passkeys synchronisées vulnérables pouvaient être compromises en direct, dès lors qu’un prompt d’authentification falsifiable s’insère dans le flux WebAuthn.

Contexte technique – Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn

Pour comprendre la portée de cette vulnérabilité passkeys, il faut revenir aux deux familles principales :

  • Les passkeys synchronisées vulnérables : stockées dans un cloud Apple, Google ou Microsoft, accessibles sur tous vos appareils. Pratiques, mais l’authentification repose sur un prompt d’authentification falsifiable — un point d’ancrage exploitable.
  • Les passkeys device‑bound : la clé privée reste enfermée dans l’appareil (Secure Enclave, TPM, YubiKey). Aucun cloud, donc moins de surface d’attaque.

Dans ce cadre, “Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn” résulte d’un enchaînement où l’UI validée devient le point d’ancrage de l’attaque.

Le problème est simple : tout mécanisme dépendant d’un prompt système est imitable. Si l’attaquant reproduit l’UI et capture le timing, il peut effectuer une attaque d’interception WebAuthn et détourner l’acte d’authentification. Autrement dit, le maillon faible n’est pas la cryptographie mais l’interface utilisateur.

Risque systémique : L’effet domino en cas de corruption de Passkeys

Le risque lié à la corruption d’une passkey est particulièrement grave lorsqu’une seule passkey est utilisée sur plusieurs sites et services (Google, Microsoft, Apple, etc.). Si cette passkey est compromise, cela peut entraîner un effet domino où l’attaquant prend le contrôle de plusieurs comptes utilisateur liés à ce service unique.

Un autre facteur de risque est l’absence de mécanisme pour savoir si une passkey a été compromise. Contrairement aux mots de passe, qui peuvent être vérifiés dans des bases de données comme “Have I Been Pwned”, il n’existe actuellement aucun moyen standardisé pour qu’un utilisateur sache si sa passkey a été corrompue.

Le risque est d’autant plus élevé si la passkey est centralisée et synchronisée via un service cloud, car un accès malveillant à un compte pourrait potentiellement donner accès à d’autres services sensibles sans que l’utilisateur en soit immédiatement informé.

⮞ Résumé

La faille n’est pas dans les algorithmes FIDO, mais dans l’UI/UX : le prompt d’authentification falsifiable, parfait pour un phishing en temps réel.

Comparatif – Faille d’interception WebAuthn : spoofing de prompts vs. clickjacking DOM

À DEF CON 33, deux recherches majeures ont ébranlé la confiance dans les mécanismes modernes d’authentification. Toutes deux exploitent des failles liées à l’interface utilisateur (UX) plutôt qu’à la cryptographie, mais leurs vecteurs et cibles diffèrent radicalement.

Architecture PassCypher vs FIDO WebAuthn — Schéma comparatif des flux d’authentification
✪ Illustration : Comparaison visuelle des architectures d’authentification : FIDO/WebAuthn (prompt falsifiable) vs PassCypher (sans cloud, sans prompt).

Prompt falsifié en temps réel

  • Auteur : Allthenticate (Las Vegas, DEF CON 33).
  • Cible : passkeys synchronisées vulnérables (Apple, Google, Microsoft).
  • Vecteur : prompt d’authentification falsifiable, calé en temps réel sur l’UI légitime (real‑time prompt spoofing).
  • Impact : attaque d’interception WebAuthn provoquant un phishing « live » ; l’utilisateur valide à son insu une demande piégée.

Détournement de clic DOM

  • Auteurs : autre équipe de chercheurs (DEF CON 33).
  • Cible : gestionnaires d’identifiants, extensions, passkeys stockées.
  • Vecteur : iframes invisibles, Shadow DOM, scripts malveillants pour détourner l’autoremplissage.
  • Impact : exfiltration silencieuse d’identifiants, passkeys et clés de crypto‑wallets.

⮞ À retenir : cette chronique se concentre exclusivement sur le spoofing de prompts, qui illustre une faille d’interception WebAuthn majeure et remet en cause la promesse de « passkeys résistantes au phishing ». Pour l’étude complète du clickjacking DOM, voir la chronique connexe.

Implications stratégiques – Passkeys et vulnérabilités UX

En conséquence, “Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn” oblige à repenser l’authentification autour de modèles hors prompt et hors cloud.

      • Ne plus considérer les passkeys synchronisées vulnérables comme inviolables.
      • Privilégier les device‑bound credentials pour les environnements sensibles.
      • Mettre en place des garde‑fous UX : détection d’anomalies dans les prompts d’authentification, signatures visuelles non falsifiables.
      • Former les utilisateurs à la menace de phishing en temps réel par attaque d’interception WebAuthn.
⮞ Insight
Ce n’est pas la cryptographie qui cède, mais l’illusion d’immunité. L’interception WebAuthn démontre que le risque réside dans l’UX, pas dans l’algorithme.
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Chronique connexe — Clickjacking des extensions DOM à DEF CON 33

Une autre recherche présentée à DEF CON 33 a mis en lumière une méthode complémentaire visant les gestionnaires d’identités et les passkeys : le clickjacking des extensions DOM. Si cette technique n’implique pas directement une attaque d’interception WebAuthn, elle illustre un autre vecteur UX critique où des iframes invisibles, du Shadow DOM et des scripts malveillants peuvent détourner l’autoremplissage et voler des identifiants, des passkeys et des clés de crypto‑wallets.

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Réglementation & conformité – MFA et interception WebAuthn

Les textes officiels comme le guide CISA sur la MFA résistante au phishing ou la directive OMB M-22-09 insistent : une authentification n’est « résistante au phishing » que si aucun intermédiaire ne peut intercepter ou détourner le flux WebAuthn.

En théorie, les passkeys WebAuthn respectent cette règle. En pratique, l’implémentation des passkeys synchronisées vulnérables ouvre une faille d’interception exploitable via un prompt d’authentification falsifiable.

En Europe, la directive NIS2 et la certification SecNumCloud rappellent la même exigence : pas de dépendance à des services tiers non maîtrisés.

 

Risque lié à la synchronisation cloud

Une des vulnérabilités les plus débattues ne concerne pas le protocole lui-même, mais son modèle de déploiement. Les passkeys synchronisés via des services cloud (comme iCloud Keychain ou Google Password Manager) sont potentiellement vulnérables si le compte cloud de l’utilisateur est compromis. Ce risque n’existe pas pour les passkeys liés à l’appareil (via une clé de sécurité matérielle ou un Secure Enclave), ce qui souligne l’importance du choix de l’architecture de déploiement.

 

À ce titre, “Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn” contrevient à l’esprit d’une MFA dite résistante au phishing dès lors que la synchronisation introduit un intermédiaire.

Autrement dit, un cloud US gérant vos passkeys sort du cadre d’une souveraineté numérique stricte.

⮞ Résumé

Une passkey synchronisée vulnérable peut compromettre l’exigence de MFA résistante au phishing (CISA, NIS2) dès lors qu’une attaque d’interception WebAuthn est possible.

Statistiques francophones et européennes – Phishing en temps réel et interception WebAuthn

Les rapports publics confirment que les attaques de phishing avancé — notamment les techniques en temps réel — constituent une menace majeure dans l’Union européenne et l’espace francophone.

  • Union européenne — ENISA : selon le rapport Threat Landscape 2024, le phishing et l’ingénierie sociale représentent 38 % des incidents signalés dans l’UE, avec une hausse notable des méthodes Adversary‑in‑the‑Middle et prompt falsifié en temps réel (real‑time prompt spoofing), associées à l’interception WebAuthn. Source : ENISA Threat Landscape 2024
  • France — Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr : en 2023, le phishing a généré 38 % des demandes d’assistance, avec plus de 1,5 M de consultations liées à l’hameçonnage. Les arnaques au faux conseiller bancaire ont bondi de +78 % vs 2022, souvent via des prompts d’authentification falsifiables. Source : Rapport d’activité 2023
  • Canada (francophone) — Centre canadien pour la cybersécurité : l’Évaluation des cybermenaces nationales 2023‑2024 indique que 65 % des entreprises s’attendent à subir un phishing ou ransomware. Le phishing reste un vecteur privilégié pour contourner la MFA, y compris via l’interception de flux WebAuthn. Source : Évaluation officielle
⮞ Lecture stratégique
Le prompt falsifié en temps réel n’est pas une expérimentation de laboratoire : il s’inscrit dans une tendance où le phishing cible l’interface d’authentification plutôt que les algorithmes, avec un recours croissant à l’attaque d’interception WebAuthn.

Cas d’usage souverain – Neutralisation de l’interception WebAuthn

Dans un scénario concret, une autorité régulatrice réserve les passkeys synchronisées aux portails publics à faible risque. Le choix PassCypher supprime la cause de “Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn” en retirant le prompt, le cloud et toute exposition DOM.
Pour les systèmes critiques (administration, opérations sensibles, infrastructures vitales), elle déploie PassCypher sous deux formes :

PassCypher NFC HSM — authentification matérielle hors‑ligne, sans serveur, avec émulation clavier BLE AES‑128‑CBC. Aucun prompt d’authentification falsifiable n’existe.
PassCypher HSM PGP — gestion souveraine de clés segmentées inexportables, validation cryptographique sans cloud ni synchronisation.

⮞ Résultat
Dans ce modèle, le vecteur prompt exploité lors de l’attaque d’interception WebAuthn à DEF CON 33 est totalement éliminé des parcours critiques.

Pourquoi PassCypher élimine le risque d’interception WebAuthn

Les solutions PassCypher se distinguent radicalement des passkeys FIDO vulnérables à l’attaque d’interception WebAuthn :

  • Pas de prompt OS/navigateur — donc aucun prompt d’authentification falsifiable.
  • Pas de cloud — pas de synchronisation vulnérable ni dépendance à un tiers.
  • Pas de DOM — aucune exposition aux scripts, extensions ou iframes.
✓ Souveraineté : en supprimant prompt, cloud et DOM, PassCypher retire tout point d’accroche à la faille d’interception WebAuthn (spoofing de prompts) révélée à DEF CON 33.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Neutralisation matérielle de l’interception

L’attaque d’Allthenticate à DEF CON 33 prouve que tout système dépendant d’un prompt OS/navigateur peut être falsifié.
PassCypher NFC HSM supprime ce vecteur : aucun prompt, aucune synchro cloud, secrets chiffrés à vie dans un nano‑HSM NFC et validés par un tap physique.

Fonctionnement utilisateur :

  • Tap NFC obligatoire — validation physique sans interface logicielle.
  • Mode HID BLE AES‑128‑CBC — transmission hors DOM, résistante aux keyloggers.
  • Écosystème Zero‑DOM — aucun secret n’apparaît dans le navigateur.

⮞ Résumé

Contrairement aux passkeys synchronisées vulnérables, PassCypher NFC HSM neutralise l’attaque d’interception WebAuthn car il n’existe pas de prompt d’authentification falsifiable.

Attaques neutralisées par PassCypher NFC HSM

Type d’attaque Vecteur Statut
Spoofing de prompts Faux dialogue OS/navigateur Neutralisé (zéro prompt)
Phishing en temps réel Validation piégée en direct Neutralisé (tap NFC obligatoire)
Enregistrement de frappe Capture de frappes clavier Neutralisé (HID BLE chiffré)

PassCypher HSM PGP — Clés segmentées contre le phishing

L’autre pilier, PassCypher HSM PGP, applique la même philosophie : aucun prompt exploitable.
Les secrets (identifiants, passkeys, clés SSH/PGP, TOTP/HOTP) résident dans des conteneurs chiffrés AES‑256 CBC PGP, protégés par un système de clés segmentées brevetées.

  • Pas de prompt — donc pas de fenêtre à falsifier.
  • Clés segmentées — inexportables, assemblées uniquement en RAM.
  • Déchiffrement éphémère — le secret disparaît aussitôt utilisé.
  • Zéro cloud — pas de synchronisation vulnérable.

⮞ Résumé

PassCypher HSM PGP supprime le terrain d’attaque du prompt falsifié en temps réel : authentification matérielle, clés segmentées et validation cryptographique sans exposition DOM ni cloud.

Comparatif de surface d’attaque

Critère Passkeys synchronisées (FIDO) PassCypher NFC HSM PassCypher HSM PGP
Prompt d’authentification Oui Non Non
Cloud de synchronisation Oui Non Non
Clé privée exportable Non (UI attaquable) Non Non
Usurpation / interception WebAuthn Présent Absent Absent
Dépendance standard FIDO Oui Non Non
⮞ Insight
En retirant le prompt d’authentification falsifiable et la synchronisation cloud, l’attaque d’interception WebAuthn démontrée à DEF CON 33 disparaît complètement.

Signaux faibles – tendances liées à l’interception WebAuthn

⮞ Weak Signals Identified
– Généralisation des attaques UI en temps réel, y compris l’interception WebAuthn via prompt d’authentification falsifiable.
– Dépendance croissante aux clouds tiers pour l’identité, augmentant l’exposition des passkeys synchronisées vulnérables.
– Multiplication des contournements via ingénierie sociale assistée par IA, appliquée aux interfaces d’authentification.

Glossaire des termes stratégiques

Un rappel des notions clés utilisées dans cette chronique, pour lecteurs débutants comme confirmés.

  • Passkey / Passkeys

    Un identifiant numérique sans mot de passe basé sur le standard FIDO/WebAuthn, conçu pour être “résistant au phishing”.

    • Passkey (singulier) : Se réfère à un identifiant numérique unique stocké sur un appareil (par exemple, le Secure Enclave, TPM, YubiKey).
    • Passkeys (pluriel) : Se réfère à la technologie générale ou à plusieurs identifiants, y compris les *passkeys synchronisés* stockés dans les clouds d’Apple, Google ou Microsoft. Ces derniers sont particulièrement vulnérables à l’**Attaque d’Interception WebAuthn** (falsification de prompt en temps réel démontrée au DEF CON 33).
  • Passkeys Pwned

    Titre de la présentation au DEF CON 33 par Allthenticate (« Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself »). Elle met en évidence comment une attaque d’interception WebAuthn peut compromettre les passkeys synchronisés en temps réel, prouvant qu’ils ne sont pas 100% résistants au phishing.

  • Passkeys synchronisées vulnérables

    Stockées dans un cloud (Apple, Google, Microsoft) et utilisables sur plusieurs appareils. Avantage en termes d’UX, mais faiblesse stratégique : dépendance à un **prompt d’authentification falsifiable** et au cloud.

  • Passkeys device-bound

    Liées à un seul périphérique (TPM, Secure Enclave, YubiKey). Plus sûres car sans synchronisation cloud.

  • Prompt

    Boîte de dialogue système ou navigateur demandant une validation (Face ID, empreinte, clé FIDO). Cible principale du spoofing.

  • Attaque d’interception WebAuthn

    Également connue sous le nom de *WebAuthn API Hijacking*. Elle manipule le flux d’authentification en falsifiant le prompt système/navigateur et en imitant l’interface utilisateur en temps réel. L’attaquant ne brise pas la cryptographie, mais intercepte le processus WebAuthn au niveau de l’UX. Voir la spécification officielle W3C WebAuthn et la documentation de la FIDO Alliance.

  • Real-time prompt spoofing

    Falsification en direct d’une fenêtre d’authentification, qui est indiscernable pour l’utilisateur.

  • Clickjacking DOM

    Attaque utilisant des *iframes invisibles* et le *Shadow DOM* pour détourner l’autoremplissage et voler des identifiants.

  • Zero-DOM

    Architecture souveraine où aucun secret n’est exposé au navigateur ni au DOM.

  • NFC HSM

    Module matériel sécurisé hors ligne, compatible HID BLE AES-128-CBC.

  • Clés segmentées

    Clés cryptographiques découpées en segments, assemblées uniquement en mémoire volatile.

  • Device-bound credential

    Identifiant attaché à un périphérique physique, non transférable ni clonable.

▸ Utilité stratégique : ce glossaire montre pourquoi l’**attaque d’interception WebAuthn** cible le prompt et l’UX, et pourquoi PassCypher élimine ce vecteur par conception.

FAQ technique (intégration & usages)

  • Q : Peut‑on migrer d’un parc FIDO vers PassCypher ?

    R : Oui, en modèle hybride. Conservez FIDO pour les usages courants, adoptez PassCypher pour les accès critiques afin d’éliminer les vecteurs d’interception WebAuthn.

  • Q : Quel impact UX sans prompt système ?

    R : Le geste est matériel (tap NFC ou validation HSM). Aucun prompt d’authentification falsifiable, aucune boîte de dialogue à usurper : suppression totale du risque de phishing en temps réel.

  • Q : Comment révoquer une clé compromise ?

    R : On révoque simplement l’HSM ou la clé cycle. Aucun cloud à purger, aucun compte tiers à contacter.

  • Q : PassCypher protège-t-il contre le real-time prompt spoofing ?

    R : Oui. L’architecture PassCypher supprime totalement le prompt OS/navigateur, supprimant ainsi la surface d’attaque exploitée à DEF CON 33.

  • Q : Peut‑on intégrer PassCypher dans une infrastructure réglementée NIS2 ?

    R : Oui. Les modules NFC HSM et HSM PGP sont conformes aux exigences de souveraineté numérique et neutralisent les risques liés aux passkeys synchronisées vulnérables.

  • Q : Les passkeys device‑bound sont‑elles totalement inviolables ?

    R : Non, mais elles éliminent le risque d’interception WebAuthn via cloud. Leur sécurité dépend ensuite de la robustesse matérielle (TPM, Secure Enclave, YubiKey) et de la protection physique de l’appareil.

  • Q : Un malware local peut‑il reproduire un prompt PassCypher ?

    R : Non. PassCypher ne repose pas sur un prompt logiciel : la validation est matérielle et hors‑ligne, donc aucun affichage falsifiable n’existe.

  • Q : Pourquoi les clouds tiers augmentent‑ils le risque ?

    R : Les passkeys synchronisées vulnérables stockées dans un cloud tiers peuvent être ciblées par des attaques d’Adversary‑in‑the‑Middle ou d’interception WebAuthn si le prompt est compromis.

Conseil RSSI / CISO – Protection universelle & souveraine

EviBITB (Embedded Browser‑In‑The‑Browser Protection) est une technologie embarquée dans PassCypher HSM PGP, y compris dans sa version gratuite.
Elle détecte et supprime automatiquement ou manuellement les iframes de redirection utilisées dans les attaques BITB et prompt spoofing, éliminant ainsi le vecteur d’interception WebAuthn.

  • Déploiement immédiat : extension gratuite pour navigateurs Chromium et Firefox, utilisable à grande échelle sans licence payante.
  • Protection universelle : agit même si l’organisation n’a pas encore migré vers un modèle hors‑prompt.
  • Compatibilité souveraine : fonctionne avec PassCypher NFC HSM Lite (99 €) et PassCypher HSM PGP complet (129 €/an).
  • Full passwordless : PassCypher NFC HSM et HSM PGP peuvent remplacer totalement FIDO/WebAuthn pour tous les parcours d’authentification, avec zéro prompt, zéro cloud et 100 % de souveraineté.

Recommandation stratégique :
Déployer EviBITB dès maintenant sur tous les postes pour neutraliser le BITB/prompt spoofing, puis planifier la migration des accès critiques vers un modèle full‑PassCypher pour supprimer définitivement la surface d’attaque.

Questions fréquentes côté RSSI / CISO

Q : Quel est l’impact réglementaire d’une attaque d’interception WebAuthn ?

R : Ce type d’attaque peut compromettre la conformité aux exigences de MFA « résistante au phishing » définies par la CISA, NIS2 et SecNumCloud. En cas de compromission de données personnelles, l’organisation s’expose à des sanctions RGPD et à une remise en cause de ses certifications sécurité.

Q : Existe-t-il une protection universelle et gratuite contre le BITB et le prompt spoofing ?

R : Oui. EviBITB est une technologie embarquée dans PassCypher HSM PGP, y compris dans sa version gratuite. Elle bloque les iframes de redirection (Browser-In-The-Browser) et supprime le vecteur du prompt d’authentification falsifiable exploité dans l’interception WebAuthn. Elle peut être déployée immédiatement à grande échelle sans licence payante.

Q : Peut-on se passer totalement de FIDO/WebAuthn ?

R : Oui. PassCypher NFC HSM et PassCypher HSM PGP sont des solutions passwordless souveraines complètes : elles permettent d’authentifier, signer et chiffrer sans infrastructure FIDO, avec zéro prompt falsifiable, zéro cloud tiers et une architecture 100 % maîtrisée.

Q : Quel est le budget moyen et le ROI d’une migration vers un modèle hors-prompt ?

R : Selon l’étude Time Spent on Authentication, un professionnel perd en moyenne 285 heures/an en authentifications classiques, soit environ 8 550 $ de coût annuel (base 30 $/h). PassCypher HSM PGP ramène ce temps à ~7 h/an, PassCypher NFC HSM à ~18 h/an. Même avec le modèle complet (129 €/an) ou le NFC HSM Lite (99 € achat unique), le point mort est atteint en quelques jours à quelques semaines, et les économies nettes dépassent 50 fois le coût annuel dans un contexte professionnel.

Q : Comment gérer un parc hybride (legacy + moderne) ?

R : Conserver FIDO pour les usages à faible risque tout en remplaçant progressivement par PassCypher NFC HSM et/ou PassCypher HSM PGP dans les environnements critiques. Cette transition supprime les prompts exploitables et conserve la compatibilité applicative.

Q : Quels indicateurs suivre pour mesurer la réduction de surface d’attaque ?

R : Nombre d’authentifications via prompt système vs. authentification matérielle, incidents liés à l’interception WebAuthn, temps moyen de remédiation et pourcentage d’accès critiques migrés vers un modèle souverain hors-prompt.

Plan d’action RSSI / CISO

Action prioritaire Impact attendu
Remplacer les passkeys synchronisées vulnérables par PassCypher NFC HSM (99 €) et/ou PassCypher HSM PGP (129 €/an) Élimine le prompt falsifiable, supprime l’interception WebAuthn, passage en passwordless souverain avec amortissement en jours selon l’étude sur le temps d’authentification
Migrer vers un modèle full‑PassCypher pour les environnements critiques Supprime toute dépendance FIDO/WebAuthn, centralise la gestion souveraine des accès et secrets, et maximise les gains de productivité mesurés par l’étude
Déployer EviBITB (technologie embarquée dans PassCypher HSM PGP, version gratuite incluse) Protection immédiate sans coût contre BITB et phishing en temps réel par prompt spoofing
Durcir l’UX (signatures visuelles, éléments non clonables) Complexifie les attaques UI, clickjacking et redress
Auditer et journaliser les flux d’authentification Détecte et trace toute tentative de détournement de flux ou d’Adversary-in-the-Middle
Aligner avec NIS2, SecNumCloud et RGPD Réduit le risque juridique et apporte une preuve de conformité
Former les utilisateurs aux menaces d’interface falsifiable Renforce la vigilance humaine et la détection proactive

Perspectives stratégiques

Le message de DEF CON 33 est clair : la sécurité de l’authentification se joue à l’interface.
Tant que l’utilisateur validera des prompts d’authentification graphiques synchronisés avec un flux réseau, le phishing en temps réel et l’interception WebAuthn resteront possibles.
Les modèles hors prompt et hors cloud — matérialisés par des HSM souverains comme PassCypherréduisent radicalement la surface d’attaque.
À court terme : généraliser le device‑bound pour les usages sensibles ; à moyen terme : éliminer l’UI falsifiable des parcours critiques. La trajectoire recommandée élimine durablement “Passkeys Faille Interception WebAuthn” des parcours critiques par un passage progressif au full‑PassCypher.

Clickjacking Extensiones DOM — Riesgos y Defensa Zero-DOM

Póster estilo cine sobre clickjacking extensiones DOM, riesgos sistémicos, vulnerabilidades de gestores de contraseñas y wallets cripto, con contramedidas Zero DOM soberanas.

Resumen Ejecutivo — Clickjacking Extensiones DOM

⮞ Nota de lectura

Si solo quieres lo esencial, este Resumen Ejecutivo (≈4 minutos) ofrece una visión sólida. Sin embargo, para una comprensión técnica completa, continúa con la crónica íntegra (≈36–38 minutos).

⚡ El Descubrimiento

Las Vegas, principios de agosto de 2025. DEF CON 33 ocupa el Centro de Convenciones de Las Vegas. Entre domos hacker, aldeas IoT, Adversary Village y competiciones CTF, el ambiente se electrifica. En el escenario, Marek Tóth conecta su portátil, inicia la demo y pulsa Enter.
De inmediato emerge el ataque estrella: clickjacking extensiones DOM. Fácil de codificar pero devastador al ejecutarse, se basa en una página trampa, iframes invisibles y una llamada maliciosa a focus(). Estos elementos engañan a los gestores de autocompletado para volcar credenciales, códigos TOTP y llaves de acceso (passkeys) en un formulario fantasma. Así, el clickjacking basado en DOM se manifiesta como una amenaza estructural.

✦ Impacto Inmediato en Gestores de Contraseñas

Los resultados son contundentes. Marek Tóth probó 11 gestores de contraseñas y todos mostraron vulnerabilidades de diseño. De hecho, 10 de 11 filtraron credenciales y secretos. Según SecurityWeek, casi 40 millones de instalaciones permanecen expuestas. Además, la ola se extiende más allá de los gestores: incluso las billeteras cripto (crypto-wallets) filtraron claves privadas “como un grifo que gotea”, exponiendo directamente activos financieros.

✦ Impacto inmediato en gestores de contraseñas

Los resultados son contundentes. Marek Tóth analizó 11 gestores de contraseñas: todos presentaban vulnerabilidades estructurales.
En 10 de ellos, se filtraron credenciales y secretos.
Según SecurityWeek, cerca de 40 millones de instalaciones siguen expuestas.
La amenaza se extiende más allá: incluso los monederos cripto filtraron claves privadas, exponiendo directamente activos financieros.

⧉ Segunda demostración ⟶ Exfiltración de passkeys vía overlay en DEF CON 33

Durante DEF CON 33, una segunda demostración independiente reveló que las passkeys «resistentes al phishing» pueden ser exfiltradas silenciosamente mediante una superposición visual y una redirección maliciosa — sin necesidad de inyección DOM. El ataque explota la confianza del usuario en interfaces conocidas y validaciones desde el navegador. Incluso FIDO/WebAuthn puede ser vulnerado en entornos no soberanos.

⚠ Mensaje Estratégico — Riesgos Sistémicos

Con solo dos demostraciones — una contra gestores y billeteras, otra contra passkeys — colapsaron dos pilares de la ciberseguridad. El mensaje es claro: mientras los secretos residan en el DOM, seguirán siendo vulnerables. Además, mientras la seguridad dependa del navegador y la nube, un solo clic puede derrumbarlo todo.
Como recuerda OWASP, el clickjacking siempre ha sido una amenaza conocida. Sin embargo, aquí colapsa la propia capa de extensión.

⎔ La Alternativa Soberana — Contramedidas Zero-DOM

Afortunadamente, existe desde hace más de una década otra vía que no depende del DOM.
Con PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM y SeedNFC para respaldo hardware de claves criptográficas, tus credenciales, contraseñas y secretos TOTP/HOTP nunca tocan el DOM.
En cambio, permanecen cifrados en HSM fuera de línea (offline), inyectados de forma segura mediante sandboxing de URL o introducidos manualmente vía aplicación NFC en Android, siempre protegidos por defensas anti-BITB.
Por tanto, no es un parche, sino una arquitectura soberana sin contraseñas, patentada: descentralizada, sin servidor, sin base de datos central y sin contraseña maestra. Libera la gestión de secretos de dependencias centralizadas como FIDO/WebAuthn.

Crónica para leer
Tiempo estimado de lectura: 36–38 minutos
Fecha de actualización: 2025-09-11
Nivel de complejidad: Avanzado / Experto
Especificidad lingüística: Léxico soberano — alta densidad técnica
Idiomas disponibles: CAT · EN · ES · FR
Accesibilidad: Optimizado para lectores de pantalla — anclas semánticas incluidas
Tipo editorial: Crónica estratégica
Sobre el autor: Escrito por Jacques Gascuel, inventor y fundador de Freemindtronic®.
Especialista en tecnologías de seguridad soberana, diseña y patenta sistemas hardware para protección de datos, soberanía criptográfica y comunicaciones seguras. Además, su experiencia abarca el cumplimiento con ANSSI, NIS2, GDPR y SecNumCloud, así como la defensa frente a amenazas híbridas mediante arquitecturas soberanas por diseño.

 

TL;DR —
En DEF CON 33, el clickjacking de extensiones DOM evidenció un riesgo sistémico para la seguridad de los navegadores y los gestores de contraseñas.
Datos expuestos: credenciales, códigos TOTP, passkeys y claves criptográficas.
Técnicas aplicadas: iframes invisibles, manipulación del Shadow DOM y superposiciones tipo Browser-in-the-Browser.
Impacto inicial: unas 40 millones de instalaciones reportadas como expuestas.
Estado al 11 de septiembre de 2025: varios proveedores publicaron parches para los métodos descritos (Bitwarden, Dashlane, Enpass, NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm, Keeper [parcial], LogMeOnce), mientras que otros siguen siendo vulnerables (1Password, iCloud Passwords, LastPass, KeePassXC-Browser).
En consecuencia: solo una arquitectura Zero-DOM con cifrado de hardware soberano elimina de forma sostenible la superficie de ataque y protege las credenciales frente a este tipo de ataques.

Anatomía del clickjacking extensiones DOM: una página maliciosa, un iframe oculto y un secuestro de autocompletado que exfiltra credenciales, llaves de acceso y claves de billeteras cripto.

Anatomía del clickjacking extensiones DOM con iframe oculto, Shadow DOM y exfiltración sigilosa de credenciales
Anatomía del clickjacking extensiones DOM: página maliciosa, iframe oculto y secuestro de autocompletado exfiltrando credenciales, llaves de acceso y claves de billeteras cripto.

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En ciberseguridad soberana Esta crónica forma parte de la sección Seguridad Digital, continuando nuestra investigación sobre exploits, vulnerabilidades sistémicas y contramedidas de confianza cero basadas en hardware.

Key Points:

  • 11 password managers proved vulnerable — credentials, TOTP, and passkeys were exfiltrated through DOM redressing.
  • Popular crypto-wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet) face the same DOM extension clickjacking risks.
  • Exploitation requires only a single click, leveraging hidden iframes, encapsulated Shadow DOM, and Browser-in-the-Browser overlays.
  • The browser sandbox is no sovereign stronghold — BITB overlays can deceive user perception.
  • PassCypher NFC / HSM PGP and SeedNFC provide hardware-based Zero-DOM flows anchored in secure enclaves, with integrated anti-BITB kill-switch.
  • A decade of sovereign R&D anticipated these risks: segmented AES-256 containers, hybrid NFC↔PGP RAM channels, and HID injection form the native alternative.

¿Qué es el clickjacking de extensiones basado en el DOM?

DOM-based extension clickjacking secuestra una extensión del navegador (gestor de contraseñas o wallet) abusando del Document Object Model. Una página engañosa enlaza iframes invisibles, Shadow DOM y una llamada maliciosa a focus() para provocar el autocompletado en un formulario invisible. La extensión «cree» que está en el campo correcto y vierte secretos allí — credenciales, códigos TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, incluso claves privadas. Porque estos secretos tocan el DOM, pueden ser exfiltrados de forma silenciosa.

⮞ Perspectiva doctrinal: El DOM-based extension clickjacking no es un bug aislado, es un error de diseño. Cualquier extensión que inyecte secretos en un DOM manipulable es inherentemente vulnerable. Solo las arquitecturas Zero-DOM (separación estructural, HSM/NFC, inyección fuera del navegador) eliminan esta superficie de ataque.

¿Qué nivel de peligrosidad tiene?

Este vector no es menor: explota la propia lógica del autocompletado y opera sin que el usuario lo note. El atacante no se limita a superponer un elemento; fuerza a la extensión a rellenar un formulario falso como si nada, haciendo la exfiltración indetectable a simple vista.

Flujo típico del ataque

  1. Preparación — la página maliciosa incrusta un iframe invisible y un Shadow DOM que oculta el contexto real; los campos se hacen no visibles (opacity:0, pointer-events:none).
  2. Cebo — la víctima hace clic en un elemento inocuo; redirecciones y un focus() malicioso redirigen el evento a un campo controlado por el atacante.
  3. Exfiltración — la extensión cree que interactúa con un campo legítimo e inyecta automáticamente credenciales, TOTP, passkeys o claves privadas en el DOM falso; los datos se exfiltran al instante.

Este mecanismo engaña las señales visuales, elude protecciones clásicas (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, frame-ancestors) y convierte el autocompletado en un canal de exfiltración invisible. Los overlays tipo Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) y la manipulación del Shadow DOM aumentan aún más el riesgo, haciendo phishable las passkeys sincronizadas y las credenciales.

⮞ Resumen

El ataque combina iframes invisibles, manipulación del Shadow DOM y redirecciones vía focus() para secuestrar extensiones de autofill. Los secretos se inyectan en un formulario fantasma, dando al atacante acceso directo a datos sensibles (credenciales, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, claves privadas). Conclusión: mientras los secretos transiten por el DOM, la superficie de ataque permanece abierta.

Historia del Clickjacking (2002–2025)

El clickjacking se ha convertido en el parásito persistente de la web moderna. El término surgió a principios de los 2000, cuando Jeremiah Grossman y Robert Hansen describieron un escenario engañoso: inducir al usuario a hacer clic en algo que en realidad no podía ver. Una ilusión óptica aplicada al código, pronto se convirtió en una técnica de ataque de referencia (OWASP).

  • 2002–2008: Aparición del “UI redressing”: capas HTML + iframes transparentes atrapando al usuario (Archivo Hansen).
  • 2009: Facebook cae víctima del Likejacking (OWASP).
  • 2010: Surge el Cursorjacking — desplazar el puntero para manipular clics (OWASP).
  • 2012–2015: Explotación vía iframes, anuncios online y malvertising (MITRE CVE) (Infosec).
  • 2016–2019: El tapjacking se extiende en móviles Android (Android Security Bulletin).
  • 2020–2024: Auge del “clickjacking híbrido” combinando XSS y phishing (OWASP WSTG).
  • 2025: En DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth presenta un nuevo nivel: Clickjacking de Extensiones DOM. Esta vez no solo los sitios web, sino también las extensiones del navegador (gestores de contraseñas, billeteras cripto) inyectan formularios invisibles, habilitando la exfiltración sigilosa de secretos.

En DEF CON 33, Tóth reveló públicamente el clickjacking de extensiones DOM, marcando un cambio estructural: de un truco visual a una debilidad sistémica en gestores de contraseñas y wallets cripto.

❓¿Cuánto tiempo llevas expuesto?

Los fabricantes de gestores de contraseñas tuvieron todas las señales de advertencia.
OWASP documenta el clickjacking desde 2002, los iframes invisibles son conocidos desde hace más de 15 años, y el Shadow DOM nunca fue un secreto esotérico.
En resumen: todos lo sabían.

Y aun así, la mayoría siguió construyendo castillos de arena sobre el autocompletado DOM. ¿Por qué? Porque se veía impecable en las presentaciones de marketing: UX fluida, inicios de sesión mágicos con un clic, adopción masiva… con la seguridad relegada a un segundo plano.

El clickjacking extensiones DOM revelado en DEF CON 33 no es un hallazgo nuevo de 2025. Es el resultado de un defecto de diseño de más de una década. Toda extensión que “confiaba en el DOM” para inyectar accesos, TOTP o passkeys ya era vulnerable.

⮞ Reflexión crítica: ¿cuánto tiempo han explotado esto en silencio?

La verdadera cuestión es: ¿durante cuánto tiempo explotaron en silencio estas vulnerabilidades atacantes discretos — mediante espionaje dirigido, robo de identidad o sifoneo de wallets cripto?

Mientras los gestores software miraban hacia otro lado, PassCypher y SeedNFC de Freemindtronic Andorra optaron por otro camino. Diseñados fuera del DOM, fuera de la nube y sin contraseña maestra, demostraron que ya existía una alternativa soberana: la seguridad por diseño.

Resultado: una década de exposición silenciosa para algunos, y una década de ventaja tecnológica para quienes invirtieron en hardware soberano.

Síntesis:
En apenas 20 años, el clickjacking pasó de ser un simple truco visual a un sabotaje sistémico de gestores de identidad. DEF CON 33 marca un punto de ruptura: la amenaza ya no son solo sitios web maliciosos, sino el núcleo mismo de las extensiones de navegador y el autocompletado. De ahí la urgencia de enfoques Zero-DOM anclados en hardware soberano como PassCypher.

Vulnerabilidades de Gestores de Contraseñas (2025)

Al 11 de septiembre de 2025, las pruebas en vivo de Marek Tóth en DEF CON 33 confirmaron que la mayoría de los gestores de contraseñas basados en navegador siguen expuestos al clickjacking de extensiones DOM en su configuración predeterminada.

De los 11 gestores probados, 10 filtraron credenciales, 9 expusieron códigos TOTP y 8 revelaron passkeys.
Así, incluso la bóveda digital más confiada puede volverse vulnerable cuando delega secretos sensibles al DOM.

  • Aún vulnerables: 1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords, KeePassXC-Browser
  • Corregidos: Bitwarden (v2025.8.2), Dashlane, Enpass (v6.11.6), Keeper (v17.2.0, parcial), LogMeOnce (v7.12.7), NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm
  • En proceso de corrección: iCloud Passwords (sin parche confirmado), 1Password (texto confuso en diálogos)
  • Marcados como “informativos” (sin plan de parche): LastPass, KeePassXC-Browser

Tabla de Estado (Actualizada 11 de septiembre de 2025)

Gestor Credenciales TOTP Passkeys Estado Parche
1Password Vulnerable
Bitwarden Parcial Corregido (v2025.8.2) Release
Dashlane Corregido Advisory
LastPass Vulnerable
Enpass Corregido (v6.11.6) Release
iCloud Passwords No Vulnerable
LogMeOnce No Corregido (v7.12.7) Release
NordPass Parcial Corregido Release
ProtonPass Parcial Corregido Releases
RoboForm Corregido Update
Keeper Parcial No No Parche parcial (v17.2.0) Release
⮞ Perspectiva clave: Aunque algunos proveedores reaccionaron con rapidez, el problema persiste: mientras las credenciales y secretos sigan expuestos en el DOM, podrán ser interceptados con un solo clic.
En contraste, las soluciones soberanas de PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM y SeedNFC eliminan la amenaza desde el diseño: credenciales, contraseñas, TOTP/HOTP o claves privadas nunca interactúan con el navegador.
Zero-DOM, superficie de ataque nula.

Divulgación CVE y Respuestas de Proveedores (Ago–Sep 2025)

El descubrimiento de Marek Tóth en DEF CON 33 no podía permanecer oculto: las vulnerabilidades de clickjacking extensiones DOM están recibiendo actualmente identificadores oficiales CVE.
Sin embargo, como suele ocurrir en los procesos de vulnerability disclosure, el avance es lento. Varias fallas fueron reportadas ya en primavera de 2025, pero a mediados de agosto algunos proveedores aún no habían publicado correcciones públicas.

Respuestas de proveedores y cronología de parches:

  • Bitwarden — reaccionó rápidamente con el parche v2025.8.0 (agosto 2025), mitigando fugas de credenciales y TOTP.
  • Dashlane — lanzó una corrección (v6.2531.1, inicios de agosto 2025), confirmada en notas oficiales.
  • RoboForm — desplegó parches en julio–agosto 2025 en versiones Windows y macOS.
  • NordPass y ProtonPass — anunciaron actualizaciones oficiales en agosto 2025, mitigando parcialmente la exfiltración vía DOM.
  • Keeper — reconoció el impacto, pero sigue en estado “en revisión” sin parche confirmado.
  • 1Password, LastPass, Enpass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce — permanecen sin parche a inicios de septiembre 2025, dejando usuarios expuestos.

El problema no es solo el retraso en los parches, sino también la manera en que algunos proveedores minimizaron el fallo. Según informes de seguridad, ciertos editores inicialmente catalogaron la vulnerabilidad como “informativa”, restándole gravedad.
En otras palabras: reconocieron la fuga, pero la relegaron a una “caja gris” hasta que la presión mediática y comunitaria los obligó a actuar.

⮞ Resumen

Los CVE de clickjacking extensiones DOM siguen en proceso.
Mientras proveedores como Bitwarden, Dashlane, NordPass, ProtonPass y RoboForm publicaron parches oficiales en agosto–septiembre 2025, otros (1Password, LastPass, Enpass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce) siguen rezagados, dejando a millones de usuarios expuestos.
Algunas compañías incluso optaron por el silencio en lugar de la transparencia, tratando un exploit estructural como un problema menor hasta que la presión externa los obligó a reaccionar.

Tecnologías de Corrección Utilizadas

Desde la divulgación pública del clickjacking extensiones DOM en DEF CON 33, los proveedores se apresuraron a lanzar parches. Sin embargo, estas correcciones siguen siendo desiguales, limitadas en su mayoría a ajustes de interfaz o comprobaciones condicionales. Ningún proveedor ha re-ingenierizado aún el motor de inyección en sí.

🔍 Antes de profundizar en los métodos de corrección, aquí tienes una vista general de las principales tecnologías desplegadas por los proveedores para mitigar el clickjacking de extensiones DOM. La infografía muestra el espectro: desde parches cosméticos hasta soluciones soberanas Zero-DOM.

Infografía con cinco métodos de corrección frente al clickjacking extensiones DOM: restricción de autocompletado, filtrado de subdominios, detección de Shadow DOM, aislamiento contextual y Zero-DOM hardware soberano
Cinco respuestas de proveedores frente al clickjacking extensiones DOM: desde parches UI hasta hardware soberano Zero-DOM.

Objetivo

Esta sección explica cómo intentaron los proveedores corregir la falla, distingue entre parches cosméticos y correcciones estructurales, y destaca las aproximaciones soberanas Zero-DOM en hardware.

Métodos de Corrección Observados (agosto 2025)

Método Descripción Gestores afectados
Restricción de Autocompletado Cambio a modo “on-click” o desactivación por defecto Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper
Filtrado de Subdominios Bloquear autocompletado en subdominios no autorizados ProtonPass, RoboForm
Detección de Shadow DOM Rechazo de inyección si el campo está encapsulado en Shadow DOM NordPass, Enpass
Aislamiento Contextual Comprobaciones previas a la inyección (iframe, opacidad, foco) Bitwarden, ProtonPass
Hardware Soberano (Zero-DOM) Los secretos nunca transitan por el DOM: NFC HSM, HSM PGP, SeedNFC PassCypher, EviKey, SeedNFC (no vulnerables por diseño)

📉 Límites Observados

  • Los parches no modificaron el motor de inyección, solo sus disparadores de activación.
  • Ningún proveedor introdujo separación estructural entre interfaz y flujo de secretos.
  • Cualquier gestor aún atado al DOM permanece expuesto estructuralmente a variantes de clickjacking.

⮞ Transición estratégica:

Estos parches muestran reacción, no ruptura. Abordan síntomas, no la falla estructural.
Para entender qué separa un parche temporal de una corrección doctrinal, avancemos al siguiente análisis.

Tecnologías de Corrección frente al Clickjacking de Extensiones DOM — Análisis Técnico y Doctrinal

📌 Observación

El clickjacking extensiones DOM no es un simple bug, sino un defecto de diseño: inyectar secretos en un DOM manipulable sin separación estructural ni verificación contextual.

⚠️ Lo que las correcciones actuales no abordan

  • Ningún proveedor ha reconstruido su motor de inyección.
  • Las correcciones se limitan a desactivar autocompletado, filtrar subdominios o detectar elementos invisibles.
  • Ninguno ha integrado una arquitectura Zero-DOM que garantice inviolabilidad por diseño.

🧠 Lo que requeriría una corrección estructural

  • Eliminar toda dependencia del DOM para la inyección de secretos.
  • Aislar el motor de inyección fuera del navegador.
  • Usar autenticación hardware (NFC, PGP, biometría).
  • Registrar cada inyección en un diario auditable.
  • Prohibir interacción con elementos invisibles o encapsulados.

📊 Tipología de correcciones

Nivel Tipo de corrección Descripción
Cosmética UI/UX, autocompletado desactivado por defecto No cambia la lógica de inyección, solo el disparador
Contextual Filtrado DOM, Shadow DOM, subdominios Agrega condiciones, pero sigue dependiendo del DOM
Estructural Zero-DOM, basado en hardware (PGP, NFC, HSM) Elimina el uso del DOM para secretos, separa interfaz y flujos críticos

🧪 Pruebas doctrinales para verificar parches

Para comprobar si la corrección de un proveedor es realmente estructural, los investigadores de seguridad pueden:

  • Inyectar un campo invisible (opacity:0) dentro de un iframe.
  • Simular un Shadow DOM encapsulado.
  • Verificar si la extensión aún inyecta secretos.
  • Comprobar si la inyección queda registrada o bloqueada.

📜 Ausencia de estándar industrial

Actualmente, no existe ningún estándar oficial (NIST, OWASP, ISO) que regule:

  • La lógica de inyección en extensiones,
  • La separación entre interfaz y flujo de secretos,
  • La trazabilidad de acciones de autocompletado.

⮞ Transición doctrinal

Los parches actuales son curitas temporales.
Solo las arquitecturas soberanas Zero-DOMPassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, SeedNFC — representan una corrección estructural y doctrinal.
El camino no es el tuning software, sino la doctrina del hardware soberano.

Riesgos Sistémicos y Vectores de Explotación

El clickjacking extensiones DOM no es un fallo aislado, sino una vulnerabilidad sistémica. Cuando una extensión del navegador se derrumba, las consecuencias no se limitan a una contraseña filtrada. En cambio, socava todo el modelo de confianza digital, provocando brechas en cascada a través de capas de autenticación e infraestructuras.

Escenarios críticos:

  • Acceso persistente — Un TOTP clonado basta para registrar un “dispositivo de confianza” y mantener acceso incluso tras un restablecimiento completo de la cuenta.
  • Reutilización de passkeys — La exfiltración de una llave de acceso actúa como un token maestro, reutilizable fuera de cualquier perímetro de control. El “Zero Trust” se convierte en ilusión.
  • Compromiso SSO — Una extensión atrapada en una empresa conduce a la fuga de tokens OAuth/SAML, comprometiendo todo el sistema de TI.
  • Brecha en la cadena de suministro — Extensiones mal reguladas crean una superficie de ataque estructural a nivel de navegador.
  • Sifoneo de criptoactivos — Billeteras como MetaMask, Phantom o TrustWallet inyectan claves en el DOM; frases semilla y claves privadas son drenadas tan fácilmente como credenciales.

⮞ Resumen

Los riesgos van mucho más allá del robo de contraseñas: TOTPs clonados, passkeys reutilizados, tokens SSO comprometidos y frases semilla exfiltradas.
Mientras el DOM siga siendo la interfaz de autocompletado, seguirá siendo también la interfaz de exfiltración encubierta.

Comparativa de Amenazas y Contramedidas Soberanas

Ataque Objetivo Secretos en Riesgo Contramedida Soberana
ToolShell RCE SharePoint / OAuth Certificados SSL, tokens SSO PassCypher HSM PGP (almacenamiento + firma fuera del DOM)
Secuestro de eSIM Identidad móvil Perfiles de operador, SIM embebida SeedNFC HSM (anclaje hardware de identidades móviles)
Clickjacking DOM Extensiones de navegador Credenciales, TOTP, passkeys PassCypher NFC HSM + PassCypher HSM PGP (OTP seguro, autocompletado en sandbox, anti-BITB)
Secuestro de wallets cripto Extensiones de billetera Claves privadas, frases semilla SeedNFC HSM + acoplamiento NFC↔HID BLE (inyección hardware multiplataforma segura)
Atomic Stealer Portapapeles macOS Llaves PGP, wallets cripto PassCypher NFC HSM ↔ HID BLE (canales cifrados, inyección sin portapapeles)

Exposición Regional e Impacto Lingüístico — Mundo Anglófono

No todas las regiones comparten el mismo nivel de riesgo frente al clickjacking extensiones DOM y a los ataques Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB). La esfera anglófona —debido a la alta adopción de gestores de contraseñas y billeteras cripto— representa una base de usuarios significativamente más expuesta. Por tanto, las contramedidas soberanas Zero-DOM son críticas para proteger a esta región digitalmente dependiente.

🌍 Exposición estimada — Región Anglófona (ago 2025)

Región Usuarios anglófonos estimados Adopción de gestores Contramedidas Zero-DOM
Hablantes globales de inglés ≈1.5 mil millones Alta (Norteamérica, Reino Unido, Australia) PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC
Norteamérica (EE.UU. + Canadá anglófono) ≈94 millones (36 % de adultos en EE.UU.) Conciencia creciente; adopción aún baja PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM
Reino Unido Alta penetración de internet y wallets cripto Adopción en maduración; regulaciones crecientes PassCypher HSM PGP, EviBITB

⮞ Perspectiva estratégica

El mundo anglófono representa una superficie de exposición inmensa: hasta 1.5 mil millones de hablantes de inglés en todo el mundo, con casi 100 millones de usuarios de gestores de contraseñas en Norteamérica.
Con el aumento de amenazas cibernéticas, estas poblaciones requieren soluciones soberanas Zero-DOM —como PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC y EviBITB— para neutralizar fundamentalmente los riesgos basados en DOM.

Fuentes: ICLS (hablantes de inglés), Security.org (uso de gestores en EE.UU.), DataReportal (estadísticas digitales UK).

Extensiones de Billeteras Cripto Expuestas

Los gestores de contraseñas no son las únicas víctimas del clickjacking extensiones DOM.
Las billeteras cripto más utilizadasMetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet — dependen del mismo mecanismo de inyección DOM para mostrar o firmar transacciones.
En consecuencia, una superposición bien colocada o un iframe invisible engañan al usuario, haciéndole creer que aprueba una transacción legítima, cuando en realidad está autorizando una transferencia maliciosa o exponiendo su frase semilla.

Implicación directa: A diferencia de credenciales robadas o TOTP clonados, estas fugas afectan a activos financieros inmediatos. Miles de millones de dólares en valor líquido dependen de tales extensiones.
Por tanto, el DOM se convierte no solo en un vector de compromiso de identidad, sino también en un canal de exfiltración monetaria.

⮞ Resumen

Las extensiones de billeteras cripto reutilizan el DOM para la interacción con el usuario. Esta elección arquitectónica las expone a las mismas fallas que los gestores de contraseñas: frases semilla, claves privadas y firmas de transacciones pueden ser interceptadas mediante overlay redressing y secuestro de autocompletado.

Contramedida soberana: SeedNFC HSM — respaldo hardware de claves privadas y frases semilla, mantenidas fuera del DOM, con inyección segura vía NFC↔HID BLE.
Las claves nunca abandonan el HSM; cada operación requiere un disparador físico del usuario, anulando el redressing en DOM.De forma complementaria, PassCypher HSM PGP y PassCypher NFC HSM protegen OTPs y credenciales de acceso a plataformas de trading, evitando así compromisos laterales entre cuentas.

Sandbox Fallida y Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Los navegadores presentan su sandbox como una fortaleza inexpugnable.
Sin embargo, los ataques de clickjacking extensiones DOM y Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) demuestran lo contrario.
Una simple superposición y un marco de autenticación falso pueden engañar al usuario, haciéndole creer que interactúa con Google, Microsoft o su banco, cuando en realidad está entregando secretos a una página fraudulenta.
Incluso las directivas frame-ancestors y algunas políticas CSP fallan en prevenir estas ilusiones de interfaz.

Aquí es donde las tecnologías soberanas cambian la ecuación.
Con EviBITB (IRDR), Freemindtronic integra en PassCypher HSM PGP un motor de detección y destrucción de iframes maliciosos, neutralizando intentos BITB en tiempo real.
Activable con un solo clic, funciona en modo manual, semiautomático o automático, totalmente serverless y sin base de datos, garantizando defensa instantánea (explicación · guía detallada).

La piedra angular sigue siendo la Sandbox URL.
Cada identificador o clave criptográfica se vincula a una URL de referencia almacenada de forma segura en el HSM cifrado.
Cuando una página solicita autocompletado, la URL activa se compara con la referencia. Si no coincide, no se inyecta ningún dato.
Así, incluso si un iframe logra evadir la detección, la Sandbox URL bloquea los intentos de exfiltración.

Esta barrera de doble capa también se extiende al uso en escritorio.
Mediante el emparejamiento seguro NFC entre un smartphone Android y la aplicación Freemindtronic con PassCypher NFC HSM, los usuarios se benefician de protección anti-BITB en escritorio.
Los secretos permanecen cifrados dentro del HSM NFC y solo se descifran en memoria RAM durante unos milisegundos, lo justo para el autocompletado — nunca persisten en el DOM.

⮞ Resumen técnico (ataque neutralizado por EviBITB + Sandbox URL)

El clickjacking extensiones DOM explota superposiciones CSS invisibles (opacity:0, pointer-events:none) para redirigir clics a un campo oculto inyectado desde el Shadow DOM (ej. protonpass-root).
Mediante focus() y rastreo de cursor, la extensión activa el autocompletado, insertando credenciales, TOTP o passkeys en un formulario invisible que se exfiltra inmediatamente.

Con EviBITB (IRDR), estos iframes y overlays son destruidos en tiempo real, eliminando el vector malicioso.
La Sandbox URL valida el destino frente a la referencia cifrada en HSM (PassCypher HSM PGP o NFC HSM). Si no coincide, el autocompletado se bloquea.
Resultado: ningún clic atrapado, ninguna inyección, ninguna fuga.
Los secretos permanecen fuera del DOM, incluso en uso de escritorio vía emparejamiento NFC HSM con smartphone Android.

Protección frente a clickjacking extensiones DOM y Browser-in-the-Browser con EviBITB y Sandbox URL dentro de PassCypher HSM PGP / NFC HSM

✪ Ilustración – El escudo EviBITB y el bloqueo Sandbox URL evitan el robo de credenciales desde un formulario de login atrapado por clickjacking.

⮞ Liderazgo técnico global

Hasta la fecha, PassCypher HSM PGP, incluso en su edición gratuita, sigue siendo la única solución conocida capaz de neutralizar prácticamente los ataques Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) y clickjacking extensiones DOM.
Mientras gestores como 1Password, LastPass, Dashlane, Bitwarden, Proton Pass… siguen exponiendo usuarios a overlays invisibles e inyecciones Shadow DOM, PassCypher se apoya en una doble barrera soberana:

  • EviBITB, motor anti-iframe que destruye marcos de redirección maliciosos en tiempo real (guía detallada, artículo técnico);
  • Sandbox URL, que vincula identificadores a una URL de referencia dentro de un contenedor cifrado AES-256 CBC PGP, bloqueando cualquier exfiltración en caso de discrepancia.

Esta combinación posiciona a Freemindtronic, desde Andorra, como pionero. Para el usuario final, instalar la extensión gratuita PassCypher HSM PGP ya eleva la seguridad más allá de los estándares actuales en todos los navegadores Chromium.

Señales Estratégicas desde DEF CON 33

En los pasillos electrificados de DEF CON 33, no solo parpadean insignias: también lo hacen nuestras certezas.
Entre una cerveza tibia y un frenético CTF, las conversaciones convergen en un punto común: el navegador ya no es una zona de confianza.
En consecuencia, el clickjacking extensiones DOM no se trata como una clase de bug, sino como un fallo estructural que afecta por igual a gestores de contraseñas, passkeys y billeteras cripto.

  • El DOM se convierte en un campo minado: ya no aloja solo “XSS básicos”; ahora porta primitivas de identidad — gestores, passkeys y wallets — haciendo del secuestro de autocompletado vía Shadow DOM un riesgo de primer orden.
  • La promesa de “resistencia al phishing” se tambalea: ver una passkey ser phished en vivo equivale a ver a Neo apuñalado por un script kiddie — dramático, pero trivial una vez que la interfaz es subvertida.
  • Lentitud industrial: algunos proveedores publican parches en 48h; otros se pierden en comités y notas de prensa. Mientras tanto, millones siguen expuestos a flaws de seguridad en extensiones y overlays invisibles.
  • Zero Trust reforzado: cualquier secreto que toque el DOM debe considerarse ya comprometido — desde credenciales hasta TOTP y passkeys.
  • Retorno del hardware soberano: a medida que las ilusiones cloud se desmoronan, la atención se dirige a contramedidas Zero-DOM offline: PassCypher NFC HSM, PassCypher HSM PGP y SeedNFC para respaldo cifrado de claves cripto. Zero DOM, cero ilusión de interfaz.

⮞ Resumen

En DEF CON 33, los expertos entregaron un mensaje claro: los navegadores ya no actúan como bastiones protectores.
En lugar de confiar en parches cosméticos, la verdadera solución radica en adoptar arquitecturas soberanas, offline y Zero-DOM.
En estos entornos, los secretos permanecen cifrados, anclados en hardware y gestionados bajo un control soberano de acceso.En consecuencia, las frases clave a retener son: clickjacking extensiones DOM, vulnerabilidades gestores contraseñas 2025 y passkeys resistentes al phishing.

Contramedidas Soberanas (Zero DOM)

Los parches de proveedores pueden tranquilizar a corto plazo, sin embargo, no resuelven el problema de fondo: el DOM sigue siendo un colador.
La única respuesta duradera es eliminar los secretos de su alcance.
Este principio, conocido como Zero DOM, dicta que ningún dato sensible debe residir, transitar ni depender del navegador.
En otras palabras, el clickjacking extensiones DOM se neutraliza no con remiendos, sino con soberanía arquitectónica.

Flujo de protección Zero DOM — credenciales, passkeys y claves cripto bloqueadas de exfiltración DOM, aseguradas por HSM PGP y NFC HSM con sandbox URL

✪ Ilustración — Flujo Zero DOM: los secretos permanecen dentro del HSM, inyectados vía HID en RAM efímera, haciendo imposible la exfiltración DOM.

En este paradigma, los secretos (credenciales, TOTP, passkeys, claves privadas) se preservan en HSMs hardware offline.
El acceso solo es posible mediante activación física (NFC, HID, emparejamiento seguro) y deja una huella efímera en RAM.
Esto elimina por completo la exposición al DOM.

Operación soberana: NFC HSM, HID BLE y HSM PGP

NFC HSM ↔ Android ↔ Activación en navegador:
Con el NFC HSM, la activación no ocurre con un simple toque.
Requiere presentar físicamente el módulo NFC HSM bajo un smartphone Android con NFC.
La aplicación Freemindtronic recibe la solicitud del ordenador emparejado (vía PassCypher HSM PGP), activa el módulo seguro y transmite el secreto cifrado sin contacto al ordenador.
Todo el proceso es end-to-end cifrado, con descifrado solo en RAM volátil — nunca en el DOM.

NFC HSM ↔ Activación HID BLE:
Emparejado con un emulador de teclado Bluetooth HID (ej. InputStick), la aplicación NFC inyecta credenciales directamente en los campos de login mediante un canal AES-128 CBC cifrado BLE.
De este modo, garantiza autocompletado seguro fuera del DOM, incluso en equipos no emparejados, neutralizando keyloggers y ataques DOM clásicos.

Activación HSM PGP local:
En escritorio, con PassCypher HSM PGP, un solo clic sobre el campo activa el autocompletado instantáneo.
El secreto se descifra localmente desde su contenedor AES-256 CBC PGP, únicamente en RAM volátil, sin NFC y nunca transitando por el DOM.
Esto garantiza una arquitectura soberana de autocompletado, resistente por diseño a extensiones maliciosas y overlays invisibles.

A diferencia de los gestores cloud o passkeys FIDO, estas soluciones no aplican parches reactivos: eliminan la superficie de ataque por diseño.
Es la esencia del enfoque soberano-por-diseño: arquitectura descentralizada, sin servidor central y sin base de datos a filtrar.

⮞ Resumen

Zero DOM no es un parche, sino un cambio doctrinal.
Mientras los secretos vivan en el navegador, seguirán siendo vulnerables.
Al trasladarlos fuera del DOM, cifrados en HSMs y activados físicamente, se vuelven inalcanzables para ataques de clickjacking o BITB.

PassCypher HSM PGP — Tecnología Zero-DOM patentada & gestión soberana de claves anti-phishing

Mucho antes de la revelación del DOM extension clickjacking en DEF CON 33, Freemindtronic tomó una decisión diferente. Desde 2015 nuestro I+D aplica un principio fundacional: nunca usar el DOM para transportar secretos. Esa doctrina Zero-Trust dio lugar a la arquitectura Zero-DOM patentada de PassCypher HSM PGP, que mantiene credenciales, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys y claves criptográficas confinadas en contenedores hardware HSM — nunca inyectadas en un entorno manipulable del navegador.

Un avance único en gestores de contraseñas

  • Zero-DOM nativo — ningún dato sensible toca el navegador.
  • HSM-PGP integrado — contenedores cifrados AES-256-CBC con segmentación de claves patentada.
  • Autonomía soberana — cero servidor, cero base de datos central, cero dependencia cloud.

Protección BITB reforzada (EviBITB)

Desde 2020, PassCypher HSM PGP incorpora EviBITB, una tecnología que neutraliza en tiempo real ataques Browser-in-the-Browser: destruye iframes maliciosos, detecta overlays fraudulentos y valida el contexto UI de forma serverless, sin base de datos y anónima. EviBITB puede funcionar en modo manual, semiautomático o totalmente automático para minimizar el riesgo BITB y el secuestro invisible del DOM.

EviBITB en PassCypher HSM PGP: detección y destrucción en tiempo real de iFrames maliciosos
EviBITB integrado en PassCypher HSM PGP: detección y destrucción en tiempo real de iFrames de redirección y overlays maliciosos.

¿Por qué resiste ataques al nivel DEF CON 33?

Porque nada transita por el DOM, no existe contraseña maestra que pueda extraerse, y los contenedores permanecen cifrados en todo momento. El descifrado ocurre únicamente en RAM volátil, durante el instante necesario para ensamblar los segmentos de clave; una vez completado el autocompletado, todo se borra inmediatamente sin dejar rastro explotable.

Características clave

  • Autofill blindado — un clic basta, pero siempre vía sandbox de URL; nunca en claro dentro del navegador.
  • EviBITB integrado — neutraliza iframes y overlays en tiempo real (manual / semiauto / automático), completamente serverless.
  • Herramientas criptográficas integradas — generación y gestión de claves AES-256 segmentadas y claves PGP sin dependencias externas.
  • Compatibilidad universal — funciona con cualquier sitio mediante software + extensión de navegador, sin plugins adicionales.
  • Arquitectura soberana — cero servidor, cero base central, cero DOM: resiliencia por diseño donde los gestores cloud fallan.

Implementación inmediata

Sin configuración compleja: instala la extensión PassCypher HSM PGP desde la Chrome Web Store o Edge Add-ons, activa la opción BITB y obtén protección Zero-DOM soberana al instante.

⮞ Resumen

PassCypher HSM PGP redefine la gestión de secretos: contenedores siempre cifrados, claves segmentadas, descifrado efímero en RAM, Zero-DOM y cero cloud. Es una solución hardware passwordless soberana diseñada para resistir las amenazas actuales y anticipar ataques cuánticos.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Gestor Soberano sin Contraseñas

Los gestores de contraseñas basados en software caen en la trampa de un simple iframe.
Sin embargo, PassCypher NFC HSM sigue un camino diferente: nunca permite que tus credenciales y contraseñas transiten por el DOM.
El nano-HSM las mantiene cifradas offline y solo las libera por un instante efímero en memoria volátil — lo justo para autenticar.

Funcionamiento en el lado del usuario:

  • Secretos intocables — el NFC HSM cifra y almacena credenciales que nunca aparecen ni se filtran.
  • TOTP/HOTP — la app Android PassCypher NFC HSM o el PassCypher HSM PGP en escritorio los generan y muestran al instante bajo demanda.
  • Entrada manual — el usuario introduce un PIN o TOTP directamente en el campo de login en un ordenador o teléfono NFC Android. La app muestra el código generado por el módulo NFC HSM. El mismo proceso aplica a credenciales, passkeys y otros secretos.
  • Autocompletado sin contacto — el usuario presenta el módulo NFC HSM a un smartphone o PC, que ejecuta el autofill de forma transparente, incluso emparejado con PassCypher HSM PGP.
  • Autofill en escritorio — con PassCypher HSM PGP en Windows o macOS, un clic sobre el campo de login completa usuario y contraseña, con validación opcional.
  • Anti-BITB distribuido — el emparejamiento seguro NFC ↔ Android ↔ navegador (Win/Mac/Linux) activa EviBITB para destruir iframes maliciosos en tiempo real.
  • Modo HID BLE — un emulador de teclado Bluetooth HID inyecta credenciales fuera del DOM, bloqueando tanto ataques DOM como keyloggers.

⮞ Resumen

PassCypher NFC HSM materializa Zero Trust (cada acción requiere validación física) y Zero Knowledge (ningún secreto se expone jamás).
Un salvaguarda soberano de identidad por diseño, que neutraliza clickjacking, ataques BITB, typosquatting, keylogging, IDN spoofing, inyecciones DOM, clipboard hijacking y extensiones maliciosas, anticipando incluso ataques cuánticos.

✪ Ataques Neutralizados por PassCypher NFC HSM

Tipo de ataque Descripción Estado con PassCypher
Clickjacking / UI Redressing Iframes u overlays invisibles que secuestran clics Neutralizado (EviBITB)
BITB (Browser-in-the-Browser) Marcos falsos de navegador simulando login Neutralizado (sandbox + emparejamiento)
Keylogging Captura de pulsaciones por malware Neutralizado (modo HID BLE)
Typosquatting URLs parecidas que imitan dominios legítimos Neutralizado (validación física)
Ataque Homográfico (IDN spoofing) Sustitución Unicode en nombres de dominio Neutralizado (Zero DOM)
Inyección DOM / DOM XSS Scripts maliciosos en el DOM Neutralizado (arquitectura fuera del DOM)
Clipboard Hijacking Intercepción o manipulación de datos del portapapeles Neutralizado (sin uso del portapapeles)
Extensiones maliciosas Plugins de navegador comprometidos Neutralizado (emparejamiento + sandbox)
Ataques Cuánticos (anticipados) Cálculo masivo para romper claves criptográficas Mitigado (claves segmentadas + AES-256 CBC + PGP)
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SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Inyección Segura de Wallets

Las extensiones de navegador para billeteras cripto viven en el DOM — y los atacantes explotan esa debilidad.
Con SeedNFC HSM, la lógica se invierte: el enclave nunca libera claves privadas ni frases semilla.
Cuando los usuarios inicializan o restauran una wallet (web o escritorio), el sistema realiza la entrada mediante una emulación HID Bluetooth — como un teclado hardware — sin portapapeles, sin DOM y sin dejar rastros de claves privadas, públicas o credenciales de hot wallets.

Flujo operativo (anti-DOM, anti-portapapeles):

  • Custodia — el SeedNFC HSM cifra y almacena la semilla/clave privada (nunca la exporta, nunca la revela).
  • Activación física — el módulo NFC HSM autoriza la operación cuando el usuario lo presenta de forma contactless a través de la app Freemindtronic (smartphone Android NFC).
  • Inyección HID BLE — el sistema “teclea” la semilla (o fragmento/format requerido) directamente en el campo de la wallet, fuera del DOM y fuera del portapapeles, resistiendo incluso keyloggers de software.
  • Protección BITB — los usuarios pueden activar EviBITB (motor anti-BITB destruye iframes) dentro de la app, neutralizando overlays y redirecciones maliciosas en la configuración o recuperación.
  • Efimeridad — la RAM volátil mantiene temporalmente los datos durante la entrada HID, para borrarlos al instante.

Casos de uso típicos:

  • Onboarding o recuperación de wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, etc.) sin exponer nunca la clave privada al navegador ni al DOM. El HSM mantiene el secreto cifrado y lo descifra solo en RAM, el tiempo mínimo necesario.
  • Operaciones sensibles en escritorio (air-gap lógico), con validación física por el usuario: presentar el módulo NFC HSM bajo un smartphone NFC Android para autorizar, sin teclado ni DOM.
  • Backup seguro multi-activo: un HSM hardware offline almacena frases semilla, claves maestras y privadas, permitiendo reutilización sin copiar, exportar ni exponer. La activación siempre ocurre por medios físicos, soberanos y auditables.

⮞ Resumen

En primer lugar, SeedNFC HSM con HID BLE inyecta claves privadas o públicas directamente en los campos de hot wallets mediante un emulador HID Bluetooth Low Energy, evitando tanto la escritura manual como la transferencia por portapapeles.
Además, el canal cifra los datos con AES-128 CBC, mientras el módulo NFC activa físicamente la operación, garantizando un proceso seguro y verificable.
Por último, el enclave HSM mantiene los secretos estrictamente confinados, fuera del DOM y más allá del alcance de extensiones maliciosas, asegurando así protección soberana por diseño.

Escenarios de Explotación y Rutas de Mitigación

Las revelaciones de DEF CON 33 no son el final del juego, sino una advertencia.
Lo que sigue puede resultar aún más corrosivo:

  • Phishing impulsado por IA + secuestro del DOM — mañana ya no serán kits de phishing caseros, sino LLMs generando superposiciones DOM en tiempo real, virtualmente indistinguibles de portales legítimos de banca o nube.
    Estos ataques de clickjacking potenciados por IA convertirán el robo de credenciales vía Shadow DOM en un arma a escala.
  • Tapjacking móvil híbrido — la pantalla táctil se convierte en un campo minado: aplicaciones apiladas, permisos invisibles y gestos en segundo plano secuestrados para validar transacciones o exfiltrar OTPs.
    Esto representa la evolución del tapjacking de phishing hacia un compromiso sistémico en entornos móviles.
  • HSM preparado para la era post-cuántica — la próxima línea de defensa no será un parche del navegador, sino HSMs resistentes a la computación cuántica, capaces de soportar los algoritmos de Shor o Grover.
    Soluciones como PassCypher HSM PGP y SeedNFC, ya concebidas como anclajes soberanos Zero-DOM post-cloud, encarnan este cambio de paradigma.

⮞ Resumen

Los atacantes del futuro no confiarán en parches del navegador: los sortearán.
Para mitigar la amenaza, se impone una ruptura: soportes hardware offline, HSMs resistentes a la cuántica y arquitecturas soberanas Zero-DOM.
Rechaza todas las demás opciones: siguen siendo parches frágiles de software que inevitablemente se quebrarán.

Síntesis Estratégica

El clickjacking extensiones DOM revela una verdad contundente: los navegadores y las extensiones no son entornos de confianza.
Los parches llegan en oleadas fragmentadas, la exposición de usuarios alcanza decenas de millones y los marcos regulatorios permanecen en un eterno desfase.

¿El único camino soberano? Una estricta gobernanza del software, combinada con salvaguardas hardware offline fuera del DOM (PassCypher NFC HSM / PassCypher HSM PGP), donde los secretos permanecen cifrados, offline e intocables por técnicas de redressing.

La Vía Soberana:

  • Gobernanza estricta de software y extensiones
  • Seguridad de identidad respaldada en hardware (PassCypher NFC HSM / HSM PGP)
  • Secretos cifrados, fuera del DOM, fuera de la nube, redress-proof

Doctrina de Soberanía Cibernética en Hardware —

  • Considerar cualquier secreto que toque el DOM como ya comprometido.
  • Activar la identidad digital únicamente mediante acciones físicas (NFC, HID BLE, HSM PGP).
  • Fundar la confianza en el aislamiento hardware, no en el sandbox del navegador.
  • Auditar extensiones como si fueran infraestructuras críticas.
  • Garantizar resiliencia post-cuántica aislando físicamente las claves.
Punto Ciego Regulatorio —
CRA, NIS2 o RGS (ANSSI) refuerzan la resiliencia del software, pero ninguno aborda los secretos incrustados en el DOM.
La custodia en hardware sigue siendo el único recurso soberano — y solo los estados capaces de producir y certificar sus propios HSMs pueden garantizar una verdadera soberanía digital.
Continuidad Estratégica —
El clickjacking en DOM se suma a una secuencia oscura: ToolShell, secuestro de eSIM, Atomic Stealer… cada uno exponiendo los límites estructurales de la confianza en software.
La doctrina de una ciberseguridad soberana anclada en hardware ya no es opcional. Se ha convertido en una línea base estratégica fundamental.

Glosario

DOM (Document Object Model)

Representación en memoria de la estructura HTML/JS de una página web; permite a scripts y extensiones acceder y modificar elementos de la página.

Shadow DOM

Subárbol DOM encapsulado usado para aislar componentes (web components); puede ocultar elementos al resto del documento.

Clickjacking (secuestro de clics)

Técnica de «UI redressing» que engaña al usuario para que haga clic en elementos ocultos o superpuestos.

DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking

Variante donde una página maliciosa combina iframes invisibles, Shadow DOM y redirecciones (focus()) para forzar a una extensión a inyectar secretos en un formulario falso.

Autofill / Autorrelleno

Mecanismo de gestores/extensiones que inserta automáticamente credenciales, códigos OTP o passkeys en campos web.

Passkey

Credencial de autenticación WebAuthn (basada en clave pública). Las passkeys almacenadas en el dispositivo son más resistentes al phishing; las sincronizadas en la nube son más vulnerables.

WebAuthn / FIDO

Estándar de autenticación con clave pública (FIDO2) para inicios de sesión sin contraseña; la seguridad depende del modelo de almacenamiento (sincronizado vs device-bound).

TOTP / HOTP

Códigos de un solo uso generados por algoritmo temporal (TOTP) o por contador (HOTP) para autenticación de dos factores.

HSM (Hardware Security Module)

Módulo hardware seguro para generar, almacenar y usar claves criptográficas sin exponerlas en claro fuera de la enclave.

PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)

Estándar de cifrado híbrido con claves públicas/privadas; aquí usado para proteger contenedores cifrados AES-256-CBC.

AES-256 CBC

Algoritmo de cifrado simétrico (modo CBC) con clave de 256 bits — usado para cifrar contenedores de secretos.

Claves segmentadas

Fragmentación de claves en segmentos para aumentar la resistencia y permitir el ensamblaje seguro en RAM efímera.

RAM efímera

Memoria volátil donde los secretos se descifran brevemente para autofill y se borran inmediatamente — sin persistencia en disco ni en el DOM.

NFC (Near Field Communication)

Tecnología sin contacto para activar físicamente un HSM y autorizar la liberación local de un secreto.

HID-BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy HID)

Emulación de teclado por BLE para inyectar datos directamente en un campo sin pasar por el DOM ni el portapapeles.

Sandbox URL

Mecanismo que vincula cada secreto a una URL esperada almacenada en el HSM; si la URL activa no coincide, el autofill se bloquea.

Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Ataque por imitación de una ventana de navegador dentro de un iframe — engaña al usuario simulando un sitio o cuadro de autenticación.

EviBITB

Motor anti-BITB serverless que detecta y destruye iframes/overlays maliciosos en tiempo real y valida el contexto UI de forma anónima.

SeedNFC

Solución HSM para custodia de seed phrases/ claves privadas; realiza la inyección fuera del DOM vía HID/NFC.

Iframe

Marco HTML que incorpora otra página; los iframes invisibles (opacity:0, pointer-events:none) son comunes en ataques de UI redressing.
focus()
Llamada JavaScript que sitúa el foco en un campo. Abusada para redirigir eventos de usuario a inputs controlados por el atacante.

Overlay

Capa visual que oculta la interfaz real y puede engañar al usuario sobre el origen de una acción.

Exfiltración

Extracción no autorizada de datos sensibles del objetivo (credenciales, TOTP, passkeys, claves privadas).

Phishable

Describe un mecanismo (p. ej. passkeys sincronizadas) susceptible de ser comprometido por falsificación de interfaz o overlays — por tanto vulnerable al phishing.

Content-Security-Policy (CSP)

Política web que controla orígenes de recursos; útil pero insuficiente por sí sola frente a variantes avanzadas de clickjacking.

X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors

Cabeceras HTTP / directivas CSP destinadas a limitar la inclusión en iframes; pueden ser eludidas en escenarios de ataque complejos.

Keylogging

Captura maliciosa de pulsaciones de teclado; mitigada por inyecciones HID seguras (sin teclado software ni portapapeles).

Nota: este glosario unifica el vocabulario técnico de la crónica. Para definiciones normativas y referencias, consulte OWASP, NIST y los estándares FIDO/WebAuthn.

🔥 En resumen: la nube quizá parchee mañana, pero el hardware ya protege hoy.

⮞ Nota — Lo que esta crónica no cubre:

Ante todo, este análisis no proporciona ni una prueba de concepto explotable ni un tutorial técnico para reproducir ataques de clickjacking extensiones DOM o phishing de passkeys.
Además, no aborda los aspectos económicos de las criptomonedas ni las implicaciones legales específicas fuera de la UE.

En cambio, el objetivo es claro: ofrecer una lectura soberana y estratégica.
Es decir, ayudar a los lectores a comprender fallos estructurales, identificar riesgos sistémicos y, sobre todo, resaltar las contramedidas Zero-DOM hardware (PassCypher, SeedNFC) como vía hacia una seguridad resiliente y resistente al phishing.

En última instancia, esta perspectiva invita a decisores y expertos en seguridad a mirar más allá de los parches temporales de software y adoptar arquitecturas soberanas basadas en hardware.

DOM Extension Clickjacking — Risks, DEF CON 33 & Zero-DOM fixes

Movie poster style illustration of DOM extension clickjacking unveiled at DEF CON 33, showing hidden iframes, Shadow DOM hijack, and sovereign Zero-DOM countermeasures

DOM extension clickjacking — a technical chronicle of DEF CON 33 demonstrations, their impact, and Zero-DOM countermeasures. See the Executive Summary below for a 4-minute overview.

Executive Summary — DOM Extension Clickjacking

Snapshot (17 Sep 2025):At DEF CON 33, live demos showed DOM-based extension clickjacking and overlay attacks that can exfiltrate credentials, TOTP codes, synced passkeys and crypto keys from browser extensions and wallets. Initial testing reported ~40M exposed installations. Several vendors published mitigations in Aug–Sep 2025 (e.g. Bitwarden, Dashlane, Enpass, NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm); others remained reported vulnerable (1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords, KeePassXC-Browser). See the status table for per-product details.

Impact: systemic — secrets that touch the DOM can be covertly exfiltrated; overlays (BITB) make synced passkeys phishable. Recommended mitigation: move to Zero-DOM hardware flows (HSM/NFC) or adopt structural injection re-engineering. See §Sovereign Countermeasures for options.

⚡ The Discovery

Las Vegas, early August 2025. DEF CON 33 takes over the Las Vegas Convention Center. Between hacker domes, IoT villages, Adversary Village, and CTF competitions, the atmosphere turns electric. On stage, Marek Tóth simply plugs in his laptop, launches the demo, and presses Enter.
Immediately, the star attack emerges: DOM extension clickjacking. Easy to code yet devastating to execute, it relies on a booby-trapped page, invisible iframes, and a malicious focus() call. These elements trick autofill managers into pouring credentials, TOTP codes, and passkeys into a phantom form. As a result, DOM-based extension clickjacking surfaces as a structural threat.

⧉ Second Demo — Phishable Passkeys (overlay)

At DEF CON 33, Allthenticate showed that synced passkeys can also be phished through simple overlay and redirection — no DOM injection required.
We cover the full implications in the dedicated section Phishable Passkeys and in attribution & sources. Also worth noting: DEF CON 33 and Black Hat 2025 highlighted another critical demonstration — BitUnlocker — targeting BitLocker via WinRE (see here)

⚠ Strategic Message — Systemic Risks

With just two demos — one targeting password managers and wallets, the other aimed directly at passkeys — two pillars of cybersecurity collapsed. The message is clear: as long as secrets reside in the DOM, they remain vulnerable. Moreover, as long as cybersecurity depends on the browser and the cloud, a single click can overturn everything. As OWASP reminds us, clickjacking has always been a well-known threat. Yet here, the extension layer itself collapses.

⎔ The Sovereign Alternative — Zero-DOM Countermeasures

Fortunately, another way has existed for more than a decade — one that does not rely on the DOM.
With PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, and SeedNFC for hardware backup of cryptographic keys, your credentials, passwords, and TOTP/HOTP secrets never touch the DOM. Instead, they remain encrypted in offline HSMs, securely injected via URL sandboxing or manually entered through the Android NFC application, and always protected by anti-BITB safeguards.
Therefore, this is not a patch, but a patented sovereign passwordless architecture: decentralized, with no server, no central database, and no master password. It frees secret management from centralized dependencies such as FIDO/WebAuthn.

Chronicle to Read
Estimated reading time: 37–39 minutes
Date updated: 2025-09-11
Complexity level: Advanced / Expert
Linguistic specificity: Sovereign lexicon — high technical density
Available languages: CAT ·EN ·ES ·FR
Accessibility: Screen-reader optimized — semantic anchors included
Editorial type: Strategic Chronicle
About the author: Jacques Gascuel, inventor and founder of Freemindtronic®.
As a specialist in sovereign security technologies, he designs and patents hardware systems for data protection, cryptographic sovereignty, and secure communications. His expertise also includes compliance with ANSSI, NIS2, GDPR, and SecNumCloud frameworks, as well as defense against hybrid threats via sovereign-by-design architectures.

Key takeaways —

  • DOM injection by extensions enables stealth exfiltration (credentials, TOTP, passkeys, keys).
  • Some vendors released mitigations (Aug–Sep 2025); structural fixes are rare.
  • Long term: adopt Zero-DOM hardware flows or re-engineer injection logic.

Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking: a malicious page, hidden iframe, and autofill hijack exfiltrating credentials, passkeys, and crypto-wallet keys.

Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking attack with hidden iframe, Shadow DOM and stealth credential exfiltration
Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking: a malicious page, hidden iframe and autofill hijack exfiltrating credentials, passkeys and crypto-wallet keys.

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In sovereign cybersecurity This chronicle is part of the Digital Security section, continuing our research into exploits, systemic vulnerabilities, and hardware-based zero trust countermeasures.

🚨 DEF CON 33 — Key points

  • Two live demos: DOM extension clickjacking (password managers/wallets) and phishable synced passkeys (overlay attacks).
  • ~11 managers tested; initial impact estimated at ~40M exposed installations.
  • Mitigation direction: fast UI/conditional fixes vs. rare structural Zero-DOM solutions.
  • See the status table and §Sovereign Countermeasures for details.

What is DOM-based extension clickjacking?

DOM-based extension clickjacking hijacks a browser extension (password manager or crypto wallet) by abusing the browser’s Document Object Model. A deceptive page chains invisible iframes, Shadow DOM and a malicious focus() call to trigger autofill into an invisible form. The extension “believes” it is interacting with a legitimate field and pours secrets there — credentials, TOTP/HOTP codes, passkeys, even private keys. Because these secrets touch the DOM, they can be exfiltrated silently.

⮞ Doctrinal insight: DOM-based extension clickjacking is not an isolated bug — it is a design flaw. Any extension that injects secrets into a manipulable DOM is inherently vulnerable. Only Zero-DOM architectures (structural separation, HSM/NFC, out-of-browser injection) remove this attack surface.

How dangerous is it?

This vector is far from minor: it exploits the autofill logic itself and operates without user awareness. The attacker does not merely overlay an element; they force the extension to fill a fake form as if nothing were wrong, making exfiltration undetectable by superficial inspection.

Typical attack flow

  1. Preparation — the malicious page embeds an iframe that is invisible and a Shadow DOM that masks the real context; inputs are rendered non-visible (opacity:0, pointer-events:none).
  2. Bait — the victim clicks a benign element; redirections and a malicious focus() redirect the event to an attacker-controlled input.
  3. Exfiltration — the extension believes it is interacting with a legitimate field and automatically injects credentials, TOTP, passkeys or private keys into the fake DOM; the data is immediately exfiltrated.

This mechanism spoofs visual cues, bypasses classic protections (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, frame-ancestors) and turns autofill into an invisible data-exfiltration channel. Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) overlays and Shadow DOM manipulation further increase the risk, making synced passkeys and credentials phishable.

⮞ Summary

The attack combines invisible iframes, Shadow DOM manipulation and focus() redirections to hijack autofill extensions. Secrets are injected into a phantom form, giving the attacker direct access to sensitive data (credentials, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, private keys). Bottom line: as long as secrets transit the DOM, the attack surface remains open.

History of Clickjacking (2002–2025)

Clickjacking has become the persistent parasite of the modern web. The term emerged in the early 2000s, when Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen described a deceptive scenario: tricking a user into clicking on something they cannot actually see. An optical illusion applied to code, it quickly became a mainstream attack technique (OWASP).

  • 2002–2008: Emergence of “UI redressing”: HTML layers + transparent iframes trapping users (Hansen Archive).
  • 2009: Facebook falls victim to Likejacking (OWASP).
  • 2010: Cursorjacking emerges — shifting the pointer to mislead user clicks (OWASP).
  • 2012–2015: Exploitation via iframes, online ads, and malvertising (MITRE CVE) (Infosec).
  • 2016–2019: Tapjacking spreads on mobile platforms (Android Security Bulletin).
  • 2020–2024: Rise of “hybrid clickjacking” combining XSS and phishing (OWASP WSTG).
  • 2025: At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth unveils a new level: DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking. This time, not only websites, but browser extensions (password managers, crypto wallets) inject invisible forms, enabling stealth exfiltration of secrets.

At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth publicly revealed DOM extension clickjacking, marking a structural shift from visual trickery to systemic weakness in password managers and crypto wallets.

❓How long have you been exposed?

Clickjacking and invisible iframes have been known for years; Shadow DOM usage is not new. The DEF CON 33 findings reveal a decade-old design pattern: extensions that trust the DOM for secret injection are inherently exposed.

Synthesis:
In just 20 years, clickjacking evolved from a simple visual trick into a systemic sabotage of identity managers. DEF CON 33 marks a breaking point: the threat is no longer just malicious websites, but the very core of browser extensions and autofill. Hence the urgency of Zero-DOM approaches anchored in sovereign hardware like PassCypher.

Vulnerable Password Managers & CVE disclosure (snapshot — 17 Sep 2025)

Updated: 17 September 2025

Following Marek Tóth’s demonstrations at DEF CON 33, multiple DOM-extension clickjacking issues were submitted for CVE assignment. Patching activity accelerated in August–September 2025, but vendor responses remain uneven. The table below summarises vendor status (credentials / TOTP / passkeys and patch status). For testing methodology and details, see the section “Correction Technologies” and vendor release notes linked in the table.

Manager Credentials TOTP Passkeys Status Official patch / note
1Password Yes Yes Yes Vulnerable (reported)
Bitwarden Yes Yes Partial Patched (v2025.8.2) Release
Dashlane Yes Yes Yes Patched Advisory
LastPass Yes Yes Yes Vulnerable (reported)
Enpass Yes Yes Yes Patched (v6.11.6) Release
iCloud Passwords Yes No Yes Vulnerable (under review)
LogMeOnce Yes No Yes Patched (v7.12.7) Release
NordPass Yes Yes Partial Patched (mitigations) Release
ProtonPass Yes Yes Partial Patched (mitigations) Releases
RoboForm Yes Yes Yes Patched Update
Keeper Partial No No Partial patch (v17.2.0) Release

⮞ Key takeaway:

Even with rapid mitigations, the problem persists — as long as credentials and other secrets transit the DOM they remain exposed to clickjacking variants. Zero-DOM solutions (PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, SeedNFC) remove the attack surface by ensuring secrets never leave the encrypted container. Zero-DOM — zero attack surface.

Note: this is a snapshot. For per-product versions, release notes and CVE identifiers, consult the table above and each vendor’s advisory page.

Technologies of Correction Used

Since the public disclosure of DOM Extension Clickjacking at DEF CON 33, vendors have rushed to release patches. Yet these fixes remain uneven, mostly limited to UI adjustments or conditional checks. No vendor has yet re-engineered the injection engine itself.

Before diving into the correction methods, here’s a visual overview of the main technologies vendors have deployed to mitigate DOM Extension Clickjacking. This image outlines the spectrum from cosmetic patches to sovereign Zero-DOM solutions.

Infographic showing five correction methods against DOM Extension Clickjacking: autofill restriction, subdomain filtering, Shadow DOM detection, contextual isolation, and Zero-DOM hardware
Five vendor responses to DOM Extension Clickjacking: from UI patches to sovereign Zero-DOM hardware.

Objective

This section explains how vendors attempted to fix the flaw, distinguishes cosmetic patches from structural corrections, and highlights sovereign Zero-DOM hardware approaches.

Correction Methods Observed (as of August 2025)

Method Description Affected Managers
Autofill Restriction Switch to “on-click” mode or default deactivation Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper
Subdomain Filtering Blocking autofill on non-authorized subdomains ProtonPass, RoboForm
Shadow DOM Detection Refusal to inject if the field is encapsulated inside Shadow DOM NordPass, Enpass
Contextual Isolation Checks before injection (iframe, opacity, focus) Bitwarden, ProtonPass
Hardware Sovereign (Zero DOM) Secrets never transit through the DOM: NFC HSM, HSM PGP, SeedNFC PassCypher, EviKey, SeedNFC (non-vulnerable by design)

📉 Limits Observed

  • Patches did not change the injection engine, only its activation triggers.
  • No vendor introduced a structural separation between UI and secret flows.
  • Any manager still tied to the DOM remains structurally exposed to clickjacking variants.
⮞ Strategic Transition
These patches show reaction, not rupture. They address symptoms, not the structural flaw.
To understand what separates a temporary patch from a doctrinal fix, let’s move to the next analysis.

Correction Technologies Against DOM Extension Clickjacking — Technical & Doctrinal Analysis

DOM extension clickjacking is a structural design flaw: secrets injected into a manipulable DOM can be hijacked unless the injection flow is architecturally separated from the browser.

What Current Fixes Do Not Address

  • No vendor has rebuilt its injection engine.
  • Fixes mostly limit activation (disable autofill, subdomain filters, detect some invisible elements) rather than change the injection model.

What a Structural Fix Would Require

  • Remove dependency on the DOM for secret injection.
  • Isolate the injection engine outside the browser (hardware or separate secure process).
  • Use hardware authentication (NFC, PGP, secure enclave) and require explicit physical/user validation.
  • Forbid interaction with invisible or encapsulated elements by design.

Typology of Fixes

Level Correction Type Description
Cosmetic UI/UX, autofill disabled by default No change to injection logic, only its trigger
Contextual DOM filtering, Shadow DOM, subdomains Adds conditions, but still relies on the DOM
Structural Zero DOM, hardware-based (PGP, NFC, HSM) Eliminates DOM use for secrets, separates UI and secret flows

Doctrinal Tests to Verify Patches

To check whether a vendor’s fix is structural, researchers can:

  • Inject an invisible field (opacity:0) inside an iframe and verify injection behavior.
  • Check whether extensions still inject secrets into encapsulated or non-visible inputs.
  • Verify whether autofill actions are auditable or blocked when context mismatches occur.

There is currently no widely adopted industry standard (NIST/OWASP/ISO) governing extension injection logic, separation of UI and secret flows, or traceability of autofill actions.

⮞ Conclusion
Current fixes are largely stopgaps. The durable solution is architectural: remove secrets from the DOM using Zero-DOM patterns and hardware-backed isolation (HSM/NFC/PGP), rather than piling UI patches on top of a flawed injection model.

Systemic Risks & Exploitation Vectors

DOM extension clickjacking is not an isolated bug but a systemic design flaw. When an extension’s injection flow is compromised, the impact goes well beyond a single leaked password: it can cascade through authentication layers and core infrastructure.

Critical scenarios

  • Persistent access — cloned TOTP or recovered session tokens can re-register “trusted” devices and preserve access after resets.
  • Passkey replay — an exfiltrated passkey can act as a reusable master token outside normal control boundaries.
  • SSO compromise — leaked OAuth/SAML tokens from an enterprise extension can expose entire IT systems.
  • Supply-chain exposure — weak or malicious extensions create a structural browser-level attack surface.
  • Crypto-asset theft — wallet extensions that rely on DOM injection can leak seed phrases, private keys, or sign malicious transactions.

⮞ Summary

The consequences reach far beyond credential theft: cloned TOTPs, replayed passkeys, compromised SSO tokens and exfiltrated seed phrases are all realistic outcomes. As long as secrets transit the DOM, they remain an exfiltration vector.

Sovereign threat comparison

Attack Target Secrets Sovereign countermeasure
ToolShell RCE SharePoint / OAuth SSL certs, SSO tokens Hardware-backed storage & signing (HSM/PGP)
eSIM hijack Mobile identity Carrier profiles Hardware anchoring (SeedNFC)
DOM clickjacking Browser extensions Credentials, TOTP, passkeys Zero-DOM + HSM / sandboxed autofill
Crypto-wallet hijack Wallet extensions Private keys, seed phrases HID/NFC injection from HSM (no DOM, no clipboard)
Atomic Stealer macOS clipboard PGP keys, wallet data Encrypted channels + HSM input (no clipboard)

Regional Exposure & Linguistic Impact — Anglophone World

Region Estimated Anglophone Users Password-Manager Adoption Sovereign Zero-DOM Countermeasures
Global English-speakers ≈1.5 billion users Strong (North America, UK, Australia) PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC
North America (USA + Canada Anglophone) ≈94 million users (36 % of US adults) Growing awareness; still low uptake PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM
United Kingdom High internet and crypto-wallet penetration Maturing adoption; rising regulations PassCypher HSM PGP, EviBITB

Strategic insight: the Anglophone sphere represents a large exposure surface; prioritize Zero-DOM, hardware-anchored mitigations in regional roadmaps. Sources: ICLS, Security.org, DataReportal.

Exposed Crypto Wallet Extensions

Crypto wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet) often rely on DOM interactions; overlays or invisible iframes can trick users into signing malicious transactions or exposing seed phrases. See §Sovereign Countermeasures for hardware mitigations.

SeedNFC HSM — hardware mitigation (concise)

Sovereign countermeasure: SeedNFC HSM provides hardware-backed storage for private keys and seed phrases kept outside the DOM. Injection is performed via secure NFC↔HID BLE channels and requires a physical user trigger, preventing DOM redressing and overlay-based signing attacks. See the full SeedNFC technical subsection for implementation details and usage flows.

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Fallible Sandbox & Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Browsers present their sandbox as a strong boundary — but DOM extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks show that UI-level illusions can still deceive users. A fake authentication frame or overlay can impersonate a trusted provider (Google, Microsoft, banks) and cause users to approve actions that release secrets or sign transactions. Standard directives such as frame-ancestors or some CSP rules do not necessarily block these interface forgeries.

Sandbox URL mechanism (technical): a robust Zero-DOM approach binds each credential or cryptographic reference to an expected URL (the “sandbox URL”) stored inside an encrypted HSM. Before any autofill or signing operation, the active page URL is compared to the HSM reference. If the URLs do not match, the secret is not released. This URL-level validation prevents exfiltration even when overlays or hidden frames evade visual detection.

Anti-iframe detection & mitigation (technical): real-time defenses inspect and neutralize suspicious iframe/overlay patterns (e.g., invisible elements, nested Shadow DOM, anomalous focus() sequences, unexpected pointer-events overrides). Detection heuristics include opacity, stacking context, focus redirections, and iframe ancestry checks; mitigation can remove or isolate the forged UI before any user interaction is processed.

For desktop flows, secure pairing between an Android NFC device and an HSM-enabled application allows secrets to be decrypted only in volatile RAM for a fraction of a second and injected outside the browser DOM, reducing persistence and exposure on the host system.

⮞ Technical Summary (attack defeated by sandbox URL + iframe neutralization)

The DOM extension clickjacking chain typically uses invisible CSS overlays (opacity:0, pointer-events:none), embedded iframes and encapsulated Shadow DOM nodes. By chaining focus() calls and cursor tracking, an extension may be tricked into autofilling credentials or signing transactions into attacker-controlled fields that are immediately exfiltrated. URL-based sandboxing plus real-time iframe neutralization closes this vector.

DOM extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser protection with EviBITB and Sandbox URL inside PassCypher HSM PGP / NFC HSM

✪ Illustration – Sandbox URL and iframe-neutralization protect credentials from clickjacking-trapped login forms.

⮞ Practical referenceFor a practical Zero-DOM implementation and product-level details (antiframe tooling, HSM URL binding and desktop pairing), see §PassCypher HSM PGP and §Sovereign Countermeasures.

BitUnlocker — Attaque sur BitLocker via WinRE

At DEF CON 33 and Black Hat USA 2025, the research team STORM presented a critical attack against BitLocker called BitUnlocker. This technique bypasses BitLocker protections by exploiting logical weaknesses in the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE).

Attack vectors

  • boot.sdi parsing — manipulation of the boot loading process
  • ReAgent.xml — modification of the recovery configuration file
  • Tampered BCD — exploitation of Boot Configuration Data settings

Methodology

The researchers targeted the boot chain and its recovery components to:

  • Identify logical vulnerabilities in WinRE;
  • Develop exploits capable of exfiltrating BitLocker secrets;
  • Propose countermeasures to reinforce BitLocker and WinRE security.

Strategic impact

This attack demonstrates that even encryption systems considered robust can be undermined via indirect vectors — in this case, the Windows recovery chain. It highlights the need for a defense-in-depth approach that protects not only cryptographic primitives but also the integrity of boot and recovery environments.

Phishable Passkeys — Overlay Attacks at DEF CON 33

At DEF CON 33, an independent demonstration showed that synced passkeys — often presented as “phishing-resistant” — can be silently exfiltrated using a simple overlay + redirect. Unlike DOM extension clickjacking, this vector requires no DOM injection: it abuses UI trust and browser-rendered frames to trick users and harvest synced credentials.

How the overlay attack works (summary)

  • Overlay / redirect: a fake authentication frame or overlay is shown that mimics a platform login.
  • Browser trust abused: the UI appears legitimate, so users approve actions or prompts that release synced passkeys.
  • Synced export: once the attacker gains access to the password manager, synced passkeys and credentials can be exported and reused.

Synced vs device-bound — core difference

  • Synced passkeys: stored and replicated via cloud/password-manager infrastructure — convenient but a single point of failure and phishable by UI-forgery attacks.
  • Device-bound passkeys: stored in a device secure element (hardware) and never leave the device — not subject to cloud-sync export, therefore far more resistant to overlay phishing.

Proofs & evidence

Strategic takeaway: overlay-based UI forgery proves that “phishing-resistance” depends on storage and trust model. Where passkeys are synced via cloud/password-managers they are phishable; device-bound credentials (secure element / hardware keys) remain the robust alternative. This reinforces the Zero-DOM + sovereign hardware doctrine.

Phishable Passkeys @ DEF CON 33 — Attribution & Technical Note

Principal Researcher: Dr. Chad Spensky (Allthenticate)

Technical Co-authors: Shourya Pratap Singh, Daniel Seetoh, Jonathan (Jonny) Lin — Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself (DEF CON 33)

Contributors acknowledged: Shortman, Masrt, sails, commandz, thelatesthuman, malarum (intro slide)

References:

Key takeaway: overlay-based UI forgery can exfiltrate synced passkeys without touching the DOM. This reinforces our doctrine: Zero-DOM + sovereign out-of-browser validation.

Strategic Signals from DEF CON 33

DEF CON 33 crystallised a shift in assumptions about browser security. Key takeaways below are concise and action-oriented.

  • Browsers are unreliable trust zones. The DOM should not be treated as a safe place for secrets.
  • Synced passkeys & DOM-injected secrets are phishable. UI-forgery and overlay techniques can defeat cloud-synced credentials.
  • Vendor responses vary; structural fixes are rare. Quick UI patches help, but few vendors have adopted architectural changes.
  • Prioritise hardware Zero-DOM approaches. Offline, hardware-anchored flows reduce exposure and belong in security roadmaps.

Summary

Rather than relying on cosmetic fixes, organisations should plan for doctrinal changes: treat any secret that touches the DOM as suspect and accelerate adoption of hardware-backed, Zero-DOM mitigations in product and policy roadmaps.

Sovereign Countermeasures (Zero DOM)

Vendor patches can reduce immediate risk but do not remove the root cause: secrets flowing through the DOM. Zero DOM means secrets should never reside in, transit through, or depend on the browser. The durable defence is architectural — keep credentials, TOTP, passkeys and private keys inside offline hardware and only expose them briefly in volatile memory when explicitly activated.

Zero DOM countermeasures flow — credentials, passkeys and crypto keys blocked from DOM exfiltration, secured by HSM PGP and NFC HSM sandbox URL injection

✪ Illustration — Zero DOM Flow: secrets remain inside the HSM, injected via HID into ephemeral RAM, making DOM exfiltration impossible.

In a Zero-DOM design, secrets are stored in offline HSMs and released only after an explicit physical action (NFC tap, HID pairing, local confirmation). Decryption happens in volatile RAM for the minimal time required to fill a field; nothing persists in the DOM or on disk.

Sovereign operation: NFC HSM, HID-BLE and HSM-PGP

NFC HSM ↔ Android ↔ Browser: the user physically presents the NFC HSM to an NFC-enabled Android device. The companion app verifies the request from the host, activates the module, and transmits the encrypted secret contactlessly to the host. Decryption occurs only in volatile RAM; the browser never holds the secret in clear.

NFC HSM ↔ HID-BLE: when paired with a Bluetooth HID emulator, the system types credentials straight into the target field over an AES-128-CBC encrypted BLE channel, avoiding clipboard, keyboard logging, and DOM exposure.

Local HSM-PGP activation: on desktop, a PassCypher-style HSM-PGP container decrypts locally (AES-256-CBC PGP) into RAM on a single user action. The secret is injected without traversing the DOM and is erased immediately after use.

This architecture removes the injection surface rather than patching it: no central server, no master password to extract, and no persistent cleartext inside the browser. Implementations should combine sandboxed URL checking, minimal ephemeral memory windows, and auditable activation logs to verify each autofill operation.

⮞ Summary

Zero DOM is a structural defence: keep secrets in hardware, require physical activation, decrypt only in RAM, and block any DOM-based injection or exfiltration.

passcypher-hsm-pgp

PassCypher HSM PGP — Patented Zero-DOM Technology & Sovereign Anti-Phishing Key Management

Long before DOM Extension Clickjacking was publicly exposed at DEF CON 33, Freemindtronic adopted a different approach. Since 2015 our R&D has followed a simple founding principle: never use the DOM to carry secrets. That Zero-Trust doctrine produced the patented Zero-DOM architecture behind PassCypher HSM PGP, which keeps credentials, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys and cryptographic keys confined in hardware HSM containers — never injected into a manipulable browser environment.

A unique advance in password managers

  • Native Zero-DOM — no sensitive data ever touches the browser.
  • Integrated HSM-PGP — AES-256-CBC encrypted containers with patented segmented-key protection.
  • Sovereign autonomy — no server, no central database, no cloud dependency.

Reinforced BITB protection (EviBITB)

Since 2020 PassCypher HSM PGP embeds EviBITB, a serverless engine that neutralizes Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks in real time by detecting and destroying malicious iframes and fraudulent overlays and validating UI context anonymously. EviBITB can operate manually, semi-automatically or fully automatically to drastically reduce BITB and invisible DOM-hijacking risk.

EviBITB embedded in PassCypher HSM PGP: real-time iframe and overlay detection and mitigation
EviBITB embedded in PassCypher HSM PGP: real-time detection and destruction of redirect iFrames and malicious overlays.

Why it resists DEF CON-style attacks

Nothing ever transits the DOM, there is no master password to extract, and containers remain encrypted at rest. Decryption occurs only in volatile RAM for the brief instant required to assemble key segments; after autofill the data is erased, leaving no exploitable trace.

Key features

  • Shielded autofill — single-click autofill via sandboxed URL, never exposed in cleartext in the browser.
  • Embedded EviBITB — real-time iframe/overlay neutralization (manual / semi / automatic), fully serverless.
  • Integrated crypto tooling — segmented AES-256 key generation and PGP key management without external dependencies.
  • Universal compatibility — works with any website via the extension; no additional plugins required.
  • Sovereign architecture — zero server, zero central DB, zero DOM; designed to remain resilient where cloud managers fail.

Immediate implementation

No complex setup is required. Install the PassCypher HSM PGP extension from the Chrome Web Store or Edge Add-ons, enable the BITB option, and benefit instantly from Zero-DOM sovereign protection.

⮞ Summary

PassCypher HSM PGP redefines secret management: permanently encrypted containers, segmented keys, ephemeral decryption in RAM, Zero-DOM and zero-cloud. A hardware-centric, passwordless solution engineered to resist current threats and anticipate quantum-era risks.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Sovereign Passwordless Manager

Software password managers fall into the trap of a simple iframe, but PassCypher NFC HSM follows a different path: it never lets your credentials and passwords transit through the DOM. The nano-HSM keeps them encrypted offline and only releases them for a fleeting instant in volatile memory — just long enough to authenticate.

User-side operation:

  • Untouchable secrets — the NFC HSM encrypts and stores credentials so they never appear or leak.
  • TOTP/HOTP — the PassCypher NFC HSM Android app or the PassCypher HSM PGP on desktop generates and displays them instantly on demand.
  • Manual entry — the user enters a PIN or TOTP directly into the login field on a computer or Android NFC phone. The PassCypher app shows the code generated by the NFC HSM module. The same process applies to credentials, passkeys, and other secrets.
  • Contactless autofill — the user simply presents the PassCypher NFC HSM module to a smartphone or computer, which executes autofill seamlessly, even when paired with PassCypher HSM PGP.
  • Desktop autofill — with PassCypher HSM PGP on Windows or macOS, the user clicks the integrated login field button to auto-complete login and password, with optional auto-validation.
  • Distributed anti-BITB — the NFC ↔ Android ↔ browser (Win/Mac/Linux) secure pairing triggers EviBITB to destroy malicious iframes in real time.
  • HID BLE mode — a paired Bluetooth HID keyboard emulator injects credentials outside the DOM, blocking both DOM-based attacks and keyloggers.

⮞ Summary

PassCypher NFC HSM embodies Zero Trust (every action requires physical validation) and Zero Knowledge (no secret is ever exposed). A sovereign hardware identity safeguard by design, it neutralizes clickjacking, BITB attacks, typosquatting, keylogging, IDN spoofing, DOM injections, clipboard hijacking, malicious extensions, while anticipating quantum attacks.

✪ Attacks Neutralized by PassCypher NFC HSM

Attack Type Description Status with PassCypher
Clickjacking / UI Redressing Invisible iframes or overlays that hijack user clicks Neutralized (EviBITB)
BITB (Browser-in-the-Browser) Fake browser frames simulating login windows Neutralized (sandbox + pairing)
Keylogging Keystroke capture by malware Neutralized (HID BLE mode)
Typosquatting Lookalike URLs mimicking legitimate domains Neutralized (physical validation)
Homograph Attack (IDN spoofing) Unicode substitution deceiving users on domain names Neutralized (Zero DOM)
DOM Injection / DOM XSS Malicious scripts injected into the DOM Neutralized (out-of-DOM architecture)
Clipboard Hijacking Interception or modification of clipboard data Neutralized (no clipboard usage)
Malicious Extensions Browser compromised by rogue plugins Neutralized (pairing + sandbox)
Quantum Attacks (anticipated) Massive computation to break crypto keys Mitigated (segmented keys + AES-256 CBC + PGP)

SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Secure Wallet Injection

Browser wallet extensions thrive in the DOM — and attackers exploit that weakness. With SeedNFC HSM, the logic flips: the enclave never releases private keys or seed phrases. When users initialize or restore a wallet (web or desktop), the system performs input through a Bluetooth HID emulation — like a hardware keyboard — with no clipboard, no DOM, and no trace for private keys, public keys, or even hot wallet credentials.

Operational flow (anti-DOM, anti-clipboard):

  • Custody — the SeedNFC HSM encrypts and stores the seed/private key (never exports it, never reveals it).
  • Physical activation — the NFC HSM authorizes the operation when the user presents it contactlessly via the Freemindtronic app (Android NFC smartphone).
  • HID BLE injection — the system types the seed (or required fragment/format) directly into the wallet input field, outside the DOM and outside the clipboard, resisting even software keyloggers.
  • BITB protection — users can activate EviBITB (anti-BITB iframe destroyer) inside the app, which neutralizes overlays and malicious redirections during onboarding or recovery.
  • Ephemerality — volatile RAM temporarily holds the data during HID input, then instantly erases it.

Typical use cases:

  • Onboarding or recovery of wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, etc.) without ever exposing the private key to the browser or DOM. The HSM keeps the secret encrypted and decrypts it only in RAM, for the minimal time required.
  • Sensitive operations on desktop (logical air-gap), with physical validation by the user: the user presents the NFC HSM module under an Android NFC smartphone to authorize the action, without keyboard interaction or DOM exposure.
  • Secure multi-asset backup: an offline hardware HSM stores seed phrases, master keys, and private keys, allowing reuse without copying, exporting, or capturing. Users perform activation exclusively through physical, sovereign, and auditable means.

⮞ Summary

First of all, SeedNFC HSM with HID BLE injects private or public keys directly into hot wallet fields via a Bluetooth Low Energy HID emulator, thereby bypassing both keyboard typing and clipboard transfer. Moreover, the channel encrypts data with AES-128 CBC, while the NFC module physically triggers activation, ensuring a secure and verifiable process.
In addition, users can enable anti-BITB protection to neutralize malicious overlays and deceptive redirections.
Finally, the HSM enclave keeps secrets strictly confined, outside the DOM and beyond the reach of malicious extensions, thus guaranteeing sovereign protection by design.

Exploitation Scenarios & Mitigation Paths

The DEF CON 33 revelations are a warning — threats will evolve beyond simple patches. Key near-term scenarios to watch:

  • AI-driven clickjacking: LLMs and automation create realistic, real-time DOM overlays and Shadow-DOM traps at scale — making phishing + DOM hijack far more scalable and convincing.
  • Hybrid mobile tapjacking: stacked UI elements, invisible gestures, and background app interactions enable large-scale mobile validation/exfiltration (OTP, transaction approvals).
  • Post-quantum HSMs: long-term mitigation requires hardware anchors and quantum-resistant key management — move the security boundary into certified HSMs and out of the browser. See §Sovereign Countermeasures for architectural guidance.

⮞ Summary

Future attackers will bypass browser fixes. Mitigation requires a rupture: offline hardware anchors, post-quantum HSM planning, and Zero-DOM designs rather than incremental software band-aids.

Strategic Synthesis

DOM extension clickjacking shows that browsers and extensions cannot be treated as trusted execution zones for secrets. Patches reduce risk but do not eliminate the structural exposure.

The sovereign path — three priorities

  • Governance: treat extensions and autofill engines as critical infrastructure — tighten development controls, mandatory audits, and incident disclosure rules.
  • Architectural change: adopt Zero-DOM designs so secrets never transit the browser; require physical activation for sensitive operations.
  • Hardware resilience: invest in hardware anchors and post-quantum HSM roadmaps to remove single-point failures in cloud/sync models.

Doctrine — concise

  • Consider any secret that touches the DOM as potentially compromised.
  • Prefer physical activation (NFC, HID BLE, HSM flows) for high-value operations.
  • Audit and regulate extension injection logic as a security-critical function.
Regulatory note — Existing regimes (CRA, NIS2, national frameworks) improve software resilience but generally do not address secrets embedded in the DOM. Policymakers should close this blind spot by requiring provable separation of UI and secret flows.

 

Glossary

DOM (Document Object Model)

In-memory representation of a web page’s HTML/JS structure; allows scripts and extensions to access and modify page elements.

Shadow DOM

Encapsulated DOM subtree used to isolate web components; can hide elements from the rest of the document.

Clickjacking

UI redressing technique that tricks users into clicking hidden or overlaid elements.

DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking

Attack variant where a malicious page chains invisible iframes, Shadow DOM and focus() redirects to coerce an extension into injecting secrets into a fake form.

Autofill

Mechanism used by password managers and browser extensions to automatically populate credentials, OTPs or passkeys into web fields.

Passkey

WebAuthn authentication credential (public-key based). Passkeys are phishing-resistant when stored device-bound in a secure element; cloud-synced passkeys are more exposed.

WebAuthn / FIDO

Public-key authentication standard (FIDO2) for passwordless logins; security depends on storage model (synced vs device-bound).

TOTP / HOTP

One-time codes generated by time-based (TOTP) or counter-based (HOTP) algorithms for two-factor authentication.

HSM (Hardware Security Module)

Hardware device that securely generates, stores and uses cryptographic keys without exposing them in cleartext outside the enclave.

PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)

Hybrid encryption standard using public/private keys; here used to protect AES-256-CBC encrypted containers.

AES-256 CBC

Symmetric encryption algorithm (CBC mode) with 256-bit keys — used to encrypt secret containers.

Segmented keys

Key fragmentation approach: keys are split into segments to increase resistance and are assembled securely in ephemeral RAM.

Ephemeral RAM

Volatile memory where secrets are briefly decrypted for an autofill operation and immediately erased — no persistence to disk or DOM.

NFC (Near Field Communication)

Contactless technology used to physically activate an HSM and authorize local secret release.

HID-BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy HID)

BLE keyboard emulation mode to inject data directly into fields without using the DOM or clipboard.

Sandbox URL

Mechanism binding each secret to an expected URL stored inside the HSM; if the active URL does not match, autofill is blocked.

Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Overlay attack that simulates a browser window inside an iframe — tricks users into interacting with a fake authentication frame.

EviBITB

Serverless anti-BITB engine that detects and destroys malicious iframes/overlays in real time and validates UI context anonymously.

SeedNFC

Hardware HSM solution for seed phrase / private key custody; performs out-of-DOM injection via HID/NFC.

Iframe

HTML frame embedding another page; invisible iframes (opacity:0, pointer-events:none) are commonly used in UI redressing attacks.
focus()
JavaScript call that sets focus on a field. Abused to redirect user events to attacker-controlled inputs.

Overlay

Visual layer (fake window/frame) that masks the real interface and deceives the user about the origin of an action.

Exfiltration

Unauthorized extraction of sensitive data from the target (credentials, TOTP, passkeys, private keys).

Phishable

Describes a mechanism (e.g., cloud-synced passkeys) that can be compromised by UI forgery or overlays — therefore vulnerable to phishing.

Content-Security-Policy (CSP)

Web policy controlling resource origins; useful but alone insufficient against advanced clickjacking variants.

X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors

HTTP headers / CSP directives intended to limit iframe inclusion; can be bypassed in complex attack scenarios.

Keylogging

Malicious capture of keystrokes; mitigated by secure HID injection (no software keyboard or clipboard use).

Note: this glossary standardises terms used in the chronicle. For normative definitions and standards, consult OWASP, NIST and FIDO/WebAuthn specifications.

🔥 In short: cloud patches help, but hardware and Zero-DOM architectures prevent class failures.

⮞ Note — What this chronicle does not cover:

This article does not provide exploitable PoCs or step-by-step attack instructions for DOM clickjacking or passkey phishing. It also does not analyse cryptocurrency economics or specific legal cases beyond a strategic security viewpoint.

The objective: explain structural flaws, quantify systemic risks, and outline Zero-DOM hardware countermeasures as the robust mitigation path. For implementation details, see §Sovereign Countermeasures and the product subsections collected there.

 

Clickjacking extensions DOM: Vulnerabilitat crítica a DEF CON 33

Cartell digital en català sobre el clickjacking d’extensions DOM amb PassCypher — contraatac sobirà Zero DOM

DOM extension clickjacking — el clickjacking d’extensions basat en DOM, mitjançant iframes invisibles, manipulacions del Shadow DOM i overlays BITB — posa en risc els gestors de contrasenyes; vegeu §Passkeys phishables. Aquesta crònica resumeix les demostracions de DEF CON 33 (DOM-based extension clickjacking i passkeys phishables), el seu impacte i les contramesures Zero-DOM (PassCypher, SeedNFC, EviBITB).

Resum Executiu

⮞ Nota de lectura

Si només voleu retenir l’essencial, el Resum Executiu (≈4 minuts) és suficient. Per a una visió completa i tècnica, continueu amb la lectura íntegra de la crònica (≈35 minuts).

⚡ El descobriment

Las Vegas, principis d’agost de 2025. El DEF CON 33 vibra al Centre de Convencions. Entre doms de hackers, pobles IoT, Adversary Village i competicions CTF, l’aire és dens de passió, insígnies i soldadures improvisades. A l’escenari, Marek Tóth no necessita artificis: connecta el portàtil, mira el públic i prem Enter. L’atac estrella: el Clickjacking d’extensions basat en DOM. Senzill de codificar, devastador d’executar: pàgina trampa, iframes invisibles, una crida focus() maliciosa… i els gestors d’autoemplenament aboquen en un formulari fantasma identificadors, contrasenyes, TOTP i passkeys.
en un formulari fantasma.

✦ Impacte immediat en gestors de contrasenyes

Els resultats són contundents. Marek Tóth va analitzar 11 gestors de contrasenyes: tots mostraven vulnerabilitats per disseny.
En 10 de 11 casos, es van exfiltrar credencials i secrets.
Segons SecurityWeek, prop de 40 milions d’instal·lacions continuen exposades.
La vulnerabilitat s’estén més enllà: fins i tot els crypto-wallets van deixar escapar claus privades, exposant directament actius digitals.

⧉ Segona demostració — Passkeys phishables (overlay)

A DEF CON 33, Allthenticate va demostrar que les Vegeu §Passkeys phishables poden ser pescades mitjançant una simple superposició i redirecció — cap injecció DOM requerida. L’anàlisi completa està disponible a la secció dedicada Phishable Passkeys i a atribució & fonts.

🚨 El missatge

En només dues demos, dos pilars de la ciberseguretat — gestors de contrasenyes i Vegeu §Passkeys phishables — s’ensorren del pedestal. El missatge és brutal: mentre els teus secrets visquin al DOM, mai no estaran segurs. I mentre la ciberseguretat depengui del navegador i del núvol, un sol clic pot capgirar-ho tot. Com recorda OWASP, el clickjacking és un clàssic — però aquí és la capa d’extensions la que queda pulveritzada.

🔑 L’alternativa

Saviez-vous qu’il existe depuis plus de dix ans une autre voie, une voie qui ne passe pas par les départements français d’outre-mer ? Avec PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM et SeedNFC pour la conservation des clés cryptographiques matérielles, vos identifiants TOTP/HOTP, vos mots de passe et vos clés secrètes ne voient jamais le DOM. Il ne s’agit pas d’un patch, mais d’une architecture propriétaire souveraine, décentralisée, serverless et databaseless, sans mot de passe maître, qui libère la gestion des secrets des dépendances centralisées telles que FIDO/WebAuthn.

Crònica per llegir
Temps estimat de lectura: 35 minuts
Data d’actualització: 2025-09-11
Nivell de complexitat: Avançat / Expert
Especificitat lingüística: Lèxic sobirà — alta densitat tècnica
Llengües disponibles: CAT · EN · ES · FR
Accessibilitat: Optimitzat per a lectors de pantalla — ancoratges semàntics integrats
Tipus editorial: Crònica estratègica
Sobre l’autor: Text escrit per Jacques Gascuel, inventor i fundador de Freemindtronic®.
Especialista en tecnologies de seguretat sobirana, dissenya i patenta sistemes de maquinari per a la protecció de dades, la sobirania criptogràfica i les comunicacions segures.
La seva experiència cobreix el compliment dels estàndards ANSSI, NIS2, RGPD i SecNumCloud, així com la lluita contra les amenaces híbrides mitjançant arquitectures sobiranes by design.

TL;DR — Al DEF CON 33, el clickjacking d’extensions basat en DOM va demostrar un risc sistèmico per a les extensions de navegador que injecten secrets al DOM. Exfiltrats: identificadors (logins), codis TOTP, Vegeu §Passkeys phishables i claus criptogràfiques. Tècniques: iframes invisibles, manipulació del Shadow DOM, superposicions Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB). Impacte inicial: ≈ 40 milions d’instal·lacions notificades com a exposades en la divulgació. Estat (11 de setembre de 2025): diversos proveïdors han publicat correccions oficials per als mètodes descrits (Bitwarden, Dashlane, Enpass, NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm, Keeper [parcial], LogMeOnce), mentre que altres continuen reportats com a vulnerables (1Password, iCloud Passwords, LastPass, KeePassXC-Browser). Contramesura: fluxos de maquinari Zero-DOM (PassCypher NFC/PGP, SeedNFC) mantenen els secrets fora del DOM del navegador. Principi: Zero DOM — eliminar la superfície d’atac.
Infografia en català mostrant l’anatomia d’un atac de clickjacking basat en DOM amb pàgina maliciosa, iframe invisible i exfiltració de secrets cap a l’atacant.
✪ Anatomia d’un atac de clickjacking d’extensions DOM: pàgina enganyosa, iframes invisibles i exfiltració de secrets cap a l’atacant. Representació pedagògica en llengua catalana.

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Què és el clickjacking d’extensions basat en el DOM?

DOM-based extension clickjacking segresta una extensió del navegador (gestor de contrasenyes o wallet) fent un mal ús del Document Object Model. Una pàgina enganyosa encadena iframes invisibles, Shadow DOM i una crida maliciosa a focus() per desencadenar l’autofill en un formulari invisible. L’extensió «creu» que actua sobre el camp correcte i hi aboca secrets — credencials, codis TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, fins i tot claus privades. Com que aquests secrets toquen el DOM, poden ser exfiltrats de manera silenciosa.

⮞ Perspectiva doctrinal: El DOM-based extension clickjacking no és un error aïllat sinó un defecte de disseny. Qualsevol extensió que injecti secrets en un DOM manipulable és intrínsecament vulnerable. Només les arquitectures Zero-DOM (separació estructural, HSM/NFC, injecció fora del navegador) eliminen aquesta superfície d’atac.

Quin nivell de perillositat té?

Aquest vector no és menor: explota la lògica mateixa de l’autofill i actua sense que l’usuari se n’adoni. L’atacant no es limita a superposar un element; força l’extensió a omplir un formulari fals com si res, fent que l’exfiltració sigui indetectable a simple vista.

Flux típic de l’atac

  1. Preparació — la pàgina maliciosa integra una iframe invisible i un Shadow DOM que amaga el context real; els camps són ocultats (opacity:0, pointer-events:none).
  2. Ham — la víctima clicca un element innocent; redireccions i un focus() maliciós redirigeixen l’esdeveniment cap a un camp controlat per l’atacant.
  3. Exfiltració — l’extensió pensa que interactua amb un camp legítim i injecta automàticament credencials, TOTP, passkeys o claus privades al DOM fals; les dades s’exfiltren immediatament.

Aquest mecanisme enganya els senyals visuals, evita proteccions clàssiques (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, frame-ancestors) i converteix l’autofill en un canal d’exfiltració invisible. Els overlays tipus Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) i les manipulacions del Shadow DOM agreugen el risc, fent que les passkeys sincronitzades i les credencials siguin susceptibles de phishing.

⮞ Resum

L’atac combina iframes invisibles, manipulació del Shadow DOM i redireccions via focus() per segrestar les extensions d’autofill. Els secrets s’injecten en un formulari fantasma, donant a l’atacant accés directe a dades sensibles (credencials, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, claus privades). Moraleja: mentre els secrets transitin pel DOM, la superfície d’atac segueix oberta.

Història del Clickjacking (2002–2025)

El clickjacking ha evolucionat durant dècades. El concepte va néixer als primers anys 2000 amb Jeremiah Grossman i Robert Hansen: enganyar un usuari perquè faci clic en un element que no veu realment. Va passar de ser una il·lusió òptica aplicada al codi a una tècnica d’atac habitual (OWASP).

  • 2002–2008: Aparició del “UI redressing”: capes HTML i iframes transparents atrapant usuaris.
  • 2009: Facebook afectat per likejacking.
  • 2010: Aparició del cursorjacking (desplaçar el cursor per enganyar el clic).
  • 2012–2015: Exploits via iframes, anuncis maliciosos i malvertising.
  • 2016–2019: Tapjacking a mòbils.
  • 2020–2024: “Hybrid clickjacking” combinant XSS i phishing.
  • 2025: A DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth presenta el salt: DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking, on les extensions injecten formularis invisibles i habiliten exfiltració silenciosa de secrets.

❓Des de quan hi ha exposició?

Les tècniques d’iframes invisibles i Shadow DOM són conegudes des de fa anys. Les descobertes de DEF CON 33 revelen un patró de disseny d’una dècada: extensions que confien en el DOM per injectar secrets estan inherentment exposades.

Síntesi: En 20 anys, el clickjacking ha passat d’una trampa visual a una sabotatge sistèmic contra gestors d’identitat; DEF CON 33 marca un punt d’inflexió i subratlla la urgència d’enfocaments Zero-DOM amb hardware sobirà.

Clickjacking extensions DOM — Anatomia de l’atac

El clickjacking extensions DOM no és una variant trivial: desvia la lògica mateixa dels gestors d’autoemplenament. Aquí, l’atacant no es limita a recobrir un botó amb una iframe; força l’extensió a omplir un formulari fals com si fos legítim.

Esquema de clickjacking d'extensions DOM en tres fases: Preparació, Esquer i Exfiltració amb extensió d’autocompleció vulnerada
Esquema visual del clickjacking d’extensions DOM: una pàgina maliciosa amb iframe invisible (Preparació), un element Shadow com a esquer (Esquer) i l’exfiltració d’identificadors, TOTP i claus a través de l’extensió d’autocompleció (Exfiltració).

Desplegament típic d’un atac:

  1. Preparació — La pàgina trampa carrega una iframe invisible i un Shadow DOM que oculta el context real.
  2. Esquer — L’usuari fa clic en un element aparentment innocu; una crida focus() redirigeix l’esdeveniment cap al camp invisible controlat per l’atacant.
  3. Exfiltració — L’extensió creu interactuar amb un camp legítim i injecta identificadors, TOTP, passkeys i fins i tot claus privades directament dins del fals DOM.

Aquesta mecànica distorsiona els senyals visuals, esquiva les defenses clàssiques (X-Frame-Options, CSP, frame-ancestors) i transforma l’autoemplenament en un canal d’exfiltració invisible. A diferència del clickjacking “tradicional”, l’usuari no fa clic en un lloc de tercers: és la seva pròpia extensió la que queda atrapada per la seva confiança en el DOM.

⮞ Resum

L’atac combina iframes invisibles, Shadow DOM i focus() per atrapar els gestors d’autoemplenament. Els gestors de contrasenyes injecten els seus secrets no pas al lloc previst, sinó en un formulari fantasma, oferint a l’atacant accés directe a dades sensibles.

Gestors vulnerables & divulgació CVE (instantània — 17 set 2025)

Actualitzat: 17 de setembre 2025

Després de les demostracions de Marek Tóth a DEF CON 33, es van remetre diverses vulnerabilitats de DOM-extension clickjacking per assignació de CVE. L’activitat de patching s’accelerà a l’agost–setembre 2025, però la resposta dels venedors és desigual. La taula resumeix l’estat per producte (credencials / TOTP / passkeys i estat del patch). Per metodologia de proves i detalls, consulteu la secció “Correction Technologies” i les notes de llançament dels venedors.

Gestor Credencials TOTP Passkeys Estat Nota oficial
1Password Vulnerable (reportat)
Bitwarden Parcial Patch (v2025.8.2) Release
Dashlane Patch Advisory
LastPass Vulnerable (reportat)
Enpass Patch (v6.11.6) Release
iCloud Passwords No Vulnerable (revisió)
LogMeOnce No Patch (v7.12.7) Release
NordPass Parcial Mitigacions Release
ProtonPass Parcial Mitigacions Releases
RoboForm Patch Update
Keeper Parcial No No Patch parcial (v17.2.0) Release

⮞ Conclusió clau:

Encara que els parches arribin ràpidament, el problema persisteix: mentre credencials i altres secrets transitin pel DOM, estan exposats a variants de clickjacking. Les solucions Zero-DOM (PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, SeedNFC) eliminen la superfície d’atac en assegurar que els secrets no surten del contenidor xifrat.

Nota: és una instantània. Per versions per producte, notes de llançament i identificadors CVE, consulteu la taula i les pàgines d’advisories dels venedors.

Tecnologies de correcció utilitzades

Des de la divulgació pública a DEF CON 33, els venedors han publicat actualitzacions. No obstant això, la majoria són pegats superficials o comprovacions condicionals; cap fabricant ha re-construït l’enginy d’injecció completament.

Imatge resum: aquestes tecnologies van des de pegats estètics fins a solucions Zero-DOM basades en hardware.

Infografia sobre les defenses contra el clickjacking d’extensions DOM: X-Frame-Options, CSP, retards d’autofill i diàlegs flotants.
Quatre mètodes de correcció contra el clickjacking d’extensions DOM: des de polítiques de seguretat fins a estratègies.

Objectiu

Explicar com els venedors han intentat mitigar la fallada, distingir pegats cosmètics de correccions estructurals i destacar enfocaments sobirans Zero-DOM.

Mètodes observats (agost 2025)

Mètode Descripció Gestors afectats
Restricció d’autoemplenament Mode “on-click” o desactivació per defecte Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper
Filtrat de subdominis Bloqueig d’autoemplenament en subdominis no autoritzats ProtonPass, RoboForm
Detecció Shadow DOM Refusar injectar si el camp és encapsulat NordPass, Enpass
Aïllament contextual Comprovacions prèvies a la injecció (iframe, opacitat, focus) Bitwarden, ProtonPass
Hardware sobirà (Zero-DOM) Secrets mai transiten pel DOM: NFC HSM, HSM PGP, SeedNFC PassCypher, EviKey, SeedNFC

Limitacions observades

  • Els pegats no modifiquen l’enginy d’injecció, només el seu disparador.
  • No s’ha introduït separació estructural entre UI i fluxos de secrets.
  • Qualsevol gestor encara lligat al DOM roman exposat estructuralment.
⮞ Transició estratègica
Aquests pegats són reaccions, no ruptures. Tracten símptomes, no la falla arquitectònica.

Anàlisi tècnica i doctrinal de les correccions

DOM extension clickjacking és una fallada de disseny estructural: secrets injectats en un DOM manipulable poden ser segrestats tret que el flux d’injecció quedi separat arquitectònicament del navegador.

Què no solucionen les correccions actuals

  • Cap venedor ha re-construït l’enginy d’injecció.
  • Les mesures principalment limiten l’activació (desactivar autoemplenament, filtres de subdomini, detecció d’elements invisibles) en lloc de canviar el model d’injecció.

Què requeriria una correcció estructural

  • Eliminar la dependència del DOM per a la injecció de secrets.
  • Aïllar l’enginy d’injecció fora del navegador (hardware o procés segur separatat).
  • Usar autenticació hardware (NFC, PGP, enclausura segura) i exigir validació física/indicació explícita de l’usuari.
  • Prohibir per disseny la interacció amb elements invisibles o encapsulats.

Tipologia de correccions

Nivell Tipus de correcció Descripció
Cosmètic UI/UX, autoemplenament desactivat per defecte No canvia l’enginy d’injecció, només el disparador
Contextual Filtrat DOM, Shadow DOM, subdominis Afegeix condicions, però encara depèn del DOM
Estructural Zero-DOM, hardware (PGP, NFC, HSM) Elimina l’ús del DOM per secrets; separa UI i fluxos de secrets

Tests doctrinals per verificar patches

Per comprovar si una correcció és realment estructural, els investigadors poden:

  • Injectar un camp invisible (opacity:0) dins d’un iframe i verificar el comportament d’injecció.
  • Comprovar si les extensions encara injecten secrets a inputs encapsulats o no visibles.
  • Verificar si les accions d’autoemplenament són registrables i bloquejades en cas de desajust de context.

No existeix actualment un estàndard industrial àmpliament adoptat (NIST/OWASP/ISO) que reguli la lògica d’injecció d’extensions, la separació UI/secret o la traçabilitat de les accions d’autoemplenament.

⮞ Conclusió
Les correccions actuals són solucions temporals. La resposta duradora és arquitectònica: treure els secrets del DOM amb patrons Zero-DOM i aïllament hardware (HSM/NFC/PGP).

Riscos sistèmics i vectors d’explotació

DOM extension clickjacking no és un bug aïllat; és una fallada de disseny sistèmica. Quan el flux d’injecció d’una extensió queda compromès, l’impacte pot expandir-se més enllà d’una contrasenya filtrada i degradar capes completes d’autenticació i infraestructures.

Escenaris crítics

  • Accés persistent — un TOTP clonat o tokens de sessió recuperats poden re-registrar dispositius “de confiança”.
  • Reproducció de passkeys — una passkey exfiltrada pot funcionar com un token mestre reutilitzable fora del control habitual.
  • Compromís SSO — tokens OAuth/SAML filtrats poden exposar sistemes IT complets.
  • Exposició supply-chain — extensions mal regulades creen una superfície d’atac estructural a nivell de navegador.
  • Robatori d’actius cripto — extensions de moneder que usen DOM poden filtrar seed phrases i claus privades o signar transaccions malicioses.

⮞ Resum

Les conseqüències van més enllà del robo de credencials: TOTPs clonats, passkeys reproduïdes, tokens SSO compromesos i seed phrases exfiltrades són resultats realistes. Mentre els secrets transitin pel DOM, representen un vector d’exfiltració.

Comparativa de amenaces sobiranes
Atac Objectiu Secrets Contramesura sobirana
ToolShell RCE SharePoint / OAuth Certificats SSL, tokens SSO Emmagatzematge i signatura hardware (HSM/PGP)
eSIM hijack Identitat mòbil Perfils de operador Ancoratge hardware (SeedNFC)
DOM clickjacking Extensions de navegador Credencials, TOTP, passkeys Zero-DOM + HSM / autoemplenament sandoxed
Crypto-wallet hijack Extensions de moneder Claus privades, seed phrases Injecció HID/NFC des de HSM (no DOM, no clipboard)
Atomic Stealer Portapapers macOS Claus PGP, dades de wallets Xarxes xifrades + entrada HSM (no clipboard)

Exposició regional i impacte lingüístic — Àmbit anglosaxó (notes)

Regió Usuaris angloparlants Adopció de gestors Contramesures Zero-DOM
Món anglòfon ≈1.5 mil milions Alta (NA, UK, AU) PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC
Amèrica del Nord ≈94M usuaris (36% adults EUA) Creixent consciència; adopció encara moderada PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM
Regne Unit Alta penetració d’internet i moneders Adopció madura; regulacions en augment PassCypher HSM PGP, EviBITB

Insight estratègic: l’espai anglosaxó representa una superfície d’exposició significativa; prioritzar Zero-DOM i mitigacions hardware als fulls de ruta regionals. Fonts: ICLS, Security.org, DataReportal.

Moneders cripto exposats

Les extensions de moneder (MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet) sovint utilitzen interaccions amb el DOM; sobreposicions o iframes invisibles poden enganyar l’usuari perquè signi transaccions malicioses o exposi la seed phrase. Vegeu §Sovereign Countermeasures per mitigacions hardware.

SeedNFC HSM — mitigació hardware (concisa)

Contramesura sobirana: SeedNFC HSM ofereix emmagatzematge hardware per claus privades i seed phrases fora del DOM. L’injecció es realitza via canals xifrats NFC↔HID BLE i requereix un desencadenament físic per part de l’usuari, impedint injeccions per redressing o firmes per sobreposició. Vegeu la subsecció técnica de SeedNFC per més detalls d’implementació.

Sandbox vulnerable & Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Els navegadors ofereixen un “sandbox” com a frontera, però el DOM extension clickjacking i les tècniques BITB demostren que les il·lusions d’interfície poden enganyar els usuaris. Un marc d’autenticació fals o una sobreposició poden suplantar proveïdors (Google, Microsoft, bancs) i fer que l’usuari autoritzi accions que alliberen secrets o signen transaccions. Directives com frame-ancestors o certes polítiques CSP no garanteixen bloqueig complet d’aquestes forgeries d’interfície.

Mecanisme de Sandbox URL (tècnic): una solució Zero-DOM robusta lliga cada credencial o referència criptogràfica a una URL esperada (“sandbox URL”) emmagatzemada dins d’un HSM xifrat. Abans d’un autoemplenament o signatura, la URL activa es compara amb la referència de l’HSM; si no coincideixen, el secret no s’allibera. Aquesta validació a nivell d’URL evita exfiltracions encara que les sobreposicions eludeixin la detecció visual.

Detecció i mitigació anti-iframe (tècnic): defenses en temps real inspeccionen i neutralitzen patrons sospitosos d’iframe/overlay (elements invisibles, Shadow DOM anidat, seqüències anòmales de focus(), pointer-events alterats). Les heurístiques inclouen opacitat, context de pila, redireccions de focus i comprovacions d’ancestria d’iframe; la mitigació pot eliminar o aïllar la UI forjada abans de qualsevol interacció.

Per a fluxos d’escriptori, l’enllaç segur entre un dispositiu Android NFC i una aplicació amb HSM permet que els secrets es desxifrin només en RAM volàtil durant una fracció de segon i s’injectin fora del DOM, reduint persistència i exposició en l’host.

⮞ Resum tècnic (atac neutralitzat per sandbox URL + neutralització d’iframe)

La cadena d’atac sol utilitzar sobreposicions CSS invisibles (opacity:0, pointer-events:none), iframes embeguts i nodes Shadow DOM encapsulats. Seqüències de focus() i seguiment del cursor poden induir l’extensió a confeccionar autoemplenament a camps controlats per l’atacant i exfiltrar les dades. L’enllaç d’URL i la neutralització en temps real dels iframes tanca aquest vector.

Il·lustració de la protecció anti-BitB i anti-clickjacking amb EviBITB i Sandbox URL integrats a PassCypher HSM PGP / NFC HSM
✪ Il·lustració – L’escut anti-BITB i el cadenat Sandbox URL bloquegen l’exfiltració de credencials en un formulari manipulat per clickjacking.

⮞ Referència pràctica Per una implementació Zero-DOM pràctica i detalls de producte (antiframe, lligams d’URL HSM, enllaç d’escriptori), consulteu §PassCypher HSM PGP i §Sovereign Countermeasures.

BitUnlocker — Atac contra BitLocker via WinRE

Al DEF CON 33 i al Black Hat USA 2025, el grup d’investigació STORM va presentar una explotació crítica contra BitLocker anomenada BitUnlocker. Aquesta tècnica eludeix les proteccions de BitLocker aprofitant falles lògiques en l’entorn de recuperació de Windows (WinRE).

Vectors d’atac

  • Parsing de boot.sdi: manipulació del procés de càrrega.
  • ReAgent.xml: modificació del fitxer de configuració de recuperació.
  • BCD segrestat: explotació de les dades de configuració d’arrencada.

Metodologia

Els investigadors van centrar-se en la cadena d’arrencada i els components de recuperació per:

  • Identificar vulnerabilitats lògiques dins de WinRE.
  • Desenvolupar exploits capaços d’exfiltrar secrets de BitLocker.
  • Proposar contramesures per endurir la seguretat de BitLocker i WinRE.

Impacte estratègic

Aquest atac demostra que fins i tot un sistema de xifrat de disc considerat robust pot ser compromès mitjançant vectors indirectes en la cadena d’arrencada i recuperació. Subratlla la necessitat d’una defensa en profunditat que integri no només la criptografia, sinó també la protecció i la integritat dels entorns d’arrencada i restauració.

Passkeys phishables — Atacs per superposició a DEF CON 33

A DEF CON 33, una demostració independent va mostrar que les passkeys sincronitzades — sovint presentades com a «resistents al phishing» — poden ser exfiltrades silenciosament utilitzant una simple superposició + redirecció. A diferència del clickjacking d’extensions basat en DOM, aquest vector no requereix cap injecció al DOM: abusa de la confiança en la interfície i dels marcs renderitzats pel navegador per enganyar usuaris i capturar credencials sincronitzades.

Com funciona l’atac per superposició (resum)

  • Superposició / redirecció: es mostra un marc o una superposició d’autenticació fals que imita una pàgina de login legítima.
  • Abús de la confiança del navegador: la UI sembla vàlida, així que els usuaris aproven accions o prompts que alliberen passkeys sincronitzades.
  • Exportació sincronitzada: un cop l’atacant accedeix al gestor o al flux sincronitzat, les passkeys i credencials sincronitzades poden ser exportades i reutilitzades.

Sincronitzades vs lligades al dispositiu — diferència clau

  • Passkeys sincronitzades: emmagatzemades i replicades via núvol/gestor — còmode però punt únic de fallada i susceptible a atacs d’usurpació d’interfície.
  • Passkeys lligades al dispositiu: emmagatzemades en un element segur del dispositiu (hardware) i mai no surten del dispositiu — no són exportables pel núvol i resulten molt més resistents als atacs per superposició.

Proves i evidència

Conseqüència estratègica: la forja d’UI demostra que la “resistència al phishing” depèn del model d’emmagatzematge i confiança. Les passkeys sincronitzades són phisbles; les emmagatzemades en elements segurs del dispositiu romanen el millor recurs. Això reforça la doctrina Zero-DOM + hardware sobirà.

Passkeys phishables @ DEF CON 33 — Atribució i nota tècnica

Investigador principal: Dr. Chad Spensky (Allthenticate)
Coautors tècnics: Shourya Pratap Singh, Daniel Seetoh, Jonathan (Jonny) Lin — Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself (DEF CON 33)
Contribuïdors reconeguts: Shortman, Masrt, sails, commandz, thelatesthuman, malarum (slide d’introducció)

Referències:

Concepte clau: La forja d’UI pot exfiltrar passkeys sincronitzades sense tocar el DOM. Reforça la necessitat de validar fora del navegador (Zero-DOM + validació sobirana fora de navegador).

Senyal estratègic DEF CON 33

DEF CON 33 va cristal·litzar un canvi de supòsits sobre la seguretat del navegador. A continuació, les conclusions concises i orientades a l’acció:

  • Els navegadors no són zones de confiança fiables. No tracteu el DOM com un espai segur per secrets.
  • Passkeys sincronitzades i secrets injectats al DOM són phisbles. Les tècniques d’overlay poden vèncer credencials sincronitzades.
  • Les respostes dels venedors són desiguals; escasses correccions estructurals. Els pegats UI són útils però insuficients.
  • Prioritzeu enfocaments hardware Zero-DOM. Fluxos offline i ancoratges hardware redueixen l’exposició i han d’aparèixer als roadmaps.

Resum

En comptes d’acontentar-se amb pegats cosmètics, les organitzacions han de planificar canvis doctrinals: tractar com a sospitosos els secrets que toquen el DOM i accelerar l’adopció de mitigacions Zero-DOM basades en hardware als productes i polítiques.

Contramesures sobiranes (Zero DOM)

Els pegats de venedors redueixen el risc immediat però no eliminen la causa arrel: els secrets que flueixen pel DOM. Zero-DOM significa que els secrets no han de residir, transitar ni dependre del navegador. La defensa duradora és arquitectònica: mantenir credencials, TOTP, passkeys i claus privades dins d’hardware offline i exposar-les breument només en RAM volàtil quan s’activa explícitament.

"Diagrama

En disseny Zero-DOM, els secrets s’emmagatzemen en HSMs offline i s’alliberen només després d’una acció física (NFC, HID pair, confirmació local). La desxifració es produeix en RAM volàtil el temps mínim necessari; res no queda en clar al DOM ni al disc.

Operació sobirana: NFC HSM, HID-BLE i HSM-PGP

NFC HSM ↔ Android ↔ Navegador:
L’usuari presenta físicament el NFC HSM davant d’un dispositiu Android amb NFC. L’app corroborarà la sol·licitud de l’host, activarà el mòdul i transmetrà el secret xifrat a l’host. La desxifració només passa en RAM volàtil; el navegador mai té el secret en clar.

NFC HSM ↔ HID-BLE:
Quan està emparellat amb un emulador HID Bluetooth, el sistema escriu credencials directament al camp objectiu per un canal BLE xifrat AES-128-CBC, evitant clipboard, keyloggers i exposició DOM.

Activació local HSM-PGP:
En escriptori, un contenidor HSM-PGP (AES-256-CBC PGP) es desxifra localment en RAM amb una acció d’usuari; la injecció no travessa el DOM i s’esborra immediatament després d’uso.

Aquesta arquitectua elimina la superfície d’injecció en lloc de parchejar-la: sense servidor central, sense contrasenya mestra a extreure i sense text clar persistent al navegador. Les implementacions han d’incloure comprovacions d’URL sandboxed, finestres efímeres de memòria i registres auditable d’activacions per verificar cada operació d’autoemplenament.

⮞ Resum

Zero-DOM és una defensa estructural: manteniu secrets en hardware, exigiu activació física, desxifreu només en RAM i bloquegeu qualsevol injecció o exfiltració basada en DOM.

PassCypher HSM PGP — Tecnologia Zero-DOM (patentada des de 2015)

Abans de la descoberta pública de DOM extension clickjacking a DEF CON 33, Freemindtronic ja havia adoptat una alternativa arquitectònica: des del 2015 apliquem el principi de no portar mai secrets pel DOM. Aquesta doctrina és la base de l’arquitectura Zero-DOM patentada de PassCypher, que emmagatzema credencials, TOTP/HOTP i claus criptogràfiques en contenidors HSM hardware — mai injectades en un entorn manipulable.

Un avenç en gestors de contrasenyes

  • Zero-DOM natiu — cap dada sensible toca el navegador.
  • HSM-PGP integrat — contenidors xifrats (AES-256-CBC PGP) amb segmentació de claus patentada.
  • Autonomia sobirana — sense servidor, sense base de dades, sense dependències al núvol.

Protecció reforçada BITB

Des del 2020 PassCypher HSM PGP integra EviBITB, un motor que detecta i neutralitza en temps real iframes i overlays maliciosos (Browser-in-the-Browser). Opera serverless i pot funcionar en modes manual, semi-automàtic o automàtic, millorant notablement la resistència contra atacs BITB i clickjacking d’extensions.

EviBITB integrat a PassCypher HSM PGP: detecció i mitigació d'iFrames i overlays de redirecció
EviBITB integrat a PassCypher HSM PGP: detecció i mitigació d’iFrames i overlays de redirecció per reduir el risc BITB i el clickjacking d’extensions DOM.

Implementació immediata

L’usuari no necessita configuracions complexes: instal·leu l’extensió PassCypher HSM PGP des del Chrome Web Store o l’add-on d’Edge, activeu l’opció BITB i obtindreu protecció Zero-DOM sobirana.

Característiques clau

  • Autoemplenament blindat — sempre via sandbox URL, mai en clar dins el navegador.
  • EviBITB integrat — destrucció d’iframes i overlays maliciosos en temps real (manual / semi / automàtic).
  • Eines criptogràfiques — generació i gestió de claus segmentades (AES-256 + PGP).
  • Compatibilitat — funciona amb qualsevol web mitjançant l’extensió; no requereix plugins addicionals.
  • Arquitectura sobirana — zero servidor, zero base de dades, zero DOM.

⮞ Resum

PassCypher HSM PGP re-defineix la gestió de secrets: contenidors permanentment xifrats, desxifrat efímer en RAM, autoemplenament via sandbox URL i protecció anti-BITB. És una solució hardware orientada a resistir les amenaces actuals i a preparar la transició cap a resiliència quàntica.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Gestor passwordless sobirà

Els gestors de programari cauen amb un sol iframe; PassCypher NFC HSM evita que les credencials transitin pel DOM. El nano-HSM les manté xifrades offline i l’alliberament només es produeix un instant en RAM per autenticar.

Funcionament a l’usuari:

  • Secrets intocables — el NFC HSM encripta i emmagatzema credencials sense exposar-les.
  • TOTP/HOTP — l’app Android o PassCypher HSM PGP genera i mostra codis al moment.
  • Entrada manual — l’usuari introdueix PIN o TOTP al camp; l’app mostra el codi generat pel HSM.
  • autoemplenament contactless — presentant el mòdul NFC l’usuari executa autoemplenament de manera segura i fora del DOM.
  • autoemplenament d’escriptori — PassCypher HSM PGP permet completar camps amb un clic i validacions opcionales.
  • Anti-BITB distribuït — l’enllaç NFC ↔ Android ↔ navegador activa EviBITB per destruir iframes maliciosos en temps real.
  • Mode HID BLE — un emulador Bluetooth HID injecta credencials fora del DOM, bloquejant atacs DOM i keyloggers.

⮞ Resum

PassCypher NFC HSM encarna Zero Trust (cada acció requereix validació física) i Zero Knowledge (cap secret s’exposa). Per disseny, neutralitza clickjacking, BITB, typosquatting, keylogging, IDN spoofing, injeccions DOM, clipboard hijacking i extensions malicioses, i anticipa atacs quàntics.

✪ Atacs neutralitzats per PassCypher NFC HSM

Tipus d’atac Descripció Estat amb PassCypher
Clickjacking / UI redressing Iframes invisibles o overlays que secweisen clics Neutralitzat (EviBITB)
BITB Marcs falsos que simulen finestres de login Neutralitzat (sandbox + enllaç)
Keylogging Captura de pulsacions Neutralitzat (HID BLE)
Typosquatting URLs lookalike Neutralitzat (validació física)
DOM Injection / DOM XSS Scripts maliciosos al DOM Neutralitzat (arquitectura out-of-DOM)
Clipboard Hijacking Intercepció del clipboard Neutralitzat (sense ús clipboard)
Malicious Extensions Plugins maliciosos Neutralitzat (pairing + sandbox)
Atacs quàntics (anticipats) Trencament massiu de claus Mitigat (segmentació de claus + AES-256 CBC + PGP)
[/row]

SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Injecció segura dels wallets

Les extensions de moneder prosperen en el DOM i els atacants exploten aquesta feblesa. Amb SeedNFC HSM, la lògica canvia: l’enclau mai allibera claus privades o seed phrases. Durant la inicialització o restauració d’un moneder, el sistema usa emulació Bluetooth HID — com un teclat hardware — sense clipboard, sense DOM i sense rastre per a claus privades o credencials.

Flux operatiu (anti-DOM, anti-clipboard):

  • Custòdia — SeedNFC HSM xifra i emmagatzema la seed/cla privada (mai l’exporta).
  • Activació física — l’usuari autoritza contactless via l’app Android NFC.
  • Injecció HID BLE — el sistema tecleja la seed o el fragment necessari directament al camp del moneder, fora del DOM i del clipboard.
  • Protecció BITB — l’usuari pot activar EviBITB dins l’app per neutralitzar overlays maliciosos durant l’onboarding o recuperació.
  • Efemeritat — la RAM conté temporalment les dades durant l’entrada HID i s’esborra immediatament.

Casos d’ús típics

  • Onboarding o recuperació de moneders (MetaMask, Phantom) sense exposar la clau al navegador.
  • Operacions sensibles a escriptori amb validació física per part de l’usuari via NFC.
  • Còpia de seguretat offline multi-actiu: HSM emmagatzema seed phrases i claus mestres per reutilització sense exportació.

⮞ Resum

SeedNFC HSM amb HID BLE injecta claus directament via emulador HID BLE, evitant teclat i clipboard. El canal xifra amb AES-128 CBC i l’activació física del mòdul assegura un procés verificable i segur. A més, es pot activar protecció anti-BITB per neutralitzar overlays.

Escenaris d’explotació i vies de mitigació

Les revelacions de DEF CON 33 són una alerta; les amenaces evolucionaran més enllà dels pegats. Cal vigilar els següents escenaris:

  • Clickjacking impulsat per IA: LLMs generaran overlays i trampes Shadow DOM en temps real, fent phishing + DOM hijack a gran escala.
  • Tapjacking híbrid mòbil: piles d’aplicacions, gestos invisibles i interaccions en segon pla per validar transaccions o exfiltrar OTPs a mòbil.
  • HSMs post-quàntics: la mitigació a llarg termini requerirà ancoratges hardware i gestió de claus resistent a ordinadors quàntics — moure el límit de seguretat cap a HSMs certificats i fora del navegador.

⮞ Resum

Els atacants futurs evitaran els pegats del navegador; la mitigació exigeix una ruptura: ancoratges hardware offline, planificació HSM post-quàntic i dissenys Zero-DOM en comptes de pegats de programari.

 

Síntesi estratègica

DOM extension clickjacking demostra que navegadors i extensions no són entorns d’execució de confiança per secrets. Els pegats redueixen risc però no eliminen l’exposició estructural.

Camí sobirà — tres prioritats

  • Governança: tractar extensions i motors d’autoemplenament com infraestructura crítica — controls de desenvolupament estrictes, auditories obligatòries i normes de divulgació d’incidents.
  • Canvi arquitectònic: adoptar dissenys Zero-DOM perquè els secrets no transitin pel navegador; exigir activació física per operacions d’alt valor.
  • Resiliència hardware: invertir en ancoratges hardware i en fulls de ruta HSM post-quàntics per eliminar punts únics de fallada en models cloud/sync.

Doctrina — concisa

  • Considerar qualsevol secret que toqui el DOM com potencialment compromès.
  • Preferir activació física (NFC, HID BLE, HSM) per operacions d’alt valor.
  • Auditar i regular la lògica d’injecció d’extensions com a funció crítica de seguretat.
Nota reguladora — marcs existents (CRA, NIS2, marcs nacionals) milloren la resiliència del programari però rarament aborden secrets integrats al DOM. Els responsables polítics han de tancar aquest punt cec exigint separació provable entre UI i fluxos de secrets.

Glossari

  • DOM (Document Object Model): estructura interna de la pàgina al navegador.
  • Clickjacking: tècnica que enganya l’usuari perquè faci clic en elements ocults o disfressats.
  • Shadow DOM: subarbre encapsulat que aïlla components.
  • Zero-DOM: arquitectura de seguretat on els secrets mai toquen el DOM, eliminant el risc d’injecció.
🔥 En resum: els pegats al núvol ajuden, però l’hardware i les arquitectures Zero-DOM eviten falles de classe.

⮞ Nota — Què no cobreix aquesta crònica:

Aquesta anàlisi no proporciona PoC explotables ni tutorials pas a pas per reproduir DOM clickjacking o passkey phishing. Tampoc analitza l’economia de les criptomonedes ni casos legals específics més enllà d’un punt de vista estratègic de seguretat.

L’objectiu és explicar falles estructurals, quantificar riscos sistèmics i traçar contramesures Zero-DOM basades en hardware. Per detalls d’implementació, consulteu §Sovereign Countermeasures i les subseccions de producte.

Clickjacking des extensions DOM : DEF CON 33 révèle 11 gestionnaires vulnérables

Affiche cyberpunk illustrant DOM Based Extension Clickjacking présenté au DEF CON 33 avec extraction de secrets du navigateur

Clickjacking d’extensions DOM : DEF CON 33 révèle une faille critique et les contre-mesures Zero-DOM

Résumé express — Clickjacking d’extensions DOM

Situation (snapshot — 17 Sep 2025) : à DEF CON 33, des démonstrations en direct ont mis en évidence des attaques de DOM-based extension clickjacking et d’overlays (BITB) capables d’exfiltrer identifiants, codes TOTP, passkeys synchronisées et clés crypto depuis des extensions et wallets. Les tests initiaux ont estimé ≈40 M d’installations exposées. Plusieurs éditeurs ont publié des atténuations en août-sept. 2025 (ex. Bitwarden, Dashlane, Enpass, NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm) ; d’autres restent signalés vulnérables (1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords, KeePassXC-Browser). Voir le tableau de statut pour le détail par produit. Impact : systémique — tout secret qui touche le DOM peut être exfiltré de manière furtive ; les overlays BITB rendent les passkeys synchronisées « phishables ».

Recommandation : migrer vers des flux matériels Zero-DOM (HSM / NFC) ou ré-ingénierie structurelle des moteurs d’injection. Voir §Contre-mesures Souveraines.

Chronique à lire

Temps de lecture estimé : 37–39 minutes
Date de mise à jour : 2025-09-11
Niveau de complexité : Avancé / Expert
Spécificité linguistique : Lexique souverain — densité technique élevée
Langues disponibles : CAT ·EN ·ES ·FR
Accessibilité : Optimisé pour lecteurs d’écran — ancres sémantiques incluses
Type éditorial : Chronique stratégique
À propos de l’auteur : Jacques Gascuel, inventeur et fondateur de Freemindtronic®. Spécialiste des technologies de sécurité souveraines, il conçoit et brevète des systèmes matériels pour la protection des données, la souveraineté cryptographique et les communications sécurisées.

🚨 DEF CON 33 — Points clés

  • Deux démonstrations en direct : clickjacking d’extensions DOM (gestionnaires/wallets) et passkeys phishables (overlay).
  • ≈11 gestionnaires testés ; impact initial estimé ≈40M d’installations exposées.
  • Direction des atténuations : correctifs UI rapides vs. rares solutions structurelles Zero-DOM.
  • Voir la table de statut et §Contre-mesures souveraines pour le détail.

Il vous reste 3 minutes : lisez le passage clé où DEF CON 33 dévoile le clickjacking d’extensions.

Infographie illustrant l’anatomie d’un clickjacking d’extensions basé sur le DOM : page malveillante, iframe invisible, autofill piégé et exfiltration des secrets vers l’attaquant.

Point d’inflexion : DEF CON 33 dévoile le clickjacking d’extensions

⚡ La découverte

Las Vegas, début août 2025. DEF CON 33 envahit le Las Vegas Convention Center. Entre dômes de hackers, villages IoT, Adversary Village et compétitions CTF, l’ambiance est électrisée. Sur scène, Marek Tóth branche son laptop, lance la démo et appuie sur Entrée. Instantanément, l’attaque vedette apparaît : le clickjacking d’extensions DOM. Facile à coder et dévastateur à exécuter, il repose sur une page piégée, des iframes invisibles et un appel focus() malveillant. Ces éléments trompent les gestionnaires d’autofill qui vident identifiants, codes TOTP et passkeys dans un formulaire fantôme. Le clickjacking d’extensions DOM s’impose donc comme une menace structurelle.

⧉ Seconde démonstration — Passkeys phishables (overlay)

Lors de DEF CON 33, Allthenticate a montré que des passkeys synchronisées peuvent aussi être phishingées via un simple overlay et une redirection — sans injection DOM. Nous traitons les implications complètes dans la section dédiée Passkeys phishables et dans Attribution & sources. À noter également : DEF CON 33 et Black Hat 2025 ont mis en lumière une autre démonstration critique — BitUnlocker — ciblant BitLocker via WinRE (voir §BitUnlocker).

⚠ Message stratégique — risques systémiques

Avec deux démonstrations — l’une visant les gestionnaires/wallets, l’autre ciblant les passkeys — deux piliers de la cybersécurité vacillent. Le constat est net : tant que vos secrets résident dans le DOM, ils restent attaquables. Et tant que la cybersécurité repose sur le navigateur et le cloud, un simple clic peut tout renverser. Comme le rappelle OWASP, le clickjacking est une menace ancienne — mais ici c’est la couche extension qui se révèle fragile.

⎔ L’alternative souveraine — Contre-mesures Zero-DOM

Saviez-vous qu’une alternative existe depuis plus de dix ans — une approche qui évite totalement le DOM du navigateur ? Grâce à PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM et SeedNFC pour la sauvegarde matérielle des clés cryptographiques, vos identifiants, mots de passe, codes TOTP/HOTP et clés privées restent chiffrés dans des HSM hors ligne et ne sont jamais exposés au DOM. Ce n’est pas une rustine : c’est une architecture souveraine propriétaire, décentralisée — sans serveur, sans base de données centrale et sans mot de passe maître — qui fonctionne hors ligne. Elle libère la gestion des secrets des dépendances techniques, d’hébergement et des obligations juridiques liées aux services centralisés (synchronisation cloud, FIDO/WebAuthn, gestionnaires de mots de passe), tout en offrant une protection native contre le clickjacking d’extensions et les attaques BITB.

Merci d’avoir pris le temps de lire ce résumé. — On dit souvent que « le diable se cache dans les détails » : c’est précisément ce que je vous propose de découvrir dans la chronique complète. Vous voulez tout savoir sur le clickjacking d’extensions DOM, les passkeys phishables, l’attaque BitUnlocker ainsi que les contre-mesures Zero-DOM et anti-overlay capables de protéger vos secrets ? ➜ Lisez la suite.

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En cybersécurité souveraine Cette chronique fait partie de la rubrique Digital Security, tournée vers les exploits, vulnérabilités systémiques et contre-mesures matérielles zero-trust.

Qu’est-ce que le clickjacking d’extensions basé sur le DOM ?

Le DOM-based extension clickjacking détourne une extension (gestionnaire de mots de passe ou wallet) en abusant du Document Object Model du navigateur. Une page trompeuse enchaîne iframes invisibles, Shadow DOM et un appel focus() malveillant pour déclencher l’autofill dans un formulaire invisible. L’extension « pense » être sur le bon champ et y déverse des secrets — identifiants, codes TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, voire clés privées. Parce que ces secrets touchent le DOM, ils peuvent être exfiltrés silencieusement.

⮞ Perspicacité doctrinale : Le DOM-based extension clickjacking n’est pas un bug ponctuel — c’est un défaut de conception. Toute extension qui injecte des secrets dans un DOM manipulable est vulnérable par nature. Seules des architectures Zero-DOM (séparation structurelle, HSM/NFC, injection hors-navigateur) éliminent cette surface d’attaque.

Quel est le niveau de dangerosité ?

Ce vecteur n’est pas une variante mineure : il exploite la logique même de l’autofill et agit à l’insu de l’utilisateur. L’attaquant ne se contente pas de superposer un élément ; il force l’extension à remplir un faux formulaire comme si de rien n’était, rendant l’exfiltration indétectable par une observation superficielle.

Déroulé type de l’attaque

  1. Préparation — la page malveillante intègre une iframe invisible et un Shadow DOM qui camoufle le vrai contexte ; des champs sont rendus non visibles (opacity:0, pointer-events:none).
  2. Appât — la victime clique sur un élément anodin ; des redirections et un focus() malveillant redirigent l’événement vers un champ contrôlé par l’attaquant.
  3. Exfiltration — l’extension croit interagir avec un champ légitime et injecte automatiquement identifiants, TOTP, passkeys ou clés privées dans le DOM factice ; les données sont aussitôt exfiltrées.

Cette mécanique trompe les indices visuels, contourne des protections classiques (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, frame-ancestors) et transforme l’autofill en un canal d’exfiltration invisible. Les overlays de type Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) ou les manipulations de Shadow DOM aggravent encore le risque, rendant les passkeys synchronisées et les credentials phishables.

⮞ Résumé

Le clickjacking d’extensions combine iframes invisibles, manipulation du Shadow DOM et redirections via focus() pour détourner les extensions d’autofill. Les secrets sont injectés dans un formulaire fantôme, offrant à l’attaquant un accès direct aux données sensibles (identifiants, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys, clés privées). Moralité : tant que les secrets transitent par le DOM, la surface d’attaque reste ouverte.

Historique du Clickjacking (2002–2025)

Le clickjacking est devenu le parasite persistant du web moderne. Le terme apparaît au début des années 2000, lorsque Jeremiah Grossman et Robert Hansen décrivent la tromperie consistant à pousser un internaute à cliquer sur quelque chose qu’il ne voit pas réellement. Une illusion appliquée au code, vite devenue une technique d’attaque incontournable (OWASP).

  • 2002–2008 : émergence du “UI redressing” : calques HTML + iframes transparentes piégeant l’utilisateur (Hansen Archive).
  • 2009 : Facebook victime du Likejacking (OWASP).
  • 2010 : apparition du Cursorjacking : décalage du pointeur pour tromper le clic (OWASP).
  • 2012–2015 : exploitation via iframes, publicité et malvertising (MITRE CVE).
  • 2016–2019 : le tapjacking sévit sur mobile (Android Security Bulletin).
  • 2020–2024 : montée du “hybrid clickjacking” mêlant XSS et phishing (OWASP WSTG).
  • 2025 : à DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth dévoile un nouveau palier : DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking. Cette fois, ce ne sont plus seulement les sites web mais les extensions navigateur (gestionnaires, wallets) qui injectent des formulaires invisibles.

❓Depuis combien de temps étiez-vous exposés ?

Le clickjacking et les iframes invisibles sont connus depuis des années ; l’utilisation du Shadow DOM n’est pas nouvelle. Les révélations de DEF CON 33 exposent un motif de conception vieux d’une décennie : les extensions qui font confiance au DOM pour injecter des secrets sont vulnérables par construction.

Synthèse : En 20 ans, le clickjacking est passé d’une astuce visuelle à un sabotage systémique des gestionnaires d’identité. DEF CON 33 marque un point de rupture : la menace n’est plus seulement le site web, mais le cœur des extensions et de l’autofill.

Gestionnaires vulnérables & divulgation CVE (instantané — 17 sept. 2025)

Mise à jour : 17 septembre 2025 Suite aux démonstrations de Marek Tóth à DEF CON 33, plusieurs problèmes de clickjacking d’extensions DOM ont été soumis pour attribution CVE. L’activité de patch s’est accélérée en août–sept. 2025, mais les réponses éditeurs restent hétérogènes. Le tableau ci-dessous résume l’état des éditeurs (identifiants / TOTP / passkeys et statut de patch). Pour la méthodologie et les détails de test, voir §Technologies de correction et les notes de version liées.

Gestionnaire Identifiants TOTP Passkeys Statut Patch / note officielle
1Password Oui Oui Oui Vulnérable (signalé)
Bitwarden Oui Oui Partiel Corrigé (v2025.8.2) Release
Dashlane Oui Oui Oui Corrigé Advisory
LastPass Oui Oui Oui Vulnérable (signalé)
Enpass Oui Oui Oui Corrigé (v6.11.6) Release
iCloud Passwords Oui Non Oui Vulnérable (en examen)
LogMeOnce Oui Non Oui Corrigé (v7.12.7) Release
NordPass Oui Oui Partiel Corrigé (atténuations) Release
ProtonPass Oui Oui Partiel Corrigé (atténuations) Releases
RoboForm Oui Oui Oui Corrigé Update
Keeper Partiel Non Non Patch partiel (v17.2.0) Release

⮞ Conclusion clé :

Même avec des atténuations rapides, le problème persiste : tant que des identifiants et autres secrets transitent par le DOM, ils restent exposés aux variantes de clickjacking. Les solutions Zero-DOM (PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, SeedNFC) suppriment la surface d’attaque en garantissant que les secrets ne quittent jamais leur conteneur chiffré. Zero-DOM = zéro surface d’attaque.

Note : instantané. Pour versions par produit, notes de version et identifiants CVE, consultez le tableau et les pages officielles des éditeurs.

Technologies de correction mises en œuvre

Depuis la divulgation publique du DOM Extension Clickjacking à DEF CON 33, des éditeurs ont publié des correctifs. Toutefois ces correctifs restent inégaux et se limitent souvent à des ajustements d’UI ou des vérifications contextuelles. Aucun fournisseur n’a jusqu’ici refondu le moteur d’injection.

Avant d’examiner les méthodes, voici une vue d’ensemble visuelle des principales technologies déployées : du pansement cosmétique aux solutions souveraines Zero-DOM.

Infographie des défenses contre le clickjacking DOM : X-Frame-Options, CSP, retards d’autofill, boîtes de dialogue flottantes
Quatre technologies de défense contre le clickjacking DOM : politiques de sécurité, délais d’injection, et isolation de l’interface. Lisez l’article complet →

Objectif

Expliquer comment les éditeurs ont tenté de corriger la faille, distinguer patchs cosmétiques et corrections structurelles, et mettre en lumière les approches souveraines Zero-DOM hardware.

Méthodes observées (août 2025)

Méthode Description Gestionnaires concernés
Restriction d’autofill Passage en mode « on-click » ou désactivation par défaut Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper
Filtrage de sous-domaines Blocage sur sous-domaines non explicitement autorisés ProtonPass, RoboForm
Détection Shadow DOM Refus d’injection si le champ est encapsulé dans un Shadow DOM NordPass, Enpass
Isolation contextuelle Contrôles avant injection (iframe, opacité, focus) Bitwarden, ProtonPass
Matériel souverain (Zero-DOM) Aucun secret ne transite par le DOM : NFC HSM, HSM PGP, SeedNFC PassCypher, EviKey, SeedNFC (non vulnérables par design)

📉 Limites observées

  • Les patchs ne changent pas le moteur d’injection, ils en limitent seulement le déclenchement.
  • Aucune séparation structurelle interface ↔ flux de secrets.
  • Tant que l’injection reste liée au DOM, de nouvelles variantes de clickjacking demeurent possibles.
⮞ Transition stratégique Ces correctifs réagissent aux symptômes sans traiter la cause. Pour distinguer la rustine de la refonte doctrinale, poursuivez avec l’analyse ci-dessous.

Technologies de correction — Analyse technique & doctrinale

Constat Le clickjacking d’extensions DOM n’est pas un bug ponctuel mais une erreur de conception : injecter des secrets dans un DOM manipulable sans séparation structurelle ni contrôle contextuel robuste rend l’architecture vulnérable.

Ce que les correctifs actuels n’adressent pas

  • Aucun éditeur n’a reconstruit son moteur d’injection.
  • Les correctifs limitent l’activation (désactivation, filtrage, détection partielle) plutôt que de changer le modèle d’injection.

Ce qu’exigerait une correction structurelle

  • Supprimer la dépendance au DOM pour l’injection de secrets.
  • Isoler le moteur d’injection hors du navigateur (matériel ou processus sécurisé séparé).
  • Imposer une authentification matérielle (NFC, PGP, enclave) et une validation physique explicite.
  • Interdire toute interaction avec des champs invisibles/encapsulés par défaut.

Typologie des correctifs

Niveau Type Description
Cosmétique UI/UX, autofill désactivé par défaut Ne modifie pas la logique d’injection, uniquement son déclencheur
Contextuel Filtrage DOM, Shadow DOM, sous-domaines Ajoute des conditions, mais reste prisonnier du DOM
Structurel Zero-DOM, matériel (PGP, NFC, HSM) Élimine l’usage du DOM pour les secrets, sépare UI et flux sensibles

Tests doctrinaux pour vérifier un correctif

  • Injecter un champ invisible (opacity:0) dans une iframe et observer le comportement d’injection.
  • Simuler un Shadow DOM encapsulé et vérifier si l’extension injecte malgré tout.
  • Vérifier si l’action d’autofill est tracée/auditable ou correctement bloquée en cas de mismatch de contexte.

Absence de norme industrielle

Aucune norme (NIST/OWASP/ISO) n’encadre aujourd’hui : (1) la logique d’injection des extensions, (2) la séparation UI ↔ flux de secrets, (3) la traçabilité des auto-remplissages.

⮞ Conclusion Les correctifs actuels sont majoritairement des pansements. La solution durable est architecturale : retirer les secrets du DOM via des patterns Zero-DOM et une isolation matérielle (HSM/NFC/PGP).

Risques systémiques & vecteurs d’exploitation

Le DOM-based extension clickjacking n’est pas un bug isolé : c’est une faille systémique. Lorsqu’un flux d’injection d’extension est compromis, l’impact dépasse le simple mot de passe volé : il peut entraîner une cascade d’effets sur l’authentification et l’infrastructure.

Scénarios critiques

  • Accès persistant — un TOTP cloné permet d’enregistrer un appareil « de confiance » et de maintenir l’accès après réinitialisation.
  • Rejeu de passkeys — une passkey exfiltrée peut servir de jeton réutilisable hors de tout contrôle.
  • Compromission SSO — fuite de tokens OAuth/SAML via une extension entreprise = brèche SI complète.
  • Chaîne d’approvisionnement — extensions faibles ou malveillantes deviennent une surface d’attaque structurelle pour les navigateurs.
  • Vol d’actifs crypto — les wallets qui s’appuient sur l’injection DOM peuvent fuir seed phrases ou clés privées, ou signer des transactions malveillantes.

⮞ Résumé

Les conséquences vont au-delà du vol de credentials : TOTP clonés, passkeys rejouées, tokens SSO compromis et seed phrases exfiltrées sont des résultats réalistes. Tant que des secrets transitent par le DOM, ils restent un vecteur d’exfiltration.

Comparatif de menace souverain

Attaque Cible Secrets Contre-mesure souveraine
ToolShell RCE SharePoint / OAuth Certificats SSL, tokens SSO Stockage + signature hors-DOM (HSM/PGP)
eSIM hijack Identité mobile Profils opérateurs Ancrage matériel (SeedNFC)
DOM clickjacking Extensions navigateur Credentials, TOTP, passkeys Zero-DOM + HSM / sandboxed autofill
Crypto-wallet hijack Extensions wallets Clés privées, seed phrases Injection HID/NFC depuis HSM (pas de DOM ni clipboard)
Atomic Stealer Presse-papier macOS Clés PGP, wallets Canaux chiffrés + HSM → injection hors-clipboard

Le clickjacking d’extensions DOM révèle ainsi la fragilité des modèles de confiance logicielle.

Exposition régionale & impact linguistique — sphère francophone

Le clickjacking d’extensions DOM frappe différemment selon les régions. Ci-dessous l’exposition estimée des populations francophones en Europe et dans la francophonie globale, là où les risques numériques sont concentrés et où les réponses souveraines doivent être priorisées.

Exposition estimée — Aire francophone (août 2025)

Zone Population francophone % en Europe Contre-mesures disponibles
Francophonie mondiale (OIF) ≈321 millions PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM, SeedNFC (docs FR)
Europe (UE + Europe entière) ≈210 millions ~20 % de l’UE PassCypher HSM PGP (compatible RGPD, ANSSI)
France (locuteurs natifs) ≈64 millions ≈95 % de la population PassCypher HSM PGP (version FR)

⮞ Lecture stratégique

Les populations francophones en Europe constituent une cible prioritaire : entre ≈210M en Europe et ≈321M dans le monde, une part significative est exposée. En France (~64M locuteurs), l’enjeu est national. Seules des contre-mesures Zero-DOM souveraines — PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM, SeedNFC (docs FR) — garantissent une défense indépendante et résiliente.

Sources : OIF, données Europe, WorldData.

Extensions crypto-wallets exposées

Les gestionnaires de mots de passe ne sont pas les seuls à tomber : les wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet) reposent souvent sur l’injection DOM pour afficher ou signer des transactions. Un overlay bien placé ou une iframe invisible peut amener l’utilisateur à croire qu’il valide une opération légitime alors qu’il signe un virement malveillant ou révèle sa seed phrase.

Implication directe : contrairement aux credentials, ici il s’agit d’actifs financiers immédiats. Des milliards de dollars reposent sur ces extensions. Le DOM devient donc un vecteur d’exfiltration monétaire.

⮞ Résumé

Les extensions wallets qui réutilisent le DOM s’exposent aux mêmes failles : seed phrases, clés privées et signatures de transactions peuvent être interceptées via redressing DOM.

Contre-mesure souveraine : SeedNFC HSM — sauvegarde matérielle des clés privées et seed phrases, hors DOM, avec injection sécurisée NFC↔HID BLE. Les clés ne quittent jamais le HSM ; l’utilisateur active physiquement chaque opération : le redressing DOM devient inopérant. En complément, PassCypher HSM PGP et PassCypher NFC HSM protègent OTP et credentials, évitant la compromission latérale.

Sandbox navigateur faillible & attaques BITB

Les navigateurs présentent leur sandbox comme un rempart, pourtant le DOM-based extension clickjacking et le Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) démontrent le contraire. Un simple overlay et un faux cadre d’authentification suffisent à tromper l’utilisateur : il croit interagir avec Google, Microsoft ou sa banque alors qu’il livre ses secrets à une page frauduleuse. Même frame-ancestors ou certaines règles CSP ne suffisent pas toujours à empêcher ces forgeries d’interface.

C’est ici que les technologies souveraines modifient la donne. Avec EviBITB (IRDR), Freemindtronic intègre dans PassCypher HSM PGP un moteur de détection et destruction d’iframes de redirection, capable de neutraliser en temps réel les tentatives de BITB. Activable en un clic, utilisable en mode manual, semi-automatique ou automatique, il fonctionne sans serveur, sans base de données et agit instantanément. (explications · guide détaillé)

La clé de voûte reste le sandbox URL. Chaque identifiant ou clé est lié à une URL de référence stockée chiffrée dans le HSM. Lorsqu’une page tente un autofill, l’URL active est comparée à celle du HSM. En cas de non-correspondance, aucune donnée n’est injectée. Ainsi, même si un iframe franchit des contrôles visuels, le sandbox URL bloque l’exfiltration.

Cette double barrière s’étend aux usages desktop via l’appairage sécurisé NFC entre un smartphone Android NFC et l’application Freemindtronic intégrant PassCypher NFC HSM : les secrets restent chiffrés dans le HSM et ne sont déchiffrés que quelques millisecondes en RAM, juste le temps nécessaire à l’auto-remplissage — sans jamais transiter ni résider dans le DOM.

⮞ Résumé technique (attaque contrée par EviBITB + sandbox URL)

La chaîne d’attaque utilise overlays CSS invisibles (opacity:0, pointer-events:none), iframes et Shadow DOM encapsulé. En enchaînant focus() et suivi du curseur, l’extension est piégée pour autofill dans un formulaire invisible aussitôt exfiltré. Avec EviBITB, ces iframes/overlays sont détruits en temps réel ; parallèlement, le sandbox URL vérifie l’authenticité de la destination par rapport à l’URL chiffrée dans le HSM. Si mismatch → autofill bloqué. Résultat : pas d’injection, pas de fuite. Les secrets restent hors-DOM, y compris en usage desktop via NFC HSM appairé.

Illustration de la protection anti-BitB et anti-clickjacking par EviBITB et Sandbox URL intégrés à PassCypher HSM PGP / NFC HSM
✪ Illustration – Le bouclier EviBITB et le cadenas Sandbox URL empêchent l’exfiltration des identifiants depuis un formulaire piégé par clickjacking.
⮞ Référence pratique Pour une implémentation Zero-DOM pratique et détails produit (outillage anti-iframe, liaison HSM URL et appairage desktop), voir §PassCypher HSM PGP et §Contre-mesures souveraines.

Passkeys phishables — Overlays observés à DEF CON 33

À DEF CON 33, une démonstration indépendante a montré que des passkeys synchronisées — souvent présentées comme « résistantes au phishing » — peuvent être exfiltrées silencieusement via un simple overlay + redirection. Contrairement au DOM-based extension clickjacking, ce vecteur n’exige aucune injection DOM : il abuse de la confiance UI et des frames rendues par le navigateur pour leurrer l’utilisateur et récolter des credentials synchronisés.

Fonctionnement (résumé)

  • Overlay / redirection : un faux cadre d’authentification imitant un portail légitime est affiché.
  • Trust navigateur abusé : l’UI semble légitime ; l’utilisateur approuve des actions/boîtes de dialogue qui libèrent les passkeys synchronisées.
  • Export synchronisé : une fois l’accès obtenu, les passkeys et credentials synchronisés peuvent être exportés et réutilisés.

Synch vs lié à l’appareil — différence clé

  • Passkeys synchronisées : stockées/répliquées via cloud / gestionnaire — pratiques mais point de défaillance unique et phishables par usurpation UI.
  • Passkeys liées à l’appareil : stockées dans un élément sécurisé matériel et ne quittent pas l’appareil — non soumises à l’export cloud, donc beaucoup plus résistantes aux overlays.

Preuves & sources

Conclusion stratégique : l’usurpation d’UI prouve que la « résistance au phishing » dépend du modèle de stockage et de confiance : les passkeys synchronisées via cloud / gestionnaires sont phishables ; les credentials liées au matériel (élément sécurisé) restent l’alternative robuste. Cela renforce la doctrine Zero-DOM + hardware souverain.

BitUnlocker — Attaque sur BitLocker via WinRE

À DEF CON 33 et Black Hat USA 2025, l’équipe STORM a présenté une attaque critique contre BitLocker nommée BitUnlocker. La technique contourne certaines protections de BitLocker en exploitant des faiblesses logiques dans l’environnement de récupération Windows (WinRE).

Vecteurs d’attaque

  • Parsing de boot.sdi — manipulation du processus de chargement
  • ReAgent.xml — modification de la configuration de récupération
  • BCD altéré — exploitation des Boot Configuration Data

Méthodologie

Les chercheurs ont ciblé la chaîne de démarrage et ses composants de récupération pour :

  • Identifier des faiblesses logiques dans WinRE ;
  • Développer des exploits capables d’exfiltrer des secrets BitLocker ;
  • Proposer des contre-mesures pour renforcer BitLocker / WinRE.

Impact stratégique

Cette attaque montre que même des systèmes de chiffrement réputés peuvent être contournés via des vecteurs indirects — ici la chaîne de récupération. Elle souligne la nécessité d’une approche « défense en profondeur » protégeant non seulement les primitives cryptographiques mais aussi l’intégrité du boot/recovery.

Passkeys phishables @ DEF CON 33 — Attribution & note technique

Recherche principale : Dr Chad Spensky (Allthenticate)

Co-auteurs techniques : Shourya Pratap Singh, Daniel Seetoh, Jonathan (Jonny) Lin — Passkeys Pwned: Turning WebAuthn Against Itself (DEF CON 33)

Contributeurs reconnus : Shortman, Masrt, sails, commandz, thelatesthuman, malarum (intro slide)

Références :

Conclusion clé : l’usurpation d’UI par overlay peut exfiltrer des passkeys synchronisées sans toucher le DOM. Doctrine renforcée : Zero-DOM + validation hors-navigateur.

Signaux stratégiques DEF CON 33

DEF CON 33 cristallise un changement d’hypothèses sur la sécurité navigateur. Points d’action :

  • Les navigateurs ne sont plus des zones de confiance. Le DOM n’est pas un sanctuaire des secrets.
  • Passkeys synchronisées & secrets injectés dans le DOM sont phishables.
  • Réponses éditeurs hétérogènes ; correctifs structurels rares.
  • Prioriser les approches Zero-DOM matérielles. Les flux hardware hors-ligne réduisent l’exposition et doivent figurer dans les feuilles de route.

Synthèse

Plutôt que de s’en tenir à des correctifs cosmétiques, planifiez une rupture doctrinale : considérez tout secret touchant le DOM comme compromis et accélérer l’adoption d’atténuations matérielles Zero-DOM.

Contre-mesures souveraines (Zero-DOM)

Les correctifs éditeurs réduisent le risque immédiat mais ne suppriment pas la cause : les secrets qui transitent par le DOM. Zero-DOM signifie que les secrets ne doivent jamais résider, transiter ou dépendre du navigateur. La défense durable est architecturale — garder credentials, TOTP, passkeys et clés privées dans du matériel hors-ligne et ne les exposer qu’éphémèrement en mémoire volatile après activation explicite.

Schéma Zero DOM Flow montrant l’arrêt de l’exfiltration DOM et l’injection sécurisée via HSM PGP / NFC HSM avec Sandbox URL
Zero DOM Flow : les secrets restent en HSM, injection HID en RAM éphémère, exfiltration DOM impossible

Dans une conception Zero-DOM, les secrets sont stockés dans des HSM hors-ligne et ne sont libérés qu’après une action physique explicite (tap NFC, appairage HID, confirmation locale). Le déchiffrement a lieu en RAM volatile pour l’intervalle minimal nécessaire ; rien ne persiste dans le DOM ou sur disque.

Fonctionnement souverain : NFC HSM, HID-BLE et HSM-PGP

NFC HSM ↔ Android ↔ Navigateur : l’utilisateur présente physiquement le NFC HSM à un appareil Android NFC. L’application compagnon vérifie la requête de l’hôte, active le module et transmet le secret chiffré sans contact au poste. Le déchiffrement ne s’effectue qu’en RAM ; le navigateur ne contient jamais le secret en clair.

NFC HSM ↔ HID-BLE : appairé avec un émulateur clavier Bluetooth HID, le système tape les credentials directement dans le champ cible via un canal AES-128-CBC chiffré, évitant clipboard, keyloggers et exposition DOM.

Activation locale HSM-PGP : en local, un conteneur HSM-PGP (AES-256-CBC PGP) se déchiffre dans la RAM sur une action utilisateur unique. Le secret est injecté sans traverser le DOM et effacé immédiatement après usage.

Cette approche supprime la surface d’injection au lieu de la masquer : pas de serveur central, pas de mot de passe maître extractible et pas de cleartext persistant dans le navigateur. Les implémentations doivent combiner sandbox URL, fenêtres mémoire minimales et journaux d’activation auditables.

⮞ Résumé

Zero-DOM est une défense structurelle : garder les secrets dans du matériel, exiger une activation physique, déchiffrer seulement en RAM, et bloquer toute injection/exfiltration basée DOM.

PassCypher HSM PGP — Technologie Zero-DOM brevetée & gestion souveraine des clés anti-phishing

Longtemps avant que le DOM Extension Clickjacking ne soit exposé publiquement à DEF CON 33, Freemindtronic a adopté une autre approche. Depuis 2015, notre R&D suit un principe fondateur : ne jamais utiliser le DOM pour transporter des secrets. Cette doctrine Zero-Trust a produit l’architecture Zero-DOM brevetée de PassCypher HSM PGP, qui maintient identifiants, TOTP/HOTP, passkeys et clés cryptographiques confinés dans des conteneurs HSM matériels — jamais injectés dans un environnement navigateur manipulable.

Un progrès unique pour la gestion des secrets

  • Zero-DOM natif — aucune donnée sensible ne touche le navigateur.
  • HSM-PGP intégré — conteneurs AES-256-CBC chiffrés + protection par segmentation de clés brevetée.
  • Souveraineté opérationnelle — zéro serveur, zéro base centrale, zéro dépendance cloud.

Protection BITB renforcée (EviBITB)

Depuis 2020, PassCypher HSM PGP intègre EviBITB, un moteur serverless neutralisant en temps réel les attaques Browser-in-the-Browser : détection et destruction d’iframes malveillants, identification d’overlays frauduleux et validation anonyme du contexte UI. EviBITB peut fonctionner en mode manuel, semi-automatique ou automatique pour réduire drastiquement le risque BITB et le détournement invisible du DOM.

Interface PassCypher HSM PGP avec EviBITB activé, supprimant automatiquement les iFrames de redirection malveillants
EviBITB embarqué dans PassCypher HSM PGP détecte et détruit en temps réel toutes les iFrames de redirection, neutralisant les attaques BITB et les détournements DOM invisibles.

EviBITB intégré : détection et destruction en temps réel des iFrames et overlays malveillants.

Pourquoi résiste-t-il aux attaques type DEF CON ?

Rien ne transite par le DOM, il n’existe pas de mot de passe maître à extraire et les conteneurs restent chiffrés au repos. La déchiffrement s’opère uniquement en RAM volatile, pour l’instant minimal requis pour assembler des segments de clés ; après l’autofill, tout est effacé sans trace exploitable.

Fonctionnalités clés

  • Auto-remplissage blindé — autofill en un clic via sandbox URL, jamais en clair dans le navigateur.
  • EviBITB embarqué — neutralisation d’iframes/overlays en temps réel (manuel / semi / automatique), 100 % serverless.
  • Outils crypto intégrés — génération et gestion de clés segmentées AES-256 et gestion PGP sans dépendances externes.
  • Compatibilité universelle — fonctionne avec n’importe quel site via logiciel + extension ; pas de plugins additionnels requis.
  • Architecture souveraine — zéro serveur, zéro DB centrale, zéro DOM : résilience par design.

Mise en œuvre immédiate

Aucune configuration complexe : installez l’extension PassCypher HSM PGP (Chrome Web Store / Edge Add-ons), activez l’option BITB et sandbox URL dans les paramètres, et bénéficiez instantanément d’une protection Zero-DOM souveraine.

⮞ En bref

PassCypher HSM PGP redéfinit la gestion des secrets : conteneurs chiffrés en permanence, clés segmentées, déchiffrement éphémère en RAM, Zero-DOM et zéro cloud. Solution matérielle passwordless souveraine conçue pour résister aux menaces actuelles et anticiper l’ère post-quantique.

PassCypher NFC HSM — Gestionnaire passwordless souverain

Quand les gestionnaires logiciels se font piéger par une simple iframe, PassCypher NFC HSM suit une autre voie : vos identifiants et mots de passe ne transitent jamais par le DOM. Ils restent chiffrés dans un nano-HSM hors-ligne et n’apparaissent qu’un instant en RAM volatile — juste le temps strict nécessaire à l’authentification.

Fonctionnement côté utilisateur :

  • Secrets intouchables — stockés et chiffrés dans le NFC HSM, jamais visibles ni extraits.
  • TOTP/HOTP — générés et affichés à la demande via l’application PassCypher NFC HSM (Android) ou sur desktop via PassCypher HSM PGP.
  • Saisie manuelle — l’utilisateur saisit PIN ou TOTP directement ; l’app PassCypher affiche le code généré par le NFC HSM.
  • Auto-remplissage sans contact — présentation du module NFC HSM au smartphone ou ordinateur ; autofill sans contact, même appairé à PassCypher HSM PGP.
  • Auto-remplissage desktop — avec PassCypher HSM PGP, clic sur un bouton intégré au champ pour remplir login/mot de passe.
  • Anti-BITB distribué — appairage NFC ↔ Android ↔ navigateur déclenchant EviBITB pour neutraliser les iframes en temps réel.
  • Mode HID BLE — émulation de clavier Bluetooth injectant hors DOM, neutralisant keyloggers et DOM-attacks.

⮞ Résumé

PassCypher NFC HSM incarne le Zero Trust (validation physique requise) et le Zero Knowledge (aucun secret exposé). Une sauvegarde d’identité matérielle by design, neutralisant clickjacking, BITB, typosquatting, keylogging, spoofing IDN, injections DOM, clipboard hijacking et anticipant les attaques quantiques.

✪ Attaques neutralisées par PassCypher NFC HSM

Type d’attaque Description Statut avec PassCypher
Clickjacking / UI Redressing Iframes invisibles ou overlays Neutralisé (EviBITB)
BITB Faux cadres simulant fenêtres d’authentification Neutralisé (sandbox + appairage)
Keylogging Capture des frappes Neutralisé (HID BLE)
Typosquatting URLs imitant des sites légitimes Neutralisé (validation physique)
Homograph Attack (IDN) Substitution Unicode pour tromper l’utilisateur Neutralisé (Zero-DOM)
Injection DOM / DOM XSS Scripts injectés dans le DOM Neutralisé (hors-DOM)
Clipboard hijacking Interception du presse-papier Neutralisé (pas d’usage clipboard)
Extensions malveillantes Plugins compromis Neutralisé (pairing + sandbox)
Attaques quantiques (anticipées) Calculs massifs visant à casser les clés Atténué (clés segmentées + AES-256 CBC + PGP)

SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Injection sécurisée des wallets

Les wallets web reposent sur le DOM — et c’est précisément là qu’on les piège. Avec SeedNFC HSM, la logique s’inverse : les clés privées et seed phrases ne quittent jamais l’enclave. Pour initialiser ou restaurer un wallet, l’entrée se fait via une émulation HID Bluetooth — comme un clavier matériel — sans presse-papier, sans DOM, sans trace pour saisir les clés privées, publiques ou credentials de hot wallets.

Flux opérationnel (anti-DOM, anti-clipboard) :

  • Custodie : la seed/clé privée est chiffrée et stockée dans SeedNFC HSM (jamais exportée).
  • Activation physique : présentation sans contact via l’appli Freemindtronic (Android NFC).
  • Injection HID BLE : la seed est dactylographiée directement dans le champ du wallet, hors DOM et hors clipboard, résistante aux keyloggers logiciels.
  • Protection BITB : EviBITB peut être activé côté appli pour neutraliser overlays lors de l’onboarding.
  • Éphémérité : les données résident seulement en RAM volatile durant la frappe HID puis sont effacées.

Cas d’usage :

  • Onboarding / recovery de wallets (MetaMask, Phantom) sans exposer la clé privée au navigateur.
  • Opérations sensibles sur poste (air-gap logique) avec validation physique par l’utilisateur via NFC.
  • Sauvegarde multi-actifs : seed phrases et clés conservées offline, activation exclusivement physique et traçable.

⮞ Résumé

SeedNFC HSM + HID BLE injecte la clé directement dans le champ du wallet via un émulateur HID BLE, évitant clavier et presse-papier. Canal chiffré AES-128 CBC, activation physique NFC et anti-BITB activable : secrets confinés hors-DOM et hors portée des extensions malveillantes.

Scénarios d’exploitation & voies de mitigation

Les révélations de DEF CON 33 ne sont pas une fin : plusieurs évolutions sont probables :

  • Clickjacking piloté par IA : LLMs génèrent des overlays DOM en temps réel, rendant les hameçonnages DOM + Shadow-DOM plus scalables et crédibles.
  • Tapjacking mobile hybride : superposition d’apps et gestes invisibles pour valider des transactions ou exfiltrer OTP.
  • HSM post-quantique : mitigation long terme via ancrage matériel et gestion de clés résistantes au quantique — déplacer la frontière de sécurité dans des HSM certifiés plutôt que dans le navigateur.

⮞ Résumé

Les attaques futures contourneront les correctifs navigateur. La mitigation exige une rupture : ancrages matériels hors-ligne, planification HSM post-quantique et designs Zero-DOM plutôt que rustines logicielles.

Synthèse stratégique

Le clickjacking d’extensions DOM démontre que navigateurs et extensions ne sont pas des zones de confiance pour les secrets. Les correctifs réduisent le risque mais n’éliminent pas l’exposition structurelle.

La voie souveraine — trois priorités

  • Gouvernance : traiter extensions et moteurs d’autofill comme infrastructure critique — contrôles de dev, audits obligatoires, règles de divulgation d’incident.
  • Changement d’architecture : adopter Zero-DOM pour que les secrets ne transitent jamais par le navigateur ; exiger activation physique pour opérations sensibles.
  • Résilience matérielle : investir dans ancrages hardware et roadmaps HSM post-quantique pour éliminer les points de défaillance cloud/sync.

Doctrine — synthétique

  • Considérer tout secret touchant le DOM comme potentiellement compromis.
  • Privilégier validation physique (NFC, HID BLE, HSM) pour opérations à haute valeur.
  • Auditer et réguler la logique d’injection des extensions comme fonction critique.
Note réglementaire — CRA, NIS2 et cadres nationaux améliorent la résilience logicielle mais traitent peu les secrets intégrés au DOM. Les décideurs doivent combler cet angle mort en exigeant séparation prouvée UI ↔ flux secrets.

Glossaire

DOM (Document Object Model)

Représentation en mémoire de la structure HTML/JS d’une page web ; permet aux scripts d’accéder et de modifier les éléments de la page.

Shadow DOM

Sous-arbre DOM encapsulé utilisé pour isoler des composants (web components) ; il peut masquer des éléments au reste du document.

Clickjacking

Technique consistant à tromper un utilisateur pour qu’il clique sur des éléments masqués ou superposés (UI redressing).

DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking

Variante où une page malveillante combine iframes invisibles, Shadow DOM et redirections (ex. focus()) pour forcer une extension à injecter des secrets dans un formulaire factice.

Autofill / Auto-remplissage

Mécanisme des gestionnaires (extensions/applications) qui insère automatiquement identifiants, mots de passe ou codes dans des champs web.

Passkey

Clé d’authentification WebAuthn (basée sur clé publique) censée être résistante au phishing lorsqu’elle est stockée en local ou dans un secure element.

WebAuthn / FIDO

Standard d’authentification par clé publique (FIDO2) permettant des logins sans mot de passe ; son niveau de sécurité dépend du modèle de stockage (synchrone vs. device-bound).

TOTP / HOTP

Codes temporaires (OTP) générés par algorithme temporel (TOTP) ou compteur (HOTP) pour l’authentification à deux facteurs.

HSM (Hardware Security Module)

Module matériel sécurisé pour générer, stocker et utiliser des clés cryptographiques sans jamais exposer les clés en clair hors de l’enclave.

PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)

Standard de chiffrement hybride utilisant clés publiques/privées ; ici employé pour conteneurs chiffrés AES-256 CBC protégés par PGP.

AES-256 CBC

Algorithme de chiffrement symétrique (mode CBC) avec clé 256 bits — utilisé pour chiffrer les conteneurs de secrets.

Clés segmentées

Approche de fragmentation des clés (segments) pour renforcer la résistance aux attaques et faciliter l’assemblage sécurisé en RAM éphémère.

Mémoire volatile (RAM éphémère)

Zone où les secrets sont brièvement déchiffrés pour l’opération d’autofill, puis immédiatement effacés — aucune persistance sur disque ou DOM.

NFC (Near Field Communication)

Technologie sans contact utilisée pour activer physiquement un HSM et autoriser la libération d’un secret de manière locale et physique.

HID-BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy HID)

Mode d’émulation d’un clavier via BLE pour injecter des données directement dans un champ sans passer par le DOM ni le presse-papier.

Sandbox URL

Mécanisme liant chaque secret à une URL attendue stockée dans l’HSM ; si l’URL active ne correspond pas, l’autofill est bloqué.

Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)

Attaque par imitation d’une fenêtre de navigateur (overlay) dans une iframe — trompe l’utilisateur en simulant un site ou une boîte d’authentification.

EviBITB

Moteur anti-BITB (serverless) qui détecte et détruit en temps réel iframes/overlays malveillants et valide le contexte UI de façon anonyme.

SeedNFC

Solution HSM matérielle pour la conservation des seed phrases/cles privées ; effectue l’injection hors-DOM via HID/NFC.

Iframe

Cadre HTML embarquant une autre page ; les iframes invisibles (opacity:0, pointer-events:none) sont souvent utilisées dans les attaques d’UI redressing.
focus()
Appel JavaScript qui place le focus sur un champ. Utilisé malicieusement pour rediriger des événements utilisateur vers des champs contrôlés par l’attaquant.

Overlay

Superposition visuelle (fenêtre/faux cadre) qui masque l’interface réelle et peut tromper l’utilisateur sur l’origine d’une action.

Exfiltration

Extraction non autorisée de données sensibles hors du dispositif ciblé (identifiants, TOTP, passkeys, clés privées).

Phishable

Qualifie un mécanisme (ex. passkeys synchronisées) susceptible d’être compromis par usurpation d’interface ou overlay — donc sujet au phishing.

Content-Security-Policy (CSP)

Politique web contrôlant ressources et origines ; utile mais insuffisante seule contre variantes avancées de clickjacking.

X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors

En-têtes HTTP / directives CSP destinées à limiter l’inclusion en iframe ; contournables dans certains scénarios d’attaque avancés.

Keylogging

Capture malveillante des frappes clavier ; contournée par les injections HID sécurisées (pas de clavier logiciel ni de presse-papier).

Remarque : ce glossaire vise à uniformiser le vocabulaire technique employé dans la chronique. Pour les définitions normatives et les références standardisées, consultez OWASP, NIST et les RFC/standards FIDO/WebAuthn.

🔥 En bref : les patchs cloud aident, mais le hardware et les architectures Zero-DOM préviennent les défaillances de classe.

⮞ Remarque — Ce que cette chronique ne couvre pas :

Cet article ne fournit ni PoC exploitables, ni tutoriels pour reproduire des attaques DOM clickjacking ou passkey phishing. Il n’analyse pas non plus l’économie des cryptomonnaies ni des cas juridiques spécifiques hors UE. Objectif : expliquer les failles structurelles, quantifier les risques systémiques et proposer les contre-mesures matérielles Zero-DOM robustes. Pour détails d’implémentation, voir §Contre-mesures souveraines et sections produit.

Reputation Cyberattacks in Hybrid Conflicts — Anatomy of an Invisible Cyberwar

Visual composition illustrating coordinated cyber smear campaigns during geopolitical tensions

Executive Summary

In the evolving landscape of hybrid warfare, reputation cyberattacks have emerged as a powerful asymmetric tool, targeting perception rather than systems. These operations exploit cognitive vectors—such as false narratives, controlled leaks, and media amplification—to destabilize trust in technologies, companies, or institutions. Unlike conventional cyberattacks, their purpose is not to penetrate networks, but to erode public confidence and strategic credibility. This Chronicle exposes the anatomy, intent, and implications of such attacks, offering sovereign countermeasures grounded in cryptographic attestation and narrative control.

Reading Chronic
Estimated reading time: 16 minutes
Complexity level: Strategic / Expert
Language specificity: Sovereign lexicon – High concept density
Accessibility: Screen reader optimized – all semantic anchors in place Navigation

TL;DR — Reputation cyberattacks manipulate public trust without technical compromise. Through narrative fabrication, selective disclosures, and synchronized influence operations, these attacks demand sovereign countermeasures like NFC HSM attestation and runtime certification.

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Key insights include:

  • Reputation attacks prioritize psychological and narrative impact over system access
  • Controlled leaks and unverifiable claims simulate vulnerability without intrusion
  • APT actors increasingly combine narrative warfare with geopolitical timing
  • Sovereign countermeasures must address both runtime trust and narrative control
  • Legal attribution, hybrid doctrines, and military exercises recognize the strategic threat
  • IA-generated content and deepfake amplification heighten the reputational asymmetry

About the Author – Jacques Gascuel, inventor of internationally patented encryption technologies and founder of Freemindtronic Andorra, is a pioneer in sovereign cybersecurity. In this Cyberculture Chronicle, he deciphers the role of reputation cyberattacks in hybrid warfare and outlines a sovereign resilience framework based on NFC HSMs, narrative control, and runtime trust architecture.

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Strategic Definition

Reputation cyberattacks are deliberate operations that undermine public trust in a targeted entity—governmental, industrial, or infrastructural—without necessitating technical penetration. Unlike classical cyberattacks, these actions do not seek to encrypt, extract, or manipulate data systems directly. Instead, they deploy orchestrated influence tactics to suggest compromise, provoke doubt, and corrode strategic credibility.

Key vectors include unverifiable claims of intrusion, dissemination of out-of-context or outdated data, and AI-generated content posing as evidence. These attacks are particularly insidious because they remain plausible without being technically demonstrable. Their targets are not systems but perceptions—clients, partners, regulators, and the broader strategic narrative.

⮞ Summary
Reputation cyberattacks weaponize doubt and narrative ambiguity. Their objective is not to compromise infrastructure but to simulate weakness, discredit governance, and manipulate perception within strategic timeframes.

Typology of Reputation Attacks

Reputation cyberattacks operate through carefully structured vectors designed to affect perception without direct intrusion. Their effectiveness stems from plausible ambiguity, combined with cognitive overload. Below is a strategic typology of the most commonly observed mechanisms used in such campaigns.

Type of Attack Method Reputation Objective
Controlled Leak Authentic or manipulated data exfiltration Undermine trust in data integrity or governance
Narrative of Compromise Unverifiable intrusion claim Simulate vulnerability or technical failure
Amplified Messaging Telegram, forums, rogue media Pressure decision-makers via public reaction
False or Outdated Leaks Repurposed legacy data as recent Manipulate interpretation and chronology
Brand Cloning / Solution Usurpation Fake products, clones, apps Confuse trust signals and damage legitimacy
⮞ Summary
Reputation attacks deploy asymmetric cognitive tactics that distort technical signals to generate public discredit. Their sophistication lies in the lack of verifiability and the strategic timing of narrative releases.

Event-Driven Triggers

Reputation cyberattacks rarely occur randomly. They are most often synchronized with sensitive diplomatic, commercial, or regulatory events, maximizing their narrative and psychological effect. These timings allow threat actors to amplify tension, delegitimize negotiations, or destabilize political outcomes with minimum technical effort.

The following correlations have been repeatedly observed across high-impact campaigns:

Trigger Type Typical Context Observed Examples
Diplomatic Events G7, NATO, BRICS, UNSC debates Jean-Noël Barrot’s G7 breach via spyware
Contract Finalization Strategic defense or tech exports Naval Group leak during Indonesian negotiations
Critical CVE Disclosure Zero-day or CVSS 9+ vulnerabilities Chrome CVE-2025-6554 exploited alongside eSIM JavaCard leaks
Political Transitions Election cycles, leadership change GhostNet during 2009 leadership reshuffles in Asia
Telecom Infrastructure Breach U.S. regulatory hearings on 5G security Salt Typhoon breach of U.S. telecom infrastructure
Military Retaliation India–Pakistan border escalation APT36 campaign post-Pahalgam attack
Weak Signals Identified
– Surge in Telegram disinformation threads one week before BRICS 2025 summit
– Anonymous claims targeting SM-DP+ infrastructures prior to Kigen certification review
– Attribution disclosures by 🇨🇿 Czechia and 🇬🇧 UK against APT31 and GRU respectively, correlating with vote censure periods
– Military-grade leaks repurposed via deepfake narratives hours before defense debates at the EU Parliament

Threat Actor Mapping

Several Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups have developed and deployed techniques specifically tailored to reputation disruption. These actors often operate under, or in coordination with, state objectives—using narrative projection as a form of geopolitical leverage. Freemindtronic has documented multiple such groups across past campaigns involving mobile identity, supply chain intrusion, and staged perception attacks.

APT Group Origin Strategic Focus Regalian Link
APT28 / Fancy Bear Russia Media influence, strategic sabotage GRU
APT29 / Cozy Bear Russia Diplomatic espionage, discrediting campaigns SVR
APT41 / Double Dragon China eSIM abuse, supply chain injection MSS
Lazarus / APT38 North Korea Crypto theft, industrial denigration RGB
APT36 / Transparent T. Pakistan Military perception ops, Android surveillance ISI
OceanLotus / APT32 Vietnam Telecom narrative control, political espionage Ministry of Public Security

Weak Signals:

  • Surge in Telegram threads 72h prior to geopolitical summits
  • Anonymous code disclosures targeting certified infrastructure
  • OSINT forums hinting at state-level leaks without attribution

APT strategy matrix showing attack timing, target sectors, and narrative tools
APT group strategy matrix mapping timing, target sectors, and reputation attack techniques.

Timeline of Geopolitical Triggers and Corresponding Leaks

This sovereign timeline reveals how state-sponsored leak campaigns align tactically with geopolitical milestones, transforming passive narrative exposure into calibrated instruments of reputational destabilization.

Date Geopolitical Trigger Leak Activity / APT Attribution
11–12 June 2025 NATO Summit Massive credential dump via Ghostwriter
18 July 2025 U.S.–China Trade Talks Strategic policy leak via Mustang Panda
5 September 2025 EU–Ukraine Association Agreement Media smear leaks via Fancy Bear
2 October 2025 U.S. Sanctions on Russia Source code exposure via Sandworm
16 November 2025 China–India Border Standoff Fake news spike via RedEcho
8 December 2025 G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Diplomatic email leak via APT31
Visual timeline showing synchronized reputation cyberattacks during major geopolitical events
Strategic timeline linking major geopolitical milestones with coordinated reputation cyberattacks
Strategic Note — Leak campaigns in hybrid conflicts are no longer tactical anomalies. They are sovereign timing instruments to erode confidence during strategic negotiations, certifications, and sanctions.
Threat Matrix — Narrative Focus
These APTs combine stealth, timing, and plausible deniability to weaponize trust decay. Their toolkit includes mobile clone propagation, certificate revocation simulation, and adversarial AI-driven content generation.

Medium Signals:

  • Reactivation of domains previously linked to APT41 and APT36
  • Spam waves targeting sectors previously affected (e.g., eSIM, military)
  • Cross-platform narrative amplification combining Telegram, deepfakes, and dark web leaks
Strategic Matrix of Reputation Cyberattacks by APT Groups
APT groups cross-referenced with targets, tactics and geopolitical synchronization vectors

Geopolitical Embedding

Reputation cyberattacks are rarely isolated actions. They are often embedded within broader geopolitical manoeuvers, aligned with strategic objectives of national influence, dissuasion, or economic disruption. Below are detailed illustrations of how states integrate reputation-based cyber operations within their doctrine of influence.

🇷🇺 Russia – Narrative Sabotage and Attribution Management

APT28 and APT29 operate as complementary arms of Russian strategic disinformation. APT28 performs media amplification and tactical leaks, while APT29 infiltrates strategic diplomatic channels. Both benefit from GRU and SVR coordination, with plausible denial and a focus on exploiting trust asymmetries within European security frameworks.

🇨🇳 China – Espionage Hybridization and Runtime Subversion

APT41 is a paradigm of China’s fusion between state-sponsored espionage and monetized cybercrime. Their use of eSIM runtime abuse and compromised SM-DP+ provisioning chains illustrates a shift from direct intrusion to sovereignty degradation via runtime narrative manipulation. The Ministry of State Security provides structural protection and strategic targeting objectives.

🇰🇵 North Korea – Financial Subversion and Mobile Identity Hijacking

Lazarus Group (APT38) leverages breaches to undermine trust in certified systems. By targeting crypto wallets, blockchain nodes, and mobile identity providers, they transform technical compromise into economic destabilization narratives. These attacks often coincide with international sanctions debates or military exercises, and are directed by the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).

🇵🇰 Pakistan – Military Psychological Pressure on India

APT36 deploys persistent mobile malware and SIM/eSIM spoofing against Indian military actors. These attacks are not solely technical; they aim to discredit Indian defense systems and pressure procurement diplomacy. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) integrates these cyber tactics within regional destabilization agendas.

🇻🇳 Vietnam – Political Control via Telecom Targeting

OceanLotus (APT32) focuses on dissidents, journalists, and telecom infrastructure across ASEAN. Their aim is to dilute external perceptions of Vietnamese governance through discreet leaks and selective disclosure of surveillance capabilities. The Ministry of Public Security provides operational coverage and mission framing.

Key Insight
All of these actors embed their reputation attacks within state-approved strategic cycles. Cyberwarfare thus becomes an extension of diplomacy by other means—targeting trust, not terrain.

Sovereign Countermeasures

Defending against reputation cyberattacks requires more than perimeter security. Sovereign actors must combine cryptographic integrity enforcement, dynamic runtime assurance, and narrative discipline. Reputation attacks flourish in ambiguity—effective defense mechanisms must therefore be verifiable, attestable, and visible to the strategic environment.

Product Alignment:
Freemindtronic’s PassCypher NFC HSM / HSM PGP and DataShielder NFC HSM / HSM PGP exemplify sovereign countermeasures in action. Their air‑gapped hardware ensures that integrity attestations and encryption proofs are generated and verified at runtime—securely, transparently, and independently from compromised infrastructure.

Out-of-Band Attestation with NFC HSM

Architectures based on NFC HSMs (Hardware Security Modules) enable offline cryptographic proof of integrity and identity. These devices remain isolated from network vectors and can confirm the non-compromise of key credentials or components, even post-incident. Freemindtronic’s PassCypher NFC HSM, PassCypher HSM PGP, DataShielder NFC HSM and Datashielder HSM PGP technologies patented exemplify this paradigm.

Real-Time Message Provenance Control

DataShielder NFC HSM Auth et DataShielder NFC HSM M-Auth chiffrent toutes les communications par défaut, sur n’importe quel canal, à l’aide de clés matérielles souveraines qui ne peuvent pas être clonées, copiées ou extraites. Ce paradigme offre :

Strategic Deterrence: The mere public declaration of using sovereign NFC HSM-based message encryption becomes a deterrent. It establishes an immutable line between verifiable encrypted communications and unverifiable content, making any forgery immediately suspect—especially in diplomatic, institutional, or executive contexts.
Visual comparison showing how NFC HSM message encryption counters generative AI manipulation in reputation cyberattacks
✪ Visual Insight — NFC HSM encryption renders deepfake or generative AI disinformation ineffective by authenticating each message by default—even across untrusted platforms.

NFC HSM encryption draws a definitive boundary between authentic messages and fabricated narratives—making AI-forged disinformation both detectable and diplomatically indefensible.

  • Verified encrypted messages sharply contrast with plaintext impersonations or unverifiable sources.
  • Default encryption affirms authorship and message integrity without delay or user intervention.
  • Falsehood becomes inherently visible, dismantling the ambiguity required for narrative manipulation.

This architecture enforces trust visibility by default—even across untrusted or compromised platforms—transforming every encrypted message into a sovereign proof of authenticity and every anomaly into a potential reputational alert.

Dynamic Certification & Runtime Audit

Static certification loses relevance once a component enters operational use. Reputation attacks exploit this gap by suggesting failure where none exists. Runtime certification performs real-time behavioural analysis, issuing updated trust vectors under sovereign control. Combined with policy-based revocation, this hardens narrative resilience.

Strategic Narrative Control

State entities and critical industries must adopt coherent, pre-structured public response strategies. The absence of technical breach must be communicated with authority and technical grounding. Naval Group’s qualified denial following its 2025 reputation leak demonstrates such sovereign narrative calibration under pressure.

Strategic Trust Vector:
This approach embodies dynamic certification, up to a temporal blockchain of trust. Unlike static attestations bound to deployment snapshots, sovereign systems like PassCypher NFC HSM and DataShielder NFC HSM perform ongoing behavioral evaluation—logging and cryptographically sealing runtime states.Each trust update can be timestamped, signed, and anchored in a sovereign ledger—transforming integrity into a traceable, irreversible narrative artifact. This not only preempts disinformation attempts but establishes a visible cryptographic chronicle that renders forgery diplomatically indefensible.
Statecraft in Cyberspace
Sovereign cyberdefense means mastering time, integrity, and narrative. Out-of-band attestation and dynamic certification are not just security features—they are diplomatic weapons in an asymmetric reputational battlefield.

Strategic Case Illustrations

Reputation cyberattacks are no longer incidental. They are increasingly doctrinal, mirroring psyops in hybrid conflicts and weaponizing cognitive ambiguity. Below, we analyze three emblematic case studies where strategic visibility became a vulnerability—compromised not by code, but by coordinated narratives.

Morocco — CNSS Data Breach & Reputational Impact (April 2025)

  • Major incident: In April 2025, Morocco’s National Social Security Fund (CNSS) experienced what is widely described as the largest cyber incident in the country’s digital history. The breach exposed personal data of approximately 2 million individuals and 500,000 enterprises, including names, national IDs, salaries, emails, and banking details. [Content verified via: moroccoworldnews.com, therecord.media, resecurity.com]
  • Claimed attribution: The Algerian group JabaRoot DZ claimed responsibility, citing retaliation for an alleged breach of the APS (Algerian Press Service) account by Moroccan-linked actors.
  • Technical vulnerability: The attack reportedly exploited “SureTriggers,” a WordPress module used by public services that auto-connects to Gmail, Slack, and Google APIs—identified as a likely vector in the incident.
  • Collateral effects: The breach prompted temporary shutdowns of key Moroccan ministerial websites (Education, Tax), and government portals were disabled as a preventive cybersecurity measure. [Confirmed via moroccoworldnews.com]
  • Institutional response: The NGO Transparency Maroc publicly criticized the lack of disclosure, urging authorities to release investigation findings and audit results to restore public confidence under data protection law 09‑08.
  • Continental context: Kaspersky ranked Morocco among Africa’s top cyberattack targets, registering more than 12.6 million cyber threats in 2024, with significant increases in spyware and data exfiltration attempts.
⮞ Summary
The Moroccan breach illustrates the duality of hybrid threats: a massive technical compromise coupled with reputational erosion targeting public trust. By compromising legitimate governmental interfaces without penetrating core infrastructures, this attack typifies silent reputation warfare in a sovereign digital context.

United Kingdom — Reputation Warfare & Cyber Sabotage (2025)

  • Contextual trigger: In May 2025, the UK government formally accused Russian GRU units 26165, 29155, and 74455 of coordinating cyber sabotage and influence operations targeting Western democracies, including the 2024 Paris Olympics and Ukrainian allies. The attribution was backed by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). [gov.uk — Official Statement]
  • Narrative dimension: Public attribution functions as a geopolitical signaling strategy—reasserting institutional legitimacy while projecting adversarial intent within a hybrid warfare doctrine.
  • Institutional framing: The UK’s NCSC framed the attacks as hybrid campaigns combining technical compromise, reputational disruption, and online disinformation vectors. [NCSC Report]
⮞ Summary
The UK case underscores how naming threat actors publicly becomes a sovereign narrative tool—transforming attribution from defensive posture into reputational counterstrike within hybrid strategic doctrine.

Australia & New Zealand — AI‑Driven Reputation Campaigns & SME Disruption (2025)

  • Threat escalation: In its July 2025 cyber threat bulletin, CyberCX raised the national threat level from “low” to “moderate” due to increased attacks by pro‑Russia and pro‑Iran hacktivists targeting SMEs and trust anchors. [CyberCX Report]
  • AI impersonation cases: The Australian Information Commissioner reported a rise in deepfake voice-based impersonation (“vishing”) affecting brands like Qantas, prompting enhanced institutional controls. [OAIC Notifiable Data Breaches Report]
  • Asymmetric reputational vectors: These campaigns leverage low-cost, high-impact impersonation to seed public distrust—especially effective when targeting service-based institutions with high emotional value.
⮞ Summary
In Australia and New Zealand, deepfake-enabled vishing attacks exemplify the evolution of hybrid threats—where brand trust, rather than infrastructure resilience, becomes the primary vector of reputational compromise.

Côte d’Ivoire — Symbolic Rise in Targeted Attacks (2024–2025)

  • Threat profile: In 2024, Côte d’Ivoire recorded 7.5 million cyberattack attempts, including 60 000 identity theft attempts targeting civilian services, military infrastructures, electoral registries, and digital payment platforms.
  • Targets: Military, electoral systems, and digital payment systems—underscoring both technical and narrative-driven attack vectors.
  • Electoral context (2025): Ahead of the October presidential election, major opposition figures—including Tidjane Thiam, Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé, and Guillaume Soro—were excluded from the final candidate list published on 4 June 2025.
  • List finality: The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), led by Coulibaly‑Kuibiert Ibrahime, announced no further revision of the electoral register would occur before the vote..
  • Narrative risk vector: The legal exclusion combined with a fixed submission window (July 25–August 26) constructs a narrow, information‑scarce environment—ideal for reputation attacks via bogus leaks, document falsification, or spoofed portals.
  • Strategic interpretation: The limited electoral inclusivity and rigid timelines magnify potential narrative manipulation by actors seeking to simulate fraud or institutional incapacity.
  • Sources: Reuters reports (June 4, 2025 – candidate exclusions) ; CEI confirmation of no further register revision :content.
⮞ Summary
In Côte d’Ivoire, structural cyber intrusions in 2024 and systemic electoral restrictions in 2025 converge into a hybrid threat environment: narrative ambiguity becomes a strategic tool, allowing reputation-based operations to undermine institutional credibility without requiring technical compromise.

AFJOC — Coordinated Regional Cyber Defense (Africa, 2025)

  • Continental response: INTERPOL’s 2025 African Cyberthreat Report calls for regional coordination via AFJOC (Africa Joint Operation against Cybercrime).
  • Threat evolution: AI-driven fraud, ransomware, and cybercrime-as-a-service dominating the threat landscape.
  • Strategic implication: Highlights the necessity of sovereign runtime attestation and regional policy synchronization.
  • Source: INTERPOL Africa Cyber Report 2025
⮞ Summary
AFJOC exemplifies a pan-African response to hybrid cyber threats—moving beyond technical patchwork to coordinated defense governance. Its operational scope highlights runtime integrity as a sovereign imperative.

Naval Group — Strategic Exposure via Reputation Leak

  • Modus operandi: “Neferpitou” publishes 13 GB of allegedly internal data, claims 1 TB tied to Naval CMS systems, coinciding with high-level Indo-Pacific negotiations.
  • Sovereign framing: Naval Group dismisses technical breach, insists on reputational targeting.
  • Narrative vulnerability: Ambiguous provenance (possible reuse of Thales 2022 breach), lack of forensic certitude fuels speculation and diplomatic pressure.
  • Systemic insight: CMS systems’ visibility within defense industry increases attack surface despite zero intrusion.
⮞ Summary
Naval Group’s incident shows how reputation can be decoupled from system security—exposure of industrial branding alone suffices to pressure negotiations, irrespective of intrusion evidence.

Dassault Rafale — Disinformation Post-Skirmish and Trust Erosion

  • Tactic: Synthetic loss narratives post-Operation Sindoor. Gameplay footage (ARMA 3), AI-enhanced visuals, and bot networks flood social media.
  • Strategic intent: Shift procurement trust toward Chinese J-10C alternatives. Undermine India-France defense collaboration.
  • Corporate response: Dassault CEO publicly debunks losses; Indian MoD affirms Rafale superiority.
  • Attack vector: Exploits latency in real-world combat validation versus immediate online simulation. Tempo differential becomes narrative leverage.
⮞ Summary
Dassault’s case highlights digital asymmetry: speed of synthetic disinformation outpaces real-time refutation. Trust erosion occurs before fact-checking stabilizes perceptions.

Kigen eSIM — Certified Component, Runtime Failure, Sovereign Breach

  • Flawed certification chain: Java Card vulnerability in GSMA-certified Kigen eUICC enables runtime extraction of cryptographic keys and profiles.
  • Collateral impact: >2 billion devices vulnerable across consumer, industrial, and automotive sectors.
  • Strategic blind spots: TS.48 test profile lacks runtime attestation, no revocation mechanism, no post-deployment control layer.
  • Geopolitical exploitation: APT41 and Lazarus repurpose cloned eSIM profiles for state-level impersonation and tracking.
  • Sovereign countermeasure: NFC HSM runtime attestation proposed to separate dynamic trust from static certification.
⮞ Summary
Kigen illustrates how certification without runtime guarantees collapses in sovereign threat contexts. Attestation must be dynamic, portable, and verifiable—independent of issuing authority.

Israel–Iran — Predatory Sparrow vs Deepfake Sabotage

  • Israeli offensive: In June 2025, Predatory Sparrow disrupted the digital services of Iran’s Sepah Bank, rendering customer operations temporarily inoperative.
  • Iranian retaliation: Fake alerts, phishing campaigns, and deepfake operations aimed at creating panic.
  • Narrative warfare: Over 60 pro-Iranian hacktivist groups coordinated attacks to simulate financial collapse and fuel unrest.
  • Source: DISA escalation report
⮞ Summary
This conflict pair showcases dual-track warfare: targeted digital disruption of critical banking infrastructure, countered by synthetic information chaos designed to manipulate public perception and incite instability.

Intermediate & Legacy Cases

Recent campaigns reveal a growing sophistication in reputation cyberattacks. However, foundational cases from previous years still shape today’s threat landscape. These legacy incidents actively illustrate persistent vectors—ransomware amplification, unverifiable supply chain compromises, and narrative manipulation—that inform current defense strategies.

Change Healthcare Ransomware Attack (USA, 2024)

  • Attack type: Ransomware combined with political reputational sabotage
  • Immediate impact: Threat actors exposed over 100 million sensitive medical records, causing $2.9 billion in direct losses and paralyzing healthcare payments for weeks
  • Narrative shift: The breach transformed into a media symbol of systemic vulnerability in U.S. healthcare infrastructure, influencing regulatory debates
  • Source: U.S. HHS official statement

SolarWinds Software Supply Chain Breach (USA, 2020)

  • Attack type: Covert infiltration through compromised update mechanism
  • Systemic breach: APT29 infiltrated U.S. federal networks, including the Pentagon and Treasury, sparking concerns over supply chain certification trust
  • Strategic consequence: Cybersecurity experts advocated for zero-trust architectures and verified software provenance policies
  • Source: CISA breach alert

Colonial Pipeline Critical Infrastructure Sabotage (USA, 2021)

  • Attack type: Ransomware disrupting fuel distribution logistics
  • Operational impact: The attack triggered massive fuel shortages across the U.S. East Coast, igniting panic buying and public anxiety
  • Narrative angle: Policymakers used the incident to challenge America’s energy independence and highlight outdated infrastructure protections
  • Source: FBI attribution report

Estée Lauder Cloud Security Exposure (2020)

  • Incident type: Public cloud misconfiguration without encryption
  • Data disclosed: 440 million log entries surfaced online; none classified as sensitive but amplified for reputational damage
  • Narrative exploitation: Media outlets reframed the incident as emblematic of weak corporate data governance, despite its low-risk technical scope
  • Source: ZDNet technical analysis

GhostNet Global Cyber Espionage Campaign (2009)

  • Origin point: China
  • Infiltration method: Long-range surveillance across embassies, ministries, and NGOs in over 100 countries
  • Reputational effect: The attack revealed the reputational power of invisible espionage and framed global cyber defense urgency
  • Source: Archived GhostNet investigation

Signal Clone Breach – TeleMessage Spoofing Campaign (2025)

  • Vector exploited: Brand mimicry and codebase confusion via Signal clone
  • Security breach: Attackers intercepted communications of diplomats and journalists, casting widespread doubt on secure messaging apps
  • Source: Freemindtronic breach analysis

Change Healthcare — Systemic Paralysis via Ransomware

  • Incident: In February 2024, the ransomware group Alphv/BlackCat infiltrated Change Healthcare, disrupting critical healthcare operations across the United States.
  • Impact: Over 100 million medical records exposed, halting prescription services and claims processing nationwide.
  • Reputational fallout: The American Hospital Association labeled it the most impactful cyber incident in U.S. health system history.
  • Aftermath: A $22 million ransom was paid; projected losses reached $2.9 billion.

Snowflake Cloud Breach — Cascading Reputation Collapse

  • Event: In April 2024, leaked credentials enabled the Scattered Spider group to access customer environments hosted by Snowflake.
  • Affected parties: AT&T (70M users), Ticketmaster (560M records), Santander Bank.
  • Strategic gap: Several Snowflake tenants had no multi-factor authentication enabled, revealing governance blind spots.
  • Reputational impact: The breach questioned shared responsibility models and trust in cloud-native zero-trust architectures.

Salt Typhoon APT — Metadata Espionage and Political Signal Leakage

  • Threat actor: Salt Typhoon (Chinese APT), targeting U.S. telecoms (AT&T, Verizon).
  • Tactics: Passive collection of call metadata and text records involving politicians such as Donald Trump and JD Vance.
  • Objective: Narrative manipulation through reputational subversion and diplomatic misattribution.
  • Official coverage: Documented by U.S. security agencies, cited in Congressional Research Service report IF12798.
[CybersecurityNews’s annual threat roundup](https://cybersecuritynews.com/top-10-cyber-attacks-of-2024/).

Strategic Insight: Each breach acts as a reputational precedent. Once trust fractures—however briefly—it reshapes certification frameworks, procurement rules, and sovereign data defense strategies.
Legacy is not just history; it’s doctrine.

Common Features & Strategic Objectives

Despite their varied execution, reputation cyberattacks exhibit a set of common features that define their logic, timing, and psychological impact. Recognizing these patterns allows sovereign actors and industrial targets to anticipate narrative shaping attempts and embed active countermeasures within their digital resilience strategy.

Common Features

  • Non-technical vectors: Some attacks do not involve system compromise—only plausible disinformation or brand usurpation.
  • Perception-centric: They aim at clients, partners, regulators—not infrastructure.
  • Strategic timing: Aligned with high-value geopolitical, economic, or regulatory events.
  • Narrative instruments: Use of Telegram, forums, deepfakes, AI-generated content, and synthetic media.
  • Attribution opacity: Exploits legal and technical gaps in global cyber governance.

Strategic Objectives

  • Erode trust in sovereign technologies or industrial actors
  • Influence acquisition, regulation, or alliance decisions
  • Create asymmetric narratives favoring the attacker
  • Delay, deflect, or preempt defense procurement or certification
  • Prepare cognitive terrain for future technical or diplomatic intrusion
Inference
Reputation cyberattacks blur the lines between cybersecurity, psychological operations, and diplomatic sabotage. Their prevention requires integration of threat intelligence, strategic communications, and runtime trust mechanisms.

Common Features & Strategic Objectives

Despite their varied execution, reputation cyberattacks exhibit a set of common features that define their logic, timing, and psychological impact. Recognizing these patterns allows sovereign actors and industrial targets to anticipate narrative shaping attempts and embed active countermeasures within their digital resilience strategy.

Common Features

  • Non-technical vectors: Some attacks do not involve system compromise—only plausible disinformation or brand usurpation.
  • Perception-centric: They aim at clients, partners, regulators—not infrastructure.
  • Strategic timing: Aligned with high-value geopolitical, economic, or regulatory events.
  • Narrative instruments: Use of Telegram, forums, deepfakes, AI-generated content, and synthetic media.
  • Attribution opacity: Exploits legal and technical gaps in global cyber governance.
Deepfake and Data Leak convergence as a hybrid toolkit for reputation cyberattacks
✪ Visual Insight — Deepfake & Leak Convergence — Diagram showing how falsified audiovisuals and authentic data leaks are combined in modern reputation cyberattacks.

Strategic Outlook

Reputation cyberattacks are no longer peripheral threats. They operate as strategic levers in hybrid conflicts, capable of delaying negotiations, undermining certification, and shifting procurement diplomacy. These attacks are asymmetric, deniable, and narrative-driven. Their true target is sovereignty—technological, diplomatic, and communicational.

The challenge ahead is not merely one of defense, but of narrative command. States and sovereign technology providers must integrate verifiable runtime trust, narrative agility, and resilience to perception distortion. Silence is no longer neutrality; it is vulnerability.

Strong Signals:

  • Coordinated leaks following high-level diplomatic statements
  • Multiple unverifiable claims against certification authorities
  • Escalation in deepfake dissemination tied to defense technologies
Sovereign Scenario
Imagine a defense consortium deploying a real-time, attested HSM-based runtime environment that logs and cryptographically proves system integrity in air-gapped mode. A leaked document emerges, claiming operational failure. Within 48 hours, the consortium publishes a verifiable attestation proving non-compromise—transforming a potential discredit into a sovereign show of digital force.

To sustain trust in the era of information warfare, sovereignty must be demonstrable—technically, legally, and narratively.

Narrative Warfare Lexicon

To fortify sovereign understanding and strategy, this lexicon outlines key concepts deployed throughout this chronicle. Each term reflects a recurring mechanism of hybrid influence in reputation-centric cyber conflicts.

Sovereign Attestation:

Verifiable proof of message origin and integrity, enforced by hardware-based cryptography and runtime sealing mechanisms.

Perception Latency:

Delay between technical compromise and public interpretation, allowing adversaries to frame or distort narratives in real-time.

Runtime Ambiguity:

Exploitation of unverified system states or certification gaps during live operation, blurring accountability boundaries.

Trusted Silence:

Intentional lack of institutional response to unverifiable leaks, contrasted by provable data integrity mechanisms.

Strategic Leakage:

Deliberate release of curated data fragments to simulate broader compromise and provoke institutional panic.

Attested Narrative Artifact:

Communication whose authenticity is cryptographically enforced and auditably traceable, independent of central validation.

Adversarial Framing:

Use of metadata, linguistic bias, or visual overlays to recontextualize legitimate content into hostile perception.

Out-of-Band Attestation (NFC HSM):

Isolated cryptographic proof of key integrity, resistant to network manipulation. These air-gapped modules independently enforce the origin and authenticity of communications.

Real-Time Integrity Proof:

Continuous sealing and audit of system states during live operation. Prevents the exploitation of momentary ambiguity or delay in narrative framing.

Dynamic Certification:

Adaptive verification mechanism that evolves with runtime behavior. Unlike static seals, it updates the trust status of components based on real-time performance and sovereign policy triggers.

Temporal Blockchain of Trust:

Time-stamped ledger of cryptographically sealed events, where each proof of integrity becomes a narrative checkpoint. This chained structure forms a verifiable, sovereign memory of truth—resilient against falsification or post-hoc reinterpretation.

Temporal Ledger of Attestation:

A chronologically ordered record of integrity proofs, allowing for verifiable reconstruction of system trust state over time. Especially useful in forensic or diplomatic contexts.

Runtime Proof Anchoring:

Technique by which runtime attestation outputs are immediately sealed and anchored in sovereign repositories, ensuring continuity and traceability of system integrity.

Distributed Sovereign Chronicle:

Federated attestation system in which multiple sovereign or institutional nodes validate and preserve cryptographic proofs of trust, forming a geopolitical ledger of resilience against coordinated narrative subversion.

Beyond This Chronicle

The anatomy of invisible cyberwars is far from complete. As sovereign digital architectures evolve, new layers of hybrid reputational threats will emerge—possibly automated, decentralized, and synthetic by design. These future vectors may combine adversarial AI, autonomous leak propagation, and real-time perception manipulation across untrusted ecosystems.

Tracking these tactics will require more than technical vigilance. It will demand:

  • Runtime sovereignty: Systems must cryptographically attest their integrity in real time, independent of external validators.
  • Adversarial lexicon auditing: Monitoring how language, metadata, and synthetic narratives are weaponized across platforms.
  • Neutral trust anchors: Deploying hardware-based cryptographic roots that remain verifiable even in contested environments.

Freemindtronic’s work on DataShielder NFC HSM and PassCypher HSM PGP exemplifies this shift. These technologies enforce message provenance, runtime attestation, and sovereign encryption—transforming each communication into a verifiable narrative artifact.

Future chronicles will deepen these vectors through:

  • Case convergence: Mapping how reputation attacks evolve across sectors, regions, and diplomatic cycles.
  • Technological foresight: Anticipating how quantum-safe cryptography, AI-generated disinformation, and decentralized identity will reshape the reputational battlefield.
  • Strategic simulation: Modeling sovereign response scenarios to reputational threats using attested environments and synthetic adversaries.
⮞ Summary
In the next phase, reputation defense will not be reactive—it will be declarative. Sovereignty will be demonstrated not only through infrastructure, but through narrative control, cryptographic visibility, and strategic timing.

eSIM Sovereignty Failure: Certified Mobile Identity at Risk

Illustration showing a strategic breach of certified eSIM mobile identity — eSIM Sovereignty Failure

 

eSIM Sovereignty Failure: Strategic Breach of Certified Mobile Identity

This Chronicle investigates the first public compromise of a GSMA-certified eSIM platform. The Kigen eUICC exploit reveals a systemic failure in runtime security, certification integrity, and sovereign oversight. This case exemplifies a broader eSIM sovereignty failure that reveals strategic gaps in certified mobile identity governance. While the technical flaw traces back to a Java Card vulnerability known since 2019, the real breach lies in the blind trust placed in certification layers without independent verification or revocation protocols. The implications reach beyond telecom security — directly into the sovereignty of digital identities.

TL;DR  — A Java Card vulnerability in a certified Kigen eSIM enabled full key and profile extraction. Over 2 billion devices may be vulnerable. Sovereign architectures like NFC HSM offer critical mitigation by removing runtime risk and enforcing out-of-band identity controls.This exploit confirms a structural eSIM sovereignty failure that demands post-certification runtime verifiability.

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In Digital Security ↑ Correlate this Chronicle with other sovereign threat analyses in the same editorial rubric.

Key insights include:

  • Certification alone cannot ensure runtime integrity — post-certification attacks exploit logic and memory states invisible to audits.
  • Java Card runtime remains unaudited post-deployment — making every certified eSIM a potential time-bomb under stress or glitching conditions.
  • Sovereign HSMs externalize trust and isolate secrets — offering a runtime enclave immune to provisioning tampering and OTA subversion.
  • Mobile identity governance must embrace revocability and field attestation — static certification chains are insufficient to counter dynamic threat models.
  • SM-DP+ infrastructures are inherently opaque — attackers can exploit provisioning without triggering compliance violations.
  • Runtime verification is the new perimeter — only sovereign architectures with live integrity checks can enforce trust beyond installation time.
  • DataShielder NFC HSM Defense exemplifies this shift — enabling secure messaging (SMS, MMS, RCS) through EviCall, with runtime asymmetric encryption enforced outside the eSIM trust perimeter.

About the Author – Jacques Gascuel, inventor of internationally patented encryption technologies and founder of Freemindtronic Andorra, is a pioneer in sovereign cybersecurity. In this Digital Security Chronicle, he deciphers the strategic breach in certified eSIMs and outlines a sovereign resilience framework based on NFC HSMs and off-host credential governance.

Genesis of the Exploit: Java Card, GSMA, and Forgotten Warnings

The breach of the Kigen eSIM platform did not occur in a vacuum. It stems from a critical vulnerability in Java Card technology—an issue first flagged by independent researchers as early as 2019. The flaw, related to runtime memory leaks and side-channel leakage vectors, remained dormant in certified environments due to insufficient post-certification scrutiny. Despite multiple advisories, the lack of a mandatory patching protocol or revocation mechanism allowed this vulnerability to persist across millions of devices.

Moreover, the GSMA certification process—intended as a guarantee of cryptographic integrity—failed to account for the nuanced runtime behavior of Java Card applets. The systemic gap lay in the absence of a sovereign certification follow-up system, especially after the issuance of eUICC certificates. This blind spot rendered the entire certification stack vulnerable to exploitation once attackers identified how to manipulate instruction flow during remote profile installation. This oversight directly contributed to a certified eSIM sovereignty failure, where legacy vulnerabilities persisted unchecked within supposedly trusted systems.

Far from being a one-off incident, this exploit exemplifies a broader systemic weakness: reliance on opaque certification pipelines without dynamic runtime assurance. Sovereign cybersecurity demands continuous attestation and verifiability—not static compliance artifacts.

Technical Breakdown — Sovereign Readout of the Runtime Breach

The attack against Kigen’s certified eUICC exploited a well-documented weakness in the Java Card runtime — specifically, the handling of memory and instruction flow during the loading of remote applets. By leveraging a side-channel attack chain, the adversary extracted sensitive keys and operational data without triggering standard telemetry or fault logs.

The exploit unfolded in three phases: reconnaissance, fault injection, and controlled memory leakage. During the reconnaissance phase, the attacker mapped the card’s internal logic by issuing benign APDU commands and analyzing response times. In the second phase, glitching techniques—specifically voltage and clock manipulation—were used to bypass secure channel initialization, exploiting fault conditions to manipulate control flow. Finally, the attacker used crafted APDUs with offset variations to read residual data from the heap, effectively exfiltrating cryptographic material and provisioning metadata.

Notably, this breach occurred without violating the certified applet interface, highlighting that even formally verified interfaces are insufficient if the runtime layer remains exposed. Furthermore, the absence of post-deployment attestation mechanisms meant that the rogue behavior remained invisible to MNOs and SM-DP+/SM-DS operators. This scenario encapsulates a textbook case of eSIM sovereignty failure rooted in runtime opacity and post-certification blindness.

Independent formal verification efforts — notably using the 5GReasoner framework — have exposed critical vulnerabilities in the M2M Remote SIM Provisioning (RSP) protocol. These include race conditions, identity binding flaws, and session takeover possibilities within GSMA-compliant SM-DP+/SM-DS architectures. These weaknesses, documented since 2020, remain unaddressed in current certification enforcement, further confirming the runtime sovereignty failure at the core of eUICC design.

Governance flowchart comparing GSMA-certified eUICC vs Freemindtronic NFC HSM, from runtime compromise to sovereignty enforcement
✪ Architecture — Governance comparison: GSMA-certified eUICC versus sovereign NFC HSM, mapping runtime threat response strategies.
✪ Diagram — Provisioning Attack Vectors …
⮞ Summary
This runtime breach demonstrates how a certified, production-grade eSIM platform can be reduced to an opaque black box — exploitable at the lowest level unless sovereignty-driven safeguards like hardware-isolated HSMs and field attestation protocols are enforced.

Geostrategic Exposure Mapping — eSIMs Across Sectors & Infrastructures

The eSIM ecosystem is deeply embedded in global supply chains, spanning sectors from critical infrastructure and defense to consumer electronics. The vulnerability exploited in the Kigen platform potentially affects any system that relies on remote provisioning and over-the-air profile updates. This includes government-issued IDs, mobile banking tokens, connected vehicles, and secure IoT modules.

Regions with centralized eID frameworks—such as the EU’s eIDAS or India’s Aadhaar-linked telecom systems—face compounded risks. Once a certified eSIM stack is compromised, attackers can clone, redirect, or exfiltrate digital identities at scale. In NATO and Five Eyes countries, the concern escalates as eSIM modules are increasingly integrated into secure communications for field units, diplomatic missions, and critical infrastructure.

What emerges is a geostrategic mosaic of exposure, where technical supply chains intersect with geopolitical fault lines. Sovereign actors must now assume that hostile powers could exploit trusted certification systems to stage covert identity subversion or persistent access operations.

⮞ Summary
eSIMs are no longer neutral components — they represent a geostrategic vector of exposure, linking runtime compromise to sovereign identity manipulation across sectors and jurisdictions.

Accountability Matrix in the Certified eSIM Compromise

The Kigen eSIM compromise is emblematic of a wider eSIM sovereignty failure, where no actor assumes full responsibility for runtime trust. While independent researchers were first to identify the Java Card side-channel risk, their findings remained largely unheeded by certification bodies and runtime vendors. The vulnerability was flagged, published, but never operationally integrated into GSMA risk models.

Vendors such as Java Card implementers and eUICC manufacturers bear the technical burden, yet they operate within a certification-driven market that disincentivizes structural transparency. Once certified, platforms are considered immutable and secure—despite lacking mechanisms for sovereign runtime inspection or patch propagation.

Certification authorities like GSMA and EMVCo facilitated compliance at the interface level but failed to mandate continuous runtime monitoring or exploit simulation testing post-certification. National regulators, for their part, lacked either the mandate or the visibility to detect deviations from expected behavior within certified stacks.

This fragmented landscape enables plausible deniability and responsibility deferral—a dangerous precedent in sovereign digital infrastructure.

Flowchart of eSIM provisioning using SM-DP+ and SM-DS with mobile network operator and eUICC
Provisioning sequence of a certified eUICC via SM-DP+ and SM-DS, highlighting runtime exposure through the discovery and activation process.
⮞ Summary
A sovereign accountability matrix demands unified oversight from research disclosure to runtime attestation—bridging the gap between technical detection, certification governance, and regulatory enforcement.

Strategic Fallout of the eSIM Sovereignty Failure

The breach of a certified eUICC signals not merely a technical failure but a collapse of the trust architecture that underpins sovereign digital identity. In delegating assurance to private certification consortia without enforceable runtime verifiability, states have inadvertently created blind zones in their own critical infrastructure.

Sovereignty risk arises when the integrity of mobile credentials—used in eID, eHealth, fintech, and defense—is no longer auditable nor revokeable in real time. The absence of field attestation protocols and HSM-enforced compartmentalization means that cloned or tampered identities can propagate undetected within systems presumed secure.

For nations operating under NIS2 or with national cryptographic governance frameworks, the Kigen incident necessitates a strategic re-evaluation: Are certification schemes serving national interests, or introducing dependencies on opaque, offshore processes? The breach demonstrates that eSIMs, while micro-scale in hardware, represent macro-scale vectors for influence, surveillance, and destabilization.

⮞ Summary

Sovereignty in the digital era hinges on runtime verifiability and trusted compartmentalization—qualities absent from current eSIM governance models relying solely on certification status.

Regulatory Landscape: Where NIS2, CRA and GSMA TS.48 Collide

The breach of Kigen’s certified eSIM platform exposes a legal grey zone where sovereignty, industry self-regulation, and supranational cybersecurity policies intersect — and often diverge. At the heart of the conflict lies GSMA TS.48, the industry-led eUICC certification standard, which lacks post-certification enforcement, runtime telemetry mandates, or revocation procedures for compromised components.

In contrast, the European Union’s NIS2 Directive and the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) introduce legal obligations for continuous risk management, vulnerability disclosure, and secure-by-design principles. These frameworks implicitly contradict the current GSMA model by requiring runtime assurance and traceability across critical infrastructures and ICT supply chains. NIS2 classifies telecom as a key sector, requiring incident notification and risk mitigation, yet most MNOs remain blind to eSIM runtime behavior due to opaque OEM integrations.

Moreover, the CRA will enforce mandatory vulnerability management at the firmware and software levels — which includes eSIM middleware and applets. This raises the question: can GSMA continue to certify eUICC stacks under TS.48 without runtime transparency, in jurisdictions bound by NIS2 and CRA?

The disconnect becomes critical when state actors deploy certified eSIMs in sensitive roles — such as in border security, defense-grade communication, or government-issued mobile ID tokens. Sovereign nations adopting EU regulations must reconcile the legal obligations of NIS2/CRA with their technical reliance on private certification frameworks from entities like the GSMA — a non-state body.

For full reference:
– [NIS2 Directive overview – europa.eu](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis2-directive)
– [Cyber Resilience Act proposal – europa.eu](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cyber-resilience-act)

⮞ Summary

Sovereign cybersecurity is now a regulatory imperative. The disconnect between GSMA TS.48 certification and the mandatory compliance regimes under NIS2 and CRA exposes states to unmanaged legal and operational risks.

Industry Blind Spots: Strategic Failures to Anticipate Side-Channel Exploits

This strategic neglect forms a recurring pattern of eSIM sovereignty failure, where runtime threats are underestimated across certified ecosystems.

The Kigen eSIM breach illustrates a critical blind spot in the mobile security industry: the persistent underestimation of physical-layer and side-channel threats in certified environments. While certification schemes such as GSMA’s TS.48 emphasize interface compliance and cryptographic validation, they omit runtime behavioral assurance, particularly under fault or stress conditions — the exact domain exploited in the attack.

Despite the public disclosure of Java Card side-channel vulnerabilities by researchers since 2017 — including multiple presentations at events like CHES, Black Hat, and the TCG’s cybersecurity forums — the mobile industry maintained an implicit assumption that certified eUICCs were impervious to practical exploitation. This assumption neglected adversary models capable of leveraging voltage glitching, electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI), or response time correlation — all proven viable in prior smartcard-class attacks. Such assumptions are emblematic of a systemic eSIM sovereignty failure — not merely of vendors, but of governance models.

Furthermore, vendors often treat Secure Element and Trusted Execution Environment vulnerabilities as theoretical or “out-of-scope” for telecom threat modeling, assuming the remote nature of provisioning offers sufficient insulation. This assumption collapses in scenarios involving pre-deployment tampering, rogue MNOs, or insider threats in SM-DP+/SM-DS infrastructure.

The most alarming aspect lies in the lack of mandatory runtime telemetry and attestation mechanisms. Even after a successful breach, neither MNOs nor regulators can independently detect anomalies in eSIM behavior unless external post-mortem forensics are conducted — often too late.

⮞ Summary
Strategic negligence toward known side-channel vectors within the eSIM certification ecosystem leaves billions of devices exposed to sovereign-grade adversaries. Runtime threats are no longer theoretical — they are operational realities requiring structural reform.

Threat Intelligence Perspective: APT Groups & Espionage Tradecraft with eSIMs

The eSIM runtime compromise represents a significant shift in the threat landscape observed by national cyber agencies and private threat intelligence units. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, particularly those linked to state-sponsored cyber espionage, have long sought covert vectors for persistent access and identity subversion. The Kigen breach effectively introduces a new toolset into their arsenal: certified cryptographic devices that can be remotely manipulated without detection.

Historically, APT campaigns targeting telecom infrastructures — such as APT10’s exploitation of managed service providers or APT41’s targeting of mobile operators — prioritized control of metadata and SMS interception. With eSIM runtime attacks, the target expands to full identity extraction and cloning at the cryptographic layer. This enables operations such as device impersonation, interception of secure apps (banking, authentication), and insertion of backdoored profiles via compromised SM-DP+ servers.

Indicators of compromise remain elusive, as current telecom threat monitoring systems do not inspect profile integrity post-installation. Moreover, the GSMA Security Accreditation Scheme (SAS) for SM-DP+/SM-DS actors does not mandate field-level telemetry capable of detecting side-channel-derived manipulations.

Official source reference: [https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-cert-services/national-csirt-network](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-cert-services/national-csirt-network)

Map showing overlapping targeting campaigns against Kigen-certified telecom infrastructures
✪ Strategic Map — Turla & OceanLotus targeting telecom infrastructures using Kigen-certified stacks

As geopolitical tensions rise, threat actors with intelligence mandates are increasingly incentivized to exploit such blind spots — not merely for data theft, but for strategic impersonation and operational misdirection. eSIMs thus shift from neutral identity containers to offensive espionage tools — a hallmark of systemic eSIM sovereignty failure exploited by nation-state actors.

APT Groups Actively Targeting eSIM Runtime and Provisioning Flows

This table summarizes state-linked threat actors whose past campaigns show both interest and capability to exploit mobile identity infrastructure, particularly through eSIM runtime and SM-DP+ provisioning chains.

APT Group Origin Known Targets eSIM Relevance
APT10 (Stone Panda) China MSPs, telecom, cloud Management infra compromise ideal for SM-DP+
APT41 (Double Dragon) China Telecom, IoT, eSIM Hybrid espionage/cybercrime — runtime abuse observed
APT29 (Cozy Bear) Russia Govs, think tanks Stealth ops, focus on digital ID compromise
APT28 (Fancy Bear) Russia Defense, NATO, Europe Critical infrastructure targeting, eSIM plausible vector
OceanLotus (APT32) Vietnam Journalists, dissidents, telecom Mobile surveillance, eSIM backdoor usage
Turla (Venomous Bear) Russia Embassies, gov networks Satellite C2 usage — ideal for stealthy eSIM pivot
APT36 (also known as Transparent T., per official threat intelligence nomenclature) /
APT36 Spear Phishing
Pakistan Indian military, mobile users Android malware, known SIM/eSIM targeting
Lazarus Group (APT38) North Korea Finance, crypto, mobile Certificate & mobile identity attacks observed
⮞ Why This Matters —
These APT groups are technically capable and geopolitically incentivized to exploit the runtime opacity and provisioning blind spots inherent in GSMA-certified eSIM infrastructures. Their known operations intersect directly with critical layers of mobile identity management — from certificate chain manipulation to RSP flow infiltration.
⮞ Summary
The breach transforms eSIMs into offensive espionage platforms — enabling cryptographic-level impersonation, persistent access, and sovereign identity hijacking by state-grade actors.
Radar diagram mapping strategic threat actor capabilities targeting eSIM runtime and provisioning layers.
✪ Diagram radar — eSIM Threat Actor Mapping. Strategic capability comparison of APT groups targeting eSIM runtime and SM-DP+/SM-DS provisioning infrastructures.

✦ Weak Signals — Emerging Risks in eSIM Threat Intelligence

  • Academic warnings unaddressed: Security Explorations has published detailed technical reports since 2021 highlighting runtime vulnerabilities in certified eSIM stacks — including memory disclosure flaws and invalid certificate acceptance.
  • Zero adaptation by GSMA: Despite side-channel research such as the 2025 Kigen incident, GSMA certification flows (SGP.23-3 v3.1) remain focused on pre-deployment validation, omitting any runtime telemetry or post-certification threat model adaptation.
  • Toolkits enabling telecom-layer APTs: MITRE’s Mobile ATT&CK matrix and Google Cloud’s APT dashboards both reflect increased use of provisioning subversion and SIM lifecycle manipulation — tactics consistent with state-driven campaigns but still untracked by telecom operators’ detection ecosystems.
  • Blind compliance perimeter: The GSMA SAS does not require anomaly detection during SM-DP+/eUICC interaction sessions — a major blind spot that persists despite known vectorization paths exploited by actors like OceanLotus and Turla.

Strategic foresight: These signals collectively indicate a shift from purely technical vulnerabilities to systemic governance lapses. Sovereign runtime verification and on-device anomaly tracing are likely to become baseline requirements in future compliance frameworks, possibly triggered by regulatory pressure under CRA and NIS2 domains.

Runtime Threats in Certified eSIMs: Four Strategic Blind Spots

While geopolitical campaigns exploit the larger telecom attack surface, the technical fragility lies within the certified eSIMs themselves. This infographic categorizes the four strategic runtime threats exposed during the breach of the Kigen platform: injection threats, integrity bypass, platform subversion, and post-certification vulnerabilities.

Infographic of eSIM threats showing Java Card injection, TS.48 bypass, post-certification risk, and sovereignty erosion
✪ Diagram — Key runtime threats undermining certified eUICC trust: Java Card injection, GSMA TS.48 bypass, sovereignty erosion, and post-certification compromise.

These threats bypass formal certification layers and exploit dynamic gaps in memory isolation, applet injection logic, and insufficient field telemetry — vulnerabilities that persist across certified stacks lacking sovereign runtime attestation.

⮞ Summary
Certified eSIMs face four critical runtime threats that remain invisible to traditional certification: injection, bypass, subversion, and post-deployment exposure. Without sovereign runtime attestation and hardware-resilient execution, these vectors reduce certified trust to a symbolic shield.

✦ Normative Blind Spots — Regulatory Gaps in eSIM Security Frameworks

Several critical attack surfaces remain unaddressed in regulatory frameworks like CRA, NIS2, and GSMA TS.48. These include runtime behavior validation, post-certification re-attestation, and sovereign auditability of cryptographic execution environments. The absence of mandatory entropy quality tests and secure lifecycle attestation mechanisms leaves certified stacks vulnerable to dormant threats exploitable post-deployment.

Examples of blind spots include:

  • TS.48 lacks runtime memory protection enforcement.
  • CRA does not cover volatile entropy regeneration failures.
  • NIS2 omits sovereign runtime visibility mandates for mobile identity devices.

Cryptographic Fragility in eSIM Implementations

While eSIMs are often marketed as cryptographically secure by design, the Kigen incident exposes critical weaknesses at the implementation level. The core issue lies in the mismatch between theoretical algorithm strength and practical execution within constrained, embedded environments — particularly in Java Card-based secure elements.

The compromise demonstrated that cryptographic keys — including ECDSA and AES session material — could be exfiltrated through side-channel differentials amplified by improper memory sanitation and volatile buffer reuse. These weaknesses were neither mitigated by the applet’s formal validation nor by the certification authorities, which focus on static compliance rather than dynamic entropy or leakage resilience.

Additionally, entropy generation in some Kigen implementations relied on pseudo-random generators insufficiently seeded under certain power-reset conditions — a factor attackers exploited to reduce keyspace guessing during runtime.

Furthermore, the compromise highlights the limitations of relying solely on the GlobalPlatform SCP03 protocol for secure channel establishment. Although SCP03 ensures channel integrity, it does not defend against memory residue exploitation once the session concludes. As a result, sensitive values may remain in unprotected RAM zones accessible via glitching or crafted APDU logic.

Official reference for cryptographic side-channel standards: [https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90b/final](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90b/final)

Secure channel cryptography bypassed by runtime memory exposure in eSIM implementations.
✪ Diagram — Secure Channel vs Runtime Memory Exposure — Schema depicting the disconnect between certified SCP03 channel security and residual memory threats in embedded Java Card environments.

The fragility lies not in the cryptographic primitives themselves, but in the unverified assumptions about their deployment environment. Without sovereign runtime verification and hardware-hardened containers, certified eSIMs remain susceptible to low-level exfiltration despite high-level assurances.

⮞ Summary
Certified algorithms offer no immunity against weak runtime environments. Sovereign security demands continuous verification beyond algorithm compliance. This type of implementation gap directly reinforces the reality of an eSIM sovereignty failure even in certified stacks.

Sovereignty Scorecard: Evaluation Framework for National eSIM Policy

To assess the sovereign resilience of eSIM infrastructures, Freemindtronic introduces the Sovereignty Scorecard — a strategic evaluation framework that ranks national deployments across five critical dimensions: runtime integrity, credential isolation, certification independence, regulatory agility, and field attestation capabilities.

Each dimension is graded based on measurable criteria:

  • Runtime Integrity — Presence of post-deployment attestation mechanisms and resistance to fault injection attacks.
  • Credential Isolation — Use of off-host hardware modules (e.g., NFC HSM) to externalize secrets and eliminate on-card exposure.
  • Certification Independence — Ability to validate eSIM security independently from GSMA or vendor-issued assertions.
  • Regulatory Agility — Alignment with evolving frameworks like NIS2, CRA, and capacity to enforce breach-driven revocation.
  • Field Attestation — Ability to confirm device compliance and integrity dynamically in operational conditions.

Based on current data, sovereign readiness varies widely. For instance, Estonia and France exhibit strong regulatory integration but diverge in credential isolation strategies. Meanwhile, federated nations such as the U.S. face internal inconsistency across state-level MNOs and eSIM issuers.

Radar chart showing comparative eSIM sovereignty levels in USA, France, China, Germany and Brazil
✪ Diagram radar — Sovereignty Runtime Scorecard — Comparative benchmark of national resilience against post-certification eSIM threats.

What is 𝒮ro?

𝒮ro (Sovereignty Runtime Exposure) is an aggregated vulnerability score that quantifies the sovereign risk associated with the runtime execution of eSIM profiles. It serves as a strategic indicator for assessing how exposed a mobile identity infrastructure is to external control, compromise, or unverifiable behavior during live operation.

This scorecard framework is intended not as a final metric but as a dynamic reference model to guide national policy adaptation and resilience strategy against systemic eSIM threats.

𝒮ro Exposure Levels

𝒮ro Score Sovereign Exposure Level Description
20 Low Exposure Presence of sovereign runtime defense mechanisms (e.g., autonomous NFC HSM, internally validated countermeasures)
40 Moderate Exposure Partial reliance on third-party infrastructures or absence of internal runtime validation
60 High Exposure Certified critical infrastructures (e.g., Java Card, SM-DP+/DS) vulnerable at runtime without effective sovereign control
80+ Critical Exposure (Extrapolated) Total dependency on certification chain, no sovereign runtime control, opaque execution environment
⮞ Summary
Without multi-layer sovereign oversight — from runtime to regulation — national eSIM infrastructures remain structurally exposed. The Scorecard provides a benchmark to close that gap.

Zero Trust Recovery from eSIM Sovereignty Failure

In response to repeated instances of eSIM sovereignty failure, zero trust becomes not just strategic but mandatory.

The collapse of runtime trust in certified eUICC platforms mandates a paradigm shift: from perimeter-based assurance to a zero-trust model tailored for eSIM governance. This model reframes the eSIM not as a static, implicitly trusted object but as a dynamic actor that must continually prove its integrity, provenance, and compliance.

A zero-trust eSIM architecture encompasses:

  • Hardware Root of Trust (HRoT) — Use of sovereign HSMs external to the eUICC to store and process critical credentials, mitigating in-situ compromise risks.
  • Out-of-Band Attestation — Continuous verification of eSIM state via independent channels, ensuring profile consistency and integrity without relying on vendor telemetry.
  • Dynamic Trust Brokering — Integration of policy engines capable of adjusting access privileges based on runtime posture, geopolitical context, or threat intelligence updates.
  • Secure Update Chains — Implementation of field-verifiable patching protocols with sovereign signature verification, bypassing dependency on vendor-initiated OTA flows.

The design principle is clear: trust must be earned continuously, not granted via certification artifacts. In practical terms, this means MNOs and state operators must enforce mutual attestation with all eSIM-capable devices, using field-grade diagnostic tools and telemetry relays.

This approach aligns with emerging cybersecurity doctrines, including the European Union’s zero-trust strategic direction within the EU Cybersecurity Strategy, and anticipated provisions under the Cyber Resilience Act.

⮞ Summary
A post-certification eSIM strategy demands more than patches — it requires an operational posture of distrust, verification, and continuous control. Zero trust is no longer optional.

Weak Signals Identified

Long before the Kigen exploit became public, several early indicators hinted at systemic fragilities in the certified eSIM ecosystem. These weak signals, often dismissed as implementation quirks or vendor-specific limitations, now reveal themselves as precursors to broader architectural vulnerabilities.

  • Patch Lag Across Certified Platforms — Multiple vendors delayed integration of Java Card security updates, despite public CVEs and independent advisories.
  • Telemetry Blackouts During Remote Provisioning — Field reports noted unexplained telemetry silences during SM-DP+ operations, indicative of instruction hijacking or glitch attacks.
  • Inconsistencies in Certification Scope — Certification reports from GSMA TS.48 evaluations showed variable test coverage across applet behaviors and runtime exceptions.
  • Proprietary Obfuscation of eUICC Source Chains — OEMs increasingly deployed closed, undocumented applet stacks, frustrating independent auditing and validation.

These signals, while subtle, constituted a strategic early warning. Their disregard stems not from lack of data, but from an institutional overreliance on certification status as a proxy for ongoing security assurance.

Timeline comparing public Java Card CVEs with GSMA certification delays
✪ Timeline — Java Card vulnerabilities vs GSMA certification inaction over time
⮞ Summary
Strategic breaches rarely erupt without warning — they ferment in ignored anomalies, silent faults, and governance blind spots. Sovereign vigilance starts with decoding the weak signals.

eSIM on External Storage?

A rising architectural trend in constrained embedded systems involves relocating eSIM data onto external memory modules — typically SPI NOR flash or embedded MultiMediaCard (eMMC). While appealing for hardware flexibility and cost reduction, this design undermines foundational security assumptions of the GSMA eUICC standard.

Externalizing the Secure Element (SE) storage exposes profile data and cryptographic keys to direct bus probing, voltage fault injection, and cold boot extraction. Even when encryption-at-rest is implemented, the integrity of runtime protection collapses once a malicious actor achieves physical access or exploits firmware vulnerabilities to redirect memory calls.

In several observed deployments, OEMs bypassed the GSMA’s certified secure loading protocols by using bootloader-level loading of profiles into external memory-mapped regions — a deviation incompatible with the runtime isolation requirements of eSIM standards.

Authorities such as the [European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)](https://www.enisa.europa.eu) and [NIST](https://csrc.nist.gov/) have consistently emphasized that cryptographic material must remain bound to tamper-resistant hardware environments. External memory eSIMs contradict this principle, creating sovereign risk through dilution of trust anchors.

⮞ Summary
Offloading eSIM data to external storage breaks the hardware root-of-trust. Sovereign-grade identity management requires tamper-resistant, self-contained execution environments.

Misconceptions & Design Constraints

The certified eSIM ecosystem suffers from persistent misconceptions rooted in legacy SIM assumptions and abstracted design abstractions. One key fallacy is the belief that certification implies secure-by-design implementation across all operational contexts. In reality, GSMA certification primarily validates compliance with protocol-level behavior — not resilience to fault injection, physical attacks, or post-certification firmware drift.

Another widespread misconception is that Java Card security models inherently guarantee isolation and non-interference between applets. In practice, vulnerabilities in object reference handling, heap reuse patterns, and predictable class loading sequences allow one applet to indirectly infer or affect the state of another, especially when runtime monitoring is absent.

OEMs and MNOs often operate under the constraint of legacy infrastructure integration — prioritizing backward compatibility with SIM toolkits or OTA provisioning platforms over runtime verifiability. This constraint often leads to the embedding of insecure debug services, deprecated cipher suites, or relaxed access control mechanisms under the guise of “certified flexibility.”

The strategic consequence is a fragmented threat landscape where the weakest implementation in the supply chain compromises the entire trust anchor. Without sovereign control over lifecycle enforcement, firmware lockdown, and remote attestation, certification becomes a checkbox — not a defense.

⮞ Summary
Certification is not synonymous with sovereignty. Design shortcuts and legacy constraints perpetuate attack surfaces that sovereign architectures must isolate and harden by default.

Countermeasures Against Certified eSIM Sovereignty Threats

These measures directly mitigate the systemic blind spots responsible for the certified eSIM sovereignty failure.

In light of systemic runtime vulnerabilities and certification blind spots, sovereign cybersecurity architectures must prioritize verifiability, hardware isolation, and post-deployment attestation. Traditional eSIM infrastructures relying solely on GSMA certification cannot guarantee runtime integrity against state-level adversaries or advanced persistent threats (APTs).

The first line of defense is the elimination of in-field runtime secrets through hardware-based enclaves such as NFC HSMs. These devices externalize cryptographic operations and enforce out-of-band identity validation, mitigating the risk of key exposure during applet execution.

Secondly, sovereign architectures must incorporate real-time behavioral monitoring. They should leverage secure telemetry and tamper-evident logs to detect abnormal access patterns and control flow deviations.

In parallel, remote attestation plays a critical role. Ideally anchored in sovereign hardware roots of trust (RoT), it allows MNOs and regulators to verify that deployed eUICC modules remain unaltered since certification.

This process includes checking firmware hashes, assessing secure element states, and confirming the continuity of audit trails. Such mechanisms reinforce operational trust and transparency in high-assurance environments.

Furthermore, regulatory mandates must evolve to require sovereign oversight in the lifecycle management of certified secure elements. This includes revocation procedures, trusted firmware distribution channels, and cryptographic agility standards that support post-quantum migration paths.

⮞ Summary
Sovereign resilience requires architectures that do not merely comply with certification but enforce runtime integrity, field visibility, and cryptographic independence from third-party vendors.

Rethinking eSIM Governance with Sovereign NFC HSM

The structural failure exposed by the Kigen breach compels a foundational shift in how nations approach eSIM governance. Rather than perpetuating reliance on external certification authorities and embedded runtime platforms, sovereign models must prioritize minimal attack surfaces, externalized key management, and verifiable operational integrity.

NFC-based Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) represent a pivotal architectural response. By isolating secrets from the runtime environment and enabling offline transaction validation, these modules offer resilience against both remote and local attack vectors. Moreover, their user-mediated design supports privacy-preserving identity activation and fine-grained access control—without requiring permanent connectivity to central servers or vendor-controlled key managers.

This paradigm aligns with core sovereignty principles. It ensures jurisdictional control over digital identities, enables revocable credentials without foreign dependency, and supports auditable hardware roots of trust.

Moreover, it directly responds to growing regulatory pressures. Frameworks such as the European Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) and the NIS2 Directive increasingly demand demonstrable security and traceability for critical digital infrastructure.

⮞ Summary
Sovereign NFC HSM architectures offer a forward-compatible path for eSIM governance—enabling state-controlled identity assurance without runtime exposure or opaque vendor dependencies.

Use Case: From EviCall to EviSIM – Resilience via DataShielder NFC HSM Defense

Freemindtronic’s sovereign cybersecurity suite delivers a tangible countermeasure to runtime eSIM compromise. This is achieved through its NFC HSM-enabled technologies, which underpin platforms like EviCall and EviSIM. Both solutions integrate seamlessly with DataShielder to establish fully air-gapped, hardware-bound identity containers. These containers operate independently from traditional eUICC execution environments.

Externalization through NFC HSM: a runtime safeguard

Thanks to EviSIM, mobile identities and eSIM profiles are stored externally in a contactless NFC HSM. Once activated, the device executes cryptographic operations—such as authentication, signature generation, or key release—in real time. Crucially, these operations occur without exposing secrets to the host device’s operating system or runtime environment. As a result, even if the OS stack or baseband processor is compromised, the credentials remain shielded, immutable, and non-extractable. These safeguards directly counteract the runtime threats that caused the certified eSIM sovereignty failure.

Sovereign control via DataShielder architecture

Beyond this core isolation, the DataShielder framework introduces additional layers of control. These include dynamic self-destruct policies, offline multi-factor unlocking, and sovereign key attestation mechanisms. This architecture fundamentally diverges from remote provisioning models dominated by SM-DP+ infrastructures. Instead, EviSIM enables field-level validation and revocation under direct sovereign supervision.

En déplaçant l’assurance de l’identité mobile loin des ancrages de confiance contrôlés par l’étranger, EviSIM rétablit l’autonomie juridictionnelle. Il s’agit d’un modèle souverain pour sécuriser les identités numériques dans un écosystème de plus en plus compromis.

DataShielder NFC HSM blocking Java Card attack during eSIM profile execution
✪ Illustration — DataShielder vs. Java Card — Protection souveraine à l’exécution d’un profil eSIM
⮞ Summary&lt
EviSIM powered by NFC HSM and DataShielder demonstrates a sovereign eSIM implementation: isolated from runtime compromise, resilient to side-channel attacks, and verifiably controlled under national jurisdiction.

Infographic: Anatomy of SM-DP+/SM-DS Flow and Attack Vectors

To visualize the complexity and vulnerabilities in eSIM provisioning, this infographic maps the full lifecycle of an eSIM profile. It spans the SM-DP+ (Subscription Manager Data Preparation) and SM-DS (Discovery Service) systems, as defined by the GSMA’s Remote SIM Provisioning standard.

Key stages include:

  • Initial bootstrap and device registration
  • Profile download request and mutual authentication
  • Encrypted delivery of the eSIM profile
  • Activation and binding to the device’s secure element

Overlaying this flow are potential attack vectors such as:

  • Side-channel leakage during profile decryption on the device
  • Relay attacks exploiting delays in SM-DP+/SM-DS communication
  • Malicious MNO provisioning triggering compromised profiles
  • Lack of post-delivery attestation, allowing silent substitution

Each step is annotated to highlight where certified trust anchors can be bypassed through runtime manipulation or credential diversion. This systemic exposure reveals why runtime isolation and sovereign credentialing are no longer optional but foundational to eSIM security governance.

Diagram of GSMA SM-DP+/SM-DS provisioning architecture showing compromised vectors
✪ Diagram — SM-DP+/SM-DS provisioning flow with identified exploit vectors
Summary
This visual breakdown of eSIM provisioning reveals multiple runtime blind spots exploitable by adversaries. It underscores the strategic necessity of sovereign field attestation and off-host credential storage.

Beyond This Chronicle: Expanding the eSIM Sovereignty Failure Scope

This Chronicle focused on a critical instance of eSIM sovereignty failure, but additional vectors deserve sovereign scrutiny. Yet several strategic dimensions remain outside the scope of this investigation and call for sovereign attention:

Post-quantum readiness of eSIM infrastructures

Currently, most GSMA certification frameworks still rely on elliptic-curve cryptography. This reliance poses vulnerabilities in a future post-quantum context. Moreover, the lack of mandated migration timelines toward post-quantum algorithms reveals enduring gaps in long-term identity resilience.

Private 5G and critical infrastructure deployments

Furthermore, industrial 5G networks using eSIM-based credentials introduce distinct threat vectors. This is particularly evident in autonomous systems, smart energy grids, or battlefield IoT scenarios. Such environments require sovereign attestation pipelines—yet current standards fail to address these needs.

eSIM vulnerabilities in satellite and remote deployments

Additionally, remote provisioning via low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites presents unique security challenges. Telemetry spoofing and delay injection attacks become feasible, enabling potential bypasses of existing integrity verification methods.

Non-GSMA provisioning implementations

Lastly, certain sovereign entities are experimenting with bespoke eSIM frameworks beyond GSMA control. While these alternatives enhance autonomy, they risk fragmenting the ecosystem in the absence of interoperable verification mechanisms.

Each of these aspects warrants focused analysis and technical experimentation. Only through such sovereign efforts can the next generation of digital identity infrastructure achieve true resilience and autonomy.

⮞ Summary
Beyond this case study, sovereign cybersecurity strategy must encompass satellite, post-quantum, industrial, and extra-GSMA eSIM use cases. Each of these contexts presents their own attack surfaces and governance blind spots.
⮞ Sovereign Use Case | eSIM Resilience with DataShielder NFC HSM Defense
In light of ongoing eSIM profile compromises by APT groups, the sovereign solution DataShielder NFC HSM Defense integrating the EviCall module encrypts all messaging channels (SMS, MMS, RCS) independently from the operator profile.Even if the eUICC is infiltrated or cloned, content access remains impossible without the embedded sovereign hardware HSM. Asymmetric runtime encryption is enforced directly within the enclave — fully outside GSMA certification and undetectable by compromised infrastructures.🔐 This solution is available off-catalogue through Fullsecure (Andorra) from Freemindtronic and AMG PRO (France), trusted sovereign deployment partners.

ToolShell SharePoint vulnerability: NFC HSM mitigates token forgery & zero-day RCE

Comparative infographic contrasting ToolShell SharePoint zero-day with NFC HSM mitigation strategies

Executive Summary

This Chronicle dissects the ToolShell SharePoint vulnerability, which exemplifies the structural risks inherent in server-side token validation mechanisms and underscores the value of sovereign credential isolation. It illustrates how credential exfiltration and token forgery erode server-centric trust models. By contrast, Freemindtronic’s sovereign NFC HSM architectures restore control through off-host credential storage, deterministic command delivery, and token-level cryptographic separation.

TL;DR — ToolShell abuses MachineKey forgery and VIEWSTATE injection to persist across SharePoint services. NFC HSM mitigates this by injecting HTTPS renewal commands from offline tokens — no DNS, no clipboard, no software dependency.

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Key insights include:

  • Post-exploitation persists via cryptographic key theft
  • NFC HSM disrupts trust hijacking through isolated storage
  • Hardware-injected workflows remove runtime risk
  • ToolShell renders MFA ineffective by reusing stolen keys

About the Author – Jacques Gascuel, inventor of multiple internationally patented encryption technologies and founder of Freemindtronic Andorra, is a pioneer in sovereign cybersecurity. In this Digital Security Chronicle, he dissects the ToolShell SharePoint zero-day vulnerability and provides a pragmatic defense framework leveraging NFC HSMs and EviKeyboard BLE. His analysis merges hands-on mitigation with field-tested resilience through Bluetooth-injected, offline certificate provisioning.

ToolShell: Context & Exploit Strategy

⮞ Summary The ToolShell exploit abuses SharePoint token validation mechanisms by exfiltrating MachineKeys and injecting persistent RCE payloads into trusted services, making post-compromise persistence trivial.

 

Severity Level: 🔴 Critical (CVSS 9.8) – remote unauthenticated RCE exploit. CVE Reference: CVE-2025-53770 | CVE-2025-53771 Vendor Bulletin: Microsoft Security Update Guide – CVE-2025-53770 First documented by Eye Security, ToolShell is a fileless backdoor exploiting CVE‑2025‑53770 to gain persistent access to on-prem SharePoint servers. It leverages in-memory payloads and .NET reflection to access MachineKeys like ValidationKey and DecryptionKey, enabling valid payload signature forgery. Security firms observed active exploitation tactics: Symantec flagged PowerShell and Certutil use to deploy binaries such as “client.exe”, while Orca Security reported 13% exposure among hybrid SharePoint cloud deployments. Attribution links these campaigns to APT actors like Linen Typhoon and Storm‑2603. Recorded Future describes ToolShell as an in-memory loader bypassing EDR detection. Microsoft and CISA have acknowledged the active exploitation and advise isolation and immediate patching (see CISA Alert – July 20, 2025).

Flowchart showing ToolShell exploitation stages from VIEWSTATE injection to MachineKey theft and remote code execution in SharePoint
Exploitation stages of ToolShell: how attackers hijack SharePoint MachineKeys to achieve persistence and remote code execution

 

⮞ Attribution & APT Actors
Partial attribution confirmed by Microsoft and Reuters:
APT41 (a.k.a. Linen Typhoon / Salt Typhoon) — a China-based, state-affiliated cluster previously linked to CVE-2023-23397 exploits and credential theft
Storm-2603 — an emerging threat group observed injecting payloads derived from the Warlock ransomware family
We observed both threat groups using MachineKey forgery to sustain long-term access across SharePoint environments and hybrid cloud systems.
Related Chronicles:
– Chronicle: APT41 – Cyberespionage and Cybercrimehttps://freemindtronic.com/apt41-cyberespionage-and-cybercrime/
– Chronicle: Salt Typhoon – Cyber Threats to Government Securityhttps://freemindtronic.com/salt-typhoon-cyber-threats-government-security/
Explore how sovereign credential exfiltration and state-linked persistence mechanisms deployed by Salt Typhoon and APT41 intersect with ToolShell’s exploitation chain, reinforcing their long-term strategic objectives.

Comparative Insights: Salt Typhoon (APT41) vs ToolShell Attack Chain

Both Salt Typhoon and ToolShell clusters reveal long-term persistence tactics, yet only the ToolShell SharePoint vulnerability leverages MachineKey reuse across hybrid AD join environments.

Tactic / Vector Salt Typhoon (APT41) ToolShell
Credential Theft Harvested plaintext credentials via CVE-2023-23397 in Outlook Extracted MachineKeys (ValidationKey/DecryptionKey) from memory
Persistence Method Registry injection, MSI payloads, webshells VIEWSTATE forgery, fileless PowerShell loaders
Target Scope Gov networks, diplomatic mail servers, supply chain vendors Hybrid SharePoint deployments (on-prem/cloud join)
Payload Technique Signed DLL side-loading, image steganography Certutil.exe, client.exe binaries, memory-resident loaders
Command & Control Steganographic beaconing + encrypted tunnels Local payload injection (offline, no active beaconing)

This comparison highlights the evolution of state-affiliated TTPs toward stealthier, credential-centric persistence across heterogeneous infrastructures. Both campaigns demonstrate how hardware-based credential isolation can neutralize these vectors.

NFC HSM Sovereign Countermeasures

✓ Sovereign Countermeasures – Use offline HSM with no telemetry – Favor air-gapped transfers – Avoid cloud MFA for critical assets

Freemindtronic’s NFC HSM technology directly addresses ToolShell’s attack surfaces. It:

  • Secures credentials outside the OS using AES-256 CBC encrypted storage
  • Delivers commands via Bluetooth HID over a paired NFC phone, avoiding RCE-exposed vectors
  • Supports token injection workflows without scripts residing on the compromised server
  • Physically rotates up to 100 ACME labels per token, ensuring breach containment

Regulatory Response & Threat Landscape

⮞ Summary CISA and international CERTs issued emergency guidance, while threat intelligence reports from Symantec, Palo Alto Networks, and Recorded Future confirmed attribution, impact metrics, and defense gaps.

On July 20, 2025, CISA added CVE‑2025‑53770/53771 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Recommended actions include:

  • Rotate MachineKeys immediately
  • Enable AMSI for command inspection
  • Deploy WAF rules against abnormal POST requests
  • Isolate or disconnect vulnerable SharePoint servers

Defensive Deployment Scenario

⮞ Summary Using NFC HSM in SharePoint infrastructure allows instant certificate revocation, local reissuance, and DNS-less recovery via physical admin control.

During ToolShell exploitation, a SharePoint deployment integrated with DataShielder NFC HSM enables administrators to:

    • Immediately revoke affected credentials with no exposure to central PKI
    • Inject new signed certificates using offline physical commands
    • Isolate and contain server breach impacts without resetting whole environments
Infographic showing air-gapped token injection with NFC HSM to mitigate SharePoint ToolShell vulnerability
Sovereign workflow: NFC HSM performs offline token injection to bypass ToolShell-style SharePoint zero-day exploits

Sovereign deployment architecture — Secure SharePoint trust management using Freemindtronic NFC HSM with Bluetooth HID transmission and air-gapped administrator control.

Related resource… Trigger HTTPS Certificate Issuance DNS-less – Another application of NFC HSM to secure SSL/TLS certificate issuance without relying on DNS, reinforcing decentralized trust models.

Our analysis reveals significant global exposure despite Microsoft’s emergency patch, driven by legacy on-prem deployments. The table presents verified threat metrics and authoritative sources that quantify the vulnerability landscape.

Metric Value Source
Confirmed victims ~400 organizations Reuters
Potentially exposed servers 8,000–9,000 Wiz.io
Initial detections 75 compromised servers Times of India
Cloud-like hybrid vulnerable rate 9% self-managed deployments Orca Security
💸 Estimated Damage: Analysts project long-term remediation costs could exceed $50M globally, considering incident response, forensic audits, and credential resets. (Source: Silent Breach, Hive Systems, Abnormal.ai, 10Guards)

Real-World NFC HSM Mitigation — ToolShell Reproduction & Protection

This section demonstrates how to configure a sovereign NFC HSM (AES-256 CDC Encryption) to neutralize ToolShell-like threats via a deterministic, DNS-less and OS-isolated certificate issuance command.

  • Label example: (6 chars max)SPDEF1
  • Payload: (55 chars max)~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --issue --standalone -d 10.10.10.10
  • Tested Tools: PassCypher NFC HSM, DataShielder NFC HSM
  • Transmission Chain: Android NFC ⬢ AES-128 HID Bluetooth BLE (low energy) ⬢ Windows 11 (EviKeyboard-InputStick) or Linux (hidraw)

Use Case: The injected ACME command issues a new HTTPS certificate to a specified IP without DNS or clipboard, restoring trust anchor independently from the SharePoint server post-compromise.

Field Validation: Successfully tested on Windows 11 Pro using Git + MSYS2 + acme.sh + InputStick dongle. Also reproducible under hardened Linux with + .socatudev
  • Strategic Benefit: Even if ToolShell exfiltrates server credentials, NFC HSM enables local reissuance of trust chains fully isolated from the infected OS.
Diagram showing NFC HSM mitigation flow against ToolShell SharePoint vulnerability via BLE HID and ACME command injection
Sovereign countermeasure flow against ToolShell: NFC HSM triggering ACME SSL issuance via Bluetooth HID

Deconstructing the ToolShell SharePoint Vulnerability Exploitation Chain

⮞ Analysis ToolShell demonstrates a post-exploitation pivot strategy where attackers escalate from configuration theft to full application control. This is achieved through:
  • Abuse of VIEWSTATE deserialization with stolen MachineKeys
  • Use of .NET method invocation without leaving artifacts
  • Insertion of loader binaries via signed PowerShell or system tools like Certutil

Such fileless payloads effectively bypass signature-based antivirus and EDR solutions. The attack chain favors stealth and persistence over overt command-and-control traffic, complicating detection.

Beyond Patching: Lessons in Architectural Sovereignty

The ToolShell SharePoint vulnerability reaffirms that patching alone cannot reestablish cryptographic integrity once secrets are compromised. Only physical key segregation ensures post-breach resilience.

Why the ToolShell SharePoint vulnerability invalidates patch-only defense strategies

⮞ Insight ToolShell’s impact reveals the strategic limitations of patching-centric models. Sovereign digital infrastructures demand:
  • Non-centralized credential issuance and rotation (PKI independence)
  • Client-side trust anchors that bypass server-side compromise
  • Automation workflows with air-gapped execution paths

NFC HSM fits this paradigm by anchoring identity and authorization logic outside vulnerable systems. This enforces zero-access trust models by default and mitigates post-patch reentry by adversaries with credential remnants.

Breakout Prevention Matrix

Attack Phase ToolShell Action NFC HSM Response
Access Gain RCE via VIEWSTATE forging Physical HSM stores no secrets on host
Credential Theft Read MachineKeys from memory Offline AES-256 CBC storage in HSM
Persistence Install fileless ToolShell loader No executable context accessible to attacker
Privilege Escalation Reuse token for lateral movement Token rotation blocks reuse vector
Diagram showing ToolShell attack phases mapped to NFC HSM countermeasures in a breakout prevention flow
Visual matrix mapping ToolShell’s attack stages—RCE, credential theft, persistence, lateral movement—to NFC HSM’s hardware-based prevention mechanisms

Weak Signal Watch

  • Emergence of VIEWSTATE forgery patterns in Exchange Server and Outlook Web Access (OWA)
  • Reappearance of ToolShell-style loaders in signed PowerShell execution chains
  • Transition from beacon-based C2 to steganographic delivery mechanisms such as image-encoded payloads.
  • Reuse of stolen MachineKeys across hybrid Azure AD join infrastructures
⮞ Post-ToolShell Weak Signals
ToolShell’s exploitation chain appears to have seeded new attack patterns beyond SharePoint:
Exchange and OWA now exhibit signs of credential forgery via deserialization vectors
Warlock ransomware variants use image steganography to silently load persistence payloads
PowerShell-based implants inherit ToolShell’s memory-resident design to bypass telemetry
MachineKey reuse across identity-bound Azure environments raises systemic trust decay issues

Server Trust Decay Test

Even after mitigation, the ToolShell SharePoint vulnerability demonstrates how credential remnants allow adversaries to retain stealth access, unless a sovereign hardware countermeasure is applied.

An attacker steals the MachineKeys on a Friday. The following Monday, the organization applies the patch but fails to rotate the credentials. The access persists. With NFC HSM::

  • Compromise is contained via off-host cryptographic separation
  • Token usage policies enforce short-term validity
  • No command lives on the server long enough to be hijacked

CVE ≠ Loss of Control

Being vulnerable does not equal being compromised — unless critical secrets reside on vulnerable systems. NFC HSM inverts this logic by anchoring control points in hardware, off the network, and out of reach from any CVE-based exploit.

Related resource… Trigger HTTPS Certificate Issuance DNS-less – Another application of NFC HSM to secure SSL/TLS certificate issuance without relying on DNS, reinforcing decentralized trust models.

ToolShell Timeline & Impact Exposure

⏱️ Timeline Analysis The time between the initial unknown presence of the vulnerability and its public mitigation reveals the persistent exposure period common to zero-day scenarios. This uncertainty underscores the strategic advantage of sovereign technologies like NFC HSM, which isolate secrets physically, rendering CVE-based attacks structurally ineffective.Microsoft Advisory for CVE-2025-53770 | CVE-2025-53771
Event Date Comment
Vulnerability exploitation begins (undisclosed phase) ~Early July 2025 (est.) Attributed to stealth campaigns before detection (Eye Security)
First mass detection by Eye Security July 18, 2025 Dozens of compromised servers spotted
Microsoft public disclosure July 20, 2025 Emergency advisory + patch instructions
CISA KEV catalog update July 20, 2025 CVE-2025-53770/53771 classified as actively exploited
Widespread patch availability July 21–23, 2025 Full mitigation for supported SharePoint editions
💸 Estimated Damage: Analysts project long-term remediation costs could exceed $50M globally, considering incident response, forensic audits, and credential resets. (Source: Silent Breach, Hive Systems, Abnormal.ai, 10Guards)
Infographic showing the timeline of ToolShell zero-day in SharePoint from exploitation to public patch and global impact
Chronological overview of the ToolShell exploit lifecycle—from initial stealth exploitation, through detection and disclosure, to emergency patch deployment by Microsoft and CISA
⮞ Sovereign Use Case | Field-Proven Resilience with Freemindtronic
In my deployments, I validated that both DataShielder NFC HSM and PassCypher NFC HSM securely store and inject a 55-character offline command like:
This deterministic payload is physically embedded and cryptographically sealed in the NFC HSM. No clipboard. No DNS. No runtime script on the compromised host. Just a sovereign injection path that stays off the radar — and off the network.In a ToolShell-type breach, these tokens allow administrators to revoke, reissue, and restore certificate trust locally. The attack chain is not just mitigated — it’s rendered structurally ineffective.~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --issue --standalone -d 10.10.10.10