Aug
Executive Summary — DOM Extension Clickjacking
⮞ Reading Note
If you only want the essentials, the Executive Summary (≈4 minutes) will give you a solid overview. However, for a complete and technical vision, you should continue with the full chronicle (≈36–38 minutes).
⚡ The Discovery
Las Vegas, early August 2025. DEF CON 33 takes over the Las Vegas Convention Center. Between hacker domes, IoT villages, Adversary Village, and CTF competitions, the atmosphere turns electric. On stage, Marek Tóth simply plugs in his laptop, launches the demo, and presses Enter.
Immediately, the star attack emerges: DOM extension clickjacking. Easy to code yet devastating to execute, it relies on a booby-trapped page, invisible iframes, and a malicious focus() call. These elements trick autofill managers into pouring credentials, TOTP codes, and passkeys into a phantom form. As a result, DOM-based extension clickjacking surfaces as a structural threat.
✦ Immediate Impact on Password Managers
The results strike hard. Marek Tóth tested 11 password managers, and all showed vulnerabilities by design. In fact, 10 out of 11 leaked credentials and secrets.
According to SecurityWeek, nearly 40 million installations remain exposed.
Furthermore, the wave spreads beyond password managers: even crypto-wallets leaked private keys “like a leaky faucet,” thereby directly exposing financial assets.
To make matters worse, a second demonstration, distinct from Tóth’s, revealed that supposedly “phishing-resistant” passkeys could be tricked by a deceptive overlay and a malicious redirection. We will explore this in detail in our Digital Security section.
Even FIDO/WebAuthn fell victim — as easily as a gamer rushing into a fake Steam portal.
⚠ Strategic Message — Systemic Risks
With just two demos — one targeting password managers and wallets, the other aimed directly at passkeys — two pillars of cybersecurity collapsed. The message is clear: as long as secrets reside in the DOM, they remain vulnerable. Moreover, as long as cybersecurity depends on the browser and the cloud, a single click can overturn everything.
As OWASP reminds us, clickjacking has always been a well-known threat. Yet here, the extension layer itself collapses.
⎔ The Sovereign Alternative — Zero-DOM Countermeasures
Fortunately, another way has existed for more than a decade — one that does not rely on the DOM.
With PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, and SeedNFC for hardware backup of cryptographic keys, your credentials, passwords, and TOTP/HOTP secrets never touch the DOM. Instead, they remain encrypted in offline HSMs, securely injected via URL sandboxing or manually entered through the Android NFC application, and always protected by anti-BITB safeguards.
Therefore, this is not a patch, but a patented sovereign passwordless architecture: decentralized, with no server, no central database, and no master password. It frees secret management from centralized dependencies such as FIDO/WebAuthn.
Chronicle to Read
Estimated reading time: 36–38 minutes
Complexity level: Advanced / Expert
Linguistic specificity: Sovereign lexicon — high technical density
Available languages: CAT · EN · ES · FR
Accessibility: Screen-reader optimized — semantic anchors included
Editorial type: Strategic Chronicle
About the author: Written by Jacques Gascuel, inventor and founder of Freemindtronic®.
As a specialist in sovereign security technologies, he designs and patents hardware systems for data protection, cryptographic sovereignty, and secure communications. Moreover, his expertise includes compliance with ANSSI, NIS2, GDPR, and SecNumCloud frameworks, as well as defense against hybrid threats via sovereign-by-design architectures.
Exfiltrated: logins, TOTP codes, passkeys, and crypto keys.
Techniques: invisible iframes, Shadow DOM, Browser-in-the-Browser overlays.
Impact: ~40M installations exposed, with ~32.7M still vulnerable as of August 23, 2025, due to missing patches.
Countermeasure: PassCypher NFC/PGP and SeedNFC — secrets (TOTP, logins, passwords, crypto/PGP keys) stored in offline HSMs, physically activated, securely injected via NFC, HID, or encrypted RAM channels.
Principle: Zero DOM, zero attack surface.
Anatomy of DOM extension clickjacking: a malicious page, hidden iframe, and autofill hijack exfiltrating credentials, passkeys, and crypto-wallet keys.
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In sovereign cybersecurity ↑ This chronicle is part of the Digital Security section, continuing our research into exploits, systemic vulnerabilities, and hardware-based zero trust countermeasures.
Strategic Navigation
- Executive Summary
- History of Clickjacking (2002–2025)
- What is DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking?
- Vulnerable Password Managers
- CVE Disclosure & Vendor Responses
- Technologies of Correction Used
- Correction Technologies — Technical & Doctrinal Analysis
- Systemic Risks & Exploitation Vectors
- Regional Exposure & Linguistic Impact
- Exposed Crypto Wallet Extensions
- Browser Sandbox Weakness & Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)
- Strategic Signals from DEF CON 33
- Sovereign Countermeasures (Zero DOM)
- PassCypher HSM PGP — Patented Zero-DOM Technology (2015)
- PassCypher NFC HSM — Passwordless Sovereign Manager
- PassCypher HSM PGP — Sovereign Key Management
- SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Secure Wallet Injection
- Future Exploitation Scenarios & Mitigation
- Strategic Synthesis
Key Points:
- 11 password managers proved vulnerable — credentials, TOTP, and passkeys were exfiltrated through DOM redressing.
- Popular crypto-wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet) face the same DOM extension clickjacking risks.
- Exploitation requires only a single click, leveraging hidden iframes, encapsulated Shadow DOM, and Browser-in-the-Browser overlays.
- The browser sandbox is no sovereign stronghold — BITB overlays can deceive user perception.
- PassCypher NFC / HSM PGP and SeedNFC provide hardware-based Zero-DOM flows anchored in secure enclaves, with integrated anti-BITB kill-switch.
- A decade of sovereign R&D anticipated these risks: segmented AES-256 containers, hybrid NFC↔PGP RAM channels, and HID injection form the native alternative.
History of Clickjacking (2002–2025)
Clickjacking has become the persistent parasite of the modern web. The term emerged in the early 2000s, when Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen described a deceptive scenario: tricking a user into clicking on something they cannot actually see. An optical illusion applied to code, it quickly became a mainstream attack technique (OWASP).
- 2002–2008: Emergence of “UI redressing”: HTML layers + transparent iframes trapping users (Hansen Archive).
- 2009: Facebook falls victim to Likejacking (OWASP).
- 2010: Cursorjacking emerges — shifting the pointer to mislead user clicks (OWASP).
- 2012–2015: Exploitation via iframes, online ads, and malvertising (MITRE CVE) (Infosec).
- 2016–2019: Tapjacking spreads on mobile platforms (Android Security Bulletin).
- 2020–2024: Rise of “hybrid clickjacking” combining XSS and phishing (OWASP WSTG).
- 2025: At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth unveils a new level: DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking. This time, not only websites, but browser extensions (password managers, crypto wallets) inject invisible forms, enabling stealth exfiltration of secrets.
At DEF CON 33, Marek Tóth publicly revealed DOM extension clickjacking, marking a structural shift from visual trickery to systemic weakness in password managers and crypto wallets.
❓How long have you been exposed?
Password manager vendors had all the warning signs.
OWASP has documented clickjacking since 2002, invisible iframes have been known for over 15 years, and Shadow DOM has never been an esoteric hacker secret.
In short: everyone knew.
And yet, most kept building their castles of sand on DOM autofill. Why? Because it looked slick on marketing slides: smooth UX, magical one-click logins, mass adoption… with security as an afterthought.
The DOM extension clickjacking revealed at DEF CON 33 is not a brand-new revelation of 2025. It is the result of a decade-old design flaw. Every extension that “trusted the DOM” to inject logins, TOTP, or passkeys was already vulnerable.
⮞ Critical Reflection: how long have attackers silently exploited this?
The real question is: how long have these vulnerabilities been exploited quietly by stealthy attackers — through targeted espionage, identity theft, or crypto-wallet siphoning?
While software-based managers looked away, PassCypher and SeedNFC from Freemindtronic Andorra took another path. Designed outside the DOM, outside the cloud, and without a master password, they proved that a sovereign alternative already existed: security by design.
Result: a decade of silent exposure for some, and a decade of technological lead for those who invested in sovereign hardware.
In just 20 years, clickjacking evolved from a simple visual trick into a systemic sabotage of identity managers. DEF CON 33 marks a breaking point: the threat is no longer just malicious websites, but the very core of browser extensions and autofill. Hence the urgency of Zero-DOM approaches anchored in sovereign hardware like PassCypher.
What is DOM-Based Extension Clickjacking? Definition, Attack Flow & Zero-DOM Defense
DOM-based extension clickjacking hijacks a password manager or wallet extension by abusing the browser’s Document Object Model. A deceptive page chains hidden iframes, Shadow DOM, and a malicious focus() to trigger autofill into an invisible form. The extension “thinks” it is on the right field and pours secrets—credentials, TOTP, passkeys, even wallet keys—straight into the attacker’s trap. Because secrets touch the DOM, they can be silently exfiltrated.
DOM extension clickjacking is not a trivial variant — it exploits the very logic of autofill password managers.
Here, the attacker does not simply overlay a button with an iframe; instead, they force the extension to fill out a fake form as if it were legitimate.
Typical attack sequence:
- Preparation — The malicious page embeds an invisible
iframeand a hidden Shadow DOM to disguise the real context. - Bait — The victim clicks on an innocent-looking element; a malicious
focus()call silently redirects the event to the attacker-controlled input field. - Exfiltration — The extension believes it is interacting with a valid form and automatically injects credentials, TOTP, passkeys, or even private crypto keys directly into the fake DOM.
This stealthy mechanism confuses visual cues, bypasses traditional defenses (X-Frame-Options, CSP, frame-ancestors), and turns autofill into a covert data exfiltration channel.
Unlike traditional clickjacking, the user is not tricked into clicking a third-party site — instead, the browser extension betrays itself by trusting the DOM.
The attack combines invisible iframes, Shadow DOM manipulation, and malicious focus() redirection to hijack autofill extensions.
As a result, password managers inject secrets not into the intended site, but into a phantom form, giving attackers direct access to sensitive data.
Glossary
- DOM (Document Object Model): The browser’s internal structure representing page elements.
- Clickjacking: A technique that tricks users into clicking hidden or disguised elements.
- Shadow DOM: A hidden encapsulated DOM subtree used to isolate components.
- Zero-DOM: A security architecture where secrets never touch the DOM, eliminating injection risks.
Password Manager Vulnerabilities (2025)
As of August 27, 2025, live testing by Marek Tóth at DEF CON 33 confirms that most browser-based password managers remain structurally exposed to DOM extension clickjacking.
Out of 11 managers tested, 10 leaked credentials, 9 leaked TOTP codes, and 8 exposed passkeys.
In short: even the most trusted vault can become porous once it delegates secrets to the DOM.
- Still vulnerable: 1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce
- Patched: Bitwarden, Dashlane, NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm, Enpass, Keeper (partial)
- Actively working on fixes: Bitwarden, Enpass, iCloud Passwords
- Marked as “informative” (no fix planned): 1Password, LastPass
Status Table (Updated August 27, 2025)
| Password Manager | Credentials | TOTP | Passkeys | Status | Patch Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1Password | Yes | Yes | Yes | Vulnerable | – |
| Bitwarden | Yes | Yes | Partial | Patched (v2025.8.0) | Release |
| Dashlane | Yes | Yes | Yes | Patched | Release |
| LastPass | Yes | Yes | Yes | Vulnerable | – |
| Enpass | Yes | Yes | Yes | Patched (v6.11.6) | Release |
| iCloud Passwords | Yes | No | Yes | Vulnerable | – |
| LogMeOnce | Yes | No | Yes | Vulnerable | – |
| NordPass | Yes | Yes | Partial | Patched | Release |
| ProtonPass | Yes | Yes | Partial | Patched | Releases |
| RoboForm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Patched | Update |
| Keeper | Partial | No | No | Partially patched (v17.2.0) | Mention |
In contrast, hardware-based solutions like PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, and SeedNFC eliminate the threat by design: no credentials, passwords, TOTP/HOTP codes, or private keys ever touch the browser.
Zero DOM, zero attack surface.
CVE Disclosure & Vendor Responses (Aug–Sep 2025)
The discovery by Marek Tóth at DEF CON 33 could not remain hidden:
DOM-based extension clickjacking vulnerabilities are currently being assigned official CVE identifiers.
Yet, as often happens in vulnerability disclosure, the process moves slowly.
Several flaws were reported as early as spring 2025, but by mid-August,
some vendors had still not issued public fixes.
Vendor responses and patching timeline:
- Bitwarden — reacted quickly with patch
v2025.8.0(August 2025), mitigating credential and TOTP leakage. - Dashlane — released a fix (v6.2531.1, early August 2025), confirmed in official release notes.
- RoboForm — deployed patches in July–August 2025 across Windows and macOS builds.
- NordPass & ProtonPass — announced official updates in August 2025, partially mitigating DOM exfiltration issues.
- Keeper — acknowledged the impact but remains in “under review” status with no confirmed patch.
- 1Password, LastPass, Enpass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce — still unpatched as of early September 2025, leaving users exposed.
The problem is not only the patching delay but also the way some vendors minimized the issue.
According to security disclosures, certain publishers initially labeled the vulnerability as “informational,” downplaying the severity.
In other words: the leakage was acknowledged, but put in a gray box until media and community pressure mounted.
⮞ Summary
DOM extension clickjacking CVEs are still being processed.
While vendors like Bitwarden, Dashlane, NordPass, ProtonPass, and RoboForm published official patches in Aug–Sep 2025,
others (1Password, LastPass, Enpass, iCloud Passwords, LogMeOnce) lag behind, leaving millions of users exposed.
Some companies even chose silence over transparency, treating a structural exploit as a minor issue until forced to act.
Technologies of Correction Used
Since the public disclosure of DOM Extension Clickjacking at DEF CON 33, vendors have rushed to release patches. Yet these fixes remain uneven, mostly limited to UI adjustments or conditional checks. No vendor has yet re-engineered the injection engine itself.
🔍 Before diving into the correction methods, here’s a visual overview of the main technologies vendors have deployed to mitigate DOM Extension Clickjacking. This image outlines the spectrum from cosmetic patches to sovereign Zero-DOM solutions.
Objective
This section explains how vendors attempted to fix the flaw, distinguishes cosmetic patches from structural corrections, and highlights sovereign Zero-DOM hardware approaches.
Correction Methods Observed (as of August 2025)
| Method | Description | Affected Managers |
|---|---|---|
| Autofill Restriction | Switch to “on-click” mode or default deactivation | Bitwarden, Dashlane, Keeper |
| Subdomain Filtering | Blocking autofill on non-authorized subdomains | ProtonPass, RoboForm |
| Shadow DOM Detection | Refusal to inject if the field is encapsulated inside Shadow DOM | NordPass, Enpass |
| Contextual Isolation | Checks before injection (iframe, opacity, focus) | Bitwarden, ProtonPass |
| Hardware Sovereign (Zero DOM) | Secrets never transit through the DOM: NFC HSM, HSM PGP, SeedNFC | PassCypher, EviKey, SeedNFC (non-vulnerable by design) |
📉 Limits Observed
- Patches did not change the injection engine, only its activation triggers.
- No vendor introduced a structural separation between UI and secret flows.
- Any manager still tied to the DOM remains structurally exposed to clickjacking variants.
These patches show reaction, not rupture. They address symptoms, not the structural flaw.
To understand what separates a temporary patch from a doctrinal fix, let’s move to the next analysis.
Correction Technologies Against DOM Extension Clickjacking — Technical and Doctrinal Analysis
📌 Observation
DOM Extension Clickjacking is not a bug, but a design flaw: injecting secrets into a manipulable DOM without structural separation or contextual verification.
⚠️ What Current Fixes Do Not Address
- No vendor has rebuilt its injection engine.
- Fixes remain limited to disabling autofill, filtering subdomains, or detecting some invisible elements.
- None integrates a Zero-DOM architecture that ensures inviolability by design.
🧠 What a Structural Fix Would Require
- Remove all dependency on the DOM for secret injection.
- Isolate the injection engine outside the browser.
- Use hardware authentication (NFC, PGP, biometrics).
- Log every injection in an auditable journal.
- Forbid interaction with invisible or encapsulated elements.
📊 Typology of Fixes
| Level | Correction Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Cosmetic | UI/UX, autofill disabled by default | No change to injection logic, only its trigger |
| Contextual | DOM filtering, Shadow DOM, subdomains | Adds conditions, but still relies on the DOM |
| Structural | Zero DOM, hardware-based (PGP, NFC, HSM) | Eliminates DOM use for secrets, separates UI and secret flows |
🧪 Doctrinal Tests to Verify Patches
To verify if a vendor’s fix is truly structural, security researchers can:
- Inject an invisible field (
opacity:0) inside an iframe. - Simulate an encapsulated Shadow DOM.
- Check if the extension still injects secrets.
- Verify if the injection is logged or blocked.
📜 Absence of Industry Standard
Currently, no official standard (NIST, OWASP, ISO) regulates:
- Extension injection logic,
- Separation of UI and secret flows,
- Traceability of autofill actions.
Today’s patches are band-aids. Only Zero-DOM sovereign architectures — PassCypher HSM PGP, PassCypher NFC HSM, SeedNFC — represent a doctrinal and structural correction.
The path forward is not software tinkering, but sovereign hardware doctrine.
Systemic Risks & Exploitation Vectors
DOM extension clickjacking is not an isolated bug — it represents a systemic flaw. When a browser extension collapses, the fallout is not limited to a leaked password. Instead, it undermines the entire digital trust model, creating cascading breaches across authentication layers and infrastructures.
Critical scenarios:
- Persistent access — A cloned TOTP is sufficient to register a “trusted device” and maintain access, even after a full account reset.
- Passkey replay — The exfiltration of a passkey functions as a master token, reusable outside any control boundary. Zero Trust becomes an illusion.
- SSO compromise — A trapped extension in an enterprise leads to the leakage of OAuth/SAML tokens, compromising the entire IT system.
- Supply chain breach — Poorly regulated extensions create a structural attack surface at the browser level.
- Crypto-assets siphoning — Wallets such as MetaMask, Phantom, and TrustWallet inject keys into the DOM; seed phrases and private keys are drained as easily as credentials.
⮞ Summary
The risks extend far beyond password theft: cloned TOTPs, replayed passkeys, compromised SSO tokens, and exfiltrated seed phrases. As long as the DOM remains the interface for autofill, it will continue to serve as the interface for stealth exfiltration.
Sovereign Threat Comparison
| Attack | Target | Secrets Targeted | Sovereign Countermeasure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ToolShell RCE | SharePoint / OAuth | SSL certificates, SSO tokens | PassCypher HSM PGP (storage + signature outside DOM) |
| eSIM hijack | Mobile identity | Carrier profiles, embedded SIM | SeedNFC HSM (hardware anchoring of mobile identities) |
| DOM Clickjacking | Browser extensions | Credentials, TOTP, passkeys | PassCypher NFC HSM + PassCypher HSM PGP (secure OTP, sandboxed autofill, anti-BITB) |
| Crypto-wallet hijack | Wallet extensions | Private keys, seed phrases | SeedNFC HSM + NFC↔HID BLE coupling (secure multi-platform hardware injection) |
| Atomic Stealer | macOS clipboard | PGP keys, crypto wallets | PassCypher NFC HSM ↔ HID BLE (encrypted channels, injection without clipboard) |
Regional Exposure & Linguistic Impact — Anglophone World
Not all regions share the same risk level when it comes to DOM-based extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks. The Anglophone sphere—thanks to high adoption of password managers and crypto wallets—represents a significantly larger exposed user base. Sovereign, Zero-DOM countermeasures are critical to safeguard this digitally dependent region.
🌍 Estimated Exposure — Anglophone Region (Aug 2025)
| Region | Estimated Anglophone Users | Password-Manager Adoption | Sovereign Zero-DOM Countermeasures |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global English-speakers | ≈1.5 billion users | Strong (North America, UK, Australia) | PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC |
| North America (USA + Canada Anglophone) | ≈94 million users (36 % of US adults) | Growing awareness; still low uptake | PassCypher HSM PGP, NFC HSM |
| United Kingdom | High internet and crypto-wallet penetration | Maturing adoption; rising regulations | PassCypher HSM PGP, EviBITB |
⮞ Strategic Insight
The Anglophone world represents an immense exposure surface: up to 1.5 billion English speakers globally, with nearly 100 million users employing password managers in North America alone. With rising cyber threats, these populations require Zero-DOM sovereign solutions—like PassCypher HSM PGP, SeedNFC, and EviBITB—to fundamentally neutralize DOM-based risks.
Sources: ICLS (English speakers), Security.org (US password manager usage), DataReportal (UK digital statistics).
Exposed Crypto Wallet Extensions
Password managers are not the only victims of DOM extension clickjacking. The most widely used crypto wallets — MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet — rely on the same DOM injection mechanism to display or sign transactions. Consequently, a well-placed overlay or an invisible iframe tricks the user into believing they are approving a legitimate transaction, while in reality they are authorizing a malicious transfer or exposing their seed phrase.
Direct implication: Unlike stolen credentials or cloned TOTP, these leaks concern immediate financial assets. Billions of dollars in liquid value depend on such extensions. Therefore, the DOM becomes not only a vector of identity compromise but also a monetary exfiltration channel.
Crypto wallet extensions reuse the DOM for user interaction. This architectural choice exposes them to the same flaws as password managers: seed phrases, private keys, and transaction signatures can be intercepted via overlay redressing and autofill hijack.
Sovereign Countermeasure: SeedNFC HSM — hardware-based backup of private keys and seed phrases, kept outside the DOM, with secure injection through NFC↔HID BLE. Keys never leave the HSM; each operation requires a physical user trigger, rendering DOM redressing ineffective.
In complement, PassCypher HSM PGP and PassCypher NFC HSM protect OTPs and access credentials for trading platforms, thereby preventing lateral compromise across accounts.
Fallible Sandbox & Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB)
Browsers present their sandbox as an impregnable fortress. However, DOM extension clickjacking and Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks prove otherwise. A simple overlay and a fake authentication frame can deceive the user into believing they are interacting with Google, Microsoft, or their bank — when in reality they are handing over secrets to a fraudulent page. Even frame-ancestors directives and some CSP policies fail to prevent such interface illusions.
This is where sovereign technologies change the equation. With EviBITB (IRDR), Freemindtronic integrates into PassCypher HSM PGP a detection and destruction engine for malicious iframes, neutralizing BITB attempts in real time. Activable with a single click, it operates in manual, semi-automatic, or automatic mode, entirely serverless and database-free, ensuring instant defense (explanation · detailed guide).
The keystone remains the sandbox URL. Each identifier or cryptographic key is bound to a reference URL securely stored inside the encrypted HSM. When a page requests autofill, the active URL is compared to the reference. If it does not match, no data is injected. Consequently, even if an iframe evades detection, the sandbox URL blocks exfiltration attempts.
This dual-layer barrier also extends to desktop usage. Through secure NFC pairing between an Android NFC smartphone and the Freemindtronic application embedding PassCypher NFC HSM, users benefit from anti-BITB protection on desktop. Secrets remain encrypted inside the NFC HSM and are only decrypted in volatile memory (RAM) for a few milliseconds, just long enough for autofill — never persisting in the DOM.
⮞ Technical Summary (attack defeated by EviBITB + sandbox URL)
The DOM extension clickjacking attack exploits invisible CSS overlays (opacity:0, pointer-events:none) to redirect clicks into a hidden field injected from the Shadow DOM (e.g., protonpass-root). By chaining focus() calls and cursor tracking, the extension triggers its autofill, placing credentials, TOTP, or passkeys into an invisible form that is immediately exfiltrated.
With EviBITB (IRDR), these iframes and overlays are destroyed in real time, eliminating the malicious click vector. Meanwhile, the sandbox URL validates the destination against the encrypted HSM reference (PassCypher HSM PGP or NFC HSM). If it does not match, autofill is blocked. The outcome: no trapped click, no injection, no leak. Secrets remain outside the DOM, including during desktop usage via NFC HSM paired with an Android smartphone.
✪ Illustration – The EviBITB shield and Sandbox URL lock prevent credential theft from a clickjacking-trapped login form.
To date, PassCypher HSM PGP, even in its free edition, remains the only known solution capable of practically neutralizing Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) and DOM extension clickjacking attacks.Where competing managers (1Password, LastPass, Dashlane, Bitwarden, Proton Pass…) continue exposing users to invisible overlays and Shadow DOM injections, PassCypher relies on a sovereign dual-barrier:
- EviBITB, an anti-iframe engine destroying malicious redirection frames in real time (detailed guide, technical article);
- Sandbox URL, binding identifiers to a reference URL within an AES-256 CBC PGP-encrypted container, blocking any exfiltration in case of mismatch.
This combination positions Freemindtronic, from Andorra, as a pioneer. For the end user, installing the free PassCypher HSM PGP extension already raises security beyond current standards across all Chromium browsers.
Strategic Signals from DEF CON 33
In the electrified corridors of DEF CON 33, it’s not just badges blinking — it’s our assumptions. Between a lukewarm beer and a frantic CTF, conversations converge on a single point: the browser is no longer a trust zone. Consequently, DOM extension clickjacking is treated not as a bug class, but as a structural failure affecting password managers, passkeys, and crypto wallets alike.
- The DOM becomes a minefield: it no longer hosts “basic XSS” only; it now carries identity primitives — managers, passkeys, and wallets — making autofill hijack via Shadow DOM a first-order risk.
- The “phishing-resistant” promise falters: watching a passkey get phished live feels like seeing Neo stabbed by a script kiddie — dramatic, yet technically trivial once the interface is subverted.
- Industrial slowness: some vendors patch in 48 hours; others drown in committees and press releases. Meanwhile, millions remain exposed to browser extension security flaws and stealth overlays.
- Zero Trust, reinforced: any secret that even touches the DOM should be treated as already compromised — from credentials to TOTP to passkeys.
- Return of sovereign hardware: as cloud illusions crumble, eyes turn to Zero-DOM countermeasures operated offline: PassCypher NFC HSM, PassCypher HSM PGP, and SeedNFC for encrypted backup of crypto keys. Zero DOM, zero interface illusion.
At DEF CON 33, experts delivered a clear message: browsers no longer act as protective bastions. Instead of relying on cosmetic patches, the real solution lies in adopting sovereign, offline, Zero-DOM architectures. In these environments, secrets remain encrypted, anchored in hardware, and fully managed under sovereign access control.
Consequently, the key phrases to retain are: DOM extension clickjacking, password manager vulnerabilities 2025, and phishing-resistant passkeys.
Sovereign Countermeasures (Zero DOM)
Vendor patches may reassure in the short term, yet they do not resolve the core issue: the DOM remains a sieve. The only durable response is to remove secrets from its reach. This principle, known as Zero DOM, dictates that no sensitive data should reside in, transit through, or depend on the browser. In other words, DOM extension clickjacking is neutralized not by patchwork, but by architectural sovereignty.
✪ Illustration — Zero DOM Flow: secrets remain inside the HSM, injected via HID into ephemeral RAM, making DOM exfiltration impossible.
In this paradigm, secrets (credentials, TOTP, passkeys, private keys) are preserved in offline hardware HSMs. Access is only possible via physical activation (NFC, HID, secure pairing) and leaves only an ephemeral footprint in RAM. This eliminates DOM exposure entirely.
⮞ Sovereign Operation: NFC HSM, HID BLE and HSM PGP
NFC HSM ↔ Android ↔ Browser Activation:
First of all, with the NFC HSM, activation does not occur via a simple phone tap. Instead, it requires physically presenting the NFC HSM module under an NFC-enabled Android smartphone. Consequently, the Freemindtronic application receives the request from the paired computer (via PassCypher HSM PGP), activates the secure module, and transmits the encrypted secret contactlessly to the computer. As a result, the entire process remains end-to-end encrypted, with decryption happening only in volatile RAM — never transiting or persisting in the DOM.
NFC HSM ↔ HID BLE Activation:
In addition, when paired with a Bluetooth HID keyboard emulator (e.g., InputStick), the Android NFC application injects credentials directly into login fields via an AES-128 CBC encrypted BLE channel. Therefore, this method ensures secure autofill outside the DOM, even on unpaired computers, while at the same time neutralizing keyloggers and classic DOM attacks.
Local HSM PGP Activation:
Finally, with PassCypher HSM PGP on desktop, a single click on the login field button triggers autofill instantly. The secret decrypts locally from its AES-256 CBC PGP container, only in volatile RAM, without NFC involvement and never transiting through the DOM. This design therefore guarantees a sovereign autofill architecture, inherently resistant to malicious extensions and invisible overlays.
Unlike cloud password managers or FIDO passkeys, these solutions do not apply reactive patches — they eliminate the attack surface by design. This is the essence of the sovereign-by-design approach: decentralized architecture, no central server, and no database to siphon.
⮞ Summary
Zero DOM is not a patch, but a doctrinal shift. As long as secrets live in the browser, they remain vulnerable. Once shifted outside the DOM, encrypted in HSMs and activated physically, they become unreachable for clickjacking or BITB attacks.
PassCypher HSM PGP — Patented Zero-DOM Technology Since 2015
Long before the exposure of DOM Extension Clickjacking at DEF CON 33, Freemindtronic took another path. Since 2015, our R&D established a founding principle: never use the DOM to carry secrets. This Zero Trust doctrine gave birth to a patented Zero-DOM architecture in PassCypher, ensuring that credentials, TOTP/HOTP, passwords, and cryptographic keys remain confined in a hardware HSM — never injected into a manipulable environment.
🚀 A Unique Advance in Password Managers
- Native Zero DOM — no sensitive data ever touches the browser.
- Integrated HSM PGP — AES-256 CBC encryption + patented key segmentation.
- Sovereign Autonomy — no server, no database, no cloud dependency.
🛡️ Reinforced BITB Protection
Since 2020, PassCypher HSM PGP has included — even in its free version — the technology EviBITB.
This innovation neutralizes Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) attacks in real time: destroying malicious iframes, detecting fraudulent overlays, and validating contexts serverlessly, database-free, and completely anonymously.
Learn how EviBITB works in detail.
⚡ Immediate Implementation
The user configures nothing: simply install the PassCypher HSM PGP extension from the
Chrome Web Store or Edge Add-ons, enable the BITB option, and enjoy Zero-DOM sovereign protection instantly — where competitors are still scrambling to react.
EviBITB embedded in PassCypher HSM PGP detects and destroys all redirection iFrames in real time, neutralizing BITB attacks and invisible DOM hijacking.
PassCypher NFC HSM — Sovereign Passwordless Manager
Software password managers fall into the trap of a simple iframe, but PassCypher NFC HSM follows a different path: it never lets your credentials and passwords transit through the DOM. The nano-HSM keeps them encrypted offline and only releases them for a fleeting instant in volatile memory — just long enough to authenticate.
User-side operation:
- Untouchable secrets — the NFC HSM encrypts and stores credentials so they never appear or leak.
- TOTP/HOTP — the PassCypher NFC HSM Android app or the PassCypher HSM PGP on desktop generates and displays them instantly on demand.
- Manual entry — the user enters a PIN or TOTP directly into the login field on a computer or Android NFC phone. The PassCypher app shows the code generated by the NFC HSM module. The same process applies to credentials, passkeys, and other secrets.
- Contactless autofill — the user simply presents the PassCypher NFC HSM module to a smartphone or computer, which executes autofill seamlessly, even when paired with PassCypher HSM PGP.
- Desktop autofill — with PassCypher HSM PGP on Windows or macOS, the user clicks the integrated login field button to auto-complete login and password, with optional auto-validation.
- Distributed anti-BITB — the NFC ↔ Android ↔ browser (Win/Mac/Linux) secure pairing triggers EviBITB to destroy malicious iframes in real time.
- HID BLE mode — a paired Bluetooth HID keyboard emulator injects credentials outside the DOM, blocking both DOM-based attacks and keyloggers.
⮞ Summary
PassCypher NFC HSM embodies Zero Trust (every action requires physical validation) and Zero Knowledge (no secret is ever exposed). A sovereign hardware identity safeguard by design, it neutralizes clickjacking, BITB attacks, typosquatting, keylogging, IDN spoofing, DOM injections, clipboard hijacking, malicious extensions, while anticipating quantum attacks.
✪ Attacks Neutralized by PassCypher NFC HSM
| Attack Type | Description | Status with PassCypher |
|---|---|---|
| Clickjacking / UI Redressing | Invisible iframes or overlays that hijack user clicks | Neutralized (EviBITB) |
| BITB (Browser-in-the-Browser) | Fake browser frames simulating login windows | Neutralized (sandbox + pairing) |
| Keylogging | Keystroke capture by malware | Neutralized (HID BLE mode) |
| Typosquatting | Lookalike URLs mimicking legitimate domains | Neutralized (physical validation) |
| Homograph Attack (IDN spoofing) | Unicode substitution deceiving users on domain names | Neutralized (Zero DOM) |
| DOM Injection / DOM XSS | Malicious scripts injected into the DOM | Neutralized (out-of-DOM architecture) |
| Clipboard Hijacking | Interception or modification of clipboard data | Neutralized (no clipboard usage) |
| Malicious Extensions | Browser compromised by rogue plugins | Neutralized (pairing + sandbox) |
| Quantum Attacks (anticipated) | Massive computation to break crypto keys | Mitigated (segmented keys + AES-256 CBC + PGP) |
PassCypher HSM PGP — Sovereign Anti-Phishing Key Management
In a world where traditional managers are looted by a simple phantom iframe, PassCypher HSM PGP refuses to bend.
Its rule? Zero server, zero database, zero DOM.
Your secrets — credentials, passwords, passkeys, SSH/PGP keys, TOTP/HOTP — live in AES-256 CBC PGP encrypted containers, protected by a patented segmented-key system engineered to withstand even the quantum era.
Why does it resist DEF CON 33-class attacks?
Because nothing ever transits through the DOM, no master password exists to be extracted, and crucially: containers stay encrypted at all times. The system decrypts them only in volatile RAM, for the brief instant required to assemble key segments. Once autofill completes, everything vanishes instantly — leaving no exploitable trace.
Key Features:
- Shielded autofill — one click is enough, but always via URL sandbox, never in cleartext inside the browser.
- Embedded EviBITB — destroys malicious iframes and overlays in real time, operable in manual, semi-automatic or fully automated mode, entirely serverless.
- Integrated crypto tools — generation and management of segmented AES-256 keys and PGP keys without external dependencies.
- Universal compatibility — works with any site via software + browser extension — no forced updates, no additional plugins.
- Sovereign architecture — no server, no database, no master password, fully anonymized — unattackable by design where cloud managers collapse.
⮞ Summary
PassCypher HSM PGP redefines secret management: containers permanently encrypted, segmented keys, ephemeral decryption in RAM, zero DOM and zero cloud.
A hardware password manager and sovereign passwordless mechanism designed to withstand today’s threats and anticipate quantum attacks.
SeedNFC + HID Bluetooth — Secure Wallet Injection
Browser wallet extensions thrive in the DOM — and attackers exploit that weakness. With SeedNFC HSM, the logic flips: the enclave never releases private keys or seed phrases. When users initialize or restore a wallet (web or desktop), the system performs input through a Bluetooth HID emulation — like a hardware keyboard — with no clipboard, no DOM, and no trace for private keys, public keys, or even hot wallet credentials.
Operational flow (anti-DOM, anti-clipboard):
- Custody — the SeedNFC HSM encrypts and stores the seed/private key (never exports it, never reveals it).
- Physical activation — the NFC HSM authorizes the operation when the user presents it contactlessly via the Freemindtronic app (Android NFC smartphone).
- HID BLE injection — the system types the seed (or required fragment/format) directly into the wallet input field, outside the DOM and outside the clipboard, resisting even software keyloggers.
- BITB protection — users can activate EviBITB (anti-BITB iframe destroyer) inside the app, which neutralizes overlays and malicious redirections during onboarding or recovery.
- Ephemerality — volatile RAM temporarily holds the data during HID input, then instantly erases it.
Typical use cases:
- Onboarding or recovery of wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, etc.) without ever exposing the private key to the browser or DOM. The HSM keeps the secret encrypted and decrypts it only in RAM, for the minimal time required.
- Sensitive operations on desktop (logical air-gap), with physical validation by the user: the user presents the NFC HSM module under an Android NFC smartphone to authorize the action, without keyboard interaction or DOM exposure.
- Secure multi-asset backup: an offline hardware HSM stores seed phrases, master keys, and private keys, allowing reuse without copying, exporting, or capturing. Users perform activation exclusively through physical, sovereign, and auditable means.
⮞ Summary
First of all, SeedNFC HSM with HID BLE injects private or public keys directly into hot wallet fields via a Bluetooth Low Energy HID emulator, thereby bypassing both keyboard typing and clipboard transfer. Moreover, the channel encrypts data with AES-128 CBC, while the NFC module physically triggers activation, ensuring a secure and verifiable process.
In addition, users can enable anti-BITB protection to neutralize malicious overlays and deceptive redirections.
Finally, the HSM enclave keeps secrets strictly confined, outside the DOM and beyond the reach of malicious extensions, thus guaranteeing sovereign protection by design.
Exploitation Scenarios & Mitigation Paths
The revelations of DEF CON 33 are not the end of the game, but a warning. What follows may prove even more corrosive:
- AI-driven phishing + DOM hijack — Tomorrow, it will not be a garage-made phishing kit, but LLMs generating real-time DOM overlays, virtually indistinguishable from legitimate banking or cloud portals. These AI-powered clickjacking attacks will weaponize Shadow DOM credential theft at scale.
- Hybrid mobile tapjacking — The touchscreen becomes a minefield: stacked apps, invisible permissions, and background gestures hijacked to validate transactions or exfiltrate OTPs. This represents the evolution of tapjacking phishing into systemic mobile compromise.
- Post-quantum ready HSM — The next line of defense will not be a browser patch, but quantum-resistant HSMs capable of withstanding Shor’s or Grover’s algorithms. Solutions such as PassCypher HSM PGP and SeedNFC, already designed as Zero-DOM post-cloud sovereign anchors, embody this paradigm shift.
⮞ Summary
Future attackers will bypass browser patches instead of relying on them.
To mitigate the threat, adopt a rupture: offline hardware supports, quantum-secure HSMs, and sovereign Zero-DOM architectures.
Reject all other options — they remain fragile software band-aids that will inevitably crack.
Strategic Synthesis
DOM extension clickjacking reveals a stark truth: browsers and extensions are not trust environments. Patches arrive in fragmented waves, user exposure reaches tens of millions, and regulatory frameworks remain in perpetual catch-up mode.
The only sovereign path? Strict software governance, combined with offline hardware safeguards outside the DOM (PassCypher NFC HSM / PassCypher HSM PGP), where secrets stay encrypted, offline, and untouchable by redressing.
The Sovereign Path:
- Strict governance of software and extensions
- Hardware-backed identity security (PassCypher NFC HSM / HSM PGP)
- Secrets encrypted, outside DOM, outside cloud, redress-proof
Doctrine of Hardware Cyber Sovereignty —
- Consider any secret that touches the DOM as already compromised.
- Activate digital identity only through physical actions (NFC, HID BLE, HSM PGP).
- Build trust on hardware isolation, not on the browser sandbox.
- Audit extensions as critical infrastructures.
- Ensure post-quantum resilience by physically isolating keys.
CRA, NIS2, or RGS (ANSSI) reinforce software resilience, yet none address secrets embedded in the DOM.
Hardware guardianship remains the only sovereign fallback — and only states capable of producing and certifying their own HSMs can guarantee true digital sovereignty.
DOM clickjacking adds to a dark sequence: ToolShell, eSIM hijack, Atomic Stealer… each exposing structural limits of software trust.
The doctrine of hardware-rooted sovereign cybersecurity is no longer optional. It has become a fundamental strategic baseline.
⮞ Note — What this chronicle does not cover:
First of all, this analysis provides neither an exploitable proof-of-concept nor a technical tutorial to reproduce DOM clickjacking or passkey phishing attacks. In addition, it does not address the economic aspects of cryptocurrencies or specific legal implications outside the EU.
Instead, the objective is clear: to deliver a sovereign, strategic reading. In other words, the chronicle aims to help readers understand structural flaws, identify systemic risks, and, above all, highlight Zero-DOM hardware countermeasures (PassCypher, SeedNFC) as a pathway to resilient and phishing-resistant security.
Ultimately, this perspective invites decision-makers and security experts to look beyond temporary software patches and adopt sovereign architectures rooted in hardware protection.
